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Introduction
Ich komme nach Leipzig, an einen Ort wo man die 
ganze Welt im kleinen sehen kann.
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, 20 January 17491
In 1945, Leipzig was indeed the place to see the whole world, or at least all facets 
of the Second World War and its aftermath. The historic town centre of this city in the very 
heart of Germany had been largely destroyed in the first complete firestorm that the British 
bombing squads accomplished in December 1943.2 In total, 38 bombing raids on the city 
left large parts completely in ruins, including all cultural venues, dozens of churches, more 
than eighty percent of the trade fair buildings and forty percent of housing. Yet, Leipzig’s 
military production survived intact, and the air armament factories went on producing right 
until the end of the war with the help of slave labour, namely some 20,000 concentration 
camp inmates, kept in the vicinity of Leipzig at Abtnaundorf, a satellite camp of 
Buchenwald.
Leipzig was expected to resist the advancing Allied forces in mid-April, since 
Himmler had forbidden the surrender of any German town. Yet, when the American troops 
entered the city, entire quarters were handed over peacefully; only small skirmishes ensued 
that were easily overcome. Thus Leipzig was initially occupied by the Americans, but 
under the terms of the Yalta Agreement the city, like all of Saxony, was to be part of the 
Soviet Zone. The Leipzigers, unaware of these agreements, welcomed the US troops with a 
sigh of relief, for fear of the Soviets was widespread, and had been steadily fuelled both by 
Goebbels’ propaganda and, above all, by the harrowing accounts of Red Army atrocities 
related by refugees from the old German East.
1 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing in a letter to his mother in Lessings Werke (Donauoschingen, 1822), p. 20.
2 Although the death toll in Hamburg in the summer of 1943 was far greater, the actual ‘technique’ of the 
firestorm was ‘perfected’ in Leipzig. Olaf Groehler, Bombenkrieg gegen Leipzig 1940-45 (Leipzig, 1994), p. 
5.
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Apart from the fundamental questions of food and shelter, the Leipzigers soon 
started to wonder whether the Americans would facilitate the renewal of the cultural life, 
so important to the city’s self-conception. Leipzig’s cultural institutions, wherever 
possible, continued throughout the war and even after the bombings of the city. Leipzig’s 
Gewandhaus orchestra played its last concert six days before the American arrival, the 
university, despite a lecture stop, was still handling qualifications, the Reichsgericht, 
Germany’s Supreme Court, only ceased proceedings with the American takeover. Yet, all 
suffered from the ideological isolation and politicisation of the Nazi years and hoped the 
Americans would support a reconstruction of the city and its culture. No one knew that less 
than a dozen weeks after the American arrival, the occupation would switch to the Soviet 
forces.
Although it was hoped that the Americans would support Leipzig in its 
reconstruction efforts, the city was largely kept in hibernation by the new rulers of the 
town, a city administration was installed but not equipped with much authority, all public 
entertainment facilities were closed and cultural events banned. The transitional nature of 
the occupation manifested itself most clearly in the field of denazification, where no 
decisive action (apart from a few arrests of the most obvious culprits) was taken as the 
American military administration saw no immediate need for it. Instead, the Americans 
‘relieved’ Leipzig of some of its most important assets. Upon leaving, they forcibly 
‘evacuated’ key members of Leipzig’s academic, economic and cultural elites as well as 
major resources from the university and important companies of the city. The main aim of 
this was the removal of potential valuables from their supposed Allies, the Soviets. Here 
the Cold War was already knocking on the door. When the Soviets took over in Leipzig 
and Saxony as a whole, the denazification process gained pace. Nonchalant during the 
American occupation, the policy now emerged in its fiercest interpretation -  Saxony’s 
denazification laws ‘outshone’ those of any other area in the Soviet Zone, let alone
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anywhere in the Western Zones. These measures impacted on all areas of public life, not 
least Leipzig’s culture. The initial remit of removing National Socialists from positions of 
influence turned in the Soviet Zone into an instrument for creating a completely altered 
political, economic and cultural landscape -  the establishment of a system in line with the 
ideas of Socialism.
Leipzig is not only an interesting topic for a regional history of a German town; 
its significance is farther reaching. Leipzig was a politically influential town with 
considerable importance on Germany as a whole. With the Supreme Court, Leipzig had in 
its midst a Reich-important institution, second only to the Reichstag. The city’s cultural 
offerings were broader and more exquisite than those of almost any other German town, 
Leipzig had a substantial number of theatres, museums, galleries and musical enterprises. 
The physicist and philosopher Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker even judged them ‘the best 
in Germany’; Berlin, usually lauded as Germany’s unsurpassed cultural centre did not rival 
Leipzig in quality, just quantity as it only ‘offered more of everything’.3 And it was in this 
cultural sphere that the city’s Biirgertum showed most of their greatest efforts. The ‘pride 
in one’s own Heimat and its cultural achievements [and] the consciousness of one’s own 
position as a representative of the region’ as Mergel defined the ‘fundamental social 
ideology’ of the Biirgertum, definitely rang true in Leipzig.4 Although often described as a 
‘workers’ stronghold’, Leipzig was essentially a Biirgerstadt -  a city based on the rule and 
achievements of its Burger. Having never been a seat of residence or capital of its Land 
Saxony, the Leipzigers had trusted in themselves to further the fortune of their town. 
Rather than being ruled from the outside they led developments beyond their city walls. 
This was true for the development of German jurisdiction where Leipzig’s city court soon 
assumed the judicial authority over the whole of Central Germany from the fourteenth
3 David C. Cassidy, Uncertainty -  The life and science o f Werner Heisenberg ( New York, 1992), p. 273.
4 Thomas Mergel, ‘Mapping Milieus Regionally: On the Spatial Rootedness o f Collective Identities’ in James 
N. Retallack (ed.), Saxony in German History (Ann Arbor, 2000), pp. 77-98, here p. 90.
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century onwards, which culminated in the establishment of Germany’s Supreme Court, the 
Reichsgericht, in 1879 in Leipzig. It was also the case for the foundation of internationally 
renowned cultural institutions, the city’s university, its musical establishments, its book 
printing and trading facilities. The burgerlich component was pivotal in the city’s cultural 
progress. And culture in turn was essential in the Lebenswelt of the Biirgertum; it was from 
the cultural realm that it drew its identity as ‘Leipzig’s cultural landscape reflected the self­
conception and confidence of the Biirgerstadf .5 Culture was seen to be the means with 
which ‘Leipzig could position itself not just in comparison with Dresden, but also Berlin, 
Munich, Hamburg and Vienna’.6 The world famous Gewandhaus, St Thomas’s Choir and 
Leipzig’s publishing quarter with Germany’s leading publishing houses were an 
illustration of this. Another example on a more local level was the city’s premier fine art 
gallery, the Museum der Bildenden Kiinste. It was the brainchild of a collective of Leipzig 
Burger whose aim was the representation of their city.7
Although Leipzig and Saxony developed in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century into workers’ strongholds, the politically conservative Biirgertum remained at the 
helm of the city. This was to change after the takeover of power by the National Socialists 
when the Biirgertum, as the ‘old elite’, lost its hold on the politics and public life of
O
Germany. Although many burgerlich exponents had supported the National Socialist 
Party (NSDAP) initially, the reality of National Socialist rule soon led to a rude 
awakening. Large sections of Leipzig’s population fell victim to the regime’s racial 
policies -  Leipzig had Germany’s sixth largest Jewish community. The German Burger, 
now politically powerless, retreated into the cultural and academic spheres where they
5 Rat der Stadt, Leipzig lebt Kultur (Leipzig, 1993), p. 22.
6 Margaret Menninger, ‘Kulturelle Eliten und kollektives Mazenatentum in Leipzig’ in Thomas Hopei and 
Steffen Sammler, Kulturpolitik und Stadtkultur in Leipzig und Lyon 18.-20. Jahrhundert (Leipzig, 2004), pp. 
83-102, here p. 83.
7 The Museum was founded by a burgerlich society for the arts, which commissioned the building, bought 
the paintings and curated exhibitions for the purpose of education and representation. It hence was, following 
Mergel’s definition, a truly burgerlich enterprise. For a detailed account see: Ibid.
8 Ines Reich, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler: Ein Oberbiirgermeister gegen den NS-Staat (Cologne, 1997), p. 267.
4
tried, and in a considerable number of cases succeeded, to maintain their standards and 
traditions. Yet with the physical destruction of the symbols of these burgerlich 
accomplishments, namely in the firestorm of 1943 and subsequent bombings, the claim to 
these achievements weakened. The bombing raids on Leipzig erased the city’s printing and 
publishing quarter and thus the material manifestation of the city of books, damaged most 
of its university facilities and destroyed the Burger-built opera and world-famous 
Gewandhaus orchestra hall. The Biirgertum was presented with the finality that even those 
not persecuted under National Socialism could not survive unscathed. It was bitter irony 
that the destruction fell in the anniversary year of most of Leipzig’s proudest burgerlich 
establishments: the conservatoire celebrated its 100th, the Gewandhaus its 200th and the 
opera its 250th anniversary; the bombs struck on the day that Leipzig’s university had been 
founded 534 years earlier.
This study investigates the combined effect of National Socialism, wartime 
damage and dual occupation first by the Americans and then the Soviets on the 
Biirgerstadt Leipzig and its internationally renowned cultural institutions. Key elements of 
both occupation policies can be explored in the city adding to the historical discourse of 
the occupation of Germany as a whole. The Americans furthered the decline of the 
Biirgerstadt by removing key members of the Biirgertum through the forced evacuations. 
The Soviets and the German communists continued this through applying denazification 
rules in the widest interpretation. To be a member of the Biirgertum was deemed 
reactionary. To be reactionary was placed very close to being National Socialist and hence 
became unacceptable. In 1946, the Communist Party leader Wilhelm Pieck made it clear 
that the majority of the Biirgertum has ‘forfeited the right to be acknowledged as the agent 
of German culture’.9 The ‘biirgerlich classical heritage’ was to be honoured, its
9 Wilhelm Pieck, ‘Urn die Erneuerung der deutschen Kultur’, Speech, 3 February 1946, printed in SED, 
Dokumente der SED, Volume 1 (Berlin, 1951), pp. 102-8, here p. 106.
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protagonists, however, eliminated as a negative factor.10 The process of eradicating this 
‘detrimental’ influence in what was to become the German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
was largely achieved by the end of the 1940s, around the time of the creation of the two 
German states. The demise of the Biirgertum had set in long before that; the loss of 
political leverage with the ascension of Nazism was one of the mile-stones. In Leipzig’s 
cultural sphere, the physical destruction of the symbols of burgerlich culture marked the 
loss of that realm, which was still considered the platform of the Biirgertum. The attempts 
to regain this territory and the eventual failure to do so marked the cultural downfall of 
Leipzig. The demise began in some parts already in the 1930s, and continued in others for 
over a half century. A panoramic view of this entire period would have exceeded the 
framework of this study. Therefore, the crucial phases are discussed but the main focus lies 
on the period of 1943 to 1949. This marks the important chapter in the decline of the 
Biirgerstadt and its Biirgertum, which had been the force behind the cultural excellence of 
Leipzig. The attacks on the Biirgertum in Leipzig did not end with the destruction of the 
Third Reich, nor did they only begin after the American or Soviet occupation. The 
continuity in the development is too strong to artificially introduce 1945 as cut-off or 
starting point. As Klaus-Dietmar Henke stated, the disintegration process of the National 
Socialist regime and the period of occupation are a ‘historic integral process’.11 Yet, the 
clinical compartmentalisation of modem German history in ‘before’ and ‘after’ 1945 is still 
widespread. This study will be a contribution to the slowly growing number of works of 
historic research that seek to change this. The idea for this study stems from the ubiquitous 
representation of Leipzig in present times as Biirgerstadt and cultural centre.
10 Horst Haase, Die SED und das kulturelle Erbe (Berlin, 1988), p. 61.
11 Klaus-Dietmar Henke, ‘Kriegsende West -  Kriegsende Ost. Zur politischen Auswirkung kollektiver 
Schliisselerfahrungen’ in Hartmut Mehringer et al., Erobert oder Befreit? (Munich, 1999), pp. 13-18, here 
p. 13.
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However, all of these recent depictions completely neglect that the term Biirgerstadt and 
partly even Kulturstadt are historic, not present titles. They have been commodified 
without questioning of their origins and their viability. The burgerlich influence, as it had 
existed in Leipzig at the beginning of the twentieth century, was not present anymore at the 
end of the century. The common notion of the dissolution of the Biirgertum cites the years 
after the end of the Second World War as the period when this process took place.12 
However, especially in Leipzig one can observe the continuities between the National 
Socialist regime and the onset of socialist rule in East Germany. This study seeks to 
explore this process with special regards to Leipzig’s standing as an internationally 
renowned cultural centre. It argues that the elimination of biirgerlich influence in the 
cultural realm led to a transition in Leipzig’s identity -  from leading Kulturstadt to a city 
just evoking great traditions. As Leipzig found itself not to be the seat of the political rulers 
in the Soviet Zone, it was marginalised in the centralisation efforts of the Soviets and more 
importantly those of the German communists who sought to standardise all aspects of their 
society. In practice that meant a new form of discrimination in favour of workers and 
peasants. In Leipzig’s cultural sphere it led to a downfall of quality and prestige. Traditions 
that had grown for centuries were cast aside to conform to the new order -  more 
comprehensively than even during the Third Reich.
A note on terminology
A main theme of this study is the change of Leipzig’s identity from a biirgerlich 
city of international cultural standing to a trade centre in the GDR. Therefore the concepts 
of Biirgertum, Biirger and biirgerlich are crucial to the discussion of the developments in 
the period under consideration and for an evaluation of the processes within the city.
12 See inter al.: Thomas GroBbolting, ‘Biirgertum, Burgerlichkeit und Entbiirgerlichung in der DDR: 
Niedergang und Metamorphosen’ in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 9-10/2008, pp. 17-25.
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The choice of not translating the terms into English has been made consciously. 
Not only is there ‘a particular difficulty in the translation, into [...] English of the German
• 9 1 3 rr-ibiirgerlich.’ The usual translation in English as bourgeois/bourgeoisie offers particular 
pitfalls as this study encompasses the onset of socialist rule in Leipzig, when bourgeoisie 
and being bourgeois were deemed debased concepts by the ruling ideology. Hence 
references by socialist authorities to ‘bourgeois/ bourgeoisie’ could be confused with 
burgerlich as a broader concept. Even today, these phrases carry negative connotations 
often linked to their use in Marxist theory. ‘Bourgeois’ further limits any other concepts 
connected with it. A bourgeois culture is by definition only the culture of the bourgeoisie, 
devoid of any connection to another social stratum. However, this study appreciates the 
cultural landscape of Leipzig to be universal, that means its culture is firmly based in the 
European canon, ‘high art’ in its best possible sense.14 This cultural landscape was largely 
initiated, maintained and expanded by the city’s Biirgertum. Nevertheless, this does not 
mean that it only had an impact on or importance for the Biirgertum. Thus ‘bourgeois’ is 
definitely not broad enough to describe it accurately. Finally, even Marx and Engels did 
not use the term ‘Biirgertum’ in the Communist Manifesto, they used ‘Bourgeoisie’.15
The less ‘tainted’ term of middle class fails to portray the different levels 
contained in the social stratum of the Biirgertum. Michael Schafer suggested the plural, 
‘middle classes’, which addresses the problem of the multilayered character. Yet, even this
13 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society, (London, 1988), p. 46. This point is 
reiterated by Jurgen Schmidt in his review of Michael Schafer’s work. See Jurgen Schmidt, Rezension zu: 
Schafer, Michael: Biirgertum in der Krise. Stadtische Mittelklassen in Edinburgh und Leipzig 1890 bis 1930. 
Gottingen 2003. In: H-Soz-u-Kult, 2! October 2003, http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu- 
berlin.de/rezensionen/2003-4-040 (accessed 22 May 2009).
14 The term ‘high art’ is contentious again and cultural theory has been on a war path against the perceived 
elitism of the term. This study, however, just refers to the ‘timeless’ and ‘universal’ aspects of high art 
culture without attempting to enter into a culture theory argument.
15 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei (1890, repr. Stuttgart, 1998).
denotation is too limiting as it excludes the upper class that was a part of the Biirgertum in 
Leipzig and crucial to the funding of the arts.16
For a member of the Biirgertum, the German Burger is chosen over both burgess, 
the inhabitant of a borough with full municipal rights, and citizen. The former is too 
strongly connected to habitation, thus more a physical connotation than a perspective. The 
latter is too broad as it encompassed every member of a city community, regardless of 
social standing, education and outlook. Burgerlich means belonging to the Biirgertum, 
being of the Biirgertum, carrying the values of the Biirgertum. Another aspect of this is the 
Bildungsbiirgertum, a category referred to in the literature as peculiarly German, relating to 
members of the Biirgertum that are well educated in the humanistic tradition.17 
Intelligentsia would loosely refer to this in English; however, this term again is borrowed 
from Marxist theory and excludes wide portions of the Biirgertum. Furthermore, the 
intelligentsia created under socialism had little resemblance with the Bildungsbiirger.
Biirgertum means an entity, a social classification, a signifier of perspective, 
economics, education, and essentially a combination of all of these aspects. Hence it is 
hard to define the concept. Suffice it to say that this study does not lay claim to having 
found an answer to the ongoing project of Biirgertumsforschung that still endeavours to 
distil definitions and grasp the full meaning of the term. In the literature it has served many 
masters, both to laud it as well as to condemn it. This study defines Biirgertum as broadly 
relating to the social stratum with its different layers and follows Joachim Fest’s definition 
of a Burger as characterised by the virtues of reliability, sense of duty and the resolve to 
become a valuable member of society.18
16 Michael Schafer, Biirgertum in der Krise. Stadtische Mittelklassen in Edinburgh und Leipzig, 1890-1930 
(Gottingen, 2003).
17 Hans Ulrich Wehler (ed.), Wege zur Geschichte des Biirgertums (Gottingen, 1994), p. 7.
18 Joachim Fest et al., D er lange Abschied vom Biirgertum (Berlin, 2005).
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A note on the existing historic discourse
Since the collapse of the GDR, regional urban studies of the transition from the 
Second World War to the Cold War have been a main focus of historical research. 
However, no such study exists for Leipzig in Anglo-American historiography. The city is 
mentioned in passing in larger studies of Germany or the Soviet Zone of Occupation. A 
standard work is Norman Naimark’s The Russians in Germany.19 In this book, Naimark 
explores all major aspects of Russian occupation policy and behaviour including the 
cultural aspect. Gareth Pritchard’s work on the Making o f the GDR also offers valuable 
insights into the political history of Saxony and Thuringia with special attention to the 
relationship of German communists and Soviet occupiers. It is in studies of Saxony that 
Leipzig gained some prominence in the Anglo-American discourse. Retallack’s 
compilation on Saxony in German History touches on some aspects of Leipzig in its 
regional setting as well as exploring the wider merits of the concept of regional history. 
Szejnmann’s study on Nazism in Saxony offers a detailed analysis of the contradictions in 
Saxon society -  most notably between the ‘organised working class’ and the ‘bourgeoisie’ 
-  and how these facilitated the rise of National Socialism in ‘Red Saxony’.
The majority of historic work on Leipzig, however, has been done in Germany 
itself. Microhistoric studies concerned with particular aspects of the city, often one specific 
public institution, have been a staple of local Leipzig historians and lay people alike 
(Leipzig has a thriving history society open to all that also publishes on topics relating to 
the city’s history). The local patriotism that shines through popular works renders some 
unscientific, however these books, especially on Leipzig’s cultural organisations, are 
significant both in their content but also through their mere existence. They exemplify how
19 Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History o f the Soviet Zone o f Occupation (London, 1995).
20 Gareth Pritchard, The making o f  the GDR 1945-53 (Manchester, 2000); Retallack, Saxony in German 
History, (Claus-Christian Szejnmann, Nazism in Central Germany: The Brownshirts in ‘R ed’ Saxony 
(Oxford, 1999).
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much value and pride is placed in these institutions, thereby in turn illustrating their 
identity creating characteristics.
Germany’s Supreme Court, the Reichsgericht in Leipzig, and its decisions have 
been largely the focus of jurisprudential studies, evaluating the practice of the court and its 
members.21 These are useful sources for the study of the history of the institution itself. 
Evaluations of the court’s conduct during the Third Reich have increased in number since 
the fall of the Wall as more critical appreciations of the continuities between the 
Reichsgericht and the West German Supreme Court, the Bundesgerichtshof established in 
1950, are no longer a taboo. The re-establishment of a court in the Reichsgericht building 
after the German unification opened a door to a historic analysis of the institution’s 
development.22 However, most of these studies are strangely divorced from an 
acknowledgement of the interaction between the city of Leipzig and the institution, which 
had been very fruitful until the takeover of power by the National Socialists. This study 
seeks to rectify this.
The 600th anniversary of the city’s university in 2009 has sparked a plethora of 
essays and short studies on individual events, persons of interest or historic periods.23 The 
period immediately after the war and the conduct of both occupation powers with regards 
to the university have been explored in detail by Hans-Uwe Feige. This historian first 
wrote his Ph.D. thesis in 1978 at the then Karl-Marx-Universitat Leipzig about the renewal 
of the university after the Second World War.
21 Some of the most recent studies include: Markus Klemmer, Gesetzesbindung und Richterfreiheit (Baden 
Baden, 1996), William Frederick Meinecke, jr., ‘Conflicting Loyalties: The Supreme Court in Weimar and 
Nazi Germany 1918-1945’, Ph.D. diss. (University of Maryland, 1998), Heiko Weidenthaler, ‘Die 
Strafsenate des Reichsgerichts 1933-45: Hiiter der Gerechtigkeit oder Handlanger des Terrors’, Diss.
(Uni versitat Wurzburg, 1999).
22 Sachsisches Staatsministerium der Justiz, Sachsische Justizgeschichte -  Leipzig Stadt der Rechtssprechung 
(Dresden, 1994), Dieter Grimm, Das Reichsgericht in Wendezeiten (Leipzig, 1997); Ursula Oehme, Das 
Reichsgericht (Leipzig, 1995).
23 See for example: Bert Sander (ed.), Vivat, crescat, floreat! Sonderedition der Leipziger Blatter zum 600. 
Griindungstag der Leipziger Universitat (Leipzig, 2009); and the volumes published so far in the Beitrage zu 
Leipziger Universitats- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte series begun in 2002.
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This work, though factual, had a strong whiff of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy about it. After 
the end of socialist rule in Germany, however, Feige returned to the subject and reassessed 
the facts in a more objective approach. His findings, however, were no less critical of the 
American conduct in Leipzig.24 The fall of the Wall also enabled a revisiting of the period 
at the end of the Second World War by the protagonists. In a colloquium in 1992, Manfred 
Heinemann and Alexandr Haritonow brought together Soviet ‘Hochschuloffiziere’ (the 
military personnel in charge of overseeing the re-instatement of Germany’s higher 
education institutions) and German students of the period for discussion, most notably 
Major Pjotr Nikitin and Wolfgang Natonek.25 These documents of oral history are 
invaluable, since many of these witnesses have now died and in the words of Pjotr Nikitin 
‘at the most only about thirty percent of the documents’ relating to Soviet cultural policies 
at the time ‘have survived, locked away in the Russian archives’.26 Nikitin’s own 
autobiography, published following the colloquium also presents unique insights into 
Soviet policies but also the behaviour and agenda of the key German players, especially 
those in political offices. In this book, Nikitin also re-wrote part of his own history as 
previously told in a GDR volume on the Hochschuloffiziere of 1977. While he was highly 
complimentary of the events and outcome of his time in office when asked to reminisce 
about it by the Institut fu r  Hochschulbildung der DDR, in his autobiography, he was far 
more candid and outspokenly critical. After the fall of Communism, he felt free to re­
evaluate his own position but more importantly that of the German communists.28
24 Hans-Uwe Feige, ‘Zum Beginn der antifaschistisch-demokratischen Erneuerung an der Universitat 
Leipzig’, Diss. (Karl-Marx-Universitat Leipzig, 1978); Ibid., ‘Vor dem Abzug: Brain Drain -  Die 
Zwangsevakuierung von Angehorigen der Universitat Leipzig durch die US-Army im Juni 1945 und ihre 
Folgen’ in: Deutschlandarchiv 24, 12/1991, pp. 1302-1313.
25 Manfred Heinemann and Alexandr Haritonow, Hochschuloffiziere und Wiederaufbau des 
Hochschulwesens in Deutschland, 1945-1949, Die Sowjetische Besatzungszone (Berlin, 2000), a similar 
volume exists for the Western Z ones.v
26 Pjotr I. Nikitin, Zwischen Dogma und gesundem Menschenverstand, Wie ich die Universitaten der 
deutschen Besatzungszone sowjetisierte (Berlin, 1997), p. 215.
27 Ibid.
28 Roland Kohler and Hans-Jurgen Schulz, Erinnerungen sowjetischer Hochschuloffiziere (East Berlin, 
1977).
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This type of politically prescribed view is of course not limited to the East 
German historiography. The West German view of post-war developments was often 
oversimplified and does not lag behind some socialist works in terms of one-sidedness, 
especially when describing events in the Soviet Zone/GDR. This was due to a lack of 
access to primary sources as well as ideologically informed views.
When considering Leipzig as a whole, different identities emerge in the historical 
discourse -  the Biirgerstadt, the city of music, the city of books. The cultural aspect is as 
important as the reasons for the city’s affluence -  the city of trade fairs, the international 
centre for fur trade. The Biirgerstadt has been used in recent years as a tool for 
comparative histories. Leipzig has been paired with Lyon, Edinburgh and Birmingham to 
explore the history of the middle classes in these cities and as a template for the 
development of the Biirgertum in the respective countries as a whole. Especially Antje 
Pieper’s work on Music and the Making o f Middle Class Culture reflects on the interaction 
and interdependency of the Biirgertum and cultural endeavours in the urban setting of the 
nineteenth century.29
In Germany, the historic analysis of the Biirgertum became a research interest 
from the late 1970s onwards and has grown over the years to vast proportions. The 
university of Bielefeld had its own collaborative research centre 
(Sonderforschungsbereich) devoted to the social history of the Biirgertum in modem 
history.30 Several of the over 500 publications in the framework of this research project 
relate to the present study’s subject, directly and indirectly. Wehler’s Wege zur Geschichte 
des Biirgertums introduces the term Biirgertum in a multitude of facets over the course of 
the eighteenth to the twentieth century. Thereby it identifies the pitfalls of a general fixed
_____________________________  V
29 Antje Pieper, Music and the Making o f  Middle Class Culture (Basingstoke, 2008); Hopei and 
Sammler, Kulturpolitik und Stadtkultur in Leipzig und Lyon 18.-20. Jahrhundert (Leipzig, 2004); Schafer, 
Biirgertum in der Krise.
30 See project report of the university of Bielefeld for Sonderforschungsbereich 177: ‘Sozialgeschichte des 
neuzeitlichen Biirgertums’, Universitat Bielefeld, http://www.uni-bielefeld.de (accessed 08 August 2008).
13
definition as both regional diversity and the ‘respective historic reality’ of this social 
formation in different times changed the understanding of what Biirgertum signified.31 
Especially valuable is the suggestion that Biirgertum as a social category does not 
adequately describe the historical reality. In Leipzig, the Biirgertum was politically and 
economically diverse, a heterogeneity furthered in the period under investigation by the 
Second World War and its devastation. Nevertheless, Biirgerlichkeit (the culture and 
habitus of the Biirgertum) overcame these adversities only to be confronted with an 
onslaught by the new rulers after the collapse of the Third Reich.32
Michael Schafer’s Biirgertum in der Krise investigates the interplay of economics, 
politics and culture in shaping this class or more precisely ‘classes’ as Schafer stipulates. 
He explores the diversity of Leipzig as a Biirgerstadt and explains its multitude (both in 
number and spectrum) of economic and educated biirgerlich existences. The focus of his 
study is the period of 1890 to 1930, thus he remains outside this study’s time frame. 
However, he portrays Leipzig’s Biirgertum, its customs and values as well as its influence 
and activity in the cultural field in an insightful way that offers a good overview of the 
Lebenswelt of Leipzig’s citizens. However, some criticism is appropriate as Schafer 
neglects the fluidity of the Leipzig Biirgertum by drawing a strict line between the 
economic and the educated parts of the Biirgertum. Leipzig had a strong mercantile 
tradition as the city was founded on the intersection of ancient trading routes. Moreover, 
merchants showed a great interest and aptitude in cultural questions, and wealth and 
business acumen could be found in the educated middle class (Leipzig’s dominant position 
in printing and publishing was a prime example of this). Indeed, ‘Leipzig’s economic 
strength and reputation were closely associated with the bourgeois ideals of education,
virtue and cultural refinement.’33 Nevertheless, Schafer provides a wealth of useful detail
v
31 Wehler (ed.), Wege zur Geschichte des Biirgertums, p. 7.
32 For ‘Biirgertum’ versus ‘Kultur des Biirgertums’ see: Ibid., p. 8.
33 Pieper, Music and the Making o f Middle Class Culture, p. 7.
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in his analysis. Furthermore, his study already draws attention to critical areas in the later 
development (signs of disintegration) of the Biirgertum of the city of Leipzig.34
The concluding publication of the Bielefeld project, Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte 
des Biirgertums, combines the various strands of analysis and offers some general insight 
into the topic. It is a valuable source especially for the explanation of key terms and 
concepts as well as a helpful guide in the historic development of the Biirgertum.35 In 
contrast to the analysis of terminology and deeply theoretical approach of the mentioned 
Bielefeld studies, other publications approach the topic in more light-hearted fashion. 
Fest’s Der lange Abschied vom Biirgertum is a dialogue in book form that nevertheless 
appropriately outlines historical developments and biirgerlich mentalities that are valid in 
the context of the present study. It does so by inseparably linking Biirgertum with a quest 
for culture, thereby providing an apt explanation for the conditions in Leipzig. This 
publication is also of particular interest as it does not follow the customary placing of the
-j/:
Biirgertum into the nineteenth century. It is, however, a general feature of the 
historiography, both German and Anglo-American, that the nineteenth century is the 
‘biirgerlich century’, hence most studies centre around this period. Jurgen Kocka, a leading 
historian of social classes, has devoted considerable work to the Biirgertum, yet mostly 
around the hundred years between 1800 and 1900.37 David Blackboum and Richard J. 
Evans published a volume investigating the German bourgeoisie, which built on their 
previous research of the topic and again, the focus of the contributions was the ‘end of the 
eighteenth century to the 1930s’ -  loosely the ‘long nineteenth century’.38 This time has
34 Schafer, Biirgertum in der Krise.
35 Peter Lundgree (ed.), Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte des Biirgertums (Gottingen, 2000).
36 Fest et al., Der lange Abschied vom Biirgertum.
37 See inter al.: Jurgen Kocka, Bildungsbiirgertum im 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1985), Biirgertum im 19. 
Jahrhundert, Volumes 1-3 (Gottingen, 1995), Burger und Biirgerlichkeit im 19. Jahrhundert (Gottingen, 
1987).
38 David Blackbourn and Richard J. Evans, The German Bourgeoisie (London 1991), p. 2.
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been characterized as the zenith of the Biirgertum?9 Indeed, Leipzig’s culture blossomed 
especially in this time, yet it also had important developments before and after that period. 
Margaret Menninger’s study on cultural elites in Leipzig provides an insight into the 
characteristics of Leipzig’s cultural landscape in the first half of the twentieth century. 
Moreover, she combines this analysis with a portrayal of burgerlich involvement and 
patronage in the cultural life of the city and illustrates how culture was not only supported 
and commissioned by the highest echelons of society but also among the lower levels of 
the burgerlich stratum. This exemplifies both the notion that Leipzig’s Burger valued 
culture greatly and saw it as their civic duty to commission and make publicly available 
works of art. Thomas Hopei expands on this in his work on democratisation of culture by 
demonstrating how burgerlich culture was taken up by the working classes and emulated 
to the point of merging.40 Thomas Adam furthers this point in his studies of Leipzig’s 
working class and Social Democratic milieu towards the end of the nineteenth century and 
the early part of the twentieth century. He observed that although Leipzig was traditionally 
viewed as a stronghold of the worker’s movement and the birthplace of German Social 
Democracy, its working class had a distinctive flavour: it was far removed from the 
proletariat and much closer to the Biirgertum than the working classes of other cities. The 
workers perceived themselves as enlightened and educated, and endeavoured to create a 
culture quite similar to that of the Biirgertum. Where they did not create their own parallel 
cultural institutions, they entered into the biirgerlich cultural sphere itself and became part 
of it, an occurrence Adam described as ‘integrative component culture (Teilkultur)\ the 
integration of the workers into the existing biirgerlich culture.41 Furthermore, he
39 Gunilla-Friedericke Budde, Bliitezeit des Biirgertums: Biirgerlichkeit im 19. Jahrhundert (Darmstadt, 
2009).
40 Menninger, ‘Kulturelle Eliten und kollektives Mazenatentum in Leipzig’; Thomas Hopei, 
‘Demokratisierung von Kultur und Kulturpolitik in Leipzig und Lyon in der ersten Halfte des 20.
Jahrhundert’ in Hopei and Sammler, Kulturpolitik und Stadtkultur in Leipzig und Lyon 18.-20. Jahrhundert, 
pp. 139-172.
Thomas Adam, ‘How proletarian was Leipzig’s Social Democratic Milieu’ in James Retallack, (ed.)
Saxony in German History, pp. 255-75, here p. 270.
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demonstrates that the Social Democratic milieu was by no means exclusively working 
class. It contained white collar workers, civil servants and even small entrepreneurs -  
traditionally all exponents of the Biirgertum. Adam manifested the political diversity of 
Leipzig’s Burger and in the same vein revealed a homogeneity in the cultural identity of 
Leipzig’s citizens that transcended traditional social classifications. According to him, the 
greatest successes were achieved in the field of music, as workers first entered the same 
concert and opera auditoria as the Biirgertum and later even shared them.42 The theme of 
music is also taken up by Recknagel and Horlitz in their compilation Musik und 
Biirgerkultur. Strongly rooted in historic musicology, this work draws on the connection of 
cultural endeavour and economic considerations in the historic development of Leipzig 
towards a city of music of international standing. Recknagel and Horlitz demonstrate that 
cultural patronage was not purely idealistic, for a strong mercantile spirit pervaded all 
aspects of Leipzig’s life.43 Leipzig was built on a trading tradition, which underlined all its 
cultural endeavours. Art, culture and mercantilism shaped Leipzig’s identity.44
There is a vast historiography dealing with the topic of Leipzig as a city of music. 
As the period under consideration here encompasses the last two years of National 
Socialist rule it is necessary to turn to studies of music and music policy of the Third Reich 
in Germany. This topic in general has been recently explored in Anglo-American 
historiography, for example in the works of Pamela Potter, Michael Kater and Erik Levi45 
Although all of these offer valid points, Kater’s and Levi’s analyses are slightly 
problematic. Kater’s work, in particular, has received criticism for his manipulative
42 Thomas Adam, ‘Leipzig -  Die Hochburg der Arbeiterkulturbewegung’ in Werner Bramke and Ulrich HeB, 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Sachsdn im 20. Jahrhundert (Leipzig, 1998) pp. 229-68.
43 Marion Recknagel and Stefan Horlitz, Musik und Biirgerkultur -  Leipzigs Aufstieg zur Musikstadt 
(Leipzig, 2007).
44 Rat der Stadt, Leipzig lebt Kultur.
45 Pamela Potter, Most German o f the Arts (London, 1998); Michael Kater, The Twisted Muse (Oxford,
1997); Erik Levi, Music in the Third Reich (London, 1994).
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treatment of sources to fit his argument.46 Moreover, he uses sweeping statements that 
might be due to the fact that his subject is very wide; however, some seem designed to cast 
him and his research in a better light. This is especially noticeable in his critiques of other 
historians where he moves from valid criticism to outright misrepresentation of facts that 
have even earned him legal action 47 Levi’s book provides a good outline of the state 
administration of music to the ‘war against modernism’ and the reaction of musical 
institutions such as orchestras and opera houses towards state measures. However, in his 
consideration of the latter, his arguments are at times factually incorrect, especially in his 
examination of the Gewandhaus orchestra. His assertion that the concert hall’s reputation 
was ‘essentially local’ might pass for eccentricity given its international standing, however, 
his analysis of the ‘matters of personnel’ is blatantly wrong 48 Hence, despite providing a 
basis for understanding of music policy in the Third Reich, these authors offer little to 
elucidate the period for the topic of the present study. Therefore, it is necessary again to 
turn to German research on music in the Third Reich. The eminent historian Fred K. 
Prieberg has approached the topic in numerous studies with attention to detail and 
meticulous archival research. His 2004 Handbuch deutsche Musiker 1933-1945 is a good 
reference guide to the musicians involved in Leipzig’s musical institutions. His work on 
music in the National Socialist state also offers some insight into how Leipzig’s musical 
scene fitted into the developments in the Germany as a whole 49 Specifically focusing on 
Leipzig, Thomas Schinkoth has thrown new light on the developments in the sphere of
46 For a further discussion of this particular point see: Helen Bluemel, ‘The Triad of St Thomas School, 
Church and Choir during 1933-45’ MA diss. (Cardiff University, 2005), pp. 40-1.
47 Whereas Kater’s critique of Levi’s overly structural approach might be reasonable, his criticisms of Moor’s 
and especially Prieberg’s research have no basis in fact. At Prieberg’s instigation, Kater had to alter 
unfounded claims in later editions of his book. See Fred. K Prieberg, Handbuch deutsche Musiker 1933-1945 
(Prieberg, Fred K., 2004, [CD-Rom]), p. 9.
48 Levi, Music, pp. 205-7. Although Devi is correct in stating that Bruno Walter had been removed from his 
post in 1933, the orchestral leader Leo Schwartz (also Jewish) remained in office until 1934. Max Brockhaus 
and Anton Kippenberg, named by Levi as having left, actually remained in office in the directorate right 
throughout the Third Reich. Kippenberg was very outspoken in the post-war arrangements for the 
Gewandhaus, and was thus far from ‘being lost for the Gewandhaus in 1933’.
49 Prieberg, Handbuch; Musik im NS-Staat (Cologne, 2000).
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music during the Third Reich. He has focused on Jewish musicians in the period and has 
also compiled a highly useful outline of Leipzig’s main musical institutions in his work on 
the Musikstadt.50
There is a significant body of publications on Leipzig’s musical institutions. 
However, they mostly focus on music and performance history, usually factoring out 
political aspects beyond the superficial. While they offer detail on the developments of the 
establishments, the wider political and social aspects are ignored. This is especially 
obvious in the case of the Gewandhaus.51 In the case of St Thomas’s, Judith Krasselt has 
examined St Thomas’s School in the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich.52 The school’s 
and choir’s alumni, the Thomanerbund, have also undertaken historic research and 
published their findings in essays in the alumni society’s own publications. Much of this, 
however, is confined to biographical examinations or individual events, wider studies 
remain unpublished.53
There are numerous biographies of Leipzig musicians of the period. Many of 
these, especially early works, however, tend to exclude in-depth political analysis, either 
out of fear of broadcasting ‘inconvenient’ truths, or because political discussion was 
deemed ‘somehow irremediably vulgar’.54 For Leipzig, the biographies of and biographical 
studies on Gustav Brecher, Bruno Walter, Karl Straube and Hermann Abendroth are of
50 Thomas Schinkoth, Musikstadt Leipzig im NS- Staat (Altenburg, 1997); Wirken und Schicksale jiidischer 
Musiker 1855 bis 1945 (Leipzig, 1994); Musik als Lebenshilfe -  Barnet Licht (Altenburg, 2000); Musik -  das 
Ende alter Illusionen? (Hamburg, 1996).
51 Bernhard Weinkauf and Gerald Grosse, Gewandhaus Leipzig: Zwei Variationen zu einem Thema (Leipzig, 
1990); Rudolf Skoda, Das Gewandhaus Leipzig (East Berlin, 1986); Johannes Forner, Res severa verum 
gaudium (East Berlin, 1976); to mention but a few.
2 Judith Krasselt, Die Thomasschule zwischen Weimarer Republik und Nationalsozialismus (Leipzig, 2000).
53 Maria Hiibner, ‘Karl Straubes letzte Lebensjahre: Zum Gedenken an seinen Todestag am 27. April 1950’, 
pp. 54-55 and Stefan Altner, ‘Karl Straube’, pp. 50-54 both in Thomanerchor Almanach IV (Leipzig, 2000), 
Roland Weise, ‘Der Thomanerchor invder Fiirstenschule’ in Thomanerchor Almanach II (Leipzig, 1996), 
pp. 10-15. The Thomanerbund has commissioned a history on the choir’s development during socialism, a 
date for publication is forthcoming.
54 Toby Thacker, Music after Hitler 1945-1955 (Aldershot, 2007), p .l. A prime example for this in relation to 
Leipzig is Charlotte Ramin’s biography of her husband published shortly after his death. In it she completely 
glosses over all ‘darker’ aspects o f Ramin’s history. Charlotte Ramin, Gunther Ramin (Freiburg, 1958).
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particular interest.55 Both works concerned with Brecher and Walter exemplify the fate of 
Jewish musicians in the Third Reich whilst giving an insight into the developments of that 
period in Leipzig. Especially Walter’s memoirs evoke the picture of Leipzig as a 
Burgerstadt that knew and valued culture.56 Lucke-Kaminiarz’s study on Abendroth 
specifically sets out to juxtapose a life history with political analysis. She examines how 
Abendroth became entangled in politics and political manoeuvring during National 
Socialism and in the Soviet Zone/GDR. Thereby Lucke-Kaminiarz manages to illustrate 
very effectively the differences and variations in cultural policies in different areas within 
the Soviet Zone of Occupation, a topic that hitherto has been largely neglected in the area 
of music history.
Historic analysis of musical developments after the Second World War has only 
slowly found entry into the historiography. Maren Koster’s study was the first to appear on 
the situation in the Soviet Zone. It focuses both on biographical studies as well as practical 
analysis of the musical output against the background of the political circumstances.57 
Pamela Potter’s and Celia Applegate’s co-authored work on Music and German National 
Identity illustrates continuities in music and music reception from the nineteenth century to 
the twentieth century, revealing links right across the watersheds of 1933 and 1945.58
These continuities in German music are taken up in Toby Thacker’s Music after 
Hitler 1945-1955.59 Thacker set himself the massive task of examining the policies 
towards music and musicians in all four zones of occupation and later both German states.
55 Jurgen Schebera, Gustav Brecher und die Leipziger Oper (Leipzig, 1990); Bruno Walter, Thema und 
Variationen (Stuttgart, 1963); Hiibner, ‘Karl Straubes letzte Lebensjahre’; Irina Lucke-Kaminiarz, Hermann 
Abendroth (Weimar, 2007).
56 See: Walter, Thema, pp. 386-90.
57 Maren Koster, Musik-Zeit-Geschehen: Zu den Musikverhaltnissen in der SBZJDDR 1945-52 (Saarbrucken, 
2002). v
58 Although these relations are mostly analysed either in musical styles or the abstract notion of ‘national 
identity’, they also allow an insight into developments and continuities that conditioned the course of cultural 
institutions in these periods. Pamela Potter and Celia Applegate, Music and German National Identity 
(Chicago, 2000).
59 Thacker, Music after Hitler.
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The first part of his book, concerned with the period up to 1949, is of particular interest to 
the present study. Thacker investigates regeneration, denazification, re-education and 
questions of Allied control and direction of music. Amid such vast amounts of primary 
sources some detail eludes him. For example, in his treatment of denazification, he ignores 
the fact that the implementation of policies within the Soviet Zone differed markedly from 
one region to the next and was by no means consistent.60
Bettina Hinterthiir’s study on music publishing in the years 1945 to the mid 1960s 
approaches the topic from an unusual, yet logical angle -  music publishers were the 
intersection between composers, musicologists, musicians and the audience.61 They 
supported composers and through their marketing and distribution efforts influenced the 
musical scene. As Leipzig was a main location in printing and publishing, the music 
publishing houses there and their development after the war were a mirror of cultural and 
musical policy and a tool in the implementation of re-educational measures in this field in 
the Soviet Zone/GDR.
Hinterthur’s book also addresses another of Leipzig’s identities: the city of books. 
Leipzig had been the German centre for book printing and publishing, and a location at the 
heart of European book trading. A lively historiography about the publishing industry in 
Leipzig emerged after the fall of the Wall and the opening of archives in the former GDR. 
Moreover, the period from 1990 onwards was a time when book publishing surfaced in 
current politics. Publishing houses bearing the same name existed in both parts of 
Germany, a legacy of political partition, of nationalisations in the East and of relocation to 
the West. Historical research thus became a practical tool in the organisation and clearing 
of tenures and the return of property to former owners.
60 This aspect has received attention in numerous publications. See for example: Helga A. Welsh, 
Revolutionarer Wandel aufBefehl? (Munich, 1989).
61 Bettina Hinterthiir, Noten nach Plan (Stuttgart, 2006).
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The publications that emerged in the process range from studies on individual 
prominent publishing houses and their most famous directors to general studies on the 
city’s book history. A particularly interesting example is the volume Das literarische 
Leipzig, complied by Juliane Brandsch and Andreas Herzog. Its various contributions offer 
a good insight into the developments of Leipzig after 1945, especially the onset of 
nationalisation of publishing houses and the centralisation of cultural policy under the 
socialist administration. Individual aspects of Leipzig’s publishing history have received 
further attention. In the course of the Buchhandelstage 1995, a special book was compiled 
that focused on the ‘resettlement’ of Leipziger publishers by the Americans and the 
subsequent re-establishment of their businesses in the Western Zones and the resulting split 
in the book traders’ umbrella organisation -  the Borsenverein -  into a Leipzig and a 
Western branch. This was one of the first publications that offered a nuanced analysis of 
the events since 1945.64 Western accounts of the Borsenverein’s development in West 
Germany usually ignored the continued existence of the organisation’s head office in 
Leipzig, whilst East German histories had mentioned only in passing a ‘capitalist’ copy­
cat, set up on the orders of the imperialist powers, highlighting instead the uninterrupted 
history of an institution that had grown to be a true representative of the workers in the 
publishing sector.65 The absolute singularity of their institution and its proud history was 
not relinquished by either side.66
A similar picture exists in the historiography of the Deutsche Biicherei, 
Germany’s national library founded by the Borsenverein in 1912. The establishment of a
62 To name but a few: Dietrich Bode, Reclam: 125 Jahre Universalbibliothek (Stuttgart, 1992); Wolfgang 
Jeske and Heinz Sarkowski, Der Inselverlag 1899-1999 (Leipzig, 1999); Sandra Knopf and Volker Titel, Der 
Leipziger Gutenbergweg (Beucha, 2001).
63 Juliane Brandsch and Andreas Herzog (eds.), Das Literarische Leipzig: kulturhistorisches Mosaik einer 
Buchstadt (Leipzig, 1995). v
64 Jan Egel (ed.), Neuanfang 1945 (Frankfurt am Main, 1995).
65 See inter al.: Andreas Werner, D er Borsenverein des Deutschen Buchhandels (Munich, 1971) and Max 
Freyer, Dor Borsenverein der Deutschen Buchhandler zu Leipzig seit 1945 (Leipzig, 1961).
66 It is interesting to note that both branches, in East and West, invoked the same history beginning with the 
Borsenverein's establishment in 1825.
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second -  rival -  institution in the Western Zones (the Deutsche Bibliothek) was treated in 
fiercely partisan accounts.67 Most West German publications focused only on the West 
German institution and clearly sought to legitimize the establishment of the Deutsche 
Bibliothek. These publications claim ‘impartiality’, yet an ideological slant is quite 
pronounced and the Cold War clearly entrenched between the lines.68 The East German 
accounts hardly acknowledged the existence of the Western rival and highlighted instead 
the proud history of their own institution as the true German national library.69
A note on archival sources
Primary sources have now been available in East German archives since the 
collapse of Communism. However, most archives still suffer a lack of financial means for 
the vast task of cataloguing documents that had been neglected in forty years of GDR rule. 
The city archive in Leipzig, despite its very helpful staff, is a case in point. Most 
documents of the era under investigation are fragile, therefore the eager historian is often 
faced with a ‘blocked for usage’ remark on his or her order slip. The scanning of these 
documents onto microfilm has allowed some of them to become obtainable, but also 
created additional problems. German archives operate a strict policy of data protection. 
Hence names, excluding those of prominent figures, have to be anonymised in historic 
studies. More frustrating for the historian are the cases in which the information included 
in these documents referring to non-prominent characters is deemed sensitive.
67 It is significant to note that in this specific case -  the Deutsche Bucherei versus the Deutsche Bibliothek -  
East German historians were more wedded to the idea of presenting facts than their West German 
counterparts who took it upon themselves to produce highly ideologically tainted works.
68 Hanns W. Eppelsheimer, Die Deutsche Bibliothek in Frankfurt am Main, Ein Bericht (Deutsche 
Bibliothek, 1950) and Deutsche Bibliothek and Borsenverein des deutschen Buchhandels, Drei Ansprachen 
gehalten aus Anlafi der Einweihung des Neubaus der Deutschen Bibliothek in Frankfurt am Main 24.4.59  
(Frankfurt, 1959).
69 See inter al.: Helmut Rotzsch, Die Deutsche Bucherei (Leipzig, 1987).
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Then the document becomes off limits and cannot be studied.70 When the file exists in 
paper form, the ‘offending’ document can be withdrawn, the remainder of the folder is 
accessible for study. Once the file has been put onto microfilm, however, this solution is no 
longer available. Thus, the files concerning the denazification and arrests of members of 
Leipzig’s Reichsgericht remained a mere tantalizing entry in the finding aids of the
• 71archive. The Bundesarchiv has transferred some files concerning the developments in 
Saxony to the Saxon State archive. Those involving Leipzig are in the city’s branch and 
can be accessed there. The archives of most of Leipzig’s cultural institutions suffered 
greatly in the war, the Gewandhaus's burned in the building’s destruction, St Thomas’s 
suffered greatly and was transferred to the city archive and the university archive fell prey 
to political manoeuvres. Until the end of the Second World War, there was no unified 
archive for the entirety of the university and individual departments stored their materials 
in boxes wherever there was opportunity. During the bombings, much material was lost 
and further losses were incurred after the war -  paper was scarce and used for heating or 
exchanged for other commodities. A ‘clean-up’ exercise by the National Socialists in the 
final days of the war as well as the removals of documents by both American and Soviet 
occupation forces added to the fragmentary nature of the archive. When finally an 
inventory of all stock was drawn up in 1950 a further reduction of material was noted. As 
the missing files contained politically contentious material -  for example the deliberations 
for the re-instatement of ex-NSDAP academics -  it must be assumed that these were 
removed by the political authorities at some stage after 1945.72
70 Exceptions can be made, but the process is lengthy involving several hearings with archive officials over 
months in which the historian has to state his or her case. A positive outcome is by no means certain and the 
procedure is discouraged.
The files in question: Stadtarchiv Leipzig (StadtAL), Stadtverordnete und Rat (StVuR), No. 1309, No. 
17506, No. 17507.
72 The depiction of the state o f the university archive is largely based on the preface to the university’s 
finding aids for the Bestand Rektorat (affectionately referred to by the archivist as ‘green monsters’) and my 
own experience of repeatedly reading the line ‘Bei Inventur 1950 nicht mehr vorhanden’ next to an 
interesting entry.
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Nevertheless, an abundance of primary sources are available, including the GARF 
(state archive of the Russian Federation) files in the Bundesarchiv, the reproductions of 
archived documents of the Soviet military administration in Germany. Due to the 
temperamental policy in Russia regarding archival accessibility, these files remain the 
safest way of studying Russian sources of the period. Parts of these, namely those 
concerning cultural policies, have also been published in both Russian and German and are 
thus widely available.73
All translations from German sources, unless otherwise stated, are my own.
Drawing on this considerable body of primary and secondary sources this study 
seeks to highlight the interconnectedness of Leipzig’s cultural identities and its status as 
Burgerstadt by giving equal weight to the main institutions as symbols of each of the city’s 
cultural characters, as city of music, books, law and learning. This is important to avoid the 
distortion often created by utilizing a one-dimensional approach. Leipzig’s cultural identity 
in 1943-49 encompassed war time destruction, dual occupation, denazification, attempts at 
regeneration, growing political interference and the remodelling of the Soviet Zone in a 
socialist image. All these factors had ramifications on Leipzig’s interwoven cultural scene 
and their full impact can only be appreciated with an analysis of its main facets. Leipzig’s 
prominent institutions (those of international renown) have been chosen as they were both 
signifiers of the city’s biirgerlich quest for culture as well as the most public venues of the 
determined and at times violent attempts to recast Leipzig in a socialist image.
73 Horst Moller et al., Die Politik der Sowjetischen Militaradministration in Deutschland: Kultur, 
Wissenschaft und Bildung 1945-1949 (Munich, 2005).
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2 Leipzig city centre 1945
The maps show L eipzig’s old city centre framed by the New Town Hall on the bottom  left 
train station on the top right.
Source: S tadtgeschichtliches M useum  Leipzig, W iederaufbauplan 1949
1 Leipzig city centre p re-1943
and the central
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1 Leipzig -  City Politics
In the first half of the twentieth century, Leipzig was a politically divided city. The 
strong workers’ movement and its political representation clashed with a no less organised 
Burgertum, which traditionally held power in the city and intended to continue in this 
manner. This resulted in complex relations between the city council and the 
Oberbiirgermeister (Lord Mayor) where divisions on party lines had to be overcome 
through personal efforts. This can be exemplified both in the case of Leipzig’s last freely 
elected Lord Mayor Goerdeler and the first post-war Lord Mayor Erich Zeigner. Goerdeler 
is a well-known historical figure who played a crucial part in the German burgerlich 
resistance to the National Socialist regime and was a key member of the circle around 
Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg, the protagonist of the 20 July 1944 attempt on 
Hitler’s life. Goerdeler was a Prussian civil servant who proved himself an able local 
politician as second mayor of Konigsberg before taking up his post in Leipzig. He was a 
burgerlich conservative and member of the DNVP (Deutsche Nationale Volkspartei -  
German National People’s Party) until 1931 when he became an independent. He had been 
a supporter of the Kaiserreich who only reluctantly accommodated himself with the 
Weimar Republic. Thus, he initially welcomed the NSDAP takeover until he came to 
understand the full extent of the National Socialist revolution and committed himself to the 
resistance. This transition occurred during his time in office in Leipzig. Erich Zeigner, on 
the other hand, is less represented in the historical discourse. The natural location for 
historical research into this man’s life, the GDR, was barred by the ambivalent view the 
SED rulers took towards Zeigner after his early death. Indeed, it was not until after 1990 
that proper historical debate smarted around Zeigner. Previously only one larger study, a 
biographical sketch written at the behest of the SED in 1985, existed. Michael Rudloff
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aptly stated that Zeigner is a ‘source of irritation’ as he was both a ‘Bildungsbiirger and 
Social Democrat’ -  two characteristics that seem incompatible.1
Both men were crucial figures in the politics of Leipzig and important also on a 
national scale through Leipzig’s prominent position within Germany. Equally, both men 
invested a lot of their efforts in the cultural sphere of Leipzig and shaped its institutions 
accordingly. Albeit of different political persuasions, both Goerdeler and Zeigner were 
exponents of the Bildungsbiirgertum, which had an immense impact on their dealings 
within the city government. Their burgerlich sense of civic duty paired with strong ideas 
about how to govern their city brought them into conflict with the respective political 
systems in which they operated. This burgerlich background will be examined as to how it 
impacted on their decisions in Leipzig in the complex interplay of city administration and 
both the National Socialist regime before the end of the Second World War and the Allied 
occupation powers and new East German authorities thereafter.
Leipzig had risen to national importance in the nineteenth century as the Kingdom 
of Saxony grew into one of the most developed areas in the wake of Germany’s rapid 
industrial revolution. Saxony’s population doubled while Leipzig’s increased massively. 
From the second half of the nineteenth century until the 1930s, the number of Leipzigers 
grew sevenfold to around 700,000. One major increase had occurred in just ten years from 
1885 to 1895 when the city’s population jumped from 170,340 to over 400,000.2
1 For Carl Friedrich Goerdeler (1884-1945) see Hans Mommsen, ‘Carl Friedrich Goerdeler im Widerstand 
gegen Hitler’ in Sabine Gillmann and Hans Mommsen (eds.), Politische Schriften und Briefe Carl 
Goerdelers, Volume 1 (Munich 2003), pp. xxxvii-lxv. Zeigner (1886-1949) was a lawyer and judge in 
Leipzig before he entered politics in 1919 for the Social Democrats. He was the Saxon minister for justice 
from 1921-23 and briefly prime minister of Saxony in 1923 before being deposed and later arrested under 
manufactured claims. After the end o f the Second World War he first became Kulturdezement and then Lord 
Mayor of Leipzig, a post he continued to hold until his death in 1949. See Anneliese and Lothar Matthes, 
Erich Zeigner: Eine biographische Skizze (Leipzig, 1985); Michael Rudloff, Erich Zeigner: Bildungsbiirger 
und Sozialdemokrat (Leipzig, 2000).
2 Werner Bramke, Carl Goerdeler und Leipzig (Leipzig, 1995), p. 21.
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Because of its economic structure, Saxony became a stronghold of the workers’ movement. 
Leipzig in particular was a hotbed of socialism with the foundation of the Zentralkomitee 
der deutschen Arbeiter (Central Committee of Workers) in 1848 and the Allgemeiner 
Deutscher Arbeiterverein (ADAV, German Workers’ Council) in 1863. The ADAV 
eventually led to the establishment of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), 
making Leipzig the cradle of German social democracy. Yet, the workers’ movement met 
with strong resistance from the conservative burgerlich camp, which opposed any political 
strengthening of workers’ representation. Until the end of the First World War, a restrictive 
three class voting system on Land and communal level kept the Social Democrats at bay. 
Yet after the war, the political power of the left grew. In the crisis year of 1923, in the wake 
of ‘Germany’s October’, Saxony became the first of the German Lander to have a 
government made up of a coalition of Social Democrats and communists under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Erich Zeigner (SPD).3 This government was, however, 
quickly deposed on Reich orders. The Reichswehr (the army of the Weimar Republic) 
occupied Saxony, with soldiers patrolling the streets. The army then oversaw the 
Reichsexekution, an order of supersession of the Zeigner government from Reich president 
Ebert on the grounds of article 48 of the Weimar constitution; the elected Land government 
was removed.4 This happened less than a month after Zeigner’s cabinet had first been 
joined by two KPD members.5 A participation in government on Land level by the 
Communist Party proved too much for the conservative national government in Berlin,
3 The crisis in Germany (occupation o f the Ruhr area, inflation) had escalated over the course of the summer 
of 1923 and a state of emergency was proclaimed. The KPD, under instructions from Moscow, tried to gain 
positions of power to facilitate a ‘revolution’ akin to the developments in Russia in 1917. Despite finding 
entry into Saxony’s government, the KPD failed to accumulate enough influence even to attempt a coup. In 
November 1923, an attack on the Weimar Republic from the right fringes (Hitler’s Munich putsch) also 
failed. See Gerhard Schulz, Zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur (Berlin, 1987).
4 Reichsgesetzblatt, RGB1. (I), Verordnung des Reichsprasidenten, p. 995, 29 October 1923.
5 Schulz, Zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur, p. 438.
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especially with the air of revolution around. Nevertheless, the SPD retained its share in 
Saxony’s government throughout the 1920s, albeit in coalition with burgerlich parties.
In Leipzig, the city council had strong left wing tendencies. The SPD frequently 
formed the largest party in the town administration. Thus the selection on 23 May 1930 of 
Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, a National Conservative, to become Lord Mayor of Leipzig went 
against the predominant left wing mood in Leipzig and the whole of Saxony.6 The 
communist city councillors showed their protest against this selection in no uncertain terms 
by boycotting his inauguration ceremony.7 Yet, Goerdeler was selected through the city 
council by the majority coalition of burgerlich parties, some votes from the NSDAP but 
also several from the SPD faction.8 Goerdeler responded to the initial adversities with 
focused policies that convinced even his rivals. He led Leipzig onto a rigid but successful 
path of saving without forgetting social security, thereby placating his critics on the left.9 
He also streamlined the city council by combining departments, and thereby curtailed the 
power of the parties through cutting the numbers of councillors. Furthermore, he pushed 
for more authority for his own post.10 It has been argued that authoritarian approaches by 
the burgerlich camp such as exemplified in Goerdeler’s restructuring of Leipzig’s 
administration paved the way for the National Socialist takeover through the abandonment 
of democracy.11 Yet, whilst it cannot be denied that Goerdeler was in favour of overcoming 
the Weimar Republic, his vision for Germany was not congruent with the unfolding Third 
Reich, as will be seen below.
6 Georg Wilhelm, Die Diktaturen und die evangelische Kirche (Gottingen, 2004).
7 Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, ‘Rechenschaftsbericht 22. Marz 1937’ in Gillmann and Mommsen, Politische 
Schriften, pp. 86-91, here p. 86.
8 Ines Reich, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler: Ein Oberbiirgermeister gegen den NS-Staat (Cologne, 1997), p. 97.
9 Goerdeler, ‘Rechenschaftsbericht 22. Marz 1937’.
10 Reich, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, pp. 98-9.
11 Ibid., p. 103.
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By becoming Lord Mayor in one of Germany’s major cities, he also gained 
membership in the Deutscher Stddtetag (German Association of Cities and Towns). This 
association decided issues of communal administration such as reforms of local 
government on a national level. Here Goerdeler quickly rose to prominence; his proposals 
for a stronger communal self-determination found agreement in the Stddtetag and 
recommended him on a national level. His shrewd economic intellect earned him the post 
of Reichskommissar fiir Preisiiberwachung (Reich Price Commissioner) in 1931 and in 
1932 he was even considered for participation in the national cabinet of von Papen.12 
Leipzig’s Lord Mayor had finally become a leading figure not only in local but national 
politics. It might have been this prominence, paired with his original welcome of the 
National Socialist takeover of power that allowed Goerdeler to retain his office. This was 
by no means a normal course of events. Goerdeler was indeed the only non-NSDAP Lord 
Mayor of a large town in Saxony to have remained in office.13 In the entire Reich only four 
continued in their post after January 1933.14 The Lord Mayor might have remained but the 
city council itself soon changed significantly. At the beginning of January 1933, the 
councillors had elected a left wing executive committee to head the city council (one 
communist and two SPD members).15 Within the following months the council was 
completely transformed. At first, when the KPD and SPD councillors came under pressure, 
Goerdeler tried to support at least the SPD faction, but to no avail. In the wake of similar 
national measures, the communists were driven out of the city council. The National
12 Goerdeler refused participation. In his ‘Rechenschaftsbericht’ in 1944 he voiced deep regret about this 
decision. See Goerdeler, ‘Rechenschaftsbericht’ in Gillmann and Mommsen, Politische Schriften, pp. 1191- 
1248.
13 Large town in this instance refers to a city with more than 100,000 inhabitants.
14 Next to Goerdeler these were Heinrich Sahm (1877-1939) in Berlin (independent, stepped down in 1935), 
Carl Neinhaus (1888-1965) in Heidelberg (Neinhaus held on to his post by joining the NSDAP in May 1933) 
and Arthur Menge (1884-1965) in Hanover (Conservative [Deutsch Hannoversche Partei], deselected from 
office 1937, imprisoned in the wake of the 20 July 1944 assassination attempt), see Horst Matzerath, 
Nationalsozialismus und kommunale Selbstverwaltung (Berlin, 1970), p. 67.
15 Emil Dorfle, ‘Tumult im Leipziger Rathaus. Die Stadtverordneten wahlen ein Linksprasidium’ in Neue 
Leipziger Zeitung, 5 January 1933.
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Socialist campaign against the left wing in the city council ended after the national ban of
the SPD in June 1933.16 The Lord Mayor had to accept an NSDAP member, Hans Rudolf
Haake, as his deputy after he rejected calls to join the party himself. It is, however,
important to note that at this point Goerdeler was still a ‘supporter of the system’, despite
his ill-feeling towards having had Haake imposed on him.17 He professed to have ‘worked
completely trustfully with the NSDAP’.18 The truth of this statement, written in prison in
1944, is doubted by some Goerdeler scholars like Werner Bramke, who questions it on the
basis of the rift between Goerdeler and his deputy Haake.19 Ines Reich on the other hand
supports the notion of a ‘fruitful cooperation’.20 The truth lies in between both, or rather
both views are correct when attributed to the right person amongst the main representatives
of the NSDAP in Leipzig. The Lord Mayor indeed initially had a good working
relationship with the leader of the NSDAP faction in the city council and later
0 1Kreishauptmann in Leipzig, Kurt Walter Donicke. Deputy Lord Mayor Rudolf Haake, 
however, pushed for complete party control (even overriding the Lord Mayor’s powers) 
from the outset. An early example of Haake’s conduct was the attempt by the National 
Socialists to fly the swastika flag on Leipzig’s town hall in March 1933. Regardless of the 
fact that the swastika flag was not an official symbol of the state at the time and a 
consultation in the city government had decided against it, Haake still attempted to plant
16 Reich, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, p. 164. Until 1 May 1935 all burgerlich independent councillors had been 
removed from office as well. See: Ibid., p. 171.
17 Ibid., p. 27.
18 ‘In den ersten Jahren nach 1933 habe ich mit der NSDAP vollkommen vertrauensvoll 
zusammengearbeitef, Goerdeler, ‘Rechenschaftsbericht’, p. 1203.
19 Bramke, Carl Goerdeler, p. 24.
20 Reich, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, p. 116.
21 Kurt Walter Donicke (1899-1945) was an early NSDAP member. In 1925 he joined the party and quickly 
ascended the ranks. In 1927 he was already at the helm of the Leipzig branch of his party. In 1929 he became 
a member of the Saxon Land parliament and in 1932 of the Leipzig city council. After the takeover of power 
he briefly served as president of the Saxon Land parliament until its dissolution in 1934. See: Josef 
Matzerath, “Donicke, Kurt Walter11 in: Institut fur Sachsische Geschichte und Volkskunde e.V., bearb. von 
Martina Schattkowsky, Sachsische Biografie, Online-Ausgabe: http://www.isgv.de/saebi/ (accessed 22 May 
2009).
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the flag on Leipzig’s town hall tower (and thereby the highest point for miles).22 The Lord 
Mayor could only prevent the endeavour by personally obstructing access to the tower.
Goerdeler is often portrayed as an ambivalent historic figure. His eventual 
resistance does not sit easily with his early endorsement of a burgerlich coalition with the 
NSDAP and his professed admiration for Hitler.23 Yet, especially in his disputes with 
Haake, Goerdeler’s burgerlich position and opposition by default to the Nazi party’s acts in 
Leipzig and further afield become visible. The Lord Mayor repeatedly had to enforce his 
own position by reversing Haake’s attempts to usurp power in various fields of the city 
administration. An example of this was Haake’s unauthorized advice that civil servants 
were not to visit Jewish doctors regardless of any exceptions provided in the National 
Socialist legislation. Goerdeler could overturn Haake’s order by insisting that existing rules 
were to be followed.24 The Lord Mayor also contested the early retirement of Dr Tittel, the 
headmaster of St Thomas’s School, instigated by the National Socialists in 1933. The 
headmaster had aroused the party’s anger by refusing to allow the absorption of the choir of 
St Thomas’s into the Hitler Youth. Goerdeler managed to defer the enforced retirement 
until 1935.25
Yet Haake was not alone in rendering Goerdeler’s position ever more precarious. 
The Gauleiter of Saxony, Martin Mutschmann, was an even more dangerous opponent. In 
1934, Mutschmann attempted to gain control over Leipzig’s energy industry. Leipzig had a 
prominent position in the energy supply of North Western Saxony through four energy 
companies. Mutschmann tried to break the city’s exceptional position and to centralize
22 Stadtarchiv Leipzig, StadtAL, Kapitel 32, No. 103, Band 1, Blatt 35, 8 March 1933.
23 Goerdeler spoke of Hitler’s ‘gewinnende Liebenswiirdigkeit’. Goerdeler, ‘Rechenschaftsbericht’, p. 1205.
24 Furthermore, Goerdeler attempted to stand up for Jews within his realm of possibilities. Even small 
gestures were remembered later on with gratitude. Dr Alfons David, a judge at the Reichsgericht, lost his post 
in the wake of the professional civil service law. Goerdeler made a point of greeting Dr David publicly when 
he met him by chance. To walk over to David, Goerdeler abandoned his companion, Deputy Lord Mayor 
Rudolf Haake. Reich, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, p. 126 and Marianne Meyer-Krahmer, Carl Goerdeler - Mut 
zum Widerstand: Eine Tochter erinnert sich (Leipzig, 1998), p. 115.
25 Helen Bluemel, T he Triad of St Thomas’, p. 17.
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Saxony’s energy industry under his control in Dresden. Goerdeler confronted the 
Gauleiter's challenge in a legal dispute lasting from 1934-35 from which Leipzig emerged 
victorious. However, Goerdeler thereby added the omnipotent leader of Saxony to the list 
of his National Socialist enemies.26
On a national level, Carl Goerdeler still maintained his standing and was 
reinstated as Reich Price Commissioner in November 1934. Eager to counteract what he 
regarded as erroneous economic decisions, he threw himself into the task. In the 
memoranda he produced whilst in this post he clearly condemned the National Socialist 
economic strategy as dangerous. He spoke out against the rearmament in the Third Reich 
based on his notion that it was financially unviable and could lead to a renewed inflation. 
Moreover, he outrightly voiced his concerns that the anti-Semitic policies were detrimental 
to Germany’s economic development.27 These conclusions were not welcomed by the 
regime. Goerdeler’s views were ignored and he himself sidelined. It must be assumed that 
Goerdeler’s fierce opposition to Mutschmann’s demands regarding the energy control in 
Saxony was linked directly to the insights he gained as Reich Price Commissioner. In 
keeping Leipzig’s special position in Saxony’s energy market, he prevented, for the time 
being, the National Socialists from gaining complete control over this important sector and 
thus slowed their progress to facilitate autarky. Goerdeler clearly refuted the idea that real 
autarky was possible and even blamed the attempts of achieving it for heightening the 
Reich’s economic problems. This advice was incompatible with the regime’s persuasions 
that were eventually manifested in the four-year plan of 1936. When Goerdeler realised his 
lack of power, he did not apply for a renewal of his post as Price Commissioner in 1935.
26 Footnote in Gillmann and Mommsen, Politische Schriften, pp. 493-4.
27 See inter al.: Ibid., p. 411.
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This experience at the heart of power left Goerdeler deeply disillusioned, 
frustrated and increased his doubts about the regime.28 Furthermore, in 1935 a reform of 
local government was passed in the Stddtetag that went against all of his efforts to procure 
more autonomy for the city administrations.29 He had fallen out of step with the regime and 
lost political leverage in the process. Therefore it is hardly surprising that his position in 
Leipzig became increasingly difficult. By May 1935, the NSDAP had pushed all burgerlich 
city councillors out, giving a clear indication of their future treatment of burgerlich 
exponents: the ‘struggle of old and new elites in the National Socialist regime had been 
decided against Goerdeler [that is the BiirgertumY .30
Outside the political arena, Goerdeler had gained considerable standing amongst 
the population of Leipzig. His social policies reconciled the working classes; his strong 
leadership endeared him to the middle and upper classes. He also proved a common 
denominator for the different circles of Leipzig’s Burger. Goerdeler was a figure that could 
unite the different strands of Leipzig’s Biirgertum and bring together the judges, merchants, 
university lecturers, musicians and artists who otherwise would have socialised just 
amongst their own kind. ‘Politicians circulated in such [...] circles only on an individual 
basis. Political manoeuvring and intrigue remained beneath the supposed dignity of 
cultured members of the social elite. The main exception was Dr Carl Goerdeler who 
frequented [all] circles.’31 Moreover, Goerdeler opened his house to those of Leipzig’s 
Biirgertum who found adjusting to the new regime difficult or impossible. Amongst 
frequent guests in the Goerdeler household were the artistic director of the opera Hans
28 Reich, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, p. 223.
29 He still complained bitterly about the decision to curtail communal self-determination in 1941. In a letter he 
bemoaned the fact that the city administrations were totally cut off from the people they were supposed to 
serve as the centralisation of power and abolition of elections meant the complete destruction of self­
administration on communal level. Goerdeler to Max Rehm, 15 June 1941 in Gillmann and Mommsen, 
Politische Schriften, pp. 171-3.
30 Reich, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, p. 267.
31 Goerdeler’s circles were those of ‘plutocracy’ [that dominated Leipzig’s social life] as Friedrich Hund, one 
of Leipzig’s eminent university professors described it. Cassidy, Uncertainty, p. 273.
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Schuler and the university professor Theodor Litt.32 Hans Schuler, an artistic director of 
international standing, had remained at the helm of Leipzig’s opera after Gustav Brecher, 
the institution’s seminal conductor, was forced out of office by the National Socialists. On 
Goerdeler’s advice he joined the NSDAP after Brecher’s departure to prevent ‘the opera 
from falling into the hands of the National Socialists’.33 In 1935, he became the general 
manager of the opera and thus fully entrenched his position there.34 Both men’s visits in 
Goerdeler’s house were more than superficial calls only owed to his position as Lord 
Mayor. The contact to men like Schuler and Litt outlasted the war and both offered support 
to the Goerdeler family after 1945.35
Leipzig’s Biirgertum in the 1930s was, in the words of one of their own, Erich 
Ebermayer, ‘open to the idea of a “national resurgence” (nationale Erhebung), 
“awakening”, economic betterment, a fight against the communists and even, though only 
to a limited extent, against the Eastern European Jews (Ostjuden). [...] but would resist any 
“cultural revolution” in Leipzig [that is a change to their ways]’. Goerdeler was seen as a 
man who could guarantee the safety of Leipzig’s cultural assets and moreover of the 
biirgerliche Lebenswelt.36 Yet National Socialist ideology encroached more and more into 
the cherished world of the ‘reactionary Leipzig’.37
The final straw for Goerdeler came in 1936. Since the springtime, the NSDAP 
Kreisleitung attempted to force Goerdeler to concede to National Socialist sentiment and 
remove the Mendelssohn memorial in front of the Gewandhaus. Yet Goerdeler refused to
32 For Litt see chapter below ‘Leipzig -  city of learning’.
33 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 1326, Blatt 149, 28 March 1946.
34 Fritz Hennenberg, Oper Leipzig (Leipzig, 1992), p. 163.
35 See Marianne Meyer-Krahmer, Carl Goerdeler und sein Weg in den Widerstand: Eine Reise in die Welt 
meines Vaters (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1989), p. 59.
36 ‘Solange er sich als Oberburgermeister in Leipzig halten kann, diirften der Thomanerchor und das 
Gewandhaus [und] auch [das] Stadtische Schauspiel [....] gesichert sein.’ Erich Ebermayer, Denn heute 
gehort uns Deutschland... (Hamburg, 1959), p. 23.
37 Ibid., p. 636.
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comply with the local party’s demands and even brought the matter to the attention of the 
special representative for questions of Jewish culture in the Propaganda Ministry, Hans
38Hinkel. Goerdeler evidently felt the need to strengthen his decision with endorsement 
from the NSDAP, moreover from someone who outranked his local adversaries. Even the 
Propaganda Ministry issued a statement saying that ‘such iconoclasm’ was not desired.39 
Yet, the power struggle continued, especially deputy Lord Mayor Haake set himself apart 
in pressing for the removal of the monument. Goerdeler was by now considering moving to 
private industry, to utilise his economic accomplishment but more importantly ‘just get out 
of this situation with dignity’.40 His first choice was to become an economic consultant for 
the directorate of Krupp, one of Germany’s largest companies. The discussions started in 
late 1935, after Goerdeler’s stint as Reich Price Commissioner had ended. In May 1936, 
Goerdeler wanted to join Krupp. Alfried Krupp sought Hitler’s approval before the final 
decision; Hitler voiced some concern, yet no outright objection.41 Goerdeler began other 
probes but also waited for the outcome of his impending re-election by the now fully 
nazified city council. On 22 May 1936, Goerdeler was confirmed in office, despite his 
growing distance from the regime.42 He was seen as still having ‘the Fiihrer’s trust’.43 
Whereas a re-appointment should have meant a reinvigoration of Goerdeler’s position in 
Leipzig, Haake’s affronts continued. Things finally came to a head when Goerdeler 
travelled to Scandinavia from 8 to 13 November 1936 and Haake promptly used 
Goerdeler’s absence to fulfil his desire to demolish the Mendelssohn monument.44
38 Goerdeler to Mutschmann in Gillmann and Mommsen, Politische Schriften, pp. 96-102.
39 Reich, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, p. 260.
40 Meyer-Krahmer, Carl Goerdeler, p. 81.
41 Joachim Scholtyseck, Robert Bosch und der liberate Widerstand gegen Hitler 1933-1945 (Munich, 1999), 
p. 208. v
42 Goerdeler was re-elected for 12 years. StadtAL, Kapitel 10G, No. 685, Band 1, Blatt 237.
43 Reich, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, p.242. The ‘trust’, however, appears to have been more of a not yet 
outrightly voiced rejection. This was to come in the second half of 1936. See Scholtyseck, Robert Bosch, p. 
209.
44 For details see below: ‘Leipzig -  city of music’.
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Upon his return to Germany, Carl Goerdeler was faced with this fa it accompli in 
direct contempt of his orders. He immediately demanded the return of the memorial to its 
place and threatened his resignation in case this was not implemented. Yet, as has been 
seen, by 1936, Goerdeler had lost a lot of his leverage in Berlin and the National Socialists 
in Leipzig’s city council felt strong enough to defy him. Goerdeler resigned immediately. 
This case has been well documented in the historiography. Most publications, especially 
those concerned with the resistance in the Third Reich, take Goerdeler’s resignation as a 
direct reaction to Haake’s insubordination or as open affront to the regime’s anti-Semitic 
policies.45 Yet, Reich’s argument that Goerdeler’s decision had been made even before this 
act of ‘cultural barbarism’ and that the monument was more of a catalyst for his choice to 
leave office, is more persuasive.46 Scholtyseck supports this notion by explaining that 
Goerdeler ‘abandoned the fiction to prevent worse by remaining in office’ 47
Goerdeler’s progress from this point onwards is well documented in resistance 
studies. He was appointed financial advisor in Robert Bosch’s company, thus providing the 
ideal front to disguise the real reasons for Goerdeler’s now frequent travels abroad.48 
Despite taking up work in Stuttgart at Bosch, Goerdeler and his family continued to live in 
Leipzig, and the Leipzigers continued to revere ‘their Lord Mayor’ 49 When Goerdeler 
attended a Gewandhaus concert after his resignation, he was greeted by ‘unbridled 
applause and elation by the Leipzig Burger’ making the concert one of the ‘most
45 See inter al.: Gerhard Ritter, Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung, (4th edition, 
Stuttgart, 1984), p. 88 and Horst Mazerath ‘Oberburgermeister im Dritten Reich’ in Gerhard Hirschfeld and 
Lothar Kettenacker, The ‘Fiihrerstaat’: myth and reality (Stuttgart, 1981), pp. 228-54, here p. 248. Others 
that have produced this argument usually quote Ritter as their source.
46 Reich states that Goerdeler’s ‘Teilopposition’ intensified since late 1935. See Reich, Carl Friedrich 
Goerdeler, p. 284 .
47 Scholtyseck, Robert Bosch, p. 210. v
48 Goerdeler tried to warn foreign governments in Europe and further afield against National Socialism and 
the threat of war. See Scholtyseck, Robert Bosch and Arthur Primrose Young, The X- Documents (London, 
1974).
49 Taxi drivers would refer to Goerdeler’s address as that of ‘our Lord Mayor. Because he is still our Lord 
Mayor’ even in 1939. Meyer-Krahmer, Carl Goerdeler, p. 70.
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embarrassing hours’ for the National Socialists.50 Apart from losing a respected municipal
leader, Goerdeler’s resignation meant also that the last proponent of the burgerlich Leipzig
had been removed from the political sphere of the city. This process of replacement of the
‘old elite’ Biirgertum repeated itself all over Germany. It often began as early as 1933 with
the exchange of mayors upon the Machtergreifung. Goerdeler was succeeded by Kurt
Walter Donicke, Leipzig’s NSDAP Kreisleiter, as Lord Mayor of Leipzig. The position
had been offered on a national scale, yet the principle of ‘awarding’ old party fighters with
significant posts prevailed and Donicke was thus appointed. Haake had commented on
Goerdeler’s resignation explaining that he ‘had to go’ as ‘he was no National Socialist and
would never become one’. He thereby also outlined that party affiliation was now the
foremost qualification of a new candidate.51 Mutschmann used Donicke’s assumption of
office publicly to denounce Goerdeler:
The predecessor of Donicke has thrown in the towel 
because he noticed that his ‘liberalistic’ [liberalistisch 
in the original] ideas would not come to fruition. This 
Goerdeler might have knowledge and ability as a jurist, 
but that is not enough in the Third Reich. A 
cosmopolitan city (Weltstadt) like Leipzig needs a 
National Socialist like Parteigenosse Donicke.52
Donicke, however, would only survive in office for a year (12 October 1937 to 11 October
1938). He continued to strengthen the party (in continuation of his Kreisleiter duties), yet
proved otherwise stretched in fulfilling his duties.53 Haake, unimpressed by having been
overlooked for the post, plotted against Donicke.54
50 Meyer-Krahmer, Mut zurn Widerstand, p. 145.
51 Ibid., p. 115.
52 Mutschmann quoted in a letter by Goerdeler to him complaining about this public statement. Mutschmann 
had continued by alleging that Goerdeler was now travelling ‘auf Kosten der Stadt in der Welt herum’ giving 
lectures of content that was not consistent with the National Socialist ideology. For this last statement 
Goerdeler demanded public rectification. Goerdeler to Mutschmann October 1937 in Gillmann and 
Mommsen, Politische Schriften, pp. 96-102, here p. 96.
53 Karin Kuhling and Doris Mundus, Leipzigs regierende Biirgermeister vom 13. Jahrhundert bis zur 
Gegenwart (Beucha, 2000), p. 70.
54 Matzerath, “Donicke, Kurt Walter".
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This intrigue and Donicke’s own ineptitude led to his downfall. He managed to incense 
Hitler over a matter of high culture, an area in which any Lord Mayor of Leipzig should 
have been proficient. Presenting Hitler with a print instead of a manuscript of a piece by 
Richard W agner, he lost the goodwill of the Fiihrer. Hitler deemed Donicke to be ‘an 
excellent Kreisleiter, but a mere cypher as mayor [...] the lowest point [of our municipal 
adm inistration]’ and demanded his dismissal.55 With the loss of his mayoral office, 
Donicke also lost all his state and party offices.56 Haake succeeded Donicke, yet only for 
ten months and only in a provisional capacity.57 The old party guard failed to convince in 
their new positions; being just a good Nazi was not sufficient after all.
The old guard was followed by the new elite, able administrators who had proven 
their allegiance to the regime, often as members of the SS. This was also the case in 
Leipzig. The man to lead Leipzig through the Second W orld W ar was SS-Gruppenfiihrer 
Alfred Freyberg. He, too, had joined the NSDAP in the 1920s, just as Donicke and Haake. 
Yet, he set him self apart as an able leader of a political administration securing the first 
state premiership for the NSDAP through his success in Anhalt in 1932.' He set about 
changing Leipzig according to his ideas, ‘pioneering’ anti-Semitic measures, which then 
were adopted as standard across Germany, as will be seen below. He also took a great 
interest in the realm of culture. Freyberg knew to use the kudos of Leipzig as city of music 
to underline his own importance and to ensure the utmost level of self-determination in his 
city administration.'79 Yet, his knowledge in the cultural field was limited. He had to rely 
heavily on his Kulturdezernent Friedrich August Hauptmann to explain the details of
^  Hugh Trevor-Roper. H itler's Table Talk 1941-1944 (New York. 2000), p. 148.
!'6 Despite this, Donicke rem ained true to the Third Reich and committed suicide upon its defeat in 1945. 
M atzerath. “Donicke, Kurt W alter’1.
57 Kuhling and M undus. Leipzigs regierende Biirgermeister, p. 70.
58 Ibid.. p.72.
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Leipzig’s cultural tradition and institutions.60 Despite this he followed very ambitious 
plans, including the substitution of St Thomas’s Choir with a school choir from a National 
Socialist elite music school (Musisches Gymnasium) which he founded in the city. The 
project seriously endangered both St Thomas’s existence as well as the reputation of 
Leipzig as a cultural centre.61 His plans were so far reaching that even the Reich Ministry 
for Education and its Minister Bernhard Rust, who was the first to promote the idea of a 
National Socialist music school, distanced themselves from the project and later refused 
their support completely, causing it to fail in 1943.62
Freyberg attempted to put his stamp on Leipzig. He had taken office, however, at a 
time when the Lord Mayor was a mere footnote to the organisation of the Reich. Strictly 
bound within the party regime and the overall structure of the state’s administration, 
Freyberg was reduced in most politically important fields to a recipient of orders. The city 
was just another layer in the coordinated structure of the Reich; it had lost entirely the 
independence of the Weimar years. The only way in which Freyberg could act 
‘progressively’ was to enforce and intensify National Socialist measures beyond the ‘letter 
of the law’. Steffen Held attributes to Freyberg an ‘anti-Semitic mindset filled with 
hatred’. The position of Lord Mayor was just the realm in which to act out these 
sentiments. Leipzig had already suffered the same depletion as other German cities through 
the ostracism of its Jewish citizens, many of whom had been an integral part of the city’s 
public life both in business and culture. Carl Goerdeler, although privately a critic of the 
more outrageous acts of anti-Semitism, did not prevent the local NSDAP from seizing
60 See inter al.: StadtAL, Rat der Stadt, Kapitel 32, No. 31, Beiheft 2/1, Blatt 167-89 (1939-42).
61 ‘...dann allerdings wird es nicht mehr lange dauern und kein Mensch spricht mehr von der Musikstadt 
Leipzig’ Ibid., Blatt 196-7; for the Musisches Gymnasium see Werner Heldmann, Musisches Gymnasium 
Frankfurt am Main 1939-45 (Berlin, 2004).
62 Freyberg complained about the lack of support from minister Rust, but to no avail. Sachsisches 
Staatsarchiv, Staatsarchiv Leipzig, (SStA Leipzig), No. 21117/3, NSDAP Leipzig, Blatt 27-8.
63 See Steffen Held, Die Leipziger Stadtverwaltung und die Deportation der Juden im NS-Staat (Leipzig,
2008), p. 11.
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authority in this field. He voiced his opinion in individual cases and acted for the most part 
only to ease and not to prevent anti-Semitic measures.64 Freyberg, rather than merely 
acquiescing, took an active part in the expansion and intensification of anti-Semitic 
policies in his city. Thus Leipzig became the first city in the Reich to introduce separate 
food rationing cards for Jews in 1939. Five separate food stores for Jews were opened; 
other retail outlets were forbidden to sell to those with a T  printed on their rationing cards. 
Another first was the implementation in 1940 of an unlimited obligation for Jews to work. 
This measure was so ‘successful’ that the Leipzig model was later copied throughout the 
Reich. Freyberg had accomplished his mission to put Leipzig on the National Socialist
65map.
The Lord Mayor also initiated changes in Leipzig’s cultural life. He felt that this 
outstanding characteristic of his city would serve well to cement his position and maybe 
further his own standing in the Reich. A special concern of his was the de-Christianisation 
of culture and thereby public life. Anti-Christian measures were a favourite field of activity 
of the SS and a certain way to find Himmler’s approval.66 A ‘proper’ Germanic belief was 
to replace Christianity, which had been ‘forced upon Germany by Rome’. Freyberg 
followed this dictum and tried to ‘Germanize’ Leipzig’s church culture. Of the myriad of 
examples a very prominent case shall suffice as illustration. In 1942, Freyberg attempted to 
re-designate the Friday motets of St Thomas’s Choir in the church of St Thomas as 
‘Heroes’ Requiems’, thereby excluding the Christian element of this weekly institution in 
the Leipzig cultural calendar. The Cantor of St Thomas, Gunther Ramin, was able to 
prevent the secularization of the concerts by quoting from field post letters of Leipzig
64 Steffen Held, ‘Carl Goerdeler in Leipzig -  Antisemitismus und Kommunalverwaltung 1933-36’ in Dan 
Diner (ed.), Leipziger Beitrdge zur jiidischen Geschichte und Kultur, Volume 1 (Munich, 2003), pp. 283-310.
65 Held, Die Leipziger Stadtverwaltung, p. 12.
66 Wilhelm, Die Diktaturen, p. 121.
67 Carsten Schreiber, Elite im Verborgenen: Ideologie und Herrschaftspraxis des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS 
und seines Netzwerkes am Beispiel Sachsens (Munich, 2008), p. 60.
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soldiers who said that they had been gaining strength at the front from the knowledge that 
they fought for the great tradition of St Thomas. Thereby Ramin managed to retain the link 
to Christianity.68
Freyberg’s ‘reorganisation’ of public life and especially his interference in 
cultural matters, particularly in the second and third year of war, succeeded in ‘alienating 
wide circles of Leipzig’s population’.69 This did not go unnoticed in the city administration 
whose cultural department, especially the Kulturdezement Hauptmann, had worked to 
ensure that Freyberg’s restructuring advances were blocked or at least neutralised in their
70impact. Nevertheless, the mood in the population became more and more reserved 
towards Freyberg’s ‘initiatives’.
This change in public opinion aided the establishment of new resistance groups in 
Leipzig.71 Carl Goerdeler had been active since his resignation in organising the biirgerlich 
and military resistance to Hitler. His Leipzig house was one of the frequent meeting places
79of this conservative movement. The initial resistance by the other side of the political 
spectrum, both Social Democratic and communist, was thoroughly destroyed at the 
beginning of National Socialist rule in 1933-34. Covering a wide-ranging spectrum, the left 
wing resistance was not successful, either in proliferation of their ideas or in securing the 
safety of the resisters themselves. Once leaflets directed against the NSDAP started to 
appear in Leipzig, the prominent left wing activists were rounded up and detained. Erich 
Zeigner, who had been imprisoned for three years following his stint as head of the Saxon 
Social Democratic and communist government in 1923, was arrested again in 1934 for his
68 See Bluemel, ‘The Triad of St Thomas’, especially p. 43.
69 ‘Weite Kreise der Bevolkerung stark befremden’, this was the verdict on the effect of Freyberg’s ideas by 
the department for culture. StadtAL, Kapitel 32, No. 31, Beiheft 7, Blatt 49, 4 January 1941; Gunther Ramin 
used the public sentiment in his argumentation whenever Freyberg attempted to interfere in St Thomas’s 
Choir’s church services. See inter al.: Ibid., No. 54, Blatt 69, 11 April 1942.
70 Ibid., Blatt 44-8 and Ibid., No. 54, Blatt 23.
71 Jurgen Tubbesing, Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland -  Antifaschistischer Block -  Einheitspartei: 
Aspekte der Geschichte der antifaschistischen Bewegung in Leipzig (Beucha, 1996), p. 53.
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participation in the distribution of these illegal leaflets.73 Yet through his persistent denial 
that frustrated all police interrogation methods, he was acquitted, unlike most of his fellow 
conspirators.74 At this stage of the Third Reich, all ‘escaped’ with mere prison sentences. 
Nevertheless, this blow to the left-wing resistance proved potent enough to neutralise any 
potential resistance throughout the remainder of the 1930s. This ‘failure’ of resistance from 
within Germany -  the organised groups of all political persuasions were eventually 
uncovered and sentenced -  focused minds on resistance from the outside.75 The sections of 
the German workers’ parties set up in exile were also afflicted by the paralysis of their 
counterparts back at home. Thus it was a truly external initiative that was to facilitate the 
decisive resistance in Leipzig.
The founding of the Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland (NKFD) in Russia in 
July 1943, was the outside incentive needed. The NKFD was created on orders of the 
Soviet leadership by German exiles in the Soviet Union and German prisoners of war. It 
was designed as a platform to fight National Socialism and further German resistance. This 
was especially true for its German officers’ branch, which was designed to combat the 
ideology amongst the German soldiers in Soviet captivity. It soon had branches in other 
European countries, mostly those under German occupation. Leipzig had its own NKFD, 
founded in September 1943.76
The historiography paints a heterogeneous picture as to the exact nature of the 
NKFD and its branches. Gerd Ueberschar describes the branches outside the Soviet Union 
as belonging to an -  albeit loosely connected -  network, implying that the NKFD was a
72 Lothar Pickenhain, ‘Goerdeler saB auf dem Boden vor dem Radio’ in Mitteilungen des Thomanerbundes 
e.V. (Leipzig, November 2003), pp. 26-8.
73 Hans Dieter Schmid, ‘Erich Zeignervund der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus in den DreiBiger 
Jahren’ in Rudloff, Erich Zeigner, pp. 95-105.
74 SStA Leipzig, 0233 Zeigner, Blatt 12, Curriculum Vitae by Zeigner.
75 Jurgen Faulenbach and Carola Schuller, Deutscher Widerstand 1933-45 (Bonn, 2004).
76 Gerd R. Ueberschar and Sabine R. Arnold, Das NKFD und der BDO im Kampf gegen Hitler 1943-45 
(Frankfurt am Main, 1995).
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coherent structure. Heike Bungert by contrast asserts that the NKFD groups outside the 
Soviet Union were wholly independent from the original organisation. For the NKFD in 
Leipzig, Edgar Bottcher stated even in the mid 1960s that it only bore the name NKFD 
because its protagonists had heard about the Moscow organisation on the radio. There had 
never been any contact with the Soviet original.77 Nevertheless, the majority of the NKFD 
members were communists and Soviet-philes despite the organisation’s own remit of 
uniting all anti-fascist movements.78
Freyberg was informed about the formation of the NKFD from the very beginning. 
In his capacity as SS-Gruppenfiihrer, he had also been active in the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) 
and was using these contacts for his office as head of Leipzig’s city government. Indeed, it 
was initially through Freyberg that the SD gained access to the town hall of the city and 
could operate from such a level, a unique occurrence in Saxony.79 Freyberg had the NKFD 
infiltrated to the extent that he felt it safe to let it continue with its work as he was fully 
informed about its actions, which amounted mostly to propagating anti-National Socialist 
ideas by a handful of leaflets, talks and other rather low key operations. However, this 
laissez-faire attitude was to end after July 1944; the entire NKFD leadership was arrested 
and sentenced to death. No one had anticipated this move, the infiltration was by trusted 
left-wing activists, therefore the leadership structure was wiped out completely.80 Yet, once 
the shock had been overcome, a new generation of resisters formed another NKFD in late 
1944. Members in this new group included the kernel of the forthcoming city 
administration, most notably Helmut Holtzhauer, one of the new leaders in the NKFD who
77 Ibid., Heike Bungert, Das Nationalkomitee und der Westen (Stuttgart, 1997) and Edgar Bottcher, Der 
Kam pfdes Nationalkomitees Freies Deutschland rettet Leipzig am Ende des zweiten Weltkrieges vor der 
7£rstdrung (Leipzig, 1965).
78 The historiography is divided on the( matter of how homogenous /heterogeneous the left-wing resistance in 
Leipzig was and how this affected on its impact and post-war development. See Carsten Voigt, 
‘Kommunistischer Widerstand in Leipzig 1943/44’ in Internationale wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur 
Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, Heft 2/2002, pp. 141-81.
79 Schreiber, Elite im Verborgenen, p. 364.
80 Tubbesing, Nationalkomitee, p. 64 .
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was later to become mayor for finance in Leipzig. It took, however, until the approach of 
the American army in April 1945 to organise a considered public resistance against the 
National Socialist city government.81 Before, the lion’s share of the NKFD’s work 
exhausted itself through organising small branches of the National Committee in the city’s 
quarters and suburbs as well as inside factories. In this the NKFD proved most successful.
Upon the American approach, the committee counted 4500 members and 38 sub-
82branches. Therefore, the resistance could strike with an orchestrated effort in many areas 
at once. Their main aim was the handover of Leipzig as an open city. The continuous heavy 
bombing of Leipzig that had started with the firestorm attack of 4 December 1943 had 
worn the population down; therefore there was no appetite for a defence until death. 
Numerous letters to the Lord Mayor exemplified this.83 Freyberg agreed and decided 
against the defence of Leipzig on 8 April 1945; what happened to ‘fortress cities’ was 
shown in Breslau’s agonising downfall in the first days of April.84 Gauleiter Mutschmann 
on the other hand insisted on holding Leipzig. He had Freyberg virtually deposed by
o c
placing him under supervision. The Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten newspaper was 
calling for perseverance in line with Mutschmann. Furthermore, on 12 April 1945 
Himmler’s order proclaiming that ‘no German city will be declared an open city’ was 
published, making acts promoting surrender or just hindering military efforts punishable by 
death.86
81 Ibid., p. 65.
82 Gerhard Steinecke, Drei Tage im April, Kriegsende in Leipzig (Leipzig, 2005), p. 22.
83 The Leipziger had a very clear picture of what would happen to their city and themselves should any 
resistance be encountered by the approaching troops. Letters reached Freyberg pleading: ‘Herr 
Oberbiirgermeister! Wir bitten Sie herzlich, Leipzig nicht in Grund und Boden schieBen zu lassen. Denken 
Sie auch als Mensch an alle Frauen und Kinder. Wir flehen Sie an! Lassen Sie uns das Dach tiber dem Kopf. 
[...] Lassen Sie Leipzig nicht vernicht^n, bitte, bitte. Wir wollen am Leben bleiben.’ StadtAL, Kapitel 72, No. 
114, Band III, Blatt 97, letter by a ‘M.P. und Frau’.
84 Wolfgang Fleischer, Kriegsende in Sachsen (Wolfersheim, 2004); for Breslau: Gregor Thum, Die fremde 
Stadt -  Breslau 1945 (Munich, 2003).
85 Bottcher, Der Kampf, p. 43.
86 Andreas Kunz, Wehrmacht und Niederlage, (Munich, 2007), p. 236.
46
Freyberg had to reiterate this in a radio address two days later where he urged the 
population to ‘continue with their duties’ and reassuring them that he would not leave the 
city. In his radio address Freyberg was accompanied by the SS-Brigadefuhrer Grohmann, 
Leipzig’s police commissioner, who was at his side. He kept a close watch on Freyberg 
since his ‘indiscretion’ about the defence of the town. The hopelessness of the situation 
was, however, obvious as Freyberg closed his speech with the words ‘God save our city’. 
Anyone who had observed Freyberg’s earlier attempts at De-Christianisation would have 
noted the bitter irony in this public statement.87
Indeed the Western front was closing in on Leipzig; Magdeburg, to the north of 
Leipzig, had been encircled just two days before Freyberg’s speech on 13 April. On that 
day, Jena, to the south of Leipzig, was taken by American troops.88 In this situation the 
NKFD was not impressed by Himmler’s order. Who was to punish disobedience given that 
the Americans were already knocking on the front door? On the day of Freyberg’s speech 
they issued leaflets calling for immediate surrender. Calling for ‘Freedom -  Peace -  Bread’ 
they addressed the main concerns of the public and urged the Leipzigers to mark their 
buildings with white flags and prevent Germans (civilians, but more importantly military) 
from resisting the American troops if possible.89 In an open letter on 16 April 1945 to both 
Freyberg and police commissioner Grohmann, they urged an end to the fighting. Leipzig’s 
population did not need much persuasion. Housewives convinced Volkssturm and also 
Wehrmacht soldiers to lay down their weapons.90
87 For the speech see Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten, 15 April 1945, for Grohmann see: Bottcher, Der Kampf, 
p. 43.
88 On 25 April finally, the American and the Russian troops met at Torgau, to the North East of Leipzig, on 
the Mulde River. Manfred Wille, D er Krieg ist aus, Madgeburg 1945 (Gudensberg-Gleichen, 2004), Ronald 
Heinemann, ‘Der amerikanische Friihljng’ in Einestages 16 May 2005, Spiegel Online, http://www.spiegel.de 
(accessed 22 May 2009).
89 The NKFD slogan was evocative of the old National Socialist rallying cry ‘Arbeit -  Freiheit -  Brof against 
the ‘bankrupt’ Weimar system, and would have probably been received as a sarcastic reminder and blow 
against the Nazi system that had now been proven bankrupt itself.
90 Ursula Oehme, Alltag in Ruinen, Leipzig 1945-49, Begleitbuch zur Ausstellung (Leipzig, 1995), p. 10.
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Entire quarters of the city would be taken without resistance (Leutzsch, Lindenau, 
Plagwitz) and the troops of the American 1st Army encountered white flags and flowers. 
The only heavy fighting took place around the Volkerschlachtdenkmal, which finally ended 
on 20 April 1945. When the Americans entered the town hall, they found the bodies of 
Freyberg, his closest colleagues and their families.91 Suicides in 1945 were not a rarity. 
Especially amongst high ranking National Socialists this was a common resort to escape 
the inevitable capture. Hitler, Bormann, Goebbels, but also lesser officials turned to this 
method in view of the German defeat. Freyberg’s erstwhile colleague in the Anhalt cabinet 
and later Gauleiter of Halle-Merseburg, Joachim Eggeling, also committed suicide when 
faced with the impending occupation of Halle on 15 April 1945.92
Once established in Leipzig, the US military administration under Major Richard 
Eaton was initially puzzled by the National Committee. They previously had encountered 
small groups of antifascist activists in the west of Germany (for example in Frankfurt and 
Hanover), yet none of these had any organisation or influence worth mentioning. The 
Americans were wholly unprepared for this ‘first resistance movement of size and 
weight’.93 With the NKFD they faced a formidable organisation with a large membership 
that had proven its efficiency and influence by preventing a full battle for the city as well as 
organising the arrest of prominent National Socialists. The National Committee had also 
set up open bureaus from 18 April onwards and thus established a form of city 
administration on their own. Their self-confidence in the face of the American forces
91 Steinecke, Drei Tage im April, p. 27.
92 For an in-depth study of suicides in Germany in the final year of the Second World War see Christian 
Goeschel, Suicide in Nazi Germany (Qxford, 2009), for Eggeling see: Rudolf Jordan und Joachim Eggeling, 
(mdr Documentary 2007), by Ernst-Michael Brandt. Lee Miller took pictures of the dead Freyberg and his 
family when their remains were found by the Americans entering the town hall. See: Lee Miller Archive, 
http://www.leemiller.co.uk (accessed 22 May 2009).
93 Klaus-Dietmar Henke, ‘Die amerikanische Militarverwaltung und das Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland, 
Leipzig’ in Henke, Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands (Munich, 1996), pp. 701-14, here p. 701.
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stemmed on the one hand from the considerable success their organising and leafleting 
actions had, but also from the feeling of responsibility towards those in their ranks who had 
died for the fight against National Socialism.94 Moreover, the NKFD played a vital role in 
upholding public order. Their resistance became seamlessly a ‘network of self- 
administrative units that regulated the social, political and economic aspects’ of Leipzig 
immediately after the entry into the city of US-troops.95
This proved a great difficulty for the Americans. First, they did not expect such a 
level of self-confident demands of participation and secondly, they could not square this 
with their own ideas of how to progress. Especially in Leipzig, where the US-occupation 
was of limited duration, it appears that the American troops were not interested in 
establishing a Strong city administration, which the NKFD would have certainly been.
It is still debated amongst historians if it was this friction that led to the decision 
to bypass the NKFD’s preferred candidate Paul KloB for the post of mayor in Leipzig.96 
Instead Dr Hans Vierling was chosen, a National Conservative and former member of the 
Stahlhelm. The Americans thus chose a member of the exact political circles that had 
helped the Nazi party gain power throughout Germany. Whereas Henke asserts that 
Vierling was chosen out of a need of the American military government to demonstrate its 
independence from and priority over the NKFD, others allege that it might have ‘just’ been 
tactlessness and ignorance.97 Scholars in the GDR naturally saw this choice as an open 
affront against the ‘true’ antifascists of the National Committee by the imperialist
94 Ibid.
95 Tubbesing, Nationalkomitee, p. 76. The NKFD Leipzig was the largest but not the only antifascist 
committee. Antifascist committees sprang up throughout Germany in the spring and summer of 1945. These 
citizens’ committees were all involved, to varying extent, in the reconstruction efforts of their towns and 
cities. For a good overview see Gareth Pritchard, The making o f the GDR 1945-53, pp. 30-56.
96 Paul KloB was an old cadre KPD member who had spent most of the National Socialist rule in 
concentration camps. See Michael Schwartz, Vertriebene und “Umsiedlerpolitik” (Munich, 2004), p. 207. 
The head of the German city administration under the Americans was just a mayor, the position of Lord 
Mayor was temporarily abolished.
97 Wilhelm, Die Diktaturen, p. 204.
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•' 98American forces. In any case, Vierling proved a malleable candidate for the Americans. 
He was very deferential in his dealings with the military government and also arranged his 
city government in accordance with American sensibilities. Vierling created an advisory 
board dominated by Leipzig’s industry and trade, whilst the NKFD was completely 
excluded from his initial administration."
The NKFD was mistrusted by Leipzig’s military government on the basis of its 
socialist leanings. Yet, the calls of the National Committee for a ‘socialist republic’ had 
quietened after the end of National Socialist rule; instead the idea of a ‘truly democratic 
Germany’ was propagated.100 At its constitutive assembly on 23 April 1945, the NKFD 
selected 15 members for its executive committee that included two priests and Saxony’s 
erstwhile Prime Minister Erich Zeigner. The other members were also not all 
communists.101 Nonetheless, the rifts between the differing strands of the antifascist 
movement were never fully overcome.102 This, however, did not hinder the committee 
from productive work. It still fulfilled its assumed role as organizers of Leipzig’s social, 
economic but also political life. In this it acted mostly independently of the American 
military government who became increasingly annoyed at the self-confidence of the 
NKFD. The National Committee proclaimed its measures next to the official notes 
displayed by the American authorities, implying equal status. The result of this was the 
eventual ban of the Committee on 28 April, just 10 days after the American arrival in
98 Kurt Bailer, ‘Der antifaschistische Widerstandskampf unter Fiihrung der KPD im Gebiet des ehemaligen 
KPD Bezirkes Leipzig Westsachsen 1941-45’, Diss. (Karl-Marx-Universitat Leipzig, 1973).
99 Tubbesing, Das Nationalkomitee, p. 77.
100 Wilhelm, Die Diktaturen, p. 207.
101 As parties were still banned in Germany, the party allegiances are retrospective: 9 KPD, 2 SPD (including 
Erich Zeigner), 2 CDU, 1 LDPD, 1 Independent. See Tubbesing, Nationalkomitee, p. 79
102 The extent of the rifts is fervently debated in the historiography. The most outspoken proponent of the idea 
of a deeply divided movement is Carsten Voigt, Horst Schmollinger on the other hand supports the notion 
that differences were put aside to work together on the task at hand. Jurgen Tubbesing occupies the middle 
ground by stating that a rapprochement of opinions occurred within the NKFD after the constituent assembly, 
yet differences were never fully overcome. See Voigt, ‘Kommunistischer Widerstand’, p. 141; Horst 
Schmollinger ‘Das Bezirkskomitee Freies Deutschland in Leipzig’ in Lutz Niethammer and Ulrich Borsdorf
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Leipzig. Although the organisation accepted the ban without revolt, the Americans 
proceeded to arrest over 300 former NKFD members after the ban with the aid of the not 
yet denazified Leipzig police. This was the same body of men that had helped the SS round 
up the first generation of the NKFD in 1944 and who, in the final days of National Socialist 
rule in Leipzig, had shot 52 political prisoners in a police prison in Leipzig-Lindenthal.103 
Although all the men detained on US orders were subsequently released again, the incident 
aroused even more anger amongst Leipzig’s antifascists than their choice of a Stahlhelm 
man as mayor. Even General Clay’s denazification consultant Walter L. Dorn later rated 
the measure as ‘political idiocy’.104 This line of action seriously discredited American 
policy in Leipzig. How was democracy to be established if Nazis were ordered to lock up 
those antifascists whose politics one found uncongenial?105 Such action not only evoked 
uncomfortably recent Nazi practice of locking up opponents without even bothering to find 
a legal pretext for locking them up, it also recalled in the most unfortunate manner the 
actions of the Weimar government in using the army to overthrow Saxony’s elected left- 
wing government in 1923. Therefore, for a third time in a generation, left-wing politicians 
in Leipzig had been locked up by armed units, simply because they were members of the 
political left and not of the right. This incident served to broaden the distance felt by the 
majority of the NKFD, not least their communist members, from the occupation power; old 
sentiments that condemned the ‘imperialist’ nature of the Americans surfaced again, this 
time underpinned by the ‘political’ character of the ban of the NKFD.106 The result was a 
strengthening of the far left in the antifascist circles in Leipzig. The National Committee’s 
clandestine successor organization, the Antifaschistischer Block (Antifascist Bloc, AB),
(eds.), Arbeiterinitiative 1945 (Wuppertal, 1976), pp. 219-251, here p. 227; Tubbesing, Nationalkomitee, p. 
55.
103 Bottcher, Der Kampf, p. 47.
104 Dorn cited in Henke, ‘Die amerikanische Militarverwaltung’, p. 707.
105 Wilhelm, Die Diktaturen, p. 207.
106 Ibid., p. 708.
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already showed signs of moving further to the left and strengthening the communist
107 •influence. The Antifascist Bloc was criticizing Vierling in open letters, mostly 
complaining about the lack of denazification of his administration and the general lack of 
organisation in the city. It might have been this change of atmosphere that swayed mayor 
Vierling to accept one of the former NKFD executives in his city administration. Erich 
Zeigner was promoted to the posts of legal counsel and Kulturdezement, albeit ‘more 
tolerated than supported’ in these capacities.108 The grievances of the Antifascist Bloc, 
however, were not addressed before the changeover of occupation powers. On 15 June, 
Fritz Selbmann, by now the established leader of the communist strand of the Antifascist 
Bloc, wrote an open letter addressed to General Eisenhower, pointing again -  as the 
Antifascist Bloc had done previously in the open letters to Vierling -  to the fact that the 
city’s administration was ‘riddled’ with active NSDAP members who had remained in 
office without problems. Furthermore, a police force made up mainly of National Socialists 
was supervising ‘true antifascists’, which struck them as a ‘clear sign’ that Major Eaton 
was ‘favouring the Nazis’.109
Despite all the discontent with the American forces there is no doubt that the 
majority of Leipzig’s population regarded them as the lesser evil compared to an 
occupation by the Red Army. When the rumours of a hand-over to the Soviets gained 
strength, the issue of whether Leipzig was to ‘remain American’ or ‘become Russian’ 
dominated the mood in the city. All American intelligence services deployed in Leipzig, 
the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD), the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) and the
107 The Antifascist Bloc came under KPD control on the initiative of Fritz Selbmann, a later leading member 
of the KPD/SED. See Tubbesing, Nationalkomitee, p. 82.
108 Claudia Lang, ‘ “Ich bin kein Freund der Diktatur, aber...“ Kontinuitat und Wandel in Erich Zeigners 
Wirken als Oberbiirgermeister von Leipzig 1945-9’ in Rudloff, Erich Zeigner, pp. 119-51, here p. 125.
109 Subsequently, Selbmann was advised by a Soviet officer, who was facilitating the return of forced 
labourers to their home countries, to go into hiding. There he was to remain until the -  by now openly 
rumoured -  switch to the Russian forces had taken place. Fritz Selbmann, Alternative-Bilanz-Credo (Halle, 
1969); copy of the letter to Eisenhower, pp. 514-22.
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Office of Strategic Service (OSS), came to the same conclusion -  absolutely nothing 
surpassed this question in importance and urgency, it ‘overshadowed everyone’s 
thoughts’.110 The fear of the Soviets was strong enough to persuade substantial numbers to 
flee to the West; especially members of the NSDAP were quick to leave. The Leipziger 
Wemer Schumann describes how his brother, a rank and file member of the Nazi party, left 
on the same day he had first heard of the rumours without taking any of his belongings; 
such was the level of panic.111
Therefore, when the Russians took over in accordance with the Yalta agreement
on 1 July, they were greeted with caution by most Leipzigers. Women were told to stay at
home, shops remained closed, the flowers that had greeted the Americans had not been
replaced for the welcome of the Russians.112 As Schumann put it: ‘The difference in the
reception was that of day and night. Whereas the Americans had been greeted as victorious
liberators, the entrance of the Russians resembled a funeral procession. No one was
cheering, there was respectful restraint.’113 Indeed, the fear of the Red Army was a
predominant notion in the city. Yet, the first days after the take over were a ‘positive
surprise’ for Leipzig’s population. As one young woman stated:
I had only expected bad things from the Russians. But 
so far their coming had only positive effects, they have 
removed all American signs: “Do Not Stop”, “Keep 
Out”, “Only for Military Personnel”. Curfews have 
been lifted, public pools and cinemas opened, you can 
sit again on all benches, public meetings are allowed 
again. It is just a pity that I can’t do anything with my 
school English.
110 Henke, ‘Der Abzug aus Sachsen und Thuringen’ in Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands, pp. 714- 
42, here p. 714.
111 Werner Schumann, Die Russen in Leipzig 1945-50, Tagebuch eines Leipzigers, Volume 7 (Dreieich,
1993), p. 7.
112 Even though the full extent was not known (the real figures surpassed by far the feared number), the 
massive problem of rape that had accompanied the Red Army occupation was well known through the witness 
reports of refugees from the East who had passed through Leipzig. Hence, it seemed advisable for women to 
keep out of sight. See inter al.: Norman Naimark, ‘Soviet Soldiers, German Women and the Problem of Rape’ 
in Naimark, The Russians in Germany, pp. 69-140.
113 Schumann, Die Russen in Leipzig, p. 11.
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Indeed, with the departure of the Americans the myriad of prohibitions and petty 
chicaneries that had characterised US-rule disappeared; there was, briefly, a whiff of 
freedom in the air and public life in Leipzig began to resume.114 Soon, however, the brutal 
conduct of the Red Army soldiers towards the civilian population that plagued most of the 
Soviet Zone of Occupation also reached Leipzig; here, violence, looting and harassment of 
women, even in daylight, continued well beyond 1948. Schumann reports an incident in 
January 1946 where a drunken Soviet soldier killed fifteen people and injured over thirty 
by driving his car into a crowd. No charges were brought against the soldier and all public 
debate was hushed up, a ban was imposed on any reports of the event in newspapers or the 
radio.115 Hubertus Knabe offers photographic evidence from 1948 of a girl in Leipzig being 
harassed by two Russian soldiers and robbed of her bicycle. He concludes that the overall 
conduct of the Red Army in the Soviet Zone left the ‘picture of the brutal conqueror in the 
collective mind’ of those living under Russian occupation.116
For Leipzig’s city administration this change meant a new military government. 
Nikolaj Ivanovich Trufanov, a general who had fought both at Stalingrad and in the final 
battle for Berlin, proved unexpectedly congenial and keen to reconstruct Leipzig and 
especially its cultural tradition.117 His first orders included the legalisation of the 
Antifascist Bloc and broadening the area of responsibility and function for the organisation.
114 ‘Ich hatte von den Russen nur Schlechtes erwartet. Aber bis jetzt hat sich ihr Kommen nur vorteilhaft 
ausgewirkt, sie haben alle Schilder der Amerikaner entfernt: Nicht Stehenbleiben, Eintritt Verboten, Nur fiir 
Militar. Auch Ausgangssperren wurden aufgehoben, Bader und Kinos geoffnet, man darf sich wieder auf alle 
Banke setzen, auch Versammlungen diirfen wieder stattfinden. Schade nur, daB ich mit meinen englischen 
Schulkenntnissen nichts anfangen kann.’ Diary of Eva Salzer, 6 July 1945 in Oehme, Alltag, p. 21.
115 Schumann, Die Russen in Leipzig, p. 25.
116 This obviously tainted the reconstruction attempts by the Soviet military administration. Even real efforts 
to improve the situation by Russian officials were received with suspicion. Hubertus Knabe, Tag der 
Befreiung? Das Kriegsende in Ostdeutschland (Berlin, 2005), photo 9, quote: p. 91.
117 Trufanov (1900-1982) was trying in earnest to alleviate the problems of Leipzig’s population as soon as he 
was given his position by the head of the Soviet military administration in Germany (SMAD) Zhukov. See 
SStA Leipzig, SED Sammlung Biographien, No. 729, Trufanov.
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In the same vein, parties were allowed to form again, as they had been in the rest of the 
Soviet Zone of Occupation since June. This was in marked contrast to the American Zone 
where political life remained suspended and political parties had to undergo a lengthy 
licensing process that only began to get under way in late summer 1945.118 Both the SPD 
and the KPD had rebuilt their structures soon after the Americans had entered Leipzig, thus 
the ‘foundation’ was a mere formality. Now operating in the open, the parties were more 
inclined to pursue their respective aims rather than work together. The common goal was 
gradually supplanted by party politics. Before the onset of this development, however, both 
parties agreed on a candidate suitable to replace the hated Vierling -  Erich Zeigner. 
Zeigner, although a member of the SPD, had shown a readiness in the past to work with the 
KPD and therefore was deemed suitable by the communists who recognized that they could 
not push for one of their own against the rest of the antifascist activists in Leipzig. Thus 
Zeigner was put forward and found the approval of Trufanov. On 5 July, Zeigner was 
informed that he would be instated as Lord Mayor. His predecessor Vierling was informed 
on 14 July that he had to step down on orders ‘from the SMAD in Berlin’ and had to vacate 
his post by 16 July. Trufanov assured Vierling that it was merely a political decision and 
that there were no personal objections against him.119 Zeigner was quietly pleased with his 
new position; he was ‘striving for an office of practical power without binding himself too 
closely to any political direction’.120 Yet, he was also aware of potential pitfalls that this 
position carried.121 Already on 4 July, Walter Ulbricht had travelled to Leipzig to instruct
118 The Soviets allowed the formation o f  ‘democratic antifascist’ parties from June 1945 onwards, the 
Americans were slower and drew out the process of licensing of political parties into the autumn of 1945. See 
Hans Woller, Gesellschaft und Politik in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone (Munich, 1986), p. 167.
119 StadtAL, StVuR (1), No. 3211, Blsitt 572, 5 July 1945 (for Zeigner’s appointment) and Blatt 548, 14 July 
1945 and 550, 16 July 1945 (for Vierling).
120 Lang, ‘Ich bin kein Freund’, p. 123.
121 He stated: ‘I have taken the post as I do not see anyone today, much less so than back then [he means his 
stint as Saxon prime minister] who is suitable for the position.’ StadtAL, NachlaB Zeigner, No. 466, Blatt 3, 
15 July 1945.
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the local KPD to concentrate on the city administration.122 Zeigner was indeed helpful in 
this. In his administration he included several KPD members.123 Especially in the realm of 
culture, the KPD was quick to occupy the crucial positions. Helmuth Holtzhauer became 
head of the department for Volksbildung, Rudolf Hartig was appointed to the helm of the 
department for culture. Both men were old cadre KPD; Holtzhauer had also been a 
significant figure in the NKFD. Both Holtzhauer and Hartig strove to assert their power in 
their respective fields thoroughly and Holtzhauer soon acquired a reputation to usurp 
responsibilities for his department that lay normally with the Lord Mayor or even further 
afield.124 In a sense, Holtzhauer’s conduct was reminiscent of that of Goerdeler’s deputy 
Haake who also attempted to seize power beyond his remit (although Zeigner, unlike 
Goerdeler, had chosen this assistant). Erich Zeigner had to tread a fine line of cooperation 
with both KPD men, first to ensure that his own powers where not curtailed and secondly 
to avert any decisions that would go against his vision for Leipzig.
As Claudia Lang has pointed out, the Lord Mayor had unprecedented powers, with 
nearly no limitations from the German side. Zeigner held all powers that would have come 
under the remit of the Reich level. Therefore, he was able to exercise authority over the 
university, the schools, national banks, local jurisdiction and also the private sector. He 
enjoyed a good rapport with the city commander Trufanov and thus showed great 
confidence in dealing with his superiors in the extended Soviet administration. The Soviet 
military administration in Saxony (SMAS) and its equivalent for the whole zone, the 
SMAD as well as the newly instated Landesverwaltung Sachsen intertwined with each 
other in a complex interplay of responsibilities, which sometimes led to clashing
122 Tubbesing, Nationalkomitee, p. 104.
123 Zeigner was the sole decision maker in the distribution of offices, thus it can be safely assumed that he 
chose his preferred candidates. See Lang, ‘Ich bin kein Freund’, p. 127.
124 Holtzhauer tried to bring the university of Leipzig fully under city control and thereby under the direct 
authority of his department, thus curtailing the Saxon Land government’s influence over the institution. See 
chapter ‘Leipzig -  city of learning’.
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demands.125 It was also not always the Soviet side that was pulling the strings, as will be 
seen in the case of Leipzig’s university in the chapters below. The Landesverwaltung 
stressed its power as a virtual ‘party headquarters’ for the communists with the old cadre 
KPD member Kurt Fischer in a key position.126 Yet, in the beginning the 
Landesverwaltung and Zeigner worked well together, Zeigner’s open approach to the KPD 
surely playing its role in this setup.127
Leipzig’s Lord Mayor utilized his position to assert his ideas even beyond his 
original remit. Within his own party, the SPD, he acted regardless of the official party line. 
His close cooperation with the KPD incurred the wrath of the local SPD, so much so that 
the SPD leader in Leipzig, Stanislaw Trabalski, threatened him with expulsion.128 As early 
as the beginning of July, after having been informed about his installation as Lord Mayor, 
he met with representatives of the KPD and assured them of a close cooperation between 
his party and theirs.129 Zeigner had done so, even though he was not a member of the party 
executive.130 It would be helpful at this point to have a closer look at Erich Zeigner as his 
personal traits may explain many of his decisions.
Erich Zeigner was of biirgerlich origin and upbringing. His chosen profession of 
lawyer was very much in keeping with trends in Leipzig. Yet, already during his studies, he
125 Lang, ‘Ich bin kein Freund’. The Landesverwaltung in Saxony was led by the Rudolf Friedrichs, who 
beforehand had been appointed by the Soviets as Lord Mayor of Dresden. Friedrichs was a member of the 
SPD. He joined the SED willingly and was later elected as Prime Minister of Saxony, a post he kept until his 
death in 1947.
126 Kurt Fischer was a member of the Aktionsgruppe Ackermann, a group of exiled communists who returned 
from the Soviet Union with the explicit aim of turning the KPD into the ‘state party’ ruling the state according 
to socialist principles. He ‘shadowed’ the SPD’s Rudolf Friedrichs until the latter’s early death in 1947, at 
first as first mayor to Friedrichs’ Lord Mayor and then as his deputy in the Landesverwaltung. The 
relationship of both became increasingly conflict prone with suggestions that Fischer might even have 
contributed to Friedrich’s death. See Michael Richter and Michael Schmeitzner, “Einer von beiden mufi so 
bald wie moglich entfernt werden ”. Der Tod des sachsischen Ministerprasidenten Rudolf Friedrichs vor dem 
Hintergrund des Konflikts mit Innenminister Kurt Fischer 1947 (Leipzig, 1999).
127 It was only after Fischer’s takeover that the climate between Leipzig’s city administration and the 
Landesverwaltung in Dresden grew cdlder as Fischer tried to centralise power around him.
128Lang, ‘Ich bin kein Freund’, p. 125.
129 Matthes, Erich Zeigner: Eine biographische Skizze, p. 33.
130 Trabalski had every right to be furious with Zeigner; not only did Zeigner exceed his powers, but he 
thereby went explicitly against Trabalski’s conviction that a co-operation with the KPD was ill-advised as he
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began to be interested in Social Democracy, an interest he had to keep hidden in the 
Kaiserreich.131 When he was able to join the Social Democratic Party after the First World 
War, he quickly rose through the ranks, first becoming the Saxon minister for justice and 
then prime minister. Thus he displayed a stem conviction as well as a strong work ethic 
and intense drive for success. That this drive might have been part of a more than normal 
compulsion to make his mark is suggested through the psychological appraisal that was 
provided for his court case in 1924, following his deposition. He was diagnosed as 
psychopath.132 It is not intended here to validate this diagnosis of Zeigner, made in the 
early decades of psychology. Yet it offers an interesting insight into to the evaluation of 
Zeigner's very focused, overly zealous and non-empathic way of working that caused 
increasing conflicts for him after becoming Lord Mayor. This office in itself provided an 
ample workload. Yet, he also wanted to be informed on all aspects of his city’s 
administration and advised his city councillors accordingly. In addition, the far reaching 
denazification measures introduced in Saxony meant that the city apparatus was altered 
considerably. The ‘Verordnung iiber den personellen Neuaufbau der offentlichen 
Verwaltungen’ of 17 August 1945 (order concerning the reorganization of the civil service 
personnel) originally demanded the dismissal of all NSDAP members from public service, 
with the exception of irreplaceable experts and merely nominal members. In Saxony this 
was taken as the basis for all denazification measures. It was the only Land in the Soviet 
Zone of Occupation where this order was subsequently extended to include nominal
had only had negative experiences of communists. Trabalski quoted in Pritchard, The making o f the GDR, 
p.74.
131 Zeigner said it was ‘impossible’ to be seen to support the SPD as a student, it would have constituted an 
‘offence’ that could have had him excluded from his chosen vocation. Zeigner quoted in Leipziger 
Volkszeitung (LVZ), 3 August 1948. Even after the end of the Kaiserreich, his joining of the party was 
regarded as “Berufsstandsverletzung”. See Rudloff, Erich Zeigner, p. 7.
132 Corinna Franke, ‘Rechtsstaatliches Verfahren oder Rachejustiz? Der ProzeB gegen den sachsischen 
Ministerprasidenten’ in Rudloff, Erich Zeigner, pp. 77-94, here p. 89.
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members of the NSDAP. Saxony was the ‘leader’ in the denazification process as its 
orders were particularly harsh. The Saxon selection on political grounds was not met by 
any other Land in the entire Soviet Zone, let alone anywhere in the Western Zones.134 This 
appears to have been engineered by Saxony’s German communists in the 
Landesverwaltung who not only pursued the aim of exchanging the National Socialist 
elements in the bureaucracy, but tried to ‘destroy the entire apparatus’ of state 
administration. Once the old structure had been done away with, a new system -  in 
accordance with communist standards, could then be established.135 In Leipzig, this order 
allowed Zeigner to exert his influence over the entire number of new appointments and 
thus strengthened his position even further.136 Since he insisted that important issues would 
be presented to him, Zeigner must have been aware of the gradual shift within the 
Antifascist Bloc towards the KPD, and, indeed its programme to exclude everyone who 
was not organised in a party (and then preferably the KPD or at least SPD).137 Yet, despite 
the feeling that anyone other than a communist was ‘not always desired’ in the 
organisation, the Antifascist Bloc was still too independent for the tastes of the central 
committee of the KPD under Walter Ulbricht in Berlin.138 Throughout the summer of 1945, 
the founding members of the Antifascist Bloc were transferred into other positions or
133 ‘Amtliche Nachrichten der Landesverwaltung, 1, 1945’ in Clemens Vollnhals, Entnazifizierung. Politische 
Sauberung und Rehabilitierung in den vier Besatzungszonen 1945-1949 (Munich, 1991), pp. 175-180. See 
also: Helga A. Welsh, Revolutionarer Wandel aufBefehl?, p. 50.
134 A proud Saxon Prime Minister Friedrichs declared that Saxony was the first and only Land to actually 
have carried out the ‘strenge Entnazifizierungsgrundsatze’, StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 3211, Blatt 192.
135 Saxony’s deputy Prime Minister Kurt Fischer cited in ‘Zweierlei "Machtergreifung". Der diktatorische 
Zugriff von NSDAP und KPD/SED auf die sachsische Verwaltung’ in Gunter Heydemann and Heinrich 
Oberreuter (eds.), Diktaturen in Deutschland -  Vergleichsaspekte, Strukturen, Institutionen und 
Verhaltensweisen (Bonn, 2003), pp. 56-93, here p. 74.
136 While he was in agreement with the denazification measures in the political administration, he was more 
than once at odds with the methods when employed in Leipzig’s cultural life. See the chapters below.
137 For Zeigner’s order see: StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 8423, Blatt 72. By 14 July 1945, the four antifascist 
parties that were allowed to form under the Soviet administration (LDPD, CDU, SPD and KPD) entered into 
the ‘Bloc of antifascist-democratic parties’ where they were to cooperate on ‘the big tasks at hand’ while 
maintaining their independence. Thus all four parties should have been represented equally also in the AB. 
But the local KPD had other plans, the AB was to be established as ‘instrument of rule’. Therefore, everyone 
who did not commit to a party was progressively ousted for not being ‘dutiful’. See Tubbesing, 
Nationalkomitee, pp. 98 - 112.
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arrested under dubious charges, ensuring that the original NKFD members were tom out of 
their network in Leipzig.139 Thus the NKFD had been persecuted by all, the National 
Socialists, the American forces and the KPD machinery. In September 1945 finally, the 
Soviet city command informed Zeigner that the Antifascist Bloc was to be disbanded.140 
The sources do not reveal what Zeigner’s position on this move was, however, the 
dispassionate way in which he announced the end of the Antifascist Bloc to its members 
suggests that he could not have been too crestfallen.141 Until their dissolution, the 
Antifascist Bloc was largely working at grass roots level, all Hausbeauftragte (persons in 
charge of an apartment bloc acting as intermediary between the inhabitants and the political 
authorities) were members. The Hausbeauftragte also were responsible for the distribution 
of food ration stamps and thus held a great level of immediate power. Through this level, 
the Antifascist Bloc was able to exert considerable influence over the population.142 With 
the disbandment of the Antifascist Bloc, Zeigner increased his own control over ‘his’ city. 
It appeared, however, that Zeigner’s strong urge for control now offended the KPD, which 
was not gaining as much political ground in Leipzig as the SPD. The Social Democrats, 
largely due to the outspoken nature of their Leipzig leader Stanislaw Trabalski, had a 
rapidly growing party membership that surpassed that of the KPD by far.143 Zeigner’s role 
as highly respected Lord Mayor and SPD member might have been seen as another 
contributing factor to this discrepancy between the parties, and thus as a threat for the
138 Pritchard, The making o f the GDR, p. 49.
139 The AB, despite having largely become KPD controlled, was too much directed at achieving a democratic 
reconstruction of Germany. As this went against Ulbricht’s plans, Jurgen Tubbesing asserts that it was on the 
initiative of Walter Ulbricht that the German antifascist movement, especially the AB, was disbanded as he 
would not tolerate independent initiatives. In Tubbesing’s words, ‘der Apparat siegt iiber die 
Selbstbestimmung’, Tubbesing, Nationalkomitee, p. 108.
140 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 3211, Blatt 415.
141 Ibid., No. 3190, Blatt 198, 21 September 1945 ‘Der Antifaschistische Block existiert nicht mehr. Es sind 
nur noch die vier antifaschistischen Parteien zugelassen’.
142 Tubbesing, Nationalkomitee, pp. 112-15.
143 As Pritchard states, ‘the assertiveness of the SPD towards the Russians did wonders for the party’s 
popularity’. Trabalski, due to his antipathy towards the KPD, felt under no obligation, as did many 
communists, to support all actions of the Soviet troops. Furthermore, he pointed directly to failings and
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KPD. Indeed, the Kreisvorstand of the KPD considered blackmailing Zeigner to ‘put him 
under pressure’ and rein him in. Yet, these plans were never carried out.144
It appears that Zeigner never learnt of these deliberations; otherwise he might have 
been less enthusiastic in supporting a unification of the SPD and the KPD. Yet, he was 
convinced that the unity of the ‘progressive forces’ of the working class parties was 
necessary to keep up the democratic momentum. In this he was closer to Walter Ulbricht’s 
statements than to his own party in Leipzig. In a speech in Leipzig in October 1945, 
Ulbricht called for the ‘Einheitsfront (united front) of the working class to be strengthened 
and developed further’ in order to fight against ‘reactionary ideologies’.145 Zeigner was to 
repeat this sentiment a few months later, calling the unity necessary to counteract the 
‘better organised class instinct of the biirgerlich reaction’.146
The SPD in Leipzig, meanwhile, developed into the ‘centre of opposition to the 
unification within the KPD’.147 Zeigner seemed to have completely ignored this fact and 
continued to pursue his aim of pressing for unification regardless of other opinions. He 
engaged his personal aide, City Director Erich Ott (also SPD), in his work for the 
unification and thus remained at odds with the party’s leadership in the city, who were 
strictly set against a merger. In other parts of Saxony, the mood was completely different.
misconduct. Pritchard, The making o f  the GDR, p. 102. By the autumn of 1945, the SPD had 6620 members 
to the KPD’s 5800 in the city o f Leipzig. Tubbesing, Nationalkomitee, p. 78.
144 Zeigner was to be blackmailed with documents that allegedly proved his collaboration with the National 
Socialists. If what is included in his personal file in the SED Leipzig archive can be seen as an example of 
this type of documents, then the KPD was counting on far-fetched accusations. The only pre-1945 document 
in Zeigner’s file is a letter written by his manager in 1944 trying to prevent losing its valued accountant: 
‘Zeigner wiirde sich unter keinen Bedingungen an irgendwelchen Verbindungen oder Besprechungen gegen 
den Staat beteiligen...’. See SStA Leipzig, SED Sammlung Kader, 0233 Erich Zeigner, Blatt 3-4, letter by 
Papierhaus Wolbing, 23 September 1944. For the blackmail debate: Ibid., SED-BPA, Kreisleitung der SED, 
1/3/5. The tactic of blackmail found its use in other cases. See Pritchard, The making o f the GDR, p. 114
145 In Ulbricht’s vocabulary anything was deemed ‘reactionary’ that did not conform with his personal view of 
politics. For the speech see SStA Leipzig, SED-BPA, Kreisleitung der SED, 1/3/7.
146 Zeigner, cited in Mike Schmeitznei;, ‘Erich Zeigner -  Linkssozialist im Zwiespalt’ in Mike Schmeitzner 
and Michael Rudloff, “...solche Schadlinge gibt es auch in Leipzig Sozialdemokraten und die SED 
(Frankfurt, 1997), pp. 106-139, here p. 132.
147 Otto Buchwitz quoted in Michael Rudloff, ‘SED-Griindung in sozialdemokratischer Hochburg. Das 
Beispiel Leipzig’, in Werner Bramke and Ulrich HeB (eds.), Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Sachsen im 20. 
Jahrhundert, (Leipzig, 1998), pp. 371-417.
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The leader of the SPD Landesvorstand Otto Buchwitz was in favour of the unification and 
attempted to exert pressure on the SPD in Leipzig, which refused to cooperate.148
The creation of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) has been a source of great debate 
amongst historians, not only in the obvious ideological point-scoring during the Cold War 
but also in the more nuanced debate about the ambiguities present in the formation of this 
new unified representation of the working class.149 Whereas a heterogeneous picture 
remains -  with pro-unification SPD groups, more reluctant KPD groups and tales of happy 
marriages between the two parties -  in Leipzig’s case the creation of the unity party was 
forced. Not only were the city’s SPD leaders threatened in various ways, the party became 
a ‘semi-illegal’ entity by the beginning of 1946. All party events, assemblies, rallies needed 
to be authorized by the Soviet military administration, which by this time was very much in 
favour of unification and thus eager to hamper the SPD’s efforts wherever possible.150 
Michael Rudloff even goes so far as stating that without the at times violent intervention of 
the Soviets, the foundation of the SED would have been impossible.151 By March 1946, the 
Leipzig leadership finally gave in. The unification in the city occurred nearly a month 
before the official Vereinigungsparteitag in Berlin on 21 April 1946.
Zeigner should have been welcomed in the SED due to his support for the 
unification and his immediate willingness to work with the communists upon resumption 
of office. Yet, his approach to work was criticised within the SED with growing force. His 
‘social democratic character’ was identified as a weakness and his bildungsburgerlich 
background only tolerated as ‘it would be a crime to take that off him’.152
148 Tubbesing, Nationalkomitee, p. 129.
149 For a good historiographical overview see Pritchard, The making o f the GDR, pp. 108-36.
150 Tubbesing, Nationalkomitee, p. 130.
151 Rudloff, ‘SED-Griindung’. Apart from being forced, the unification in Leipzig could not even have been 
disguised as the democratic wish of the majority of future SED members. The SPD had 64,543, the KPD only 
23,000 members in the Bezirk of Leipzig by March 1946. See Tubbesing, Nationalkomitee, p. 128.
152 SStA Leipzig, SED Sammlung Kader, 0233 Erich Zeigner, Blatt 20-1, Charakteristik 1946.
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Nevertheless, he still entered the communal elections in September 1946 as the 
SED's top candidate for the office of Lord Mayor. Zeigner was well respected in Leipzig’s 
population; he spoke to both the Burgertum as well as the working class. Thus the SED 
would have been foolish to look for another candidate. Yet, as the results of this election 
showed, Zeigner’s popularity did not translate into a majority for the ‘progressive’ working 
class party. The btirgerlich camp (CDU and LDPD) gained the majority in Leipzig.153 This, 
however, did not turn into any real shift in the distribution of political power. Zeigner still 
maintained control over the appointment of offices in the city administration and hence was 
able to largely exclude the biirgerlich representatives from departmental positions, if not 
the council itself. Indeed he promoted Helmuth Holtzhauer from the department for 
Volksbildung to the politically more influential post of first mayor for finance and
154economy.
Zeigner’s urge to control all aspects of his city administration was counteracted by 
the dire economic situation Leipzig found itself in after the war. Not only was the city 
severely damaged in the war and needed resources for reconstruction, it also was by far the 
main contributor to the reparation effort of Saxony. Thus Zeigner was operating under 
severe economic and political constraints. He was largely dependent on the Saxon Land 
government, having to ask for even small sums.155 Yet, this was only one aspect of 
Zeigner’s increasing problems. Despite taking over more offices in the SED structure and 
entering the Saxon diet and its constitutional committee, he was increasingly distrusted in 
his party. In the wake of the seemingly unending waves of denazification, Zeigner had to
153 Lang, ‘Ich bin kein Freund’, p. 155.
154 SStA Leipzig, SED Sammlung Kader, N 1011 Helmuth Holtzhauer.
155 See Lang, ‘Ich bin kein Freund’, p. 154. Saxony in turn had about 50 percent of the production capacity in
the entire Soviet Zone, thus ‘nur da gab’s was zu holen’, Manfred Unger, ‘Erich Zeigner und die Sowjetische
Militarkommandantur’ in Rudloff, Erich Zeigner, pp. 151-175, here p. 171.
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provide the SED repeatedly with detailed curricula vitae.156 The internal SED profiling 
became less and less favourable towards him. He was deemed ‘to be his own worst enemy, 
lacking the appropriate skills to evaluate those around him and the rigour needed for his
t ^7office’. The ‘rigour’ needed probably refers to a strict adherence to the SED party line, 
yet, as in the SPD before, Zeigner was not a party soldier. He followed his own ideas, 
which were a curious compromise between his own biirgerlich appearance and socialist
• 158mindset. As will be seen in the chapters below, Zeigner by no means condemned the 
fruits of the biirgerlich nineteenth century, especially not in the realm of culture. 
Furthermore, he was taken by the importance of his office and would not yield to the 
‘whims’ of his subordinates just because they were members of the SED. He also did not 
share the complete servility to Soviet demands displayed by most of his party comrades.159 
With the increase in power of the SED, behaviour like this was less and less tolerated. 
Zeigner came under increasing pressure and suspicion. When he undertook a promotional 
trip for Leipzig’s trade fair to the Bizone in 1947, the SED half expected him to abscond 
and remain ‘over there’. Hence he was monitored by the Soviet authorities on a tip off by 
the SED Kreisvorstand.160 Zeigner, for his part, became more and more disillusioned with 
his position and the party. He increasingly used Article 36 of the ‘Democratic Municipal 
Code for Saxony’ to push his decisions through the city government.161 This in turn
156 Although he complied at every instance, he also got increasingly fed up with this nuisance formality and 
pleaded with the Kreisvorstand o f the SED to exempt him from this task in view o f his many other 
responsibilities. SStA Leipzig, SED Sammlung Kader, 0233 Erich Zeigner, Blatt 6-18.
157 Ibid., Blatt 22.
158 This will be clearly visible in the chapters below in his attempts to maintain the traditions of the biirgerlich 
cultural institutions of Leipzig but also to implement socialist ideas.
159 Zeigner rebutted attempts to bring several cultural institutions in Leipzig under direct SED control. See 
inter al.: StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 8422, Blatt 11; and Ibid., No. 2612, Blatt 3. He furthermore tried his 
utmost to prevent measures by the Soviet occupation powers that went against the interest o f his city (see the 
case of the Reichsgericht library in chapter 3 below).
160 Michael Rudloff, ‘Dr Erich Zeigner und die Grundung der SED’ in Rudloff, Erich Zeigner, pp. 106-118
161 Lang, ‘Ich bin kein Freund’, p. 128. Zeigner helped draft the Municipal Code during his stint in the 
Landtag constitutional committee, see Johannes Frackowiak, ‘Erich Zeigner und die Sachsische 
Verfassungsdiskussion 1946/47’ in Rudloff, Erich Zeigner, pp. 194-201. Article 36 allowed the mayor to take 
decisions in lieu of the city council under the premise of retrospectively attaining approval. See
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strengthened the mistrust in the SED executive, which again bemoaned his ‘social 
democratic schooling, which is well visible in his public appearances and speeches.’ He 
was, however, still deemed to ‘view the unity party in a positive light’.162 The unity party 
had by now decided to morph into a ‘party of a new type’.163 The blind obedience now 
required was not something Zeigner could or wanted to deliver, he was too absorbed in his 
own modus operandi.164 Therefore, he became increasingly isolated in the party. Even in 
his city administration, the councillors tried to circumvent him by ‘forgetting’ to inform 
him of the dates of their meetings.165 The internal profiling concluded that Zeigner did ‘not 
embody the functionary the ‘party of a new type’ required.’166
Zeigner moved to a stance of opposition to the SED, which manifested itself in 
small acts towards individuals, rather than open proclamations on a political platform. 
This might have earned him the goodwill of those who benefited from his actions, but 
others -  those in open opposition, like the CDU’s member of the Landtag Dr Karl 
Buchheim -  criticised this duplicity: ‘Zeigner speaks differently as a private man than as a 
party man’ and thus was not to be trusted.168
At a time when more and more decisions slipped away from the control of the city 
administration due to the centralisation efforts of the Unity Party, the SED was still 
condemning Zeigner’s ‘one man politics’ that ‘excluded his colleagues’ and were too
‘Demokratische Gemeindeordnung fiir Sachsen’ in Verfassungen Deutschlands, 
http://www.verfassungen.de/de/sac/gemeindeordnung47.htm, (accessed 22 May 2009).
162 SStA Leipzig, SED Sammlung Kader, 0233 Erich Zeigner, Blatt 34.
163 Despite the outward promotion of the concept of self-administration on communal level, the KPD and then 
SED were set on organising a centralist rule where the municipal level ‘was embedded in the central 
administration and received its orders therefrom’. In Wilhelm Pieck’s words: ‘The cadre of the party decides 
everything.’ See Christopher Beckmann, ‘Machtergreifung vor Ort’ in Heydemann and Oberreuter (eds.), 
Diktaturen in Deutschland, pp. 94-117, here p. 98 and p. 75.
164 Zeigner was working stringent 16 hour days. Apart from his office as Lord Mayor and member of 
Landtag, by 1947 he had also taken over a lecturing post at Leipzig University (theory of administration) and 
became the head of the Institute of Cqmmunal Studies at the same institution. See Rudloff, Erich Zeigner, p. 
115
165 Lang, ‘Ich bin kein Freund’, p. 133.
166 SStA Leipzig, SED Sammlung Kader, 0233 Erich Zeigner, Blatt 34, 1948.
167 Rudloff, ‘Dr Erich Zeigner’, p. 115.
168 Schmeitzner, ‘Erich Zeigner’, p. 138.
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‘conservative and formalistic’. One SED city councillor, Kirmsse, even spoke of a ‘Zeigner 
system’ that was supposedly reigning in the town hall.169 Yet, from 1948 onwards, Zeigner 
was more or less reduced to reacting to measures taken above his head or against his will. 
He was rebuffed by the Soviet authorities when he insisted that the city administration was 
not a vehicle of party politics.170 He had to toe the party line, even if that meant not only 
that his opinion was passed over but that he personally was also humiliated.171
Zeigner was spared the full onslaught of Stalinisation and its results in the GDR of 
the 1950s that might have cost him his freedom or worse. After his death in April 1949, 
Leipzig became a main battle ground for the SED. All opposition was quashed; the SED 
cleansed from its ranks most erstwhile SPD members under the premise that the city was a 
‘stronghold of the Schumacher Ideology’.172 Since City Director Erich Ott was also 
amongst those former SPD members to be expelled from the SED, even though Ott was 
substantial in pushing for the unification of the two workers’ parties in Leipzig, the
1 7 ^allegation was transparently dishonest. The last remnants of biirgerlich aspects of 
Leipzig’s proud cultural tradition had to bow to the needs of the newly emerging Arbeiter- 
und Bauemstaat. Without Zeigner, who attempted the balancing act between 
Bildungsbiirgertum and socialism, the latter fully established itself without regards for the 
distinctiveness of the city of Leipzig.
169 SStA Leipzig, SED Sammlung Kader, 0233 Erich Zeigner, Blatt 41, 1948 and Blatt 69, 1949.
170 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 3211, Blatt 28, Meeting with Soviet city command 11 May 1948.
171 A prime example is the debate over the Gewandhaus’s conductor Albert, when Zeigner finally gave up 
stating: ‘Soli doch die Partei und die Kommandantur machen, was sie wollen.’ Ibid., No. 1324, Blatt 137, 
August 1948.
172 Kurt Schumacher (1895-1952) was the leader of the SPD in the British Zone and later all Western Zones. 
He refused any cooperation with the KPD in the Western Zones. He condemned the unification of SPD and 
SED in the Soviet Zone and refused apy cooperation with the SED. In turn, the SED viewed him (and by 
extension former SPD members in its own ranks) as enemies. Schumacher’s Social Democracy was 
denounced as Sozialdemokratismus and placed on a par with American imperialism, thus any proponent of 
Schumacher’s view (or just member of the SPD) was automatically a class enemy. Tubbesing, 
Nationalkomitee, p. 144.
173 Schmeitzner, ‘Erich Zeigner -  Linkssozialist’, p. 313.
66
In his will, Zeigner stipulated that he did not want a great display after his death: ‘I 
do not lay claim to be lauded after my death after having been so often and iniquitously 
insulted during my life-time.’174 The SED nevertheless sang his praises in 1949, only to 
defame Zeigner in 1953 as reactionary and traitor to the working class.175
Leipzig’s traditional political class, recruited from the conservative Burgertum, 
underwent a significant change in the first half of the twentieth century. Having coped with 
the entrance of the workers’ parties into the city administration, a natural process given 
Leipzig’s and Saxony’s strong working class tradition, it faced a much greater challenge 
after the takeover of power by the National Socialists. As Leipzig was one of Germany’s 
largest and most important cities, its local political development had importance at Reich 
level. The process of replacement of the conservative ‘old elite’ by the Nazi party was 
slower than in other German cities, mainly due to Carl Goerdeler’s prominence and 
strength of will. But even he did not prevent the onset of anti-Semitic policies, nor the 
complete takeover of the city administration by NSDAP members. Nearly two years before 
he left office, all biirgerlich city councillors had been substituted by National Socialists. 
The biirgerlich classes discovered too late that their initial welcome of the NSDAP was ill- 
advised. In the regime’s vocabulary, the Burgertum was reactionary, it had to ‘step down to 
make way for the National Socialist renewal’. This renewal meant the replacement of 
Goerdeler, an able politician and administrator who earned his post in Leipzig by gaining 
expertise in a number of lesser positions, by an old guard National Socialist whose main 
qualification was the low number in his party membership book (denoting an early
174 SStA Leipzig, SED Sammlung Ka<|er, 0233 Erich Zeigner, Blatt 71.
175 Ibid., Blatt 87-91; in 1953 Erich Honecker complained that FDJ groups were carrying Zeigner’s name as 
he was clearly unworthy of this honour, having been in charge of the Saxon government that prevented a 
glorious proletarian revolution in 1923. Unfortunately, the date is missing from this protocol, so it is uncertain 
whether this allegation followed the uprising in June 1953. See Ibid., Blatt 99.
176 StadtAL, Kapitel 32, Blatt 57-9.
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follower of Hitler). Donicke’s case proved that mere party allegiance was not enough to 
lead such an important city. Even Haake, who as Goerdeler’s deputy should have gained 
considerable insight into the running of an efficient city administration, failed and was 
dismissed after less than a year. By now it was time to introduce the vanguard of the Nazi 
regime -  the SS in the shape of Gruppenfuhrer Alfred Freyberg. Freyberg marked the 
complete immersion of Leipzig’s politics into the National Socialist ideology. Not only did 
he push for anti-Christian measures so popular in the SS, he also brought Leipzig to the 
forefront in terms of anti-Semitic policies. The population of Leipzig did not react 
favourably to the de-Christianisation efforts and most of the proposals had to be buried. 
Yet, as was the case all over Germany, the anti-Semitic policies aroused less criticism, if 
any at all. Thus Leipzig became a frontrunner in the escalating persecution of Jews.
The resistance in Leipzig did not overthrow the Nazi regime, but in the final days 
of the war, it prevented the destruction of the city by organising the surrender of Leipzig 
without major skirmishes. The NKFD had thus proven themselves as an organisation of 
considerable influence, yet their offer of cooperation with the American occupation forces 
was largely ignored and the organisation itself banned. The lack of proper denazification 
efforts by the US-troops combined with the rejection of the broad antifascist coalition that 
had constituted the NKFD brought the more radical (left wing) elements in the National 
Committee to the fore. Once the exchange of occupation authorities had taken place these 
forces, mainly communist, came into positions of power. Even though an SPD man, Erich 
Zeigner, was chosen as Lord Mayor, the push for more authority from the KPD was 
increasingly noticeable, not least in the repeated efforts of Helmuth Holtzhauer to gain 
influence beyond his remit. Zeigner proved himself compliant with communist ideas. He 
was an important factor in thev forced unification of the workers’ parties in Leipzig, this 
first very clear sign of anti-democratic measures. With the strengthening of the communists
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within the SED, all other antifascists were marginalized, not least those with a burgerlich 
background. Zeigner, albeit of burgerlich origin himself, dismissed anyone as ‘reactionary’ 
who did not support the ‘progressive’ work of the SED and warned especially against the 
regaining of strength of the ‘burgerlich reaction’. In this the new leading party, SED, 
emulated the former state party NSDAP -  both dismissed the Burgertum as ‘reactionary’ 
and broadened this definition to include anyone who did not share their convictions. 
Furthermore, Saxony’s stringent denazification rules made it impossible to retain the old 
structures in public life and administration, even if they pre-dated the Third Reich. The 
purges on racial grounds of the years 1933-35 were now in a sense echoed by the purges on 
political grounds. After a period of consolidation, the SED in Leipzig, as everywhere else 
in the Soviet Zone, set out to gain full control over all aspects of public life. That this 
process had a profound impact on the cultural and intellectual life of the once proud 
Burgerstadt Leipzig will be shown in the following chapters.
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2 Leipzig -  City of Music
Music was one of Leipzig’s cultural fortes. Numerous composers, instrumentalists 
and conductors have left their traces in the town and were equally stimulated by the 
uniquely inspirational atmosphere of the city. It was this spirit that shaped Leipzig’s 
musical tradition and its institutions. The city was home to a number of prestigious musical 
establishments founded and maintained by the Burger of Leipzig, who prided themselves 
in creating institutions of excellence otherwise only known to royal enterprises. Amongst 
them were Germany’s first conservatoire, St Thomas’s Choir -  one of Europe’s oldest 
surviving cultural institutions, the original home of Bach’s masterpieces and the 
Gewandhaus -  the world’s oldest concert hall founded by Burger and the heart of the 
Musikstadt. All this and many smaller professional and lay ensembles made up the singular 
international standing of the city in the field of music. In the Gewandhaus especially, all 
facets of Leipzig’s musical tradition and self-image came to the fore. It also was the arena 
of Leipzig’s society. When Werner Heisenberg first arrived in Leipzig in the late 1920s, 
his interest in music was nicely matched by the cultural offerings in the city. The young 
scientist immersed himself into the music scene of the city so much so that his parents 
‘chided him for leading a life of pleasure.’ The reprimand was unwarranted as Heisenberg 
only adjusted himself to the ways of the Leipzig Biirgertum, which provided him with ‘a 
direct entree into the elite social circles of Leipzig’.1 The representatives of Leipzig’s 
Herren der Stadt met regularly at the Friday motet of St Thomas’s Choir, after which a 
private word with the Cantor of St Thomas’s as well as his illustrious audience such as the 
city councillors was possible. Once Carl Goerdeler had become Lord Mayor of Leipzig, he 
was a regular attendee of the spiritual concerts of Bach’s choir and could be met for a short 
conversation on the steps of St Thomas’s Church. The unrivalled centre stage for Leipzig’s
1 Cassidy, Uncertainty, p. 273.
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social elite was the Gewandhaus. Founded in 1743 by the Burger of Leipzig, it has since 
been a source of special pride for Leipzig. The Gewandhaus directorate accordingly 
represented a cross section of the city’s burgerlich spectrum. The Lord Mayor held the 
position of Kurator (curator) of the Gewandhaus and the directorate consisted of university 
professors, publishers, city politicians and business men. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century their ranks were also joined by members of the Reichsgericht.2 The Gewandhaus 
concerts were the quintessence of Leipzig’s music life as well as its social centre. In the 
magnificent foyer of the Gewandhaus building ‘everyone of distinction’ met.3 Beyond 
their social role, the Gewandhaus concerts were also of the highest musical standard. An 
impressive lineage of conductors threaded through the concert hall’s history. The most 
famous, Felix Mendelssohn Bartholdy, not only conducted the orchestra but revived the 
opus of Johann Sebastian Bach, the Cantor of St Thomas’s Choir who had largely been 
forgotten in the late eighteenth century. Through this, he reunited Leipzig and Germany 
with a composer who was to become the primus of the classical music canon. Moreover, 
Mendelssohn also established Germany’s first conservatoire in the city, thereby firmly 
rooting Leipzig’s claim to national importance in the field of music. The conservatoire and 
the Gewandhaus lived in a symbiotic relationship, with the orchestra’s musicians teaching 
at the college and their students then joining the orchestra. This produced the 
Gewandhausklang, a unique voice to the orchestra, revered nationally and internationally.4
The twentieth century had begun well for Leipzig’s music scene. The 
Gewandhaus secured Arthur Nikisch as Kapellmeister. Nikisch was no stranger to Leipzig, 
he and Gustav Mahler shared the rostrum in Leipzig’s opera in the 1880s. Not only did
2 For an overview of the professions of the directors between 1905 and 1940 see: StadtAL, StVuR(I), 8418, 
Blatt 9 and Ibid., Familiengeschichtliche Sammlung (FS), FamiliennachlaB Limburger, No. 174. Although 
the number of directors varied, all the named professional groups were represented in the directorate-it 
constituted the informal headquarters*of Hund’s ‘plutocracy’. See chapter 1, footnote 29.
3 Meyer-Krahmer, Mut zum W iderstand , p. 92; The Gewandhaus building was one of Leipzig’s architectural 
landmarks. It had been built in 1882-84 to accommodate for the orchestra’s growing audience. The 
construction had been funded entirely by Leipzig’s Burger. Its grand architecture and its brilliant acoustics 
sparked a row of copies, most notably the concert hall in Chicago.
4 Rat der Stadt, Leipzig lebt Kultur.
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Nikisch establish a new style of conducting but once Gewandhauskapellmeister, he also 
laid the foundations of the modem repertoire for symphonic orchestras and furthered the 
reception of Bruckner, Tchaikovsky and other Slavic composers.5 Nikisch furthermore was 
interested in opening up the Gewandhaus concerts to a wider audience. From 1915, he 
championed the idea of Arbeiterkonzerte (concerts for workers) to introduce this large 
section of Leipzig’s population to one of the key cultural fixtures. Tickets for these events 
were sold at a fraction of the normal price. From 1918, these workers’ concerts became a 
regular part of the orchestra’s functions.6 After Nikisch’s death, Wilhelm Furtwangler took 
over the podium in 1922 and continued to broaden the scope of the time honoured 
institution. Furtwangler not only succeeded Nikisch in Leipzig but also with the Berliner 
Philharmoniker. After a while this arrangement became a real problem for the 
Gewandhaus directorate. They demanded that their institution should take priority over any 
other engagement including Berlin. This, after all, was the Gewandhausl Furtwangler 
insisted on being allowed to continue in both capacities with his personal stress lying with 
the orchestra in Berlin. This eventually led to the parting of ways between the Gewandhaus 
directorate and Furtwangler in 1929.7 This peculiar case fittingly portrayed the pride and 
self-confidence of the Leipziger Burger who presided over the Gewandhaus. Who was a 
Furtwangler in comparison to the city’s foremost orchestra? Apart from this set-back, the 
1920s had been a very successful decade for music in Leipzig. Especially the opera shone. 
Under the dual leadership of conductor Gustav Brecher and artistic director Walther 
Briigmann, the city’s opera became a beacon of new musical and aesthetic developments. 
One particular climax of this development was the world premiere of Ernst Krenek’s opera 
Jonny spielt auf! in 1927. This jazz inspired opus had been rejected by the Hamburger
— :------------------------------------  v
5 With this Nikisch stepped into the footsteps of his famous predecessor Mendelssohn, who had created the 
modern canon of classical music with German masters at its core. See Applegate and Potter, Music and 
German National Identity, p. 9.
6 Jurgen Schebera, Gustav Brecher und die Oper Leipzig, p. 83.
7 Rat der Stadt, Leipzig lebt Kultur, p. 78.
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Staatsoper; Leipzig showed less scruples and the piece advanced to one of the greatest 
opera successes in the Weimar Republic.8 Another world premiere gained equal fame, if 
not for the same reasons. When the Weill/Brecht opera Aufstieg und Fall der Stadt 
Mahagonny was premiered in Leipzig in March 1930, it created the greatest scandal of the 
period.9 Even before the actual performance, a sense of riot was palpable. The city centre 
was disrupted in the afternoon before the show by National Socialist agitators. On the 
evening itself, there was so much uproar and booing that the music nearly drowned in the 
noise and Brecher managed only with great difficulty to finish conducting to the end. This 
was a taste of things to come. With the beginning of the 1930s, the National Socialists 
began to propagate their cultural ideas in an increasingly violent manner. Even before the 
ascendancy of National Socialism to the state doctrine, its followers, a noisy minority, 
almost silenced Brecher.10 Upon the seizure of power, Brecher faced the full brute force of 
the new leaders. His last performance of Weill’s Silbersee was so riddled by SA 
interruptions that Brecher left the podium prematurely. Shortly afterwards, he lost his 
position and was ostracised.11
The Gewandhaus was spared the intrusion of a politically motivated mob as it ran 
its concerts under Anrecht. This subscription to the concert season harked back to the 
earliest days of the orchestra. In 1743, sixteen Burger founded the orchestra by each 
paying for one musician in the ensemble. From then onwards, the Gewandhaus orchestra 
always operated on a ‘club’ basis. The latest instalment of this system had been the
8 The title page of the programme later came to notorious fame again -  this time as the poster theme of the 
Nazis’ Entartete Musik exhibition. See both Online Musikmagazin, http://www.omm.de and Jurgen Hoflich, 
‘Jonny spielt au f in Musikproduktion Jurgen Hoflich, http://www.musikmph.de (accessed 22 May 2009).
For a good outline of the wider reception of Jonny spielt auf, see inter al.: Glenn Watkins, ‘Josephine and 
Jonny’ in Watkins, Pyramids at the Louvre (London, 1994), pp. 134-63 and Bernard Gendron, ‘Negrophilia’ 
in Gendron, Between Montmatre and the Mudd Club (Chicago, 2002), pp. 137-53.
9 Georg Friedrich Kuhn: Weill-Dessau, http://www.gf-kuehn.de (accessed 22 May 2009).
10 It was only in 1930 that the NSDAP gained some footing in Leipzig’s political sphere (akin to the party’s 
emergence on a national scale). Before, the party had scrambled around the 1 percent mark in elections. 
Szejnmann, Nazism in Central Germany, p. 222 .
11 Gustav Brecher (1879-1940) lost his conductorship in March, even before the law for the restoration of the 
professional civil service came into force and would have provided a ‘legal basis’ for his dismissal. He 
subsequently fled from Germany at the end of 1933 and committed suicide in Ostende in 1940. Jurgen 
Kesting, ‘Auch Freitod kann Mord sein’ in Hamburger Abendblatt, 26 November 2006.
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construction of the new building in 1884, funded completely by Leipzig’s Burger, who, if 
they had contributed sufficiently, would gain an Anrecht, a claim to a seat. About 90 per 
cent of the Gewandhaus seats were thus occupied. The Anrecht was considered a sacred 
asset; it could be bequeathed to the family and was even named as enticement in personal 
ads to show how eligible the -  mostly female -  candidates were.12 As the concerts were a 
fixture in the musical as well as social life of Leipzig, most Anrecht holders would make 
use of it and buy tickets for every concert. The mob was kept out.13 Wilhelm Furtwangler 
had left the year before the Mahagonny scandal, thus his successor could not have foreseen 
the tide turning in Leipzig when taking office. Bruno Walter, again an internationally 
renowned conductor, gladly followed the call to the Gewandhaus in 1929. He regarded the 
position in ‘the oldest and most famous of the German concert institutions’ as one to retain 
until the end of his active career.14 Walter, too, followed engagements outside his contract 
with the Gewandhaus, yet, he did so seemingly without losing sight of Leipzig’s orchestra 
as his main arena and without alienating the directorate as Furtwangler had done. This, 
however, was partly due to the changing times. The National Socialist component in 
cultural matters grew in the following years to the extent that the Gewandhaus directorate 
decided that Walter should have greater freedom to pursue his engagements outside 
Germany. This even went so far as allowing Walter to follow an invitation to New York 
for the 1931/32 season that clashed with the Gewandhaus’ concert calendar. Here, one 
could assume that the directorate chose this indirect way to rid itself of the presence of a 
Jewish musician whose exposed position in one of Germany’s prime concert halls was 
clearly perceived as an affront to National Socialist racial ideals. Yet, neither did Walter
12 The Anrecht ranked on par with financial independence in these ads. It was seen as a valuable asset. A 
typical ad mentioning the Anrecht would contain the age, education, financial and Anrecht status of the 
eligible young lady. See numerous ad$ in Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten, sample period 1927-29.
13 This carries plurivalent meaning. The Gewandhaus audience was an elite group and remained so. Even 
once the orchestra itself opened to the workers’ concerts and admitted everyone to the public final rehearsals 
at discounted prices, yet the Anrechtskonzerte remained the mainstay of the house and retained their 
exclusivity -  devoid of political agitators and those ‘below’ rank.
14 Bruno Walter, Thema und Variationen: Erinnerungen und Gedanken (Frankfurt, 1988), p. 375.
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regard it as a polite ushering out of the door, nor were the directorate’s later actions 
indicative of any urge to pacify the National Socialists.15
The takeover of power brought the mob from the fringes into positions of power. 
Leipzig’s city council -  albeit under the leadership of Carl Goerdeler -  still was no 
exception. The NSDAP party stalwarts installed in the city administration included 
Kulturdezement Hauptmann, who, despite carrying an honest appreciation for the great 
traditions of Leipzig’s cultural heritage, shared the anti-Semitic orientation of the 
movement. He therefore was among those who called for the immediate dismissal of 
Jewish musicians from Leipzig’s premier establishments. Gustav Brecher was the first to 
lose his position. In Bruno Walter’s case, both the Gewandhaus directorate and Lord 
Mayor Goerdeler as curator of the concert institute refused to oblige.16 Walter returned in 
mid-March 1933 to the Gewandhaus from an engagement in America.17 In New York, he 
had already been notified by the directorate that there had been calls to depose him, but 
was assured that the Gewandhaus would stand behind him. On 16 March, when Walter 
arrived at the concert hall in the morning for the public rehearsal of the night’s 
performance, he found himself standing in front of closed doors. A note informed him that 
the rehearsal and the concert were cancelled and he was divested of his post. This incident 
did not pass quietly. Walter was greeted by a large crowd of the Leipzig audience waiting 
for entry to the rehearsal, their emotions ranging from protest to disappointment, disbelief 
to horror. Members of the orchestra stood forlorn and speechless, quietly acknowledging 
their conductor. Bruno Walter felt disheartened, yet he was not surprised. Days before this 
event, the board of directors of the Gewandhaus had informed him about a threat of closure 
should Walter continue as Kapellmeister. However, they were determined not to bow to
15 Ibid., ‘Die [...] vorgeschlagenen D&ten standen naturlich mit meinen Leipziger Verpflichtungen im 
Widerspruch. Doch [das] Direktorium des Gewandhauses [sah] ein, daB man mir angesichts der bedrohlichen 
inneren Lage in Deutschland nicht eine Wiederaufnahme meiner Beziehung zum amerikanischen Musikleben 
erschweren durfte.’, p. 330.
16 Ibid., p. 335.
17 For Walter’s deposition see Ibid., pp. 384-9.
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pressure. Even Walter’s offer to resign was declined by the directors on the basis that 
musical tradition was too great a good to be so easily abandoned. They also insisted on 
maintaining their institution’s independence.18 Notably, the force behind the closure of the 
concert hall and the removal of Walter from his post were not any of Leipzig‘s officials 
(who had their orders from Goerdeler) but the Saxon ministry for the interior under the 
leadership of the NSDAP’s Manfred von Killinger. Leipzig’s administration, at that point 
at least, was still not prepared to sacrifice the integrity of one of its city’s proudest 
institutions.19 Leipzig’s newspapers carried just a short statement that the concert had been 
cancelled and Bruno Walter had left his post. Only the National Socialist Leipziger 
Tageszeitung spoke of a triumph and called the cancellation of the rehearsal and evening 
concerts, as well as Walter’s dismissal, a matter of course ‘as there had been the threat that 
the majority of the audience would revert to self-administered justice because of this 
insolence and tactlessness [that is Walter fulfilling his contract and conducting his 
orchestra]’. It was not elaborated whatever form this ‘self administered justice’ was to 
take, but the implied threat was unmistakable.20
The removal of musicians, choirmasters and conservatoire lecturers soon followed 
suit when ‘racial’ or just political attributes contravened the new order. Painful holes 
appeared in the previously dense fabric of the Musikstadt.21 The National Socialist party 
attempted to gain influence in most of Leipzig’s musical establishments, not always 
successfully but invariably causing damage along the way. Leipzig’s opera lost its
18 The directors might have actually not believed that their renowned institution would be targeted in such a 
way. Too great was the trust and pride in its international reputation. ‘Der Antisemitismus des Hitlerschen 
Programms [...] wird vor den groBen kunstlerischen und geistigen Personlichkeiten haltmachen, schon um 
sich nicht im Ausland zu blamieren.’ It appears that the directors misread not only Hitler’s programme but 
also Brecher’s ousting. Ebermayer, Denn heute, p. 24.
19 Walter, Thema und Variationen, pp. 386-7.
20 The author, Musikdezernent Hauptmann [!], could not have meant the upset and speechless audience who 
had waited in front of the concert hall. Leipziger Tageszeitung 16 and 17 March 1933; both the Leipziger 
Neueste Nachrichten and the Neue Leipziger Zeitung carried an identical piece of 5 lines stating the facts 
without giving any explanation or opinion. See both publications 17 March 1933. The Social Democrat 
Leipziger Volkszeitung had already ceased publication by this date.
21 Examples include: Leo Schwarz (orchestral leader of the Gewandhaus), Gunter Raphael (composer, 
lecturer at the Leipzig conservatoire), Barnet Licht (choir master, conductor and music teacher). See: 
Joachim Schlesinger, Leipzig: Geschichte und Kultur 1895-2000, Chronik (Leipzig, 2003).
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formidable international reputation after Brecher’s deposition when both the dramatic and 
musical administration was placed in Hans Schuler’s hands.22 The artistic friction of a 
duumvirate that had resulted in the fruitful collaborations of the 1920s and early 1930s was 
henceforth undesirable; streamlined productions following the aesthetic line of the 
National Socialist movement were the flavour of the day. The Gewandhaus lost its 
Kapellmeister and orchestral leader and remained without permanent conductor until 1934. 
These were not the only changes to come in the composition of this time-honoured music 
enterprise. Although subsidised by the city council of Leipzig, the Gewandhaus had 
remained solely in the hands of a board of directors consisting of what the orchestra’s 
statutes called ‘musically interested’ citizens of the city until the 1930s. The National 
Socialists forced party members and one of their trusted city officials onto the board of 
directors, thus exerting considerable political pressure on a previously Burger-run 
institution.23 This seemed a tolerable outcome for the Gewandhaus directorate, as the 
volkisch mood called for much more radical changes. Rumours had appeared in various 
papers that the directorate would resign en bloc. The National Socialist press picked up on 
these reports proclaiming elatedly the end of an era when ‘the once leading Biirgertum 
step[ped] down to make way for the National Socialist renewal’. The directorate was quick 
to refute these reports. This left the political agitators wanting as the directorate ‘[failed] 
fully to accommodate the will for a National Socialist culture’.24 This ‘will’ did not stop at 
the personnel department. The repertoire of the orchestra was ‘purged’, music by Jewish 
composers, even the works of the Gewandhaus's former conductor Mendelssohn, were 
outlawed. Mendelssohn was instrumental in furthering Leipzig’s musical reputation in the
22 Schiiler, who on Goerdeler’s suggestion had joined the NSDAP, tried to keep a low profile to keep the 
opera and his position off the National Socialists’ radar.
23 It subsequently even had to enshrine these party posts in its institutional constitution. See: Gewandhaus 
constitution 17 September 1940, StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 8422, Blatt 321-6; here it is important to clarify 
that the original directorate itself had NSDAP party members in its midst who, however, had been appointed 
due to their interest in music and standing in the Leipzig Burgerschaft, not their political affiliations (which 
largely were made out of convenience when it became en vogue to be a NSDAP member after the takeover of 
power in 1933).
4 Report on Gewandhaus rumours in Ibid., Kapitel 32, Blatt 57-9, 1933.
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nineteenth century by forming an environment attracting more musicians and conducive to 
creativity. None of these facts mattered in the Third Reich, only Mendelssohn’s racial 
background did. Yet, the National Socialists did not content themselves with eradicating 
Mendelssohn from the performance scene; they also wanted to erase him from the city’s 
landscape. Their next line of attack was directed against the Mendelssohn monument in 
front of the Gewandhaus.
In 1892, a Mendelssohn statue had been erected to commemorate the orchestra’s 
greatest conductor. It was fully funded by Leipziger Burger and therefore could not easily 
be demolished, since it was private rather than city property. Carl Goerdeler rebutted the 
calls from his own council, especially those by his National Socialist deputy Hans Rudolf 
Haake, to raze the memorial.25 Yet ultimately Haake prevailed. Under the cover of night, 
he ordered the removal of the Mendelssohn memorial from the main entrance of the 
Gewandhaus in late 1936. Haake had used one of Goerdeler’s absences from Leipzig to 
carry out this plan. It has to be assumed that Haake wanted to set an example, since the act 
was carried out on 9 November, the anniversary of the Munich putsch. Evidently fearing a 
public backlash, the ‘great deed’ was hushed up, the press was banned from reporting 
anything about the incident and public discussion of the event was quietened. When the 
head of the Gewandhaus directorate replied to an angry accusation of cultural barbarism 
from Switzerland, clarifying that the statue was removed on the council’s orders without 
knowledge or acceptance of the Gewandhaus, he was demoted and could barely sustain a 
place in the directorate itself.
As has been seen in the chapter above, Goerdeler would not stand for this 
‘cultural barbarism’ and resigned in late 1936. He eventually left his post in spring of the
25 The Kreisleitung of the NSDAP began its campaign in spring 1936 with a letter to Goerdeler claiming that 
the public of Leipzig could no longer bear a monument honouring a Jew. Ibid. Kapitel 26 A, No. 39, Blatt 43, 
8 May 1936.
26 Haake had established before that support for his views from the directorate was not forthcoming: ‘Bei der 
Einstellung des derzeitigen Gewandhausdirektoriums nicht so einfach’, see Ibid., Blatt 170, 3 September 
1936; The forced change of leadership in the Gewandhaus directorate: Ibid., StVuR(I), No. 8418, Blatt 12.
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following year. With his departure, other vestiges of cultural independence fell. It was also 
in 1937 that the Choir of St Thomas’s, one of Germany’s most formidable boys’ choirs and 
Bach’s domain for 27 years, was incorporated into the Hitler Youth. The triad of St 
Thomas -  its school, church and choir -  was one of Europe’s oldest cultural institutions. 
And yet, even this time-honoured establishment was not safe from the grasp of the 
National Socialist ideology. St Thomas’s grammar school could only just avert losing its 
intellectual standard in favour of volkisch education. The choir however, due to its 
considerable national and international acclaim, was less able to remain outside the 
regime’s hold. Lord Mayor Goerdeler, whose two sons were attending St Thomas’s, had 
supported the school’s headmaster in refusing the incorporation of the choir into the Hitler 
Youth. Yet after Goerdeler left his office, the choir had no choice but to bow to the 
political pressure. It did so, however, a year after the Hitler Youth became ‘Staatsjugend’ 
and with a long list of exceptions, which allowed the choir very considerable freedom and 
independence to pursue its normal proceedings without being ‘converted’ to the National 
Socialist cause.27 This did not remain the only politically engineered change in St 
Thomas’s affairs. When Freyberg assumed office as Lord Mayor in 1939, he forced the 
retirement of the Cantor of St Thomas, Karl Straube, in favour of Gunther Ramin. 
Freyberg hoped to have a more malleable person in Gunther Ramin, who had displayed 
some political opportunism in furthering his musical career up to that point. Freyberg 
wanted to exploit this to gain greater control over one of Germany’s most important 
cultural establishments in order to use the choir to increase his own standing in Germany. 
He also sought to sever the strong ties of St Thomas’s School and Choir with their church.
27 This list included that choir work took precedence over Hitler Youth work and meetings, the choir would 
not be split into different groups within the Hitler Youth and would be exempted from the compulsory 
camping excursion (Zeltlager). See Helen Bluemel, ‘The Triad of St Thomas’, especially pp. 30-32. The case 
of St Thomas’s clearly contradicts Kater’s sweeping statement that all boys’ choirs fell in one swoop and 
became totally immersed in the ‘ideal conversion agency’ of the Hitler Youth. Michael Kater, The Twisted 
Muse (Oxford, 1997), p. 140.
28 Gunther Ramin had accepted National Socialist homage and support for his international tours where he 
became a successful export for the regime. In turn he had promoted German culture by only playing the 
German organ repertoire when abroad. See Bluemel, ‘The Triad of St Thomas’, pp. 24-5.
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Ramin, however, proved himself to be a strong guardian of St Thomas’s heritage. In the 
years 1941-43, he refuted Freyberg’s attempt to dissolve the triad and thus saved a
'J Q
tradition of more than 730 years.
Despite all these destructive and bitter incisions, the utmost effort was made by 
the musical protagonists in Leipzig to retain as much of the city’s musical tradition and its 
institutions as possible. Therefore, it was only natural that the musical life continued with 
an studied air of normality in spite of the outbreak of war. St Thomas’s Choir maintained 
its Friday motets and Saturday cantatas in St Thomas’s Church, the opera continued and 
the Gewandhaus held normal concert seasons. When Goebbels made his Sportpalast 
speech in February 1943, proclaiming the Total War and initiating afterwards the closure 
of most of Germany’s cultural and otherwise entertaining institutions, Leipzig’s opera 
(until its destruction in December 1943), the choir music and the Gewandhaus's concert 
season continued. The Gewandhauskapellmeister Hermann Abendroth gained a special 
concession allowing the time honoured concert institution to sustain its performance 
schedule throughout the war. The firestorm of 4 December 1943 destroyed St Thomas’s 
School and the Alumnat where the boys were living. Thus Bach’s choir had to be 
evacuated to Grimma, 40 kilometres away from Leipzig. The concerts in St Thomas’s 
Church in Leipzig continued despite the evacuation. The weekly programme, however, 
was shortened to a motet on Saturdays. The Reichsbahn provided special trains for the 
weekly fixtures and thus the Leipziger had the benefit of these concerts until early 1945, 
when the train lines were just not safe enough anymore. Thereafter the choir continued its 
performances in the Frauenkirche in Grimma. There they also performed publicly Bach’s
29 See Ibid., especially chapter 1 and 3.
30 Thus the Gewandhaus was one o f Only nine cultural establishments to remain open in Germany throughout 
the war after Goebbels's measures were implemented. See Lucke-Kaminiarz, Hermann Abendroth -  Ein 
Musiker im Wechselspiel der Zeitgeschichte. Several sources highlight also the human aspect of Abendroth’s 
achievement: By sustaining the orchestra throughout the war, Abendroth managed to prevent the drafting of 
most of his musicians. Of 109 instrumentalists in 1939, 96 were still with the institution in 1944. See inter al: 
Schinkoth, Musikstadt Leipzig im NS- Staat, p. 254.
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Passion of St John for Easter 1945 -  without the traditional accompaniment by the 
Gewandhaus orchestra -  the only musicians to do so in the entirety of Germany.31
It seemed fateful that the Gewandhaus survived the firestorm of 4 December 
1943, the only one of Leipzig's many concert venues left standing. There was to be only a 
short reprieve, however. The last concert in the Gewandhaus building took place on 13 
February 1944. During the American raids of 20 February 1944, the building was hit 
several times and its famous wooden interior accelerated the destructive force of the fire; 
the building was gutted. Nevertheless, the concerts proceeded according to programme. 
The first exile, the partially destroyed operetta venue Drei Linden outside the city’s centre 
only served for a few performances until the end of the season. A larger venue was clearly 
needed, thus the Gewandhaus moved to Leipzig’s largest film theatre, the ‘Capitol’, for its 
new season beginning in September 1944. The cinema’s capacity with 1700 seats was 
nearly equal to the concert hall’s own.32 The orchestra even maintained its custom of radio 
broadcasts; the last verifiable recording dates from 26 March 1945, just three weeks before 
the occupation of Leipzig. Thereby, the city of Leipzig retained a largely ‘normal’ level of 
musical performances befitting a Musikstadt right until the final months of the war. The 
orchestra’s performances continued until the advance of the American troops to Leipzig’s 
outskirts in mid-April 1945. The last concert was played on 12 April; on 18 April the 
Americans entered the city.33 This date marked the beginning of the first real intermission 
in the Gewandhaus’s proceedings since the onset of the war. All public entertainment was 
halted; even music was only allowed in the context of church services. This was 
unprecedented: neither the Thirty Year War (1618-48) nor the plague had completely
31 This traditional Easter concert was not performed anywhere else in Germany due to the war. StadtAL, 
Thomasschule [ThoSchu], No. 56, Gesangsauffiihrungen des Thomanerchores (performance log), Blatt 131, 
29 and 30 March 1945.
32 Rudolf Skoda, Das Neue Gewandhaus (Berlin, 1985).
33 Claudius Bohm and Sven W. Staps, 250 Jahre Leipziger Stadt und Gewandhausorchester (Leipzig, 1993).
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halted public (and especially musical) entertainment in Leipzig.34 Yet there were attempts 
to circumvent the American ban. Here the interconnectedness of Leipzig’s music scene 
bore fruit again. Gunther Ramin, the Cantor of St Thomas used the church music 
‘loophole’ to incorporate the Gewandhaus orchestra in musical services to accompany his 
choir or even just on its own. In the same way that St Thomas’s Choir was able to continue 
to perform Mendelssohn pieces during the Third Reich, Ramin enabled the Gewandhaus 
orchestra to play -  by appropriate labelling. Mendelssohn’s pieces were attributed to other 
composers or to anonymous, the Gewandhaus's concerts became church services. The 
choir itself moved seamlessly from performances during wartime to performances after 
Leipzig’s occupation. Indeed, the only break in the motet cycle of St Thomas’s Choir was 
a fourteen day gap between concerts during which the American occupation forces vetted 
Gunther Ramin’s political credentials. Until the 29 May 1945, the choir remained in its 
exile in Grimma even though it had already resumed its concert schedule in Leipzig.35
Despite this, the period of American occupation with its performance ban was 
generally seen as a phase of cultural standstill. Not only did the measure deprive Leipzig’s 
Burger of any form of entertainment and diversion, it also facilitated the hiring away of 
musicians and artists from Leipzig’s cultural institutions by other -  already reopened -  
establishments outside the city. This endangered Leipzig’s standing as a city of music, a 
situation its music loving Burger were anxious to change. The Gewandhaus's directorate 
especially was keen to resurrect Leipzig’s musical life. On 7 May 1945, Hellmuth von 
Hase wrote to Mayor Vierling proposing a resumption of the Gewandhaus concerts:
Although [...] more pressing issues than cultural
questions are on the forefront, I would like to take the
34 Bernhard Knick, St Thomas zu Leipzig (Wiesbaden, 1963).
35 The performance log poignantly even states the time of return of the choir to their Leipzig home: 4 pm on 
29 May 1945. StadtAL, Thomasschule, ThoSchu, No. 56, Blatt 133.
36 Several pleas by citizens, cultural institutes and even the city council and Lord Mayor to the American 
military administration went unheard. See for example: Thomas Ahbe and Michael Hofmann, Hungern, 
Hamstern, Heiligabend (Leipzig, 1996) and StadtAL, StVuR (I) No. 8380, Blatt 8 and 9. For concrete 
worries about other cities, especially in Thuringia, taking over artists, see: Ibid., No. 7969, Blatt 48, memo of 
a discussion between Major Eaton and mayor Vierling and legal counsellor Zeigner, 26 June 1945.
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liberty to draw your attention to the possibility of the 
resumption of the musical life that is so meaningful for 
Leipzig, as a branch of public life that immediately -  
without strain on municipal offices or claiming public 
finances -  could be resurrected. I am hereby thinking 
predominantly of the function of the Gewandhaus,37
As the performances had taken place in an interim venue before the end of the 
war, the city would not incur any immediate rebuilding costs but reap the benefits of a 
renewed cultural life. Von Hase emphasised the importance of the Gewandhaus for 
Leipzig’s reputation as Musikstadt and its meaning for Leipzig’s citizens as a place of
' l O
relaxation and regalement. Vierling welcomed von Hase’s approach; however, due to the 
American stance, he had to postpone immediate action.39 Despite this failure to attain 
direct results, von Hase’s letter was a clear attempt to regain ownership of the 
Gewandhaus's decision-making process and thus re-establish the Gewandhaus as a 
Burger-led institution. He even pre-empted an official denazification by declaring the party 
members in the directorate untenable. Nevertheless, his endeavour was rather ambitious. 
Of the old directorate, there were only four members left in Leipzig: von Hase, Max 
Brockhaus (a music publisher), Adolphe Meyer (a banker) and Walter Tiemann (a 
university professor). The head of the directorate Anton Kippenberg (the head of the 
famous Inselverlag) had been evacuated to Marburg when his flat was destroyed in the 
final months of the war. Yet, von Hase assured Vierling that as soon as the authorisation
37 Hellmuth von Hase to Vierling: ‘Obwohl Sie zweifellos durch Ihr neues Amt auf das auBerste in Anspruch 
genommen sind und im jetzigen Zeitpunkt dringlichere Aufgaben im Vordergrund stehen als kulturelle 
Fragen, erlaube ich mir, Ihre Aufmerksamkeit auf die Moglichkeit der Wiederingangsetzung des fur Leipzig 
so bedeutungsvollen Musiklebens zu lenken, als einen Zweig des offentlichen Lebens, der sofort -  ohne 
Arbeitsbelastung stadtischer Dienststellen oder Inanspruchnahme offentlicher Mittel -  wieder aufgenommen 
werden konnte. Ich denke dabei in erster Linie an die Tatigkeit des Gewandhauses[...]’ Ibid., No. 8422, Blatt 
1-2, 7 May 1945 -  the resurrection of the Gewandhaus was so pressing that it could not wait until the official 
end of the war (Leipzig had been occupied for three weeks at the time, yet Germany had not surrendered in 
general). v
8 Ibid.; Hellmuth von Hase was a typical Burger o f Leipzig, enmeshed deeply in the city’s economic and 
cultural fabric. He was the owner and general manager of the printing and publishing house Breitkopf und 
Hartel, one of Germany’s most prolific music publishers. In 1945, he had been a member of the Gewandhaus 
directorate for 24 years, and its chairman for 2 years before the National Socialists ousted him in 1938.
39 Vierling’s reply: Ibid., Blatt 4, 8 May 1945.
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was given, the directorate could begin its work thoroughly and return to its old form.40 
This, however, was not to be as von Hase, so far the driving force behind the revival of the 
Gewandhaus directorate, voluntarily followed the American relocation train in June 1945, 
thus he held his office in abeyance 41
When the Russians took over occupation command in Leipzig on 1 July 1945, this 
marked the end of Vierling’s term in office. Soon after, Erich Zeigner was promoted from 
legal council and head of the culture department to Lord Mayor. Vierling had been 
sympathetic to a once again independent Gewandhaus, Zeigner seemed to share this 
opinion. Initially, he seemed a blessing for the Gewandhaus whose curator he had become 
by taking office as Lord Mayor.42
For the musical life of the city the changeover to Soviet occupation meant that 
only a week after the arrival of the troops, the Gewandhaus gave its first concert with 
Beethoven’s Egmont on 7 July 1945. The opera opened on 20 July with Beethoven’s 
Fidelio in its interim venue Drei Linden.43 In the beginning, it appeared as if the recovery 
of Leipzig as Musikstadt was well under way. The three main musical institutions, the 
opera, the Gewandhaus and St Thomas’s Choir were all performing. However, soon the 
denazification measures that had slowly begun under the Americans came into full swing 
and encroached upon the cultural sphere. The ‘Verordnung iiber den personellen 
Neuaufbau der offentlichen Verwaltungen’ of 17 August 1945 demanded the dismissal of 
all NSDAP members from public service. As this order was used not just within but most 
importantly also outside the political administration in Saxony, Leipzig’s cultural 
institutions were also affected. The Gewandhaus orchestra fell under this directive,
40 Letter by von Hase: Ibid., Blatt 6.
41 Von Hase’s publishing house Breitkopf und Hartel was not on the list of American desirables, thus he had 
to convince the American authorities  ^to allow him, his family and his most trusted employees to accompany 
those ordered to move zones.
42 The position of curator came automatically with the Lord Mayor’s post. It was usually held as an honorary 
office and ensured that the Gewandhaus had an advocate in the city council without, however, having to face 
an active decision maker. Yet this was exactly the position Zeigner assumed once in office.
43 The pieces were suitably chosen for their subject matter. StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 8384, Blatt 33.
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primarily because of its incarnation as Stadtorchester (city orchestra). Some musicians, 
those most seriously implicated, were dismissed immediately, however, it was impossible 
to dismiss every single party member. About fifty percent of the instrumentalists had been 
members of the NSDAP.44 With the viability of the orchestra at stake, the director for art 
and culture in the culture department of the city council, Rudolf Hartig, wrote to the Lord 
Mayor demanding greater flexibility in respect to the cultural institutions of Leipzig 45 He 
warned against a ‘transformation happening too fast’ thereby endangering the orchestra’s 
quality. Furthermore, he called attention to the damage cultural life in Leipzig would 
sustain if the decree was followed to the letter. Hartig demanded modifications to the order 
to suit the ‘distinctiveness’ of the cultural field and its protagonists. He seemed especially 
unsettled by the fact that Leipzig was losing high calibre artists and musicians by strictly 
adhering to the decree, only to see them find new engagements in other cities in the Soviet 
Occupation Zone, where a more relaxed approach seemed to be prevailing.46 Lord Mayor 
Zeigner acknowledged the problems. However, apart from referring to the special 
conditions in the order of 17 August that allowed for an exception where ‘highly skilled 
personnel’ was involved, he could not find answers to Hartig’s concerns.47
Yet, the Gewandhaus's problems did not end with the unresolved question of 
whether the majority of its musicians had to leave due to their political affiliations. There
44 It appears, however, that most of these party members had joined the NSDAP for opportunistic reasons, 
rather than conviction. Complaints exist from the late 1930s about the irreverent silence with which the 
musicians greeted the Hitler salute. This was especially ‘embarrassing’ at a public rehearsal for the trade fair 
concert in spring 1938, conducted by Hans Weisbach. That complaint even reached the Reich war ministry: 
StadtAL, Kapitel 32, Blatt 190-1; The irreverence might have been directed equally at the salute and the 
saluter as Hans Weisbach’s credentials were more ideological than musical. See: Fred K. Prieberg, Handbuch 
Deutsche Musiker 1933-45 (Aupres de Zombry, 2004), pp. 7628-37.
45 Rudolf Hartig (1893-1962), had been a school teacher and member of the KPD from 1920 onwards. 
Because of his communist stance, he spent large parts of the Thousand Year Reich’ in concentration camps. 
As Hartig had shown a considerable interest and aptitude for music, he was well placed in this office. See 
SStA Leipzig, SED Sammlung Biographie, No. 925 Rudolf Hartig.
46 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 7969, Blatt 89-90, Hartig to Lord Mayor Zeigner 6 October 1945; Hartig named 
Abendroth, Stiehler and Fritzsche, (the Gewandhaus's conductor, the orchestral leader and the opera’s choir 
master) as being politically implicated but already having found new engagements. For Abendroth 
especially, see below.
47 Exceptional artists who could not be replaced were excluded from the obligatory dismissals. Ibid., Blatt 
104 .
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was also the matter of the repertoire. The orchestra had joined Leipzig’s other cultural 
establishments (the opera, the Schauspielhaus [Leipzig’s main theatre] ) in performing 
works of artists who had been banned during the Third Reich.48 Whilst it was gratifying for 
the orchestra to be able to play works of its former Kapellmeister Mendelssohn, the 
Gewandhaus directorate was less happy to receive demands by Hartig to amend the 
performance schedule in November 1945. He thereby ventured into the realm of the 
directorate’s responsibilities. The Gewandhaus directorate consisted at that point of only 
two actively working members. Together with conductor Hermann Abendroth, they 
continued to the best of their ability in the old manner, planning and preparing the concerts 
and scheduling the programmes. The administrative issues were attended to by the 
Gewandhauskanzlei, the institution’s office, which was still fully functioning with 
dedicated staff.
Therefore, albeit small in size, the ruling body of the institution was still 
operational. Hence, this encroachment into the directorate’s sphere of authority was met 
with unease. The directorate appealed to the Lord Mayor, as the Gewandhaus’s curator, to 
re-evaluate the Kulturamt’s suggestions. Due to their length and gravity most of the 
proposed works would ‘be hardly bearable, even for the greatest of music enthusiasts, and 
could barely fulfil the intention of providing calming enjoyment so necessary in the current 
times.’ Although this appeared to be a matter of artistic differences, it later became clear 
that the real concern lay elsewhere: ‘We are of course prepared to present our schedules to 
the Kulturamt and receive its wishes and fulfil them if possible. However, we would like to 
maintain in principle our independence in these decisions.’ For the directorate this matter 
of artistic independence was a comer stone in sustaining the reputation of this 
internationally renowned concert institute 49 The Lord Mayor tended to agree with these
48 Lieselotte Borusiak and Gertrud Hohnel, Chronik der Stadt Leipzig l- l l  (Leipzig, 1971).
49 t [...]Einige Kulturamtsvorschlage waren [...][durch den] musikalischen Inhalt und Schwere selbst fur die 
groBten Musikenthusiasten kaum ertragbar und wiirden die schone Absicht eines entspannten Genusses, der
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arguments. Despite honouring the Kulturamt s efforts, Zeigner was leaning towards 
respecting the conductor’s (and by extension the directorate’s) judgement. He sought, 
however, to reserve the right for himself and the Kulturamt to veto ‘tasteless and politically 
tactless proposals’.50
In other matters, the Gewandhaus very willingly followed the city authority’s 
directives, notably in the question of the Anrecht. The traditional ticket management was 
temporarily suspended to allow a free sale of tickets and thus open the concerts to 
everyone. With the Gewandhaus building derelict, the Anrecht had for the time being lost 
its importance and was easily given up in the hope of meeting the demands for a 
restructured operation without yielding any substantial rights of self-governance.
However, the director of the Kulturamt, Hartig, was not at all interested in re­
establishing the concert institution in its traditional form. Hartig aimed thoroughly to 
reform the establishment by turning it into a ‘Volkskonzertinstitut’ (a people’s concert 
institute).51 To that end, he instigated the takeover of the Gewandhaus by the city.52 His 
first manoeuvre was to discredit the Gewandhaus in the city council due to its high 
maintenance expenses that had to be borne by the city of Leipzig.53 Furthermore, he 
pointed to the ‘privileged’ nature of its audience and the inaccessibility of the concerts to 
the working class as a result of high ticket prices. He therefore demanded the dissolution of 
the Gewandhaus directorate, which, in his opinion, had been incapacitated through the 
‘desertion’ of most of its members. Only if control over the concerts lay with the
doch heute so notwendig ist, kaum noch erfullen. [...] [Wir] sind selbstverstandlich gern bereit, dem 
Kulturamt unsere Plane vorzulegen und dessen Wiinsche entgegenzunehmen und nach Moglichkeit zu 
erfullen. Aber wir mochten uns doch in den EntschlieBungen prinzipiell unsere Selbstandigkeit bewahren’, 
StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 8422, Blatt 10, letter by the Gewandhaus directorate to Lord Mayor Zeigner, 2 
November 1945.
50 Letter by Lord Mayor Zeigner to Kulturamt, 8 November 1945; Ibid., Blatt 11.
51 He already harboured these plans when fighting for the exemption of artists from the denazification order 
in October 1945. Ibid., No. 7972, Blatt 6-12, 2 October 1945.
52 Ibid., No. 8422, Blatt 12, Letter by the Kulturamt to Lord Mayor Zeigner, 9 November 1945.
53 The Gewandhaus only paid a small proportion of the musicians’ salary. The city had to subsidize the entire 
enterprise, musicians included. They had done so since the late nineteenth century without claiming a stake 
in the decision-making in the Gewandhaus. Hartig wanted to change this.
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Kulturamt, would the conceits be widely accessible for the general public.54 Since the legal 
constitution of the Gewandhaus as a private foundation under civil law might have 
thwarted his ambitions, he demanded the ‘abolition of the institution of the Gewandhaus’. 
This move was reminiscent of the attempts of takeover by the National Socialists. Indeed, 
Hartig was not shy to recommend using ‘Goebbels’s methods’ where appropriate.55 His 
drive did not exhaust itself in changing the Gewandhaus', his ideas also encompassed St 
Thomas’s Choir. As a communist, he was naturally highly suspicious of the close 
relationship of the choir and its church. He acknowledged that the ‘historical function’ of 
the choir fundamentally could not be changed. The Bachpflege, one of the choir’s main 
duties, had to continue, particularly because of its part in Leipzig’s international 
reputation. Nevertheless, the choir ‘had to be urged to apply itself to secular music.’ In 
a way he echoed Freyberg’s (Nazi) attempts at De-Christianisation in the early 1940s. The 
new ‘fields of application’ of the choir were to be found in staff canteens of factories, 
where the boys were supposed to heighten the morale of the workers.58 For the 
Gewandhaus, he envisaged an even more extensive change in character. In Hartig’s 
cultural programme for the year 1946, he laid out his plans for the ‘restructuring’ of the 
Gewandhaus. The foundation was to be dissolved and the ‘exclusivity’ broken. The ‘old 
Gewandhaus’ was an institution that had been built, supported and maintained by a music 
loving Biirgertum. This historical constellation was ‘never to recur again’, therefore the 
status of the Gewandhaus as a ‘special’ institute (Sonderinstitut) had to be brought to an 
end.59 In the pursuance of this aim, a conglomerate of overlapping and sometimes
conflicting levels of authority emerged. Lord Mayor Zeigner, the Volksbildungsamt and the
Kulturamt (both divisions in the city’s department for Art, Culture and Volksbildung) and
54 Ibid., Blatt 22, Letter by the Kulturamt to Lord Mayor Zeigner, 5 December 1945.
55 Ibid., No. 2133, Blatt 225, 12 November 1945.
56 Elfie Rembold, ‘Stadtische Musikkultur, Leipziger Bachfeste in den Diktaturen’ in Hopei and Sammler, 
Kulturpolitik und Stadtkultur in Leipzig und Lyon, pp. 201-30.
57 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 7972, Blatt 13-14.
58 Ibid., No. 4293, Blatt 56.
59 Ibid., No. 8423, Blatt 124 and No. 8418, Blatt 19 and Blatt 52, January 1946.
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the Soviet authorities (albeit mostly in the background) all claimed influence in the affairs 
of the concert hall. Equally, the Gewandhaus directorate and its administrative counterpart, 
the Gewandhauskanzlei, insisted on their sole power of representation. The 
Volksbildungsamt fostered the same idea as the Kulturamt regarding the dissolution of the 
Gewandhaus directorate, however, not yet with the same finality. Instead of advocating the 
abolition of the entire institution, it demanded a ‘more suitable’ and effective directorate.60 
Nevertheless, the old directorate was not defeated easily. The two remaining active 
members in Leipzig, Walter Tiemann and Adolphe Meyer, rejected a decision by Lord 
Mayor Zeigner to put the Gewandhaus provisionally under the control of the Kulturamt61 
Rather, they entered into discussions with Zeigner to renew the directorate and enliven the 
administration. One of the first bones of contention was the question of replacement for 
Gewandhauskapellmeister Abendroth.
Hermann Abendroth’s position had already started to become precarious shortly 
after the takeover of power by the Soviet occupation forces in July 1945. The 
Gewandhaus's conductor had already been on the black list of the Americans. However, 
as no secular concerts of any kind were allowed, this matter did not have any concrete 
effect on the Gewandhaus at that time. Indeed, Abendroth even conducted his orchestra 
and the St Thomas’s Choir in a prayer service for the resistance clergyman Martin 
Niemoller in the Gewandhaus in late May 1945.
Hermann Abendroth had been the Gewandhaus conductor since 1934.64 He 
steered the Gewandhaus through the war, having won for the orchestra an exemption from
60 Ibid., No. 8472, Blatt 10, Letter by the Volksbildungsamt to the Gewandhaus directorate, 10 December 
1945.
61 Ibid., No. 8422, Blatt 28, Letter by Lord Mayor Zeigner to Tiemann and Meyer, 10 December 1945.
62 Thacker, Music after Hitler, p. 43
63 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 8534, Bl^tt 7, 27 May 1945.
64 Hermann Abendroth (1883-1956) followed Bruno Walter who had been disposed in 1933. According to 
confidential files of Leipzig’s city council, Abendroth had by no means been the first choice: ‘[...]Da die 
erste Klasse der Konzertdirigenten Furtwangler, Klemperer, Bruno Walter augenblicklich nicht infrage 
kommt, ware Abendroth (als deutscher Mann) vielleicht augenblicklich der geeigneteste Dirigent fiir die 
Gewandhaus Konzerte.’ StadtAL, Kapitel 32, Blatt 22. This was not the first time Abendroth was under
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Goebbels’s total war order.65 When the Gewandhaus building was bombed and eventually 
destroyed in 1944, he relocated the Gewandhaus orchestra to the Capitol cinema and 
maintained the normal performance cycle.
Abendroth’s position had been questioned in Leipzig even though the American 
black list was unknown.66 Thus when the Russians took over and an immediate 
intensification of the political purging process was noticeable, it was assumed that he had 
to leave. However, the first denazification laws concerning musicians in public service did 
not explicitly touch his case. On the one hand, he was definitely implicated as a party 
member, on the other hand, however, he was irreplaceable.67 Thus initially, he remained in 
office, relaying orders of the new city council to his orchestra and organising the new 
concert cycle accordingly.68
Soon, however, his position became untenable with attacks appearing from 
various fronts. The communists, who gained more and more influence in Leipzig’s 
government, demanded his dismissal, and Gunther Ramin, the Cantor of St Thomas 
resumed his battle for the leadership of the Gewandhaus Choir, thereby unwittingly 
challenging Abendroth’s whole position.69
Abendroth had begun to look around for alternative employment even before 
these problems became noticeable. Seeking to fill the gap that his previous (and now
discussion for the position. He had been unsuccessful in his application for the position of 
Gewandhauskapellmeisier in 1922, when the competition was not circumscribed by racial considerations.
See: Lucke-Kaminiarz, Hermann Abendroth.
65 Erik Levi’s assertion that the Gewandhaus's ‘reputation was essentially local’ during the period of the 
Third Reich is unsustainable. Concerts from the Gewandhaus were transmitted live by radio to New York, 
the Mendelssohn monument incident reverberated widely and the fact that the orchestra was exempted from 
the total war order seems difficult to reconcile with Levi’s throwaway comment. See Levi, Music in the Third 
Reich.
66 See letter of Dr. Vieweg to Kulturamt 6 June 1945, demanding Abendroth’s deposition from office due to 
his NSDAP membership and ‘lack of artistic vision’, StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 8382, Blatt 1.
67 See footnote no. 15 and 16.
68 See letter 14 July 1945, Abendroth is told to keep the next 4-6 concerts outside the Anrecht and to arrange 
for 50 per cent of all tickets to be allocated to the Antifaschistischer Block. StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 8380, 
Blatt 66.
69 Ramin had fought for this office throughout the 1930s, especially after his appointment as Cantor of St 
Thomas in 1939. During that time Abendroth, who had demanded the post in his contract negotiations, kept 
the upper hand, possibly due to the advantage of being a member of the NSDAP. This party membership now 
turned into a disadvantage and he lost the choir. See for example StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 8533, Blatt 12-14.
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impossible) tour engagements had left, he found an appropriate field of activity as musical 
director of the German National Theatre in Weimar, Thuringia. Associated with this post 
came the conductorship of the Weimar Staatskapelle, which Abendroth also gladly took 
over.70 Furthermore, in addition to his dormant lecturing post in Leipzig’s conservatoire, 
he found a professorship at Weimar’s School of Music, the state conservatoire of 
Thuringia.71 Contrary to the common assertion that persons implicated with the National 
Socialist dictatorship had to move to the Western occupation zones to continue their 
professions, Abendroth just moved within the Soviet Zone.72 Indeed, great support for 
hiring Abendroth came from Weimar’s Soviet command, even though local KPD activists 
insisted that he could not be hired. His credentials as a musician were clearly considered 
more important than his political past.73
Nevertheless, Abendroth evidently held his post in Leipzig in high esteem, thus he 
challenged his dismissal in 1945 and throughout the first half of 1946. The unresolved 
question of the Gewandhaus's legal status and the competing levels of authority prompted 
him to contest the decision. After the official date of his removal from office on 15 
December 1945, he spoke with the Lord Mayor claiming that the city was in no position to 
dismiss him as the Gewandhaus was a private institution and that the denazification laws 
for the public sector were therefore not applicable.74 Furthermore, the city of Leipzig, even 
when acting upon orders of the administration of Saxony, could not annul a private 
contract. The Volksbildungsamt under Holtzhauer wanted to disregard the question of
70 Weimar was, however, not too far away from Leipzig to make a coordination of all of Abendroth’s 
positions possible.
'He took office both at the Staatskapelle and the Weimar School of Music in October 1945, a month before 
he was dismissed from the Gewandhaus. In December 1945 he was entrusted by the Landesprasident 
(premier of Thuringia) Dr Paul with the superintendence over the city of Jena’s musical life, a position which 
was broadened to include all of Thuringia in 1946. See Lucke-Kaminiarz, Hermann Abendroth.
72 It was by no means a case of unwitting appointment. Exasperated political officials from Leipzig openly 
criticized Weimar for employing Abendroth as ‘he was clearly unacceptable in Leipzig’. See Ibid., p. 110.
73 Naimark, The Russians in Germany, p. 431. Abendroth was not only implicated by his party membership, 
he had ‘only’ joined in 1937, but more importantly through his position as leader of the Fachschaft of the 
choirmasters and music teachers in the Reichsmusikkammer and several publications he had written in this 
position. See Prieberg, ‘Hermann Abendroth’ in Handbuch deutsche Musiker 1933-45, pp. 39-49.
74 StadtAL, StVuR (I), 1324, Blatt 6, 20 December 1945.
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whether Abendroth’s contract was for private or public employment and referred the 
matter to Dresden. ‘[This issue] will be presented to the Landesverwaltung, so that it will 
be decided there, whether the premier music institution of Leipzig can still be led by 
Abendroth against all guidelines from the Landesverwaltung, regardless of whether it is a 
private or a public institution.’75 Yet, the Landesverwaltung did not intervene on the 
Volksbildungsamt’s behalf. Thus the dispute continued with growing vigour until July 
1946. Abendroth continued carrying the prestigious title of Gewandhauskapellmeister, 
even though he admitted that he was ‘out of engagement’.76 The situation was further 
complicated through the efforts of city councillor Richard Pudor, member of the Liberal 
Democratic party. Seeing the problems that the Gewandhaus suffered after losing 
Abendroth, he intervened at the Soviet command in Leipzig to have Abendroth reinstated 
regardless of his former political affiliations. On 30 March 1946, Pudor announced that his 
attempts had been fruitful and Abendroth was allowed to return. He had already discussed 
the terms with Abendroth and recruited mayor Sachse of the city council to arrange 
everything necessary. According to him, the only piece of the mosaic missing was the Lord 
Mayor’s consent.77 Zeigner, however, was not obliging. At first, he refrained from 
positioning himself. This led mayor Sachse to assure him that the whole issue was not 
directed at ‘saving’ Abendroth but at maintaining the concert hall’s international 
reputation. As soon as a suitable successor was found Abendroth could be dismissed.78 
Whilst the Lord Mayor still continued his silence, the other members of the city council 
were more proactive. The staunch communist Helmut Holtzhauer, then still Leipzig’s 
councillor for Volksbildung, even identified the attempt to return Abendroth as a symptom
75 ‘Ich werde daruber hinaus die Angelegenheit der Landesverwaltung vorlegen, damit dort geklart wird, ob 
das entscheidende Musikinstitut Leipzig ungeachtet der Richtlinien der Landesverwaltung weiterhin von 
Abendroth geleitet werden kann, gleichviel ob es sich in soweit um eine private oder um eine offentliche 
Institution handelt.’ StadtAL, StVuRv(I), No. 8472, Blatt 10.
76 Ibid., No. 1324, Blatt 6; Blatt 13-14; Blatt 17-23.
77 Ibid., Blatt 7, Letter Richard Pudor to Lord Mayor Zeigner, 30 March 1945.
78 Ibid., Blatt 9, Letter Sachse to Lord Mayor Zeigner, 13 April 46: *[...] es geht mir weniger um die 
Personlichkeit des Abendroth, als um die Erhaltung des Orchesters als eines international bekannten 
Klangkorpers’.
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of reactionary forces gaining power.79 This led Sachse to conclude that the city council was 
not interested in the further engagement of Abendroth; he informed Pudor accordingly. 
Finally, Zeigner affirmed the dismissal of Abendroth, he did so not just in his position as 
Lord Mayor of Leipzig, but as curator of the Gewandhaus, demanding the immediate 
cessation of the use of the title of Gewandhauskapellmeister by Abendroth, who finally 
complied in late July.80 In this context, a document unearthed by Toby Thacker in the 
British National Archive, needs further attention. At a meeting of the four occupying 
powers in Germany in May 1946, when challenged by the American representative over 
employing the clearly blacklisted Abendroth, the Soviet delegate pointed to the fact that 
they had ‘dealt’ with the matter by ‘remov[ing] him from Leipzig to Weimar’.81 Thacker 
interpreted the document as a statement of the Soviet strategy. Yet, as has been seen above, 
the removal of Abendroth from Leipzig was largely based on German communists’ efforts. 
Even in March 1946, the Soviet city command in Leipzig was happy for Abendroth to 
return, even asking him to ‘stipulate his conditions’.82 Abendroth in turn was the initiator 
of his move to Thuringia, as he stated in a letter to the Gewandhaus's Anton Kippenberg: 
‘I thought it right in these changeable political times to have another string to my bow -  in 
agreement with Tiemann and Meyer [...]’.83 What is more, the local Soviet administration 
in Thuringia supported Abendroth’s engagement against the local German communists.84 
Thacker may be perfectly correct in saying that the Soviets were more lenient than the 
Americans, but in a sense that is beside the point. The real issue here is not leniency but 
agency, for it was German and not Allied hostility that toppled Abendroth in Leipzig. 
Abendroth’s case very clearly shows the complexity of denazification in the Soviet Zone.
79 Ibid., Blatt 10, Letter Holtzhauer to Lord Mayor Zeigner, 24 April 46.
80 Ibid., Blatt 17-19; Blatt 21-23.
81 Toby Thacker, Music after Hitler 1945-1955 ( Aldershot, 2007), p.43, Document in question: The National 
Archive, TNA/PRO/FO 1005/831. v
82 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 1324, Blatt 30, 30 March 1946.
83 Copy of letter Abendroth to Kippenberg 3 December 1945: ‘Dann aber hielt ich es -  im Einverstandnis mit 
Tiemann und Meyer -  fur richtig, in diesen wechselvollen politischen Zeiten ein weiteres Eisen im Feuer zu 
haben.’ See: Lucke-Kaminiarz, Hermann Abendroth, pp. 112-13.
84 Naimark, The Russians in Germany, p. 431.
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The striking regional variations were not simply due to inconsistencies in Soviet policy, 
they were due to the fact that the Soviets were not the only players in this game, and that 
some players, like Kurt Fischer in Dresden, were particularly adept in it. Thacker might 
have been right in suggesting that the Soviet claim of moving Abendroth *[...] to a less 
prestigious position in Weimar’ was an ‘excuse’.85 Yet the Soviets were probably not
‘evasive’ about Abendroth, more so about the actual mechanism of denazification in their
_ _ _ _  86 zone.
Understandably, this entire episode surrounding Abendroth harmed the 
Gewandhaus's reputation. The expertise of the Gewandhaus directorate in choosing and 
approaching a suitable successor was no longer valued. The new conductor was to sign a 
contract with the city rather than just the concert hall. Ironically, the Kulturamt, so 
persistent in removing Abendroth from office, allotted the Kapellmeister post to Herbert 
von Karajan. The sources do not disclose whether Hartig was prepared to ignore Karajan’s 
substantial political involvement in the Third Reich or whether he was actually unaware of 
Karajan’s record. It might be that Hartig just had chosen a known name to demonstrate a 
competence in the musical field. As Karajan’s name was never mentioned again, it is likely 
to have been an off-the-cuff suggestion.87 The Gewandhaus directorate advised to await 
the imminent return of the directorate’s chairman Anton Kippenberg before taking any 
steps.88 Only after Kippenberg’s resumption of office was a decision to be made, both in 
the matters of the succession of conductor as well as continuance of the institution itself. 
However, it took until May 1946 before Kippenberg really positioned himself by declaring 
Tiemann his locum in Leipzig. By that point the efforts of the different levels of the city 
government had pushed their takeover bids forward. Lord Mayor Zeigner, a lawyer
85 Thacker, Music, p. 43.
86 As will be seen in the chapters on Leipzig University and even more so that on law in Leipzig, the Soviets 
were by no means more lenient than any of the other occupation powers.
87 It would have been more than strange to substitute Abendroth, who became an NSDAP member in 1937, 
with Karajan, who even in his fabricated account never joined the party later than 1935 (in fact, he joined in 
1933, see Prieberg, Handbuch deutsche Musiker 1933-45, pp. 3545-3577).
88 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 8472, Blatt 16.
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himself, contemplated which legal means, if any, were open to the city and himself as 
curator to dissolve the foundation. He recalled Hellmuth von Hase from the directorate,
O Q
thus definitely excluding him from any further Gewandhaus business. The Kulturbund, 
an organisation for the promotion of culture, also got engaged in the question of the 
Gewandhaus’s future and demanded an opening of the institution to all members of the 
public and the establishment of a working committee of interested and qualified persons. 
This committee was to replace the present Gewandhaus directorate.90 The Kulturamt was 
quick to pick up on the proposal and reiterated its request to place the Gewandhaus under 
city command. Thereafter, the said committee could be created. This idea now became 
fashionable across the different authorities. The Volksbildungsamt favoured a Gewandhaus 
directorate/ working committee with a majority of workers’ parties. The Lord Mayor was 
pondering potential candidates.91 The initial deliberations between Zeigner, Tiemann and 
Meyer about a new directorate spiralled into an open debate within the city council through 
the Kulturbund’s intervention. In this climate, the Kulturamt attempted yet again to realise 
its ambition and take over control in the Gewandhaus. It tried to place the Gewandhaus’s 
administrative body, the Gewandhauskanzlei, under its control in May 1946. Only 
directives from the Kulturamt were to be followed until a final answer was found regarding 
the future configuration of the concert institution as a whole.92 Although Kippenberg had 
yielded his position operationally to Tiemann, in this matter he stepped in personally and 
denied firmly the Kulturamt’s authority. Instead of issuing directives to the
89 Ibid., Blatt 21; Zeigner considered whether the Gewandhaus foundation could be dissolved according to its 
own constitution (§ 9 stated that the capital would devolve on the city upon the cessation of the foundation, 
the assets then could only be used to support other public music enterprises), however, with the Gewandhaus 
orchestra performing according to schedule, the foundation could hardly be considered as lapsed.
90 Ibid., No. 8422, Blatt 57 and No. 8418, Blatt 23 -  both sources are part of one letter (numbered and dated 
from 18 January 1946). Blatt 23 contains a list of proposed members of the new committee, mostly from a 
middle-class background. Whereas the proposal itself was welcomed by the city authorities, the roster was 
ignored. This might be a reason for the separation of the parts in the filing. The Kulturbund was founded as 
an association for everyone involve^ in the cultural reconstruction of Germany. Initially planned to be above 
party lines and zonal divisions, it soon descended into a Soviet Zone-only club that oriented itself on the 
SED’s cultural policies. See: Wolfgang Schivelbusch, ‘Kulturbund’ in Schivelbusch, In a Cold Crater 
Cultural and Intellectual Life in Berlin, 1945-48 (London, 1998), pp. 72-106.
91 Ibid., No. 8422, Blatt 103 and 105, 18 March and 2 April 1946 respectively.
92 Ibid., Blatt 144, letter by Hartig to the Gewandhauskanzlei, 14 May 1946.
Gewandhauskanzlei, the Kulturamt would have to address its wishes to the Gewandhaus 
directorate.93 Kippenberg’s intervention prompted the city council in June 1946 to appeal 
to the Landesverwaltung in Dresden, for advice. A seemingly harmless enquiry about how 
best to provide for the ‘private foundation’ insinuated that any other action but complete 
dissolution and assigning authority to the city council would be irresponsible: ‘It is 
doubtful whether the further development of this institution is secure as a private 
foundation or if it would not prove more appropriate for the future if the city of Leipzig 
takes over the artistic and financial concerns of the Gewandhaus’. Therefore the Land 
government was urged to use its power and officiate over the disbanding of the 
Gewandhaus foundation.94 From that point onwards the city authorities drove a parallel 
strategy: on the one hand the Kulturamt and the Volksbildungsamt eagerly awaited the 
sanction to dissolve the Gewandhaus foundation, on the other they relied on the Lord 
Mayor in his capacity as curator of the Gewandhaus to implement their suggestions in the 
concert institute. Zeigner perceptibly increased his claim to influence over the 
Gewandhaus and took liberties in the decision-making.95 The tone towards the 
Gewandhaus directorate changed accordingly; it was treated as defunct and redundant. 
Hartig and Holtzhauer agreed to petition the Lord Mayor to define the responsibilities of 
the members of the ‘former’ directorate, as both Tiemann and Meyer -  irritatingly -  ‘still 
believed that they could play a decisive role’.96 Another proposal in September 1946 called 
for the establishment of a transitional directorate to stop Tiemann and Meyer from
93 Ibid., Blatt 160, Kippenberg’s reply 23 May 1946.
94 Ibid., Blatt 174, letter by the city council, office of the Lord Mayor to the Saxony state government’s 
president Dr Friedrichs, 3 June 1946. As parts (those pre-dating the Third Reich) of the civil law in Saxony 
were still used in proceedings, in this case the state government was the only body that could legally 
pronounce the dissolution of this private foundation under civil law.
5 Whereas he tried before to accommodate the directorate’s objections, he now ignored to instate a selected 
new board of candidates, amongst them mayor Eichelbaum. Ibid., No. 8472, Blatt 44, letter by Kippenberg to 
Zeigner asking for the appointment of six new directorate members, 8 August 1946.
96 Ibid., No. 8422, Blatt 219 ,4  September 1946: ‘AuBerdem ware es gut, wenn von Seiten des 
Oberbiirgermeisters die Kompetenzen der Herren der ehemaligen Direktion Tiemann und Meyer geklart 
wiirden, nachdem beide Herren, wie es scheint, immernoch glauben, maBgebend zu sein’.
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interfering.97 This transitional directorate never materialized. Nor did the chaotic struggle 
for authority in decisions concerning the time-honoured Gewandhaus cease. The 
Volksbildungsamt encroached into the day-to-day dealings of the orchestra, without, 
however, the proper expertise to do so. This was shown in the Volksbildungsamt’ s 
selection of sheet music it had ordered for the orchestra’s performances without any prior 
consultations. This sheet music was neither appropriate nor of good quality. Moreover, the 
Gewandhaus directorate had already acquired materials in line with the ‘requirements of 
the new times’ -  namely Shostakovich’s eighth and ninth symphonies. The directorate’s 
choice would allow the Gewandhaus orchestra to premiere these pieces in Europe, thus 
both connecting to its grand tradition of premieres and fulfilling Hartig’s demand to 
embrace the ‘politico-cultural’ reality and perform modem Russian music.98 Therefore, the 
directorate complained to Hartig in the Kulturamt, not to Holtzhauer in the 
Volksbildungsamt about this case. One can presume that the directorate used this further to 
complicate the struggle for authority between the two offices, presumably hoping to 
benefit from the division. The Volksbildungsamt clearly had neither acted in favour of the 
Gewandhaus’s renown nor according to Hartig’s guidelines.99 Yet despite the directorate’s 
best efforts to comply with the new rules and simultaneously outmanoeuvre its critics, the 
city council was adamant that the directorate needed to be finally silenced. Lord Mayor 
Zeigner was central to this process by pursuing the matter of the dissolution of the 
foundation with the Land government in Dresden. In October 1946, even before Dresden 
had ruled on the matter, he declared the directorate non-existent.100 In letters to the
97 Ibid., Blatt 230, 25 September 1946.
98 Ibid., Blatt 236, when the symphonies were finally performed they were merely German premieres. Lukas 
Neumann, ‘Jeder wolle etwas anderes’ in Gewandhausmagazin, Winter 2003/04, No. 41, pp. 33-7
99 Ibid., No. 7969, Blatt 122, 2 November 1945; Hartig called for an education of the people by giving them 
an understanding of Russian culture.  ^A special week of cultural events with a Russian theme was to fulfil this 
purpose in the autumn o f 1945, yet failed to reach the masses. Thus Hartig demanded a stronger emphasis on 
newer Russian music and an appreciation of the political necessities. With its choice of music, the 
Gewandhaus directorate had just done this.
100 Ibid., No. 8422, Blatt 240, letter by the Lord Mayor to the Saxon Landesverwaltung, 1 October 1946, 
asking for clarification in the matter of the dissolution of the Gewandhaus foundation.
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directorate’s members, he based his argument on the fact that since the war, the
Gewandhaus foundation had hardly fulfilled its purpose. Most significantly, the foundation
was not in any financial position to tend to its duties and commitments, which already had
to be covered by the city. Thus the city council was well in its rights to assign the
Gewandhaus to its jurisdiction. He thanked both Tiemann and Meyer for their work but
made it clear in no uncertain terms that their interference would be no longer tolerated.101
The Gewandhauskanzlei was informed by the city council that the directorate had ceased
to exist and all issues concerning the Gewandhaus would be decided in the
Volksbildungsamt.102 The Gewandhaus directorate repudiated this fiercely:
We find ourselves unable to share your opinion in this 
matter, especially with respect to our assumed 
obligations and responsibilities and in the interest of the 
musical life of the city of Leipzig, which in essence is 
closely connected to the existence and work of this 
world famous creation of biirgerlich idealism.
Furthermore, Tiemann and Meyer claimed that any problems facing the
directorate were caused by the unwillingness of the Lord Mayor to fulfil his duties as
curator and facilitate the rebuilding of a functional institution. Therefore, there were no
financial or even ‘cultural’ motives for the Kulturamt to ‘attend to the duties of the
Gewandhaus'. Moreover,
We have always objected to the patronizing and 
intrusive behaviour of this authority [Kulturamt] and, at 
all times, felt it to be uncalled for and repressive; we 
only tolerated this in view of the prevailing political 
arrangements. We would truly appreciate the day that 
finally allowed us full freedom of action. [...] We have 
been entrusted with this responsibility not only by the 
city of Leipzig but the whole musical world.103
101 Ibid., Blatt 250 and 251, 12 October 1946, identical letters by the Lord Mayor to Tiemann and Meyer 
‘relieving’ them from their duties.
102 Ibid., Blatt 257, 16 October 1946.V
103 Ibid., Blatt 262-3, Official letter by the Gewandhaus directorate to Lord Mayor Zeigner, 20 October 1946: 
‘[...] wir konnen uns im Hinblick auf die von uns iibernommenen Pflichten und im Interesse des Musiklebens 
der Stadt Leipzig, das im Wesentlichen mit der Existenz und der Wirksamkeit dieser weltberiihmten 
Schopfung biirgerlichen Idealismus eng verbunden ist, Ihrer Meinung nicht anschlieBen. Wir haben das 
Gewandhausdirektorium wieder aufbauen wollen, Sie haben auf Vorschlage nicht geantwortet. [...] Es lag
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Despite this most outspoken refusal, the city council’s decision was final. The 
Gewandhauskanzlei was permanently placed under the authority of the Volksbildungsamt. 
Lord Mayor Zeigner reiterated this point again in a letter to Tiemann and Meyer, inviting 
them to a discussion about an interim solution until the Land government had decided the 
future of the foundation. This invitation arose more from Zeigner’s legal concerns than any 
intention to include the old directorate’s members or utilize their expertise.104
After all the efforts to gain control over this most prestigious of concert 
organizations, the city council and its cultural department were unclear what to do with it. 
There remained the problem of identifying and implementing a suitable structure to ensure 
both control over the concert institute as well as the quality of its artistic output.105 The 
hopes for progress in the planned consultations with Tiemann and Meyer failed; Tiemann 
showed passive resistance and cancelled the appointment and Adolphe Meyer missed the 
proposed dates due to illness and later death. Kippenberg, who had followed the 
developments from Marburg (in the American Zone), was indignant. He urged Tiemann to 
‘do his utmost to preserve the fundamental independence of the Gewandhaus’.106
The uncertainty about the shape of the Gewandhaus’s legal future was further 
complicated by the decision of the Land government in early 1947 that all foundations in 
Saxony were to be dissolved and their assets bundled into three large capital reserves under 
Dresden’s control. This would have annulled the Gewandhaus constitution and 
concurrently revoked the city’s influence over the institute completely. To avoid this, 
Zeigner intervened in Dresden. In a consultation with the Secretary of State Geyer, he
also keinerlei wirtschaftliche oder gar “kulturelle” Veranlassung vor, daB sich das Kulturamt der Stadt 
unserer Aufgaben hatte annehmen miissen. Wir haben die Bevormundung und Einmischung dieser Instanz 
stets als unnotig und hemmend empfunden und nur aus Rucksichten eines zeitbedingten Einvernehmens 
ertragen. Wir wtirden den Tag, der uns wieder voile Bewegungsfreiheit gestattet, aufrichtigst begriiBen [...] 
uns ist Verantwortung nicht nur von Leipzig sondern auch von der ganzen musikalischen Welt auferlegt.’.
104 Ibid., Blatt 294, letter by Zeigner to Tiemann, 14 November 1946. Zeigner had been eager to seek legal 
assurance from various sources throughout his dealings in this matter, despite being himself more than 
qualified to weigh up any implications.
1 5 Ibid., Blatt 318, letter by the Volksbildungsamt to the Lord Mayor.
106 Ibid., No. 8472, Blatt 70.
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arranged for the Gewandhaus foundation and its related assets to be transferred into the 
hands of the city of Leipzig. This was possible as there were ‘no financial assets worth 
mentioning’. Furthermore, Geyer did not see any prospect of the Gewandhaus (the actual 
building) being reconstructed ‘in the next five to ten years’.107
The decision of Saxony’s Landesverwaltung gave the city council control, 
however, the question remained of how to integrate the unique concert institution into the 
organizational structure of the city’s cultural policy. Despite the repeated calls for a 
complete absorption into the city’s administration, the debate narrowed around the 
question of whether to re-establish an independent institution (very much akin to the old 
organization) or to create a foundation dependent on the city. Anton Kippenberg presented 
his idea clearly:
The Gewandhaus does not just belong to the city, it is a 
concern for the whole of the German people, indeed of 
the whole world [...] If the Gewandhaus is to be 
municipalized or nationalized, it would become a 
concert institute like many others and thus lose its 
nimbus that sets it apart from all the others.108
The Volksbildungsamt agreed that the Gewandhaus had to preserve its century old 
importance in Leipzig’s musical life, but it had to accommodate the ‘tenor of the times’. 
Thus it proposed to either retain the status quo (that is continued support of the 
Gewandhaus in artistic and financial questions by Leipzig’s city council) or to create a 
subsidiary foundation under the control of the Volksbildungsamt.109 In the latter case the 
foundation’s decision-making body was to consist of the curator (a post still to be held by 
the current Lord Mayor), the head of the department for Art, Culture and Volksbildung, the
107 Ibid., No. 8422, Blatt 344, minutes of meeting of Zeigner and Geyer on 16 January 1947; the measure was 
implemented at the end of February after Zeigner had to send a reminder to Dresden, see Ibid., Blatt 359 and 
Blatt 369, 12 February and 27 February 1947 respectively. However, the decision did not dissolve the 
foundation, merely transferred it intoythe city’s hands. The question of its future remained open.
108 ‘Das Gewandhaus gehort nicht der Stadt allein, sondern ist Sache des ganzen deutschen Volkes, ja der 
Welt [...] Wiirde es verstadtlicht oder verstaatlicht, so ware es ein Konzertinstitut wie viele andere auch und 
auch den Nimbus, der es vor den anderen so auszeichnet, wiirde es verlieren.’ Ibid., No. 8472, Blatt 70, 14 
March 1947.
109 Ibid., No. 8423, Blatt 124.
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principal city councillor, one member of the city council, the leader of the Free 
Confederation of German Trade Unions {Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, FDGB) in 
Leipzig and finally three respected members of Leipzig’s Burgertum, who had to be 
suggested each by one of the three political parties. The final decision about whether all the 
proposed party candidates were accepted, was incumbent on the Lord Mayor.110 Thereby, 
the influence of the Burgertum, that social stratum which initiated the Gewandhaus in 
1743, was strictly curtailed. In comparison, in its old constitution, the Gewandhaus 
foundation stipulated that the directorate as its governing body was to be selected by the 
previous members of the directorate from the Burger of the city. The curator had only the 
ceremonial duty of instating them into their office.111 When NSDAP members were forced 
onto the Gewandhaus directorate in the late 1930s, this had already been seen as 
endangering the existence of the concert institute. The purpose of the foundation to ‘realise 
musical works of true artistic value for the benefit of the public’, was threatened then by 
political intrusion seeking to exploit the Gewandhaus for propaganda reasons. The 
Volksbildungsamf s suggestion far surpassed the National Socialists’ interference. It 
envisaged a Gewandhaus under immediate control and influence of the political rulers.112 
Despite Dresden’s confirmation that the Gewandhaus was now under city control, it still 
had not transpired which part of the city administration was to take over. The Gewandhaus 
fell clearly within the remit of Hartig and the Kulturamt, yet its wide appeal and truly 
biirgerlich origin made it a focus of attention for the Volksbildungsamf s head Helmut 
Holtzhauer, who continued to comment on the issue even after leaving the 
Volksbildungsamt for his post as Leipzig’s mayor for finance in late 1946. Both men were 
later to become leaders in the early GDR’s cultural policy in the Staatliche Kommission fur
110 Ibid., No. 8418, Blatt 60. v
111 Cf.: Ibid., No. 8422, Blatt 321-6, Constitution of the Gewandhaus foundation, 17 September 1940.
112 Cf.: Ibid., the passage referring to the foundation’s mission was taken over from its previous constitution 
dated 6 March 1873. See Handbuch der Gewandhaus Konzertdirektion (Leipzig, 1905) -  this private print 
was only distributed amongst the members of the directorate. See StadtAL, FS, FamiliennachlaB Limburger, 
No. 174.
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Kunsiangelegenheiten (state commission for artistic issues).113 The issue of the 
Gewandhaus was a training ground for their political strategy in cultural planning.
If it appeared to have been just a struggle behind the scenes, the conflict about the 
Gewandhaus's structural future had implications for the orchestra itself. Abendroth’s 
departure at the end of 1945 left the post of Gewandhauskapellmeister vacant. Different 
deliberations about a suitable successor failed for various reasons. Hasty proposals like the 
suggestion of Karajan were not to be taken seriously. Other attempts to procure Hermann 
Scherchen were futile as the conductor could not be located or refused to answer the city’s 
letters. Scherchen would have been an ideal candidate. An internationally versed conductor 
and clear and outspoken critic of National Socialism with communist leanings would have 
satisfied everyone. But communications could not be established.114 After a concert season 
with guest conductors, finally Herbert Albert was chosen to fill the vacancy in 1946. This 
new conductor was not quite of the same calibre as his predecessors. The Gewandhaus 
now failed to attract the vanguard of the conducting profession and even the merely 
adequate did not value the position as much as their predecessors as will be seen in 
Albert’s case.115
Albert came to this conductorship through two guest appearances in the 
Gewandhaus, which were eagerly received by the audience. The problems surrounding the 
procurement of other conductors quickly led to a two year contract with a view to renewal 
after this period. Albert made good contact with the musicians in the orchestra and 
refreshed the repertoire. Amongst the pieces he performed were many Leipzig premieres of 
modem pieces neglected or banned under the previous regime. The works of Hindemith,
113 Toby Thacker, ‘ “Anleitung und Kontrolle”: Stakuko and the censorship of music in the GDR, 1951-53’ 
in Beate Muller (ed.), Censorship and Cultural Regulation in the Modem Age (Amsterdam/New York,
2004), pp. 87-108. v
114 Scherchen was asked by Wilhelm Furtwangler to share the Berliner Philharmoniker conductorship by 
partaking in guest concerts in 1939; Scherchen’s political position made this impossible. Prieberg, ‘Hermann 
Scherchen’ in Handbuch deutsche Musiker, pp. 6073-84.
115 The times of Bruno Walter’s admiration for the ‘oldest and most famous of all German concert 
institutions’ were over. See Walter, Thema und Variationen, p. 330.
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Shostakovich (the eighth and ninth symphonies obtained by the directorate), Mussorgsky, 
Britten, Khatchaturian and Stravinsky were amongst those premieres, giving the Leipzig 
audience a welcome breath of fresh musical air and broadening their previously forcibly 
narrowed musical view.116 Yet, more ominously, Albert’s Leipzig premieres also included 
works by Max Trapp and Hans Pfitzner. Both composers were not only favourites in 
National Socialist repertoires but also, in Trapp’s case, even in combination with party 
offices, active in their support for and promotion of the ideas of the Third Reich.117 
Albert’s programme planning in this respect was even remarked on abroad.118 The city 
administration, however, did not object. Even Lord Mayor Zeigner who had so ardently 
insisted on a right to veto ‘politically tactless’ programmes did not protest.119 It seems 
Albert was given relative free reign, the city was happy just to have a conductor. Yet, the 
hopes placed on Albert’s appointment were soon frustrated. Only one year after taking 
office, just after the city council had finally seized control over the Gewandhaus, 
difficulties surfaced. Albert was by no means committed to the Gewandhaus first and 
foremost, but saw it as secondary to his commitments in Bamberg (in the American Zone), 
so much so that he lured the best members of the Gewandhaus orchestra away to join that 
ensemble.120 Albert left no doubt of his disregard for the Gewandhaus by handing in his 
notice in January 1948, knowing perfectly well that the lack of a successor would put 
pressure on the city council to offer him more preferable conditions to keep him. Indeed, 
Albert’s subsequent proposal for a new contract included passages allowing him more
116 Albert received ovations from his audience, the critics in the newspapers were also full of praise. The 
premiere of Khatchaturian’s piano concerto was commended as ‘Kunststiick an Geschmeidigkeit’. See 
Leipziger Zeitung, 14 March 1947.
117 Prieberg, ‘Max Trapp’ and ‘Hans Pfitzner’ in Handbuch deutsche Musiker, pp. 7226-31 and pp. 5193- 
5243 respectively.
118 Copy of an American article on the Gewandhaus programme 1947/48 in the files of the Lord Mayor’s 
office. The author remarks in particular on the inclusion of Pfitzner’s works. StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 8423, 
Blatt 232.
119 There is nothing in the files that suggests a debate about the programming. The following problems with 
Albert never touched upon the topic of music selection.
120 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 1324, Blatt 29-30, 7 December 1947. This problem therefore came to the 
attention of the city council just a month before Albert handed in his notice.
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freedom to perform outside Leipzig, a reduced number of concerts he had to give with the 
Gewandhaus and an increased salary. Furthermore, he now openly defied the requirement 
to establish permanent residence in Leipzig.121 This exemplified how rapidly the standing 
of the Gewandhaus had decreased. Even just adequate conductors such as Albert felt 
qualified to treat the institution with this level of disrespect. The city council acted 
accordingly: Albert was only to be given a renewed engagement if he committed himself 
completely to the Gewandhaus and the city of Leipzig.122 However, its outrage did not 
solve the remaining problem: a permanent conductor was needed to maintain and rebuild 
the body of the orchestra after the continuous dismissals of politically implicated members 
and the exit of several highly qualified musicians to ensembles in the Western Occupation 
Zones. Despite the lukewarm reception of Albert’s first contract proposal, he even 
increased his demands for a salary in March 1948.123 Rudolf Hartig became involved and 
introduced two other aspects into the equation. Firstly, the Gewandhaus audience would 
not understand another change of conductor ‘yet again’.124 Secondly, he pleaded for 
waiving the residence requirement as from a political point of view, Leipzig and the 
Gewandhaus had to keep Albert. High profile departures from the Soviet Zone to the 
Western Zones of Occupation were already a problem; Albert’s leaving would be a 
propaganda disaster.125 In the climate of the increasing Cold War tensions this was not 
shedding a good light on Leipzig or on the Soviet Zone. Hartig’s fears were justified: on 20 
April 1948, the Mainecho, a newspaper in the American Zone, published the
121 Zeigner alleged that Albert’s real reasons lay in his desire to move permanently into the American Zone. 
Albert’s residence demand seemed to confirm this notion. See Ibid., Blatt 44-5 (Lord Mayor Zeigner to City 
Councillor Lang). For the details of Albert’s contractual demands: meeting minutes Lang and Zeigner, 20 
February 1948, Ibid., Blatt 66-7.
122 ‘Albert miBversteht offenbar vollig die Situation.’ Albert was already in breach of his old contract by 
refusing to relocate his residence from Stuttgart (Western zones) to Leipzig. In the opinion of the city 
council, this was a main prerequisite for any further cooperation. Ibid., Blatt 69, 24 February 1948.
123 Ibid., Blatt 79.
124 ‘Es ist ja sonst kein anderer da, auch will das Publikum nicht schon wieder einen neuen Dirigenten.’ The 
Gewandhaus audience was used to having a Gewandhauskapellmeister for a long time, the conductor put his 
stamp on the sound of the orchestra. The previous ‘quick’ changes, Wilhelm Furtwangler after 8 years, but 
especially Bruno Walter’s forced departure after only 4 years had caused considerable disturbances. See 
letter by Rudolf Hartig, 12 April 1948, StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 1324, Blatt 84.
125 Ibid., Blatt 84-6.
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announcement that Albert was to move to the Western Zones. The reason given was the 
alleged interference of Leipzig’s Soviet city command in his concert programming, 
demanding the inclusion of at least one Slavic composer in every performance.126 The city 
council was outraged. Yet, despite this renewed affront, the city could not just terminate 
dealings with Albert. The Soviet city command became involved in the spring and refused 
to allow a departure of the conductor and ordered a new contract to be drawn up according 
to Albert’s terms. This went directly against the declared wishes of the SED in Leipzig, yet 
the Soviet commands had to be obeyed.127 Therefore Lord Mayor Zeigner sent Albert his 
new three year contract in early June 1948. He also instructed his colleagues in the city 
council that the role of the occupation power in this whole endeavour was to be kept quiet 
when the information about Albert’s new engagement was made public.128 However, by 
August 1948, it became apparent that in spite of all concessions, Albert was not interested 
in remaining in Leipzig and the Soviet Zone. Whether the Berlin Blockade and the now 
openly developing Cold War influenced his decision, or whether he was already 
determined to leave beforehand cannot be ascertained from the sources. On reception of a 
letter from Leipzig’s Kulturamt concerning the distribution of guest conductor concerts of 
the Gewandhaus (the number of which had increased due to Albert’s insistence on more 
‘artistic freedom’), he claimed that the allocation of all of the concerts to Joseph Keilberth 
constituted a breach of his agreement.129 Therefore he withdrew from his post and the 
contract and even refused to ever return to Leipzig. Leipzig’s city council tried to argue
126 Ibid., Blatt 91, Article from the Mainecho dated 20 April 1948; nothing of this dictate can be found in the 
actual Gewandhaus programme in the archive. Besides, the programming had been in the hands of the 
conductor, first with the input of the Gewandhaus directorate and later with that of the cultural department of 
the city council. The Soviet authorities were not at all involved in scheduling and planning performances. 
Ironically, the only interference of the Soviet city command was to intervene in favour of Albert. Ibid., No. 
3211, Blatt 32-3, 1 April 1948.
127 Ibid., No. 1324, Blatt 93, 14 May f948.
128 Ibid., Blatt 128, 11 June 1948.
129 Ibid., Blatt 132, 10 August 1948. Another reason for Albert’s decision to remain in the American zone 
might have been the actual choice of guest conductor. Albert resented Keilberth as Lord Mayor Zeigner had 
attempted to procure Keilberth for the post of Gewandhauskapellmeister in 1946 and only settled for Albert 
as second choice. See Neumann, ‘Jeder wolle etwas anderes’ for Zeigner’s favourites in 1946.
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that legally there was no breach of any terms.130 The Soviet command pressed the Lord 
Mayor to arrange for Albert to stay. Zeigner resigned himself to carry out his duty, not 
without emphasising his unwillingness: ‘I will keep my opinion to myself from now on, 
the city command and the party leadership can do as they please, I will not take the blame 
if everything just works out exactly as I said it would’. His best attempts to retain the 
conductor were to no avail.131 Things turned out as he predicted. Albert stated curtly that 
any further negotiations with him were futile as he would not set foot into Leipzig again. 
He remained with his orchestra in Bamberg.132
During the concert season 1948/49 there was no Gewandhauskapellmeister. The 
Gewandhaus was from now on dependent on guest conductors. One of whom was no 
stranger: Professor Abendroth, the once ‘unacceptable Nazi-musician’, now comfortably 
installed in various posts in Thuringia, returned to Leipzig.133 In addition to his guest 
appearances, he took over the conductorship of the Gewandhaus’s rival, the 
Rundfunksinfonie Orchestra Leipzig whilst still keeping his positions in Weimar.134
Abendroth’s reappearance also shed a light on another great difficulty for the 
Gewandhaus: the lack of a proper concert hall. When Abendroth resurfaced in Leipzig in 
1948, he could refer to his newly re-erected Nationaltheater in Weimar. The 
Nationaltheater had been razed to the ground during the war (only the front remained 
standing) and the reconstruction was thus a great feat. Yet by August 1948, the 
Nationaltheater opened as the first rebuilt theatre in Germany. Abendroth’s Staatskapelle 
had a suitable new/old home.
130 StadtAL, StVuR(I), No. 1324, Blatt 133; The contract did not contain any requirement for the 
Gewandhaus or the city to consult Albert on the allocation of the guest concerts (six in total). Moreover, the 
terms of the agreement included Albert’s conditions stipulating that he could remain in Stuttgart and travel to 
Leipzig for his engagements.
131 Ibid., Blatt 137; Blatt 139. Zeigne^ only reluctantly followed the Soviet command’s orders. In his opinion, 
any discussion was pointless. However, despite this, he had to continue - as supplicant - the increasingly 
humiliating negotiations with Albert.
132 Ibid., No. 8443, Blatt 191, Albert on 31 August 1948.
133 Ibid., No. 8423, Blatt 326.
134 Prieberg, ‘Hermann Abendroth’ in Handbuch deutsche Musiker, pp. 38-49, here p. 39.
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Until 1947, the Gewandhaus orchestra performed in the Capitol. This cinema was 
situated in the centre of town, making it not only the Gewandhaus's interim but also one of 
the busiest movie theatres. Hartig advised the Capitol’s licensee in early 1946 that the 
Gewandhaus concerts were a ‘cardinal necessity and important part of the public cultural 
life, for their facilitation every Leipziger would do anything. The public interest is self- 
evident, so that I can take it for granted that you too, will support the cause’.135 In 1947, 
however, the circumstances changed. The Capitol had become too important for its 
superior, the Soviet film distribution company SovExport, to risk damage to the screen by 
constant removal for the accommodation of the orchestra musicians. Thus the Gewandhaus 
had to move to the Kongrefihalle (a congress centre) next to Leipzig Zoo. The acoustics in 
the building were unsuitable for an orchestra.136 The immediate proximity to the zoo and 
its restaurant and ballroom meant that there was often outside noise interrupting the 
rehearsals during the day and even the performances at night. Furthermore, the 
KongreBhalle was also used for the Schauspiel theatre, during the trade fairs and for 
political rallies. This changing occupancy of the concert room led to clashes in schedule, 
interruptions and relocations of the rehearsals without notice or the provision of alternative 
rooms in the complex.137 This was a less than desirable situation. Besides, the Gewandhaus 
building was a representation of Leipzig itself, the visible symbol of the achievements and 
cultural endeavour of its Burger. Therefore, a high calibre committee was founded to 
rebuild the Gewandhaus.138 This reconstruction had been in the minds of the old 
directorate (including Kippenberg) and now took shape with the resolute leadership of
135 Ibid., No. 8422, Blatt 47: ‘Im Allgemeinen darf gesagt werden, daB ja die Gewandhauskonzerte als 
auBerste Notwendigkeit und wichtiger Teil des offentlich kulturellen Lebens zu betrachten sind und fur ihre 
Ermoglichung von jedem Leipziger alles getan werden wird. DaB ein offentliches Interesse hier vorliegt ist 
selbstverstandlich, so daB ich es auch von Ihnen als selbstverstandlich betrachten darf, die ganze Sache zu 
unterstutzen.’ Letter by Hartig, 5 January 1946.
136 The move had already been considered after it became increasingly difficult to make arrangements with 
the Capitol in August 1946, see Ibid., Blatt 216.
137 Ibid., No. 8423, Blatt 243.
138 The Wiederaufbaukomitee included amongst others: Erich Zeigner, Anton Kippenberg, Max Brockhaus, 
Gunther Ramin, Bruno Walter, Herbert Albert and Wilhelm Furtwangler, Ibid. No. 8502, Blatt 8.
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Erich Zeigner. The Lord Mayor, who up to this point was instrumental in obstructing the 
Gewandhaus directorate’s room to manoeuvre and thus any reconstruction efforts, showed 
great passion for this project. However, he made it clear right from the beginning that the 
rebuilding of the Gewandhaus was entirely separate from the still unresolved question of 
the Gewandhaus foundation’s continuance.139 Despite the enthusiasm of its members and 
the urgency to stop further deterioration of the building, the committee made no fast 
progress. This was partially due to unrealistic ideas such as the statement that a peace 
agreement was imminent after which ‘a call to the world’ was to be issued asking for funds 
and material to reconstruct the Gewandhaus.140 Initially, the only maintenance work agreed 
upon was the restoration of the roof. For this purpose the city pledged considerable funds 
immediately.141 However, the implementation was not immediate. The Saxon 
Landesverwaltung refused its approval of the reconstruction plans.142 This meant that no 
construction permission was given, which severely complicated the procurement of 
building material.143 Zeigner initially refuted the claims of the Landesverwaltung that a 
reconstruction was only allowed if the Land agreed, as contravening the Democratic 
Municipal Order.144 When this was of no avail, he personally assumed responsibility for 
the pressing ahead of the reconstruction effort in spite of the Landesverwaltung.145 The 
question of sufficient funding was now paramount. There was considerable disagreement 
as to how to approach the issue. Kippenberg favoured a ‘appeal to the world’, whereas 
Zeigner thought this problematic. Max Brockhaus offered the suggestion that an
139 Ibid., Blatt 2, August 1947.
140 Ibid., Blatt 8, Minutes from the founding meeting of the Gewandhaus reconstruction committee on 15 
October 1947: ‘ [...] nach FriedensschluB einen Aufruf an die Welt erlassen, Mittel und Material zum 
Wiederaufbau des Gewandhauses zur Verfiigung zu stellen [...]’.
141 Ibid.: ‘Die Stadt kann sofort 200 000 Mark zur Verfiigung stellen.’.
142 Ibid., Blatt 17, 12 December 1947.
143 Ibid., No. 5034, Blatt 1. Two years after the end of the war, building material was still very scarce, 
without the right documentation it was legally impossible to obtain provisions.
144 Ibid., Blatt 19. Zeigner’s appeal ^as valid as the code stated: ‘als Selbstverwaltungsangelegenheiten 
sollen die Gemeinden auf wirtschaftlichem, sozialem und kulturellem Gebiet alle Aufgaben iibernehmen, die 
geeignet sind, das Wohl der Einwohner der Gemeinde zu fordern.’ The rebuilding of the Gewandhaus clearly 
fell under this. See: ‘Demokratische Gemeindeordnung fur Sachsen’, Article 4.
145 Christoph Kaufmann, Von einem Abrifi wird abgeraten: Das Gewandhaus zwischen 1944 und 1968 
(Beucha, 1996).
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international fund should be created -  independent from the city, so as to not cause 
problems for Zeigner, who still feared the reaction to such a course of action not just for 
the international reputation of Leipzig (which was rather metaphysical) but also from the 
SMAD, which was very real.146 Therefore, a subscription appeal was drafted and 
distributed in Germany calling for aid as this ‘reconstruction is necessary to continue a 
great tradition and [...] maintain the high level of musical culture in Leipzig’.147 The city 
itself continued to provide means for the immediate securing of the building but was 
relying on the success of the appeal. Yet, this was not to be. Of course, the war had left 
many people mined, who might have been interested in participating in the reconstruction 
effort. The real reason for the slow trickling of funds, apart from all smouldering East- 
West wrangling that might have dissuaded those in the Western Zones from supporting the 
effort in Leipzig, was the Gewandhaus's new situation as a mere municipal institution 
devoid of its independent status. As one recipient of the subscription form in Leipzig 
replied:
I would really like to participate in the reconstruction of 
the Gewandhaus, if I knew that the Gewandhaus would 
be once again an institution outside the city 
administration. As it is now the case that the city 
administration has taken over control, it is the 
administration’s call to provide the necessary 
finances.148
This sentiment was widespread, as a report from 1949 states: ‘the original 
building was funded by the efforts of the biirgerlich circles. It is doubtful whether one
146 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 8502, Blatt 19-22, 2 January 1948.
147 Ibid., Blatt 33.
148 Ibid., No. 8423, Blatt 229: ‘Ich danke fur freundliche Ubersendung des Zeichnungsscheines, muB leider 
ablehnen, diesen Schein auszufiillen, da die Zustande im Gewandhaus wirklich nicht ermutigen, sich an dem 
Wiederaufbau des Gewandhauses zu beteiligen [...] ich wiirde mich wirklich gern an dem Wiederaufbau des 
Gewandhauses beteiligen, wenn ich wiiBte, daB das Gewandhaus wieder eine Einrichtung wiirde, welche 
auBerhalb der stadtischen Verwaltung steht. Nachdem nunmehr aber die stadtische Verwaltung die 
Gewandhausorganistation ubernommen hat, muB auch die stadtische Verwaltung sehen, wie sie die 
entsprechenden Geldmittel bekommt.’ This letter is even more remarkable when one takes into account that 
its writer, Wilhelm Victor, was a city councillor himself. Thus rather than a latent aversion against the new 
order, his views were informed by direct insight into the city administration’s working from one of its 
members.
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could expect any contributions from this side any more’.149 The Gewandhaus had ceased to 
be a symbol of Leipzig’s Burgertum and thus the Burgertum severed its ties with the 
institution.
The Wahrungsreform of 1948 nearly wiped out the funds that had been collected 
up to that point and the growing Cold War tensions made contributions from the Western 
Zones, let alone those from abroad, increasingly unlikely. With Erich Zeigner’s death 
finally the reconstruction committee was tacitly disbanded. Isolated attempts at addressing 
the issue, such as a preliminary survey by the city’s construction authority in 1949 did not 
result in any actual construction efforts.150
Leipzig’s music venues were largely destroyed in the war and any immediate 
reconstruction efforts failed due to lack of resources and political will. Leipzig’s opera was 
rebuilt only in the 1950s as the SED leader Otto Grotewohl deemed it necessary that a big 
trade fair city such as Leipzig had ‘an opera: the city owed it to the visitors’. As his ideas 
for the ‘distribution of duties’ in the GDR, however, ranked Leipzig as ‘trading and 
industry town’, any further rebuilding efforts, especially those for an erstwhile biirgerlich 
symbol like the Gewandhaus were hardly worth including in his planning.151 The opera 
was seen as a necessary commodity, a staple in the cultural offerings of a trading town. 
The days of dominance in the operatic world in the 1920s, however, were long gone for 
Leipzig’s opera. Since Brecher’s forced departure, the most remarkable aspect that came to 
mind when speaking about the opera house in Leipzig was that it had the largest stage in 
Europe.152 For an institution that had led the world in performance it was surely a 
regression to only lead it in stage size. Furthermore, that last bit of celebrity sank into
149 Ibid., No. 8418, Blatt 84, report by city councillor Lang, 3 March 1949: ‘...es werden zum Beispiel fur den 
Wiederaufbau des Gewandhauses kaum noch erhebliche Mittel aus den Kreisen der Biirgerschaft zu erwarten 
sein, wahrend das friihere Haus aus den Mitteln der Biirgerschaft errichtet worden ist.’ Ibid., No. 8418, Blatt 
84, report by city councillor Lang, 3 fyiarch 1949.
150 Ibid., No. 5035, ‘Voruntersuchung zum Wiederaufbau des Gewandhauses 1949’.
151 Ibid., No. 3178, Blatt 34-35, Minutes of discussion at the SED Central Committee in Berlin, 7 December 
1949, Grotewohl’s idea for the main cities of the GDR was such: ‘Berlin als politischer Schwerpunkt,
Leipzig als Wirtschafts- und Industriestadt, Dresden als Musik- und Weimar als Kulturstadt’.
152 Ibid., No. 2268, Blatt 231.
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rubble during the night of 4 December 1943. Hans Schuler had remained at the helm 
throughout the entire Third Reich. This post, secured with his membership in the NSDAP, 
came with the price of diminished artistic endeavour. Having witnessed the destructive 
force of Nazi agitators in the auditorium, Schuler concentrated from 1933 onwards on 
more conservative, ‘safe’ performances. A glimpse of past glory came in 1943, when 
Schuler commissioned Mary Wigman to choreograph a performance of Orff’s Carmina 
Burana at the opera.153 Not only was the piece well received, but it was a reminder of the 
house’s more daring days. Mary Wigman had fallen from favour with the National 
Socialists by 1941.154 Through an old friend with suitable influence, the artistic director 
Hanns Niedecken-Gebhard, Wigman was still able to teach at Leipzig’s conservatoire and 
realise Carmina Burana with Schuler. When the bombing raids destroyed the institution’s 
building in 1943, the opera moved, like the Gewandhaus, to the Drei Linden operetta 
building. There it remained until the war finally forced its closure. Schuler was briefly 
imprisoned in the wake of 20 July 1944, but although he had supported Goerdeler, he was 
not proven guilty and hence survived the purge. He continued to direct the opera after its 
re-opening in 1945 (still in the Drei Linden) but soon became caught up in the 
denazification process. Schuler could prove his antifascist credentials (and the fact that his 
party membership was a front); by March 1946, his denazification had been processed and 
Schuler was exonerated.155 Yet, the SED continued to press for his dismissal and even 
declared a ‘political battle’ over the issue.156 Schiller’s burgerlich background, rather than 
any perceived or real Nazi entanglement brought about his downfall in Leipzig. Schuler’s 
removal was of course indicative of the increasingly vicious policy towards any
153 Mary Wigman (1886-1973) was a German choreographer and dancer. She established the Ausdruckstanz 
(Modern German Dance). See: Mary Ann Santos Newhall, Mary Wigman (New York, 2009).
154 Wigman’s speciality, the Ausdruckstanz, was banned by the regime as not complying with ‘ballet 
traditions and National Socialist valups.’ This was a marked shift from the days of Wigman’s performance at 
the 1936 Berlin Olympics, where her dance on the opening-night was accompanied by eighty background 
dancers. Newhall, Mary Wigman, pp. 53- 58.
155 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 1326, Blatt 149, 28 March 1946.
156 Ibid., Blatt 193, Kreisleitung SED to Zeigner, 21 February 1947: ‘Die Sache Schuler ist nun ein 
politischer Kampf, man muB alle Register ziehen, ihn von dieser Position zu entfernen.’.
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protagonist of biirgerlich culture in Leipzig.157 Yet the lengthy procedure also showed 
something else: the standing of Leipzig’s opera had deteriorated to an extent that no 
urgency was felt in resolving the matter.158 Opera had become a commodity in the cultural 
planning of Leipzig. Seen as a staple of high art, it was made available to all, with reduced 
prices, but also a programme that was easily accessible to anyone. This lowered the artistic 
standard to the extent that even students of the conservatoire explicitly asked to be only 
used in Gewandhaus concerts but not for any ‘Opemdienst’.159
The only location of Leipzig’s rich music tradition that had survived the war was 
St Thomas’s Church. Its choir was able to return to Leipzig and continue its performance 
schedule. Yet, the wider future of the institution as triad of church, school and choir was 
less secure. The school building was beyond repair and teaching had to move into other 
premises -  without having been allocated a permanent school building until 1946. St 
Thomas’s School officially became Primary School Number 41 in September 1946. Far 
from being an independent school, it now had to follow the city’s policies on admission 
and more importantly curriculum. These policies were in accordance with the idea of the 
‘new school’, the symbol of complete change in the educational system of the Soviet Zone. 
The overriding aim now was to provide an anti-fascist and democratic schooling, with 
equal access to all. St Thomas’s had been a fee-paying grammar school. Thus the school’s 
make-up had been predominantly biirgerlich with some workers’ children attending on 
scholarships. Two criteria were employed to select studentship candidates -  an academic 
and a musical ability test. All boys who qualified for the choir were gladly admitted
157 Hans Schuler’s case is fascinating and offers an insight into the extent of the cultural remodelling efforts 
of the SED. Schuler merits a detailed study as an example of the ousting of biirgerlich proponents from the 
cultural sphere in the Soviet Zone. The city archive Mannheim holds an extensive collection of Schuler’s 
personal papers enabling the necessary research, which, however, would have exceeded the framework of 
this present study. ^
158 Whereas the vacancy in the Gewandhaus had caused embarrassment and swift action, the Schuler case 
was discussed publicly and at length without any regard for the reputation of the opera house. StadtAL,
StVuR (I), No. 1326, Blatt 174-177, 1946.
159 Ibid., No. 16319, Blatt 62, 64, 66, 67, letters of conservatoire students offering their services for the 
Gewandhaus orchestra, 1948.
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without too close an inspection of their academic credentials.160 For the academic 
scholarship only those who proved outstanding abilities came into consideration. Everyone 
else had to pay tuition fees. In the new system, schooling became free and open to all. St 
Thomas’s only managed to hold onto its special status for the choir boys. The choir still 
remained a part of the school and the choir boys were receiving tuition in accordance with 
their choir practice. The curriculum, however, followed the same principles in all schools; 
the biirgerlich education monopoly that offered better education to those who could afford 
it was not to be re-instated after the war. The new system, of course, was not fully 
established when schooling commenced in the Soviet Zone on 1 October 1945. By then it 
had only been achieved to plan for new school books (indeed these where amongst the first 
books to be printed in the Soviet Zone) and organise school rooms. Often, the pupils’ first 
weeks or even months were spent not learning but clearing their school buildings of rubble. 
Nonetheless, the principles of the ‘new school’ were fleshed out over the following months 
and then impacted fully on St Thomas’s.161
By 1 December 1945, Russian became the compulsory first foreign language for 
all pupils of secondary school age. This caused a problem in St Thomas’s School. Latin 
had been the first foreign language in the school and was crucial for the education of the 
choir boys, who needed the language tuition to understand their repertoire. Gunther Ramin 
intervened at the Lord Mayor’s office. The choir needed the ‘foundation of the humanistic
1 f\0education [including the Latin language]’ fully to ‘comprehend’ its task. The Lord 
Mayor forwarded the issue to the Volksbildungsamt, the responsible authority for the
160 That, however, is not to say that pupils were kept in St Thomas’s who were unable to follow the 
curriculum at all. Yet, choir candidates did not have to score the highest marks in the academic tests to be 
admitted into the school.
161 Benita Blessing offers a comprehensive and well written study of the ‘new school’ in the Soviet Zone of 
Occupation. Her book examines the theory behind the new schooling concepts as well as its practical 
successes and shortcomings in the le^d up to the establishment of the GDR. As a detailed discussion of the 
new schooling system in the Soviet Zone would go beyond the scope of this study, it only touches upon those 
areas that are of particular impact on St Thomas’s and their especially on the choir’s development. See Benita 
Blessing, The Antifascist Classroom: Denazification in Soviet-occupied Germany, 1945-1949 (New York, 
2006).
162 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 10226, Blatt 48.
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schooling administration of the city. The Volksbildungsamt acted according to Ramin’s 
wishes and ordered that members of the choir of St Thomas would receive Latin tuition 
instead of Russian lessons.163 The Bildungsburgertum had prevailed for the time being.
Despite the new schooling methods, St Thomas’s Choir began the post-war period 
with a continuation of its traditional church music performances. Yet, whereas the choir 
was able to avoid being incorporated into a larger cultural policy during National Socialist 
rule, it now was open to a full onslaught of political intervention. The Kulturamt set out its 
plans for the cultural landscape of Leipzig as early as in autumn 1945. Of course, St 
Thomas had always been a mainstay in the city’s cultural calendar, but remained so on its 
own terms. Now Hartig was allocating the roles and tasks for the choir. First and foremost 
was the continuation of the Bachpflege, yet, the focus had to shift from musica sacra to 
secular music. The choir was to take a greater part in the cultural efforts of the city by 
taking part in rallies and performing on the outskirts of the city.164 Thus, it was now used 
in official events such as charity concerts for ‘resettlers’ (the SED euphemism for those 
driven out of their homes in the post-war ethnic cleansing of the old German East) and 
special performances for official visitors from the Soviet Union. Secular concerts for the 
working population also became part of the choir’s remit.165 Zeigner showed a great 
interest in the choir, he was one of the protagonists of the idea of ‘branching out’ and 
putting the choir on the stages of the Capitol and the Drei Linden to promote their mastery 
to a wider audience. He meant this not just in an ideological sense. The traditional concerts 
of the choir on Fridays and Saturdays were so packed that the city felt it necessary to post 
police at the entrances of St Thomas’s Church.166 The Lord Mayor was also anxious to
163 Ibid., Blatt 49. After the establishment of the GDR, St Thomas’s lost this language privilege.
164 Ibid., No. 7972, Blatt 14 and Blatt 54.
165 Ibid., No. 10226, Blatt 110, Concert in the framework of the ‘Neue Heimat-Neues Leben’ event; Ibid.,
No. 1344, Blatt 223. ‘Weltliche Konzerte fur die arbeitende Bevolkerung’; Borusiak and Hohnel, Chronik /, 
13-14 October 1946: ‘Sonderkonzert fur Gaste’; in 1950, the choir was used for the ‘popularisation’ of the 
election. StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 8533, Blatt 195.
166 Ibid., No. 8534, Blatt 10: the police was ordered to arrive 1 hour before the start of the concert, at the very 
latest; Ibid., Blatt 15: ‘Man sollte den Thomanerchor auch im Capitol und den Drei Linden auftreten lassen
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ensure better clothing and rations for the boys.167 That Zeigner’s interest in St Thomas was 
not merely one of political concern and ideological utilization is highlighted in a letter he 
sent to Cantor Ramin in the autumn of 1945 asking for a larger font in the small textbooks 
that accompanied the motets: ‘Would you please provide larger motet texts. My eyes are 
not as strong any more and I would like to follow properly.’ Despite his socialist 
leanings, Zeigner still wanted to follow the church service in all its aspects.
The concert tours that had founded the choir’s international fame were slowly 
starting again. In September 1946, the choir went to Berlin on its first major tour since the 
Second World War. From early 1947, copious requests for performances in the Western 
Zones reached Ramin’s desk. The Cantor thus enquired in the Kulturamt, if this would be 
something to consider. Ramin himself had refused the requests so far, but felt now that he 
was running out of excuses. He asked Hartig to sound out the possibilities with the Soviet 
military command.169 The reply followed promptly four days later; the SMAD welcomed 
‘Westreisen’ and ordered Ramin to begin the necessary preparations.170 The choir was 
happy to represent Leipzig and the SMAD saw it as chance of using the choir as an 
advertisement for its region. At the end of the year, the choir finally travelled to Hamburg 
and Lubeck. Whereas the tour itself was a great success and the choir was received 
rapturously at every concert, the aftermath was less positive. Rumours started circling in 
the newspapers of the Western Zones that the choir was going to relocate to the West.171 
Not only were these false claims a nuisance in themselves, they also had an air of Cold 
War animosity. If true, it would have been yet another case of artists leaving the Soviet
[...]man soli bei den Parteien und dem Kulturbund die Werbetrommel riihren, damit Horer in tunlichst groBer 
Zahl ein kiinstlerisches Erlebnis mit nach Hause nehmen konnen.’ Zeigner to Hartig, 29 October 1945.
167 Ibid. v
168 Ibid., Blatt 17, 17 September 1945: ‘Konnten Sie bitte fur groBere Motettentexte sorgen. Mein Augenlicht 
ist nicht mehr so gut und ich mochte doch folgen konnen.’.
169 Ibid., No. 8533, Blatt 98, 15 February 1947.
170 Ibid., Blatt 100, 19 February 1947.
171 See: Rheinischer Merkur, 17 December 1947 and Freie Presse, 1 January 1948.
115
Zone, a trend that was causing already great propaganda problems for the Soviets.172 
Despite the immediate denial, the story continued to run. Ramin received letters from a 
cousin in Liibeck, who eventually discovered the source of the reports. A former teacher of 
St Thomas’s School had apparently attempted to detach the sixth formers amongst the 
Thomaner to form his own choir in Liibeck.173 Ramin then informed Lord Mayor Zeigner 
about these findings, who had been inundated with questions regarding the rumours.174 By 
now, however, there were tales from all over the Western Zones. A youth hostel in Coburg, 
Bavaria (Just a few kilometres from the border to the Soviet Zone), claimed to have been 
ordered by the Americans to keep a certain section of its establishment closed off to 
facilitate the accommodation of the choir.175 Other reports spoke of the choir ‘wandering
17bthe Bizone’. Ramin was anxious to ensure that the choir could still continue its touring
activities, thus he issued a statement declaring that if the choir was to leave Leipzig, it
would cease to exist:
A 740 year old tradition binds the Thomanerchor to St 
Thomas’s Church, whose genius loci Johann Sebastian 
Bach has given it its special character and the choir is 
absolutely dependent on this. Should the choir part 
from this, it will be merely a [...] boys’ choir as there 
are many in Germany, nothing more.1 7
Yet, it was not only the reputation of Leipzig that suffered from these rumours, 
Ramin himself now came under close supervision, his movements were observed for signs 
of a planned departure. Even nine months after the rumours had been dispersed, the 
Landesverwaltung Saxony still urged Zeigner to ensure that the choir would not leave 
Leipzig, and most importantly the Soviet Zone when on tour. Zeigner replied that there had 
been no signs of any manoeuvres in that direction despite ample opportunity on both
172 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 8424, Bl^tt 76.
173 Ibid., No. 8534, Blatt 36.
174 Ibid., NEZ, Blatt 37, 30 January 1948.
175 Ibid., Stadtverordnetenversammlung, Rat der Stadt, StvV, No. 8537, Blatt 6.
176 Borusiak and Hohnel, Chronik I , Februar 1948: ‘[...] der Chor irrt in der Bizone herum.’
177 StadtAL, Stadtverordnetenversammlung, StvV, No. 8537, Blatt 26.
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private trips by the Ramin family as well as further tours of the choir to the Western 
Zone.'78
In spite of having proved ‘faithful’ to the Soviet Zone and having accommodated 
most of the changes in the new school system, St Thomas’s came under yet more scrutiny. 
The Volksbildungsamt complained about the ‘undemocratic’ habit of saying grace in the 
Alumnat and ordered the immediate stop of the practice. Even though this resembled 
verbatim an order the choir had been given by the National Socialists in 1943, the 
headmaster of St Thomas was obliging.179 The choir, however, was not. As the Alumnat 
was where the choir lived, rather than learned, Ramin refused this renewed intrusion, the 
law guiding ‘democratic schooling’ did not apply to living quarters. Furthermore, as the 
choir’s main application was the musica sacra, Christian traditions were as necessary for 
the understanding of the choir’s work as Latin.180 As in the case of Latin, the leeway 
granted because of this explanation ceased with the establishment of the GDR. In 1950, the 
proud head of the school authority announced that St Thomas ‘had lost the odium of being 
a reactionary throng inside our republic.’181 Whereas the choir could maintain, within 
limits, its traditions, the remainder of the school lost its biirgerlich classical curriculum. 
The socialists had gone even further than the Third Reich had, St Thomas’s was now 
‘gleichgeschaltet’.
In both cases, the Gewandhaus and St Thomas’s, the takeover by the Soviet forces 
and the German communists proved far more incisive than the National Socialist rule, 
whilst the opera just continued its descent that had started in 1933. While musicians of 
international standing were removed during the Third Reich on racial grounds, in the
aftermath of the Second World War, they were forced out by denazification rules and
v
178 Ibid., NEZ, Blatt 47 28 September 1948 and Blatt 48 1 October 1948.
179 Ibid., StVuR (I), No. 10226, Blatt 126, 22 February 1949.
180 Ibid., Blatt 129, 26 February 1949.
181 Ibid., No. 10227, Blatt 234, 17 April 1950: ‘[...]das Odium einer reaktionaren Herde in unserer Republik’.
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political interventions. This led to the demise of the hitherto well-regarded Gewandhaus
that subsequently struggled even to attract suitable candidates as the political climate
•
became less and less favourable. The assumption of control by the city administration 
furthermore caused the fall of the Gewandhaus from a proud independent biirgerlich 
establishment to a mere municipal concert institution, which found its clear expression in 
the failure to rebuild the concert hall that had once been a magnificent symbol of Leipzig’s 
Biirgerstolz.
The Triad of St Thomas suffered equally through the standardisation of schooling 
and cultural life. The distinctive position, which the institution had fought so hard to 
maintain during National Socialist rule, was lost in the integration of its components into 
the Socialist cultural policy. The city of music had lost its unique institutions and thus 
largely its international appeal.
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3 Leipzig -  City of Books
Buchstadt Leipzig was one of the proud titles of Saxony’s largest city. The city’s 
status as a Buchstadt was based on its huge printing and publishing capacity, its famous 
book fair, the world’s largest trading space for published works, and the fact that all 
German publishers either had their headquarters or at least a branch in the city. Indeed, 
most of Germany’s famous publishing houses were founded there. Pillars of the cultural 
Germany such as Brockhaus, Insel and Reclam had their home in Leipzig. Accordingly, 
the book trade’s main organization, the Borsenverein der deutschen Buchhandler (German 
Publishers and Booksellers Association), was founded and had its seat in Leipzig. The city 
held one of the largest publishing quarters in Europe, devoted to publishing houses, paper 
making and printing factories, many of which were producing unique and highly 
specialised merchandise. A college specialising in book printing and design attracted many 
students both nationally and internationally and ensured a steady flow of new talent in the 
printing business.1 The city could boast many firsts in the field, the world’s first daily 
newspaper, which was published in the city in 1650, the world’s first publishing house for 
music founded in 1719 (Breitkopf und Hartel), the first edition of Germany’s seminal 
dictionary, the Duden in 1872, and the first German specialist publisher of art books (E.A. 
Seemann Verlag).
It was on the initiative of the Borsenverein that the Deutsche Biicherei was 
founded in Leipzig in 1912. A joint project of the Borsenverein, the Kingdom of Saxony 
and the city of Leipzig, the institution was envisaged to be Germany’s National Library. It 
was designed to collect and catalogue all literature that was printed in the German Reich 
(both in German and other languages) and all foreign literature printed in the German 
language from 1 January 1913 onwards. Thus it constituted Germany’s first and only
1 Brandsch and Herzog, Das literarische Leipzig (Leipzig, 1995).
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copyright library, whose duties, besides collecting and cataloguing, soon encompassed the 
publishing of a national bibliography.
*
The Deutsche Biicherei emerged as a symbol of the Buchstadt Leipzig, the 
institutional manifestation of the city’s claim to predominance in Germany. Both were 
closely interlinked and had a symbiotic relationship. The Deutsche Biicherei would not 
have been established if Leipzig had not been the unchallenged centre of the German book 
trade and the existence of the library meant that Leipzig’s paramount status was cemented. 
These close ties, however, meant that each would become vulnerable if support from the 
other were to fall away.
After the takeover of power by the National Socialists in 1933, the Deutsche 
Biicherei became subject to the Gleichschaltung process. From February onwards, that is 
before the introduction of the Berufsbeamtengesetz, local NSDAP members demanded the 
sacking of the library’s Jewish staff. Moreover, despite the institution’s remit to collect all 
works of German and German language output, demands were made to exclude 
‘undesirable’ authors from the collection.2 In June 1933, the institution came under the 
jurisdiction of the Propaganda Ministry. From then onwards, the National Socialists used 
the resources of the library to compile and extend their blacklists of literature including 
Jewish but also German dissident authors. These blacklists were patchy to say the least. A 
most curious case was that of Erich Ebermayer, a Leipzig jurist and writer. Whilst 
Ebermayer’s father, the former Oberreichsanwalt Ludwig Ebermayer, was being wooed at 
the time by the Reich Ministry for Justice to participate in the restructuring of the penal 
code, his son’s books were banned. Erich Ebermayer was also the cousin of Reichsleiter
Phillipp Bouhler, who later also worked in the Reichsschriftums- and Reichspressekammer
\
(Reich chambers for literature and the press), and of Fritz Todt, the mastermind behind the
2 See Steffen Held, ‘Bibliothekar Uhlendahl und die Verbotslisten’ in Leipziger Volkszeitung, 4 July 2008.
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German Autobahnen. The ban on his works (which did not extend to all of his 
publications) was peculiar.3 Furthermore, he himself did not see how the distinction 
between his allowed and his banned books was made. Indeed, he continued to be able to 
publish in the Third Reich and to work on many theatre and UFA film projects directly 
under Goebbels’s nose. The Ebermayer case, however, highlighted another, more sinister 
detail. Despite the fact that not all of his books were on the blacklist, one of his publishers
-  the renowned Reclam Verlag -  removed all works by Ebermayer from its portfolio, 
including two of the books not on the list of banned titles.4
The Reclam Verlag did not act on its own; the Borsenverein was well aware of the 
blacklists and indeed supported its members, publishers and book traders alike, in 
removing works that were to be regarded as ‘nationally corrosive’.5 The Borsenverein also 
engaged in a self-motivated campaign of purging ‘undesirable’ contacts from its books. 
The address list of book traders, the most comprehensive compendium of the German book 
trade, was ‘relieved’ of communists, Jews, Social Democrats -  starting well before the 
Reichstagsbrand, the Berufsbeamtengesetz and the ban on the SPD in June 1933. The 
Borsenverein also integrated nicely into the National Socialist machinery. It became a sub­
organisation of the book trade department of the Reichsschriftumskammer\ its headquarters
-  the Buchhandlerhaus -  became the seat of this branch of the Reich chamber. The register 
of members enabled the confiscation of Jewish publishing houses as all necessary details 
were listed, thereby rationalising the process tremendously.6
3 It clearly went against the racial ideas of the National Socialists -  Ebermayer was not only ‘blaublond' 
(blond and blue-eyed), but also had the aforementioned strong family connections.
4 ‘Der Verlag Phillip Reclam hat die Beziehungen zu mir abgebrochen. Er hat, ohne dazu genotigt zu sein, 
auch meine beiden Bande [...], die nicht verboten sind, aus der Universal-Bibliothek entfernt [...] und ersucht 
mich, ihm umgehend [...] den Kontorest [...] zu iiberweisen.’ Ebermayer, Denn heute, pp. 77-87, quote: p. 85.
5 Announcement by the Borsenverein in Neue Leipziger Nachrichten, 11 May 1933. On 14 May 1933, the 
Borsenverein published the list o f the now forbidden books. See Ibid., 14 May 1933.
6 Otto Seifert, ‘Aspekte des geistigen Klimas fur die “Arisierung” und die Folgen fur die Buchstadt Leipzig 
in Monika Gibas (ed.), 4Arisierung ’ in Leipzig -  Annaherung an ein lange verdrangtes Kapitel der 
Stadtgeschichte derJahre 1933 bis 1945 (Leipzig, 2007), pp. 72-98.
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Shortly after the Deutsche Biicherei had come under the authority of the
Propaganda Ministry, its head, the reputed librarian Dr Heinrich Uhlendahl was taken into
‘Schutzhaft (protective custody) on political grounds’ on 17 June 1933.7 He had attracted
the ire of the local NSDAP for not following their demands regarding staffing and book
collection. He was held until the 20 June and able to return to his office on 1 July. Yet, the
Kreisleitung of the NSDAP was still not content. On 4 July it published a newspaper
announcement calling for Uhlendahl’s removal:
[...] Even though the accusations against him have not 
been proven in their entirety, the process of investigation 
has also not provided the NSDAP with any reason to trust 
Dr Uhlendahl in any way. We still oppose him as 
unreliable for the purposes of the National Socialist 
revolution and will continue to work towards the day 
when we can be fully in charge of the cultural treasure of 
the German people as deposited in the Deutsche 
Biicherei.8
Somewhat shaken by this experience, Uhlendahl then retreated into his profession 
and refrained from political comment. He did not join the NSDAP, but through his 
previous membership in the Stahlhelm, he was automatically enrolled as an SA member 
until 1938 when he resigned from this organisation.9 He had to accept that the 
Reichssicherheitsdienst (SD) opened a Schrifttumsstelle (office for literature) in the 
Deutsche Biicherei premises. The SD also utilized the library’s vast expertise to compile its 
propaganda lists of literature that was to be banned and authors that had to be observed. It
7 Dr Heinrich Uhlendahl (1886-1954), was one of Germany’s foremost librarians and co-founder of the 
International Library and Bibliography Committee. He became head of the Deutsche Biicherei in 1924. See 
Gerd Simon, Chronologie Heinrich Uhlendahl (Universitat Tiibigen, 2006 -  available online: 
http://homepages.uni-tuebingen.de/gerd.simon/ChrUhlendahl.pdf). ‘Vorriibergehend in Schutzhaft’, Neue 
Leipziger Zeitung, 21 June 1933. The National Socialist ‘Schutzhaft’ was a euphemism for arbitrary arrest.
8 ‘Wenn sich auch die gegen ihn vorgebrachten Anschuldigungen nicht in vollem Umfange bewahrheiten, so 
hat andererseits der Verlauf der Untefsuchung fur die NSDAP nicht die geringste Veranlassung gegeben, Dr 
Uhlendahl irgendwelches Vertrauen entgegenzubringen. Wir lehnen ihn nach wie vor als im Sinne der 
nationalsozialistischen Revolution unzuverlassig ab und werden unentwegt darauf hinarbeiten, den in der 
Deutschen Biicherei niedergelegten Kulturschatz des deutschen Volkes einwandfrei ihrer alleinigen Obhut zu 
unterstellen.’ Ibid., 4 July 1933.
9 Simon, Chronologie Heinrich Uhlendahl.
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also employed the holdings of the Deutsche Biicherei to issue personal assessments of any
writer who was considered for an office or award in the Third Reich.10
»
For the day-to-day work of the Deutsche Biicherei this had few immediate 
repercussions, as neither the SD office, nor the Propaganda Ministry interfered directly in 
the routine proceedings. The library had to remove some of its stock in line with the 
blacklists, but could prevent the destruction thereof under the premise of storing it out of 
reach. The national bibliography was curtailed into excluding ‘objectionable’ works of 
print on its main list. The denial of these works, however, did not mean that they were not 
catalogued. A separate list of ‘restricted works’ was published from 1939 to 1944. In 1942, 
the scope of the library’s collection was widened to include German works translated into 
foreign languages, printed works in a foreign language about Germany and music 
collections.11 However, the various Nazi agencies did not stop the Deutsche Biicherei from 
pursuing its original duty of collecting all German works printed at home or abroad. Thus, 
works by exiled German writers continued to find their way into the library’s collection.12 
A list of all Works that were not allowed to be indicated 1933-1945 was eventually 
published after the end of the Second World War.13
The impact of National Socialism on the make up of the Buchstadt Leipzig was 
considerable. The confiscation and closure of many well-established Jewish publishers and 
book traders, Henri Hinrichsen of the renowned music publisher Edition Peters shall be 
named here as pars pro toto, as well as the ban on left-wing publications and their 
proprietors and purveyors robbed the city of vast sections of its former spectrum. On an 
international scale, these measures led to the isolation of the German book trade and to a
10 Werner Schroeder, ‘...eine Fundgrube der Schrifttumsinformation. Die Leipziger Arbeitstelle fur 
Schrifttumsbearbeitung beim Sicherheitshauptamt und die “SD- Verbindungsstelle an der Deutschen 
Bucherei’” in Gibas, ‘Arisierung ’ in Leipzig, pp. 116-151.
11 Kathrin Ansorge, Die Deutsche Bibliothek Leipzig, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin (Frankfurt am Main, 2005).
12 Gottfried Rost, ‘Die Deutsche Bucherei -  Gesamtarchiv des deutschsprachigen Schrifttums seit 1913’ in 
Brandsch and Herzog, Das literarische Leipzig, pp. 272-76.
13 Deutsche Bucherei Leipzig, Deutsche Nationalbibliographie. Erganzung I, Verzeichnis der Schriften, die 
1933-1945 nicht angezeigt werden durften (Leipzig, 1949).
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progressive marginalisation of Leipzig. The restriction of book trade and production in the 
wake of the total war declaration further contributed to the demise of the Buchstadt's 
national and international standing.14 «
The Buchstadt, as well as Leipzig as a whole was surprised by the bombing raid 
of the night of 4 December 1943. As no one had expected a bombing attack -  Saxony and 
Leipzig had even taken in numerous refugees from other bombed German towns -  no 
precautions had been taken for this case. This lack of preparation proved fatal for Leipzig’s 
book trading and printing facilities. Libraries and bookshops were hit. About 80 per cent of 
Leipzig’s printing quarter was levelled by the bombing raid. This included buildings, 
streets, machinery, transport vehicles and vast amounts of paper and books. The extent of 
destruction was compared by one observer to the burning of the library of Alexandria; just 
in terms of already finished books around 50 million volumes were burned. The 
destruction to the scarce resource of paper as a whole was even greater. Some of Leipzig’s 
most prestigious publishing companies (for example the Brockhaus Verlag) were almost 
completely razed. The distinguished Insel Verlag alone lost over one million books.15 The 
remaining factories still capable of production were hit by the War Economy Authority’s 
order that all reconstruction efforts had to aid Leipzig’s air armament industry, which 
meant that 3,500 workers were removed from their workplace in the printing factories, 
leaving insufficient staff to carry out repairs, let alone continue orderly production.16 In 
addition to all the other destruction endured, the Deutsche Bucherei building was partially 
struck and 50,000 volumes of collected journals turned into cinders. Therefore, in early
14 Seifert, ‘Aspekte des geistigen Klimas’, p. 90.
15 For the Alexandria comparison see Heinz Sarkowski, ‘Von Ost nach West’ in Egel, Neuanfang 1945; for 
figures on the destruction of the city and the publishing quarter see Volker Titel and Sabine Knopf, Der 
Leipziger Gutenbergweg (Beucha, 2QQ1) and Frank Uwe Schulz, ‘Demontagen in Leipzig’ in Rainer Karlsch 
and Jochen Laufer, Sowjetische Demontagen in Deutschland 1944-49: Hintergriinde, Ziele und Wirkungen 
(Berlin, 2002), pp. 403-47.
16 Olaf Groehler, Bombenkrieg gegen Leipzig 1940-45 (Leipzig, 1994); the air armament industry was on the 
outskirts and surrounding areas of Leipzig and suffered comparatively less than the culturally rich inner city 
and the printing quarter.
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January 1944, the Deutsche Biicherei closed to the public and removed its remaining stock 
of over 1.6 million books to several rural sites in Saxony and Thuringia.
The lack of reconstruction of Leipzig’s civilian facilities, the closing down of 
public and cultural life, the increase of bombing raids and lack of German retaliation in 
addition to the haemorrhaging of German forces on the Eastern Front convinced the city’s 
population by early 1944 that the war was lost.17 An apt footnote to this was provided by 
Kulturdezement Hauptmann. There had been an ongoing debate between the Leipzig city 
council and the Propaganda Ministry about a representational work promoting the 
Buchstadt Leipzig since late 1942. The city was eager to commend itself especially 
because of the constraints of war. Yet the consent of the Propaganda Ministry was needed 
to release the allocated paper for the production. The approval came eventually, but the 
project was no longer relevant. As Hauptmann dryly remarked: ‘after the destruction of 
nearly all important cultural institutions -  beginning with the old city centre, the university, 
the Gewandhaus, the opera to the book trade industry’, the volume would only highlight 
that ‘next to nothing was left’.18
The American occupation was welcomed at first with the hope of a re­
establishment of Leipzig’s institutions that had suffered in the previous years. The 
transitional nature of the American occupation may not have been known to the public, yet 
the policy inconsistencies, the astonishing ignorance of local conditions and indeed the 
palpable lack of interest displayed by the Americans soon became all too obvious in the 
notorious decision of the US authorities to allocate to the Herfurth Verlag the printing and 
publishing of the Amtliche Nachrichten, a paper charged with broadcasting American
17 Ibid., p.9. i
18 ‘Ich mochte [...] zu bedenken geben, daB ein solches Werk nach der Zerstorung fast aller bedeutsamen 
Kulturstatten, angefangen bei der Altstadt iiber die Universitat, dem Gewandhaus, dem Neuen Theater bis 
zum Buchhandel und der Wirtschaft, doch wohl beim AuBenstehenden, der zu werben ist, kaum mehr 
Anklang finden diirfte, eben weil von alle dem nur noch verschwindend wenig iibrig ist [...]’, StadtAL,
Kapitel 6, No. 103, Blatt 17, 22 March 1944.
125
orders. Herfurth had previously been responsible for the Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten, a 
newspaper notorious for its National Socialist propaganda.19 This assignment seemed even 
more remarkable as all other printing of papers, journals or books was prohibited pending 
the results of denazification questionnaires distributed by the US authorities. The book 
trade was definitely in need of a political investigation, yet the questionnaires never made 
it back to the American authorities -  there was no enforced request for returns in the period 
of American occupation. Thus a rekindling of the book trade or production did not occur 
throughout the period of late April to the end of June 1945.
The mounting disagreements with the Soviets meant that it was not in the 
American interest to facilitate the reconstruction of anything the Russians would lay their 
hands on. The printing and publishing industry was just one of these fields better left in 
disrepair.20 Rather, acting in the framework of ‘Project Paperclip’, Leipzig was 
systematically ransacked for valuable resources that could be carted off to the Western 
American Zone.21 As everywhere else in US occupied Saxony and Thuringia, this meant 
that valuable companies and distinguished academics were ‘encouraged’ to move to the 
Western American Occupied Zone. This move was to include the academics’ documents 
and research materials and in the case of the companies, their staff, valuable machinery and 
patents. During the course of this process the book trade in Leipzig received special 
attention, too.22 The leading publishers together with their families and important 
documents, as well as the large parts of the Borsenverein’s assets, were taken to 
Wiesbaden and Frankfurt am Main a fortnight before the Soviet takeover on 1 July 1945. 
The discussions for this had been taking place from early May onwards. Thus the curious
19 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 3895, Blatt 95: ‘Die Verhaftung an Militarismus und Nazismus ist 
dokumentarisch und stadtbekannt.’.
20 Titel and Knopf, Der Leipziger Gutenbergweg.
21 ‘Project Paperclip’ is best known fur the transfer of the Peenemiinde rocket scientists to America. The 
‘evacuation’ of academics, company managers and valuable patents, machinery and financial means from the 
territory that was to become the Soviet Occupation Zone is less well known as it presented an early case of 
American breach of agreement with their Soviet Allies. These were uncomfortable facts in the Cold War. See 
Henke, Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands.
22 Thomas Bille, ‘Buchstadt ohne Filetstucke’ in Egel, Neuanfang 1945, pp. 36-41.
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situation emerged where a leading member of Leipzig’s Biirgertum such as Hellmuth von 
Hase, the manager of music publishers Breitkopf und Hartel, was planning the re-opening 
of the Gewandhaus, while he was well aware that his departure was, if not imminent, at 
least to be expected soon.23 With hindsight, one of the Buchstadt’s ‘resettlers’, Friedrich 
Michael -  deputy head of the Insel Verlag, called this measure ‘wise and insightful’. He 
gladly followed the ‘friendly invitation by the Americans.’24 It is interesting, however, to 
note that in the official histories of the publishers involved, this process is either not 
mentioned or dismissed as a ‘normal’ procedure. The American involvement and partial 
coercion that some of the evacuees suffered is not referred to; rather it is portrayed -  if at 
all -  as a business decision.25
This ‘evacuation’ did, as will be also seen in the case of the university, remove 
some of Leipzig’s most eminent Burger, thereby ripping a hole in the fabric of this social 
stratum. The book trade had been one of the mainstays of Leipzig’s Biirgertum', biirgerlich 
tradition was closely linked to the Buchstadt. Renowned publishers had been the fulcrum 
of biirgerlich society in the city, uniting the intellectual and artistic strands of the 
Bildungsbiirgertum. The ‘decency’ of the old publishing dynasties represented ‘fine 
biirgerlich culture’. 26 With them gone, Leipzig was left in a more difficult position in the 
reconstruction effort, materially and intellectually.
23 The Zeitzeugenprojekt reported about meetings to initiate the transfer of pivotal representatives of the book 
trade to the Western American Zone in early May. This is the clearest indicator in the literature that the 
Americans were well-aware of their imminent departure, or at least definitely set on securing vital parts of 
industry and academia for their own use in their ‘undisputed’ area of Germany. Volker Titel and Thomas 
Keiderling, Geschichte der Buchstadt Leipzig, Zeitzeugenprojekt: http://www.zeitzeugenprojekt.de (accessed 
22 August 2008). For details on von Hase and the Gewandhaus see chapter above ‘Leipzig -  city of music’.
24 Friedrich Michael, So ernst wie heiter: Betrachtungen, Erinnerungen, Episteln und Glossen (Sigmaringen, 
1983), p. 327 and p. 341 respectively. In Michael’s book a clear anti-Soviet stance can be observed, written 
as it was during the period of the German partition his coloured view of the past is easily explained, 
moreover as he enjoyed a fruitful career once in the American Zone. The enforcement of the evacuations did 
not affect the book traders much. In consideration of the utter destruction of their erstwhile work place, a new 
beginning, especially as favoured ‘guests’ of the Americans surely seemed appealing. See chapter ‘Leipzig -  
city of learning’ for the more sinister side of the American transports.
25 Insel Verlag: http://www.suhrkamp.de/verlagsgeschichte_71.html (accessed 22/05/2009), Georg Thieme 
Verlag: http://www.thieme.de (accessed 22 May 2009).
26 Ebermayer, Denn heute, p. 23.
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Most scholars describe the American conduct as a deliberate decision to pre­
empt the change of power and thus of the political and economic system, and transfer the 
entire organisational structure of the German book trade to their own zone.27 However, the 
claim that the Americans alone ‘dismantled the Buchstadt Leipzig’ is too simplistic 28 The 
process took longer than the period of the US occupation in Leipzig, and was not 
exclusively the work of the Americans as will be shown below.
The transition from the US to the Soviet occupying forces went more smoothly 
than feared by Leipzig’s population. The Russian authorities almost immediately moved to 
re-establish the cultural life so important to the self-conception of the Leipziger, stressing 
the intention of rebuilding.29 The efforts to revive Leipzig’s cultural identity offered 
glimpses of hope to the population, suggesting a reconstruction of their lives was 
possible.30 Leipzig was also to be revived as a city of books.
The Minister for Culture of the Soviet military administration, Solotuchin, visited
Leipzig in late July 1945. In a meeting with Lord Mayor Zeigner, the director of the
Deutsche Bucherei Heinrich Uhlendahl and Heinrich Becker (a board member of the
Borsenverein), Solotuchin expressed the need for Leipzig to regain its leading cultural role:
Leipzig as a city of books and the seat of the Deutsche 
Bucherei is called upon to lay the foundations for the 
intellectual life in the new Germany. The city has the 
special obligation to assume the leading role in the 
intellectual fight against Nazism and militarism.31
27 Brandsch and Herzog, Das literarische Leipzig', Titel and Knopf, Der Leipziger Gutenbergweg.
28 Christian Lenhardt cited in Schulz, ‘Demontagen in Leipzig’, p. 411.
29 The Russian takeover has been described as ‘Schock angenehmer Uberraschung’, see Henke, Besetzung, p. 
748.
30 ‘[—] man darf wieder [in] die Kinos [...]’, see: Diary of Eva Salzer, 6 July 1945, in Oehme, Alltag, p. 21; 
see also: StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 83$2, Blatt 1, Letter to the Kulturamt Leipzig: ‘[Kultur] scheint die 
Moglichkeit, das Vertrauen der Welt am ehesten zuriickzugewinnen’.
31 Ibid., No. 8852, Blatt 34, 27 July 1945, excerpt from a transcript of the meeting: ‘Leipzig als Buchstadt 
und als Sitz der Deutschen Bucherei ist berufen, die Fundamente fur das geistige Leben im neuen 
Deutschland zu legen. [Die Stadt] habe die besondere Aufgabe, im geistigen Kampf gegen Nazismus und 
Militarismus an fuhrender Stelle zu stehen.’.
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This promise, however, also had ominous undertones. A veiled Soviet desire to 
control the entire ideological outlook of Germany was suggested here. This intellectual 
renewal, in the Soviet Zone at least, required a thorough denazification of the book trade 
and the publishing companies.32 The first step was the revocation of the assignment to print 
and publish the Amtliche Nachrichten from the Herfurth Verlag on 9 July 1945. On 10 
July, the city’s department for culture called for a list of all publishers and book traders 
situated in Leipzig, including a political evaluation of those registered. Finally, four days 
later, on 14 July a commission charged with the examination of the book trade was 
established. The commission extended the dispersion of the denazification questionnaires 
requested by the US troops. It was now to include all executive staff of the companies, not 
just their directors and owners, as required by the Americans.33 The guidelines published 
by the commission demanded the exclusion of anyone who had been a member of the 
NSDAP or one of its sub-organisations from a leading position in the publishing houses, 
printing factories and book traders. Companies whose owners fell into that category were 
to be closed down. However, exceptions existed for those who could prove themselves to 
have been active antifascists. Furthermore, owners were able to sell their companies’ assets 
even after a closure order.34 These ostensibly liberal measures, however, soon became 
superfluous in a wave of sequestrations and dismantling.
The denazification procedures were not the only obstacles preventing the swift 
restart of the book trade. War damage resulted in a very limited capacity for new 
production. Furthermore, any newly printed materials required permission from the 
Russian authorities, who could veto the production process at any stage. In addition, any 
publishing house wanting to resume its activities had to apply and wait for a licence to do
 ;- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  V
32 The American transport included anyone from a renowned publishing house that was not too ‘nazistisch 
anriichig’, a proper denazification did not take place. See Michael, So ernst wie heiter, p. 336.
33 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 8852, Blatt 1- 6, 9-14 July 1945.
34 Ibid., Blatt 69: ‘Anordnung zur Sauberung des Buchhandels innerhalb der SBZ Deutschlands von 
faschistischen und reaktionaren Elementen’.
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so.35 Due to these circumstances the focus fell on the existing stock that most sellers and 
publishers had been relocating to safety in rural locations during the last years and months 
of the war. These inventories, however, were seized by the Soviet authorities. The pretext 
given was the necessity to locate and eliminate any literary material containing National 
Socialist, racist, militaristic or reactionary ideas.36 The obvious problem in this undertaking 
was the lack of any binding guideline explaining which works were deemed to fall into 
these categories. Therefore, all of the publishers and book traders’ inventories remained 
confiscated. The measure was broadened also to include any stock still stored in Leipzig. 
This stirred unrest among the book traders, but even more so within the Borsenverein. In a 
meeting of the executive council of the association on 24 July 1945, the need for 
accelerated purging measures was stressed. The retrieval of the relocated stock had been 
named already as the most important and pressing issue in an internal memorandum over a 
month before. The Borsenverein’s representations, however, were ignored.37
An information leaflet was issued on 1 August, informing the city’s population of 
a ban on National Socialist literature. It contained a list of books with the warning that any 
sale or hire thereof was prohibited and liable to prosecution. Moreover, it also included a 
disclaimer stating that the list was not exhaustive.38 Thus it did not present the book traders 
with precise information with which to work. It was not until April 1946, when a 
bibliographical commission of the Deutsche Bucherei published a list specifying all 
‘objectionable’ books, that a reliable foundation for any future trade existed.39 Despite 
these problems, the industry did not reach a complete standstill as new state publishing 
companies were created.
35 This at least was the official line. As will be seen below, the Soviet authorities were not interested in 
granting licences to private publishers at all.
36 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 8852, Blatt 34.
37 Meeting of 24 July 1945: Ibid., No. 9156, Blatt 41. Memorandum of 22 June 1945: Ibid., Blatt 46. The 
Borsenverein was yet to be officially recognized, thus its weight in the discussion was negligible.
38 Ibid., No. 8856, Blatt 1, 1 August 1945.
39 For the second time in less than 15 years, the Deutsche Biicherei was used to create lists of censored books. 
The content might not have been the same as the Nazi lists, the process, however, was similar.
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These new publishing companies were designed for a special purpose. Leipzig’s 
role as a spearhead in the Soviet fight for a ‘new Germany’ was also directed at the 
reorganisation of the education system. Solotuchin’s idea of cultural leadership involved 
measures to redesign the schooling of German children.40 Thus on 12 October 1945 the 
Verlag Volk und Wissen, specialising in school textbooks, was founded. The Soviet 
authorities envisaged producing schoolbooks for all of Germany, providing a source of 
intellectual reconstruction and direction for the war depleted nation. Yet the distribution of 
the Volk und Wissen literature was only ever achieved in the Soviet Occupation Zone; 
Leipzig’s role as leaders in education for the whole of Germany was reduced to a uncertain 
one within its own zone. This also appears to have occurred in the other field Solotuchin 
had predestined Leipzig to lead: the city’s status as Buchstadt. As this did not express a 
new ambition but merely the reconstitution of Leipzig’s ‘natural’ standing, the failure to 
achieve this was even more obvious than in the case of the text books. The occupying 
authorities might have proclaimed their inclination to re-establish the city of books; 
however, their conduct unmasked these declarations as mere lip service. Although Leipzig 
was to regain its position as leading location for publishing and book trading, the licensing 
of the established publishers was not in the interest of the Soviet administration. Rather, its 
interests lay in the nationalisation of existing, and the creation of new state-owned 
publishing houses. The department for book trade and libraries in Leipzig’s city 
administration warned Lord Mayor Zeigner in January 1946 that Leipzig was already 
falling behind all other zones in Germany.41 This left Leipzig’s status as centre of the book 
trade vulnerable to attacks from rival cities waiting on the horizon such as Frankfurt am 
Main, Munich or the Austrian capital Vienna. Even more alarming, however, was the
stream of authors emigrating to the Western Zones, looking for new publishers and thereby
v
40 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 8852, Blatt 34.
41 Both in terms of number of licensed publishers and book production. See Ibid. No. 8856, Blatt 34, 12 
January 1946.
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hollowing out Leipzig’s ‘cultural assets’. A committee of the city’s culture department had 
already concluded that private publishers were vital in maintaining a creative and thriving 
book market. The conclusion that in a collectivised system creativity and freedom of 
expression would falter was to prove prophetic.42 Zeigner was trying to find a way around 
the obvious unwillingness of the authorities to revert back to the established system of 
private publishers and to prevent the nationalisation of, at least, the most important houses. 
He did eventually achieve the licensing of a marginal number of private companies 43 
Another problem for the book trade was the fact that although the Borsenverein still 
existed and voiced itself from time to time, it had not been officially reinstated. Thus the 
lobbying power of this formally powerful association was now virtually non-existent. Only 
on Lord Mayor Zeigner’s instigation was the association allowed to resume its operation 
on 6 August 1946.44 Its first director was Ernst Reclam, head of the distinguished Reclam 
Verlag, who had declined the American ‘offer’ to transfer his business to the West. He 
thereby had demonstrated his strong determination to aid the re-establishment of Leipzig as 
an important centre of book trade and publishing. At the point of his assumption of office, 
however, a first wave of expropriations had already hit Leipzig’s book trade companies. 
Prestigious enterprises such as the Bibliographisches Institut and the Leipziger 
Verlagsdruckerei were among those that were nationalised. The problem of nationalisation 
was also deemed the reason for Reclam’s resignation from office and eventual emigration 
to Stuttgart (in the American Zone) in 1947 45
The Borsenverein, however, still strove to improve the situation for publishers and 
booksellers in Leipzig. Although the confiscated stocks had been released, a normal sales
42 Universitatsbibliothek Leipzig, Universitatsbibliothek Archiv, No. 46 A-63: Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
Buchhandel im KulturausschuB ‘Uber die Unentbehrlichkeit der Privatverlage flir den Neuaufbau des 
deutschen Kulturlebens’, manuscript 1945.
43 The awarding of these licences was fi slow process, it was heralded as a great milestone when 5 long- 
established and leading publishing houses finally received their licences in February 1947[!]. The process 
gained pace after that, however in 1948 the number had only risen to 37 of formerly over 300 publishers; see: 
Borusiak and Hohnel, Chronik I.
44 Titel and Knopf, Der Leipziger Gutenbergweg.
45 See Reclam’s company history: http://www.reclam.de (accessed 22 May 2009).
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procedure could not be established until October 1946, as most of the remaining inventory 
was still located outside the city and transport very hard to come by. The Borsenverein 
eventually obtained transport from the city authorities, not just to retrieve the stock but also 
to procure books produced in other cities. The sales aspect had become the major focus of 
Leipzig’s efforts, as its own printing production remained low. Therefore, the turnover of 
books was the city’s sole stake in the book trade as a whole.46
However, the destruction caused by the bombing soon ceased to be the main 
reason for the city’s production shortfall. The major cause was the continuous 
dismantlement of the printing machinery and the companies’ buildings 47 The looting of 
German property started well before the war had ended. After the capitulation, it was the 
failure to reach an agreement about reparations at the conference of Potsdam that prompted 
the Soviet authorities to extract as much as they could from their zone 48 Saxony was the 
Soviets’ main target due to its widespread industrialisation. The initial focus lay on the 
dismantlement of complete factories, including not only the machinery but also the 
buildings themselves.49
In Leipzig, the armament factories were the first point of call, but the Soviets also 
soon turned their attention to the printing quarter; machinery was removed and entire 
buildings disassembled. Workers were also required to swiftly clear the remaining factories 
and prepare for production. The Soviet idea of cultural leadership of Leipzig thus found its 
translation in book production for reparation purposes. This production was controlled 
according to planned economic principles thereby already altering the economic
46 See StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 8852, Blatt 78, 30 September 1946.
47 In the assessment of one contemporary observer: ‘Das weltbekannte Leipziger Buchdruckgewerbe [muBte 
durch die Demontagen] betrachtliche EinbuBen hinnehmen’. In view of the destruction already incurred 
through the war, it is a strong statement to place the ‘extensive losses’ at the door of the occupation power. 
See: Gustav Wilhelm Harmssen, Am Abend der Demontage: 6 Jahre Reparationspolitik (Bremen, 1951).
48 Naimark, The Russians in Germany.
49 The plans outlining the Soviet and communist conduct in Saxony were drawn up by the KPD exiles before 
the end of the war. See Winfried Haider, ‘Verhangnisvolle Wirkungen und empfindliche Lahmungen im 
Wirtschaftsablauf in Karlsch and Laufer, Sowjetische Demontagen in Deutschland 1944-49, pp. 447-71.
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procedures of an industry, which the Soviets claimed they wanted to ‘reinstate’.50 The 
commissioning of this production was enthusiastically honoured by the Soviet propaganda 
as ‘generous reconstruction aid’. It was a continuous source of employment for the printing 
workers, yet it deprived Leipzig of its competitiveness. The utilization of over 90 percent 
of the available printing factories for the reparation assignments hindered any production 
for the normal market significantly. Thus, in terms of production, there was very little that 
could distinguish Leipzig in the German book trade. This situation in the publishing field 
barely altered until well beyond 1948.51
In 1946, the reparation demands of the Soviets suddenly increased and previous 
agreements were thrown out. The first sign was the dismantlement of the HASAG 
buildings. This armament factory had been on the original dismantling lists; however, 
Leipzig’s city administration had procured the buildings to house printing facilities, 
therefore the disassembly went directly against these agreements. In addition, more 
printing companies appeared on the lists of the dismantling divisions. These developments 
prompted the head of the municipal planning department to exclaim: ‘Any hopes for a 
swift and sizeable rise of the graphical industry have to be discarded’.52 Indeed, the 
renewed intensification of dismantlement in Leipzig lacked logic. Dismantling orders were 
issued at short notice, thereby interfering directly with any ongoing production. Factory 
workers were employed to disassemble the machinery, thus acting as ‘their own 
gravediggers’.53 Moreover, many workers complained about maltreatment and beatings, 
especially those who were members of the workers’ parties.54
50 See: StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 8852, Blatt 5, 14 July 1945, ‘Planungen zur Wiederbelebung des 
Buchhandels'.
51 See Schulz, ‘Demontagen in Leipzig’; Titel and Keiderling, Zeitzeugenprojekt; Brandsch and Herzog, Das 
literarische Leipzig.
52‘Alle Erwartungen auf einen baldigenyund groBen Aufstieg des graphischen Gewerbes in Leipzig sind 
gegenstandslos geworden’. StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 11054, Blatt 32, 21 March 1946.
53 This sentiment was widely shared among Leipzig’s workers. See Ibid., Blatt 28-30, March 1946.
54 These men had a doubly hard time, amongst their fellow workers they were blamed for the dismantling 
measures, yet still as all German workers were labelled ‘fascists and capitalists’ by the Soviet guards, they 
were beaten by those soldiers. See Ibid., Blatt 29, March 1946.
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The dismantlement included specialised factories, a circumstance that only 
compounded the lack of comprehension in Leipzig for the measures of the Soviet 
authorities. How was the city supposed to regain its status as unchallenged centre for 
graphics and printing if unique companies, that set it apart from the competition, were 
removed? A particularly baffling case was the order of complete disassembly of the 
Leipziger Chromo und Kunstdruckpapierfabrik AG. It was the most important factory in 
the entire Soviet Zone for the production of high quality papers. Fifty percent of the pre­
war production capacity had already been regained with the support of the Soviet 
authorities for the rebuilding effort, when the dismantlement order appeared in March 
1946. Not only did this render the reconstruction efforts meaningless, it also had a long- 
lasting effect on the production of other companies who lost their production materials. 
This is not to mention the paper factory’s workers who became unemployed.
This dismantlement of specialised companies, particularly those that had clearly 
never been involved in the Nazi war effort, caused widespread alarm among Leipzig’s 
population.55 It prompted Leipzig’s authorities and especially Lord Mayor Zeigner to get 
involved and attempt to revert or at least ease removal orders. On 25 April 1946, Zeigner 
personally explained to Leipzig’s Soviet Military Commander Borrissov that the total 
removal of distinguished companies, in this case the Brockhaus Verlag, could not be 
allowed if Leipzig was to retain any significance beyond a local level. He obtained the 
concession that a total dismantlement was to be avoided.56 Although Borrissov was rather 
non-committal regarding the removals in general, this small success inspired self- 
confidence in Leipzig’s administration. The Lord Mayor went so far as to question the 
legality of ever-changing dismantling lists and insisted that the disassembly of factories 
had to take the sustainability of Leipzig’s economy into account.57 The issue was also
V
55 Ibid., Blatt 28, March 1946.
56 Ibid., Blatt 72, 25 April 1946.
57 Ibid., Blatt 92, 4 November 1946.
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brought to the attention of representatives of the Soviet military administration in Berlin. 
Leipzig’s City Director Erich Ott pleaded for an end of the dismantlement of entire 
printing factories as this interfered with the reparation production. Moreover, he referred to 
Leipzig’s ‘tireless’ efforts to facilitate the printing of millions of books for the Soviet 
Union. Therefore, to conduct an orderly reparation production, a stop of the removals had 
to be effected. If that was not possible, at least 25 per cent of the machinery and equipment 
had to be retained. Ott phrased his demand quite frankly: ‘Our achievements give us the 
right to ask for the maintenance of the means of existence of the companies in question.’ 58 
Ott was subsequently given verbal assurance that Leipzig was to receive full support. 
However, this support did not materialise.59 He nevertheless propagated decisive measures 
against the increasingly absurd dismantling orders. In one case he instructed a company to 
defy Soviet orders. The printing factory Brandstetter had been given orders to release their 
entire standing type to the Soviet officials. The standing forms were to be melted down to 
provide metal to meet the material targets of the particular dismantling squad in question. 
The company’s standing type largely consisted of scientific books, most of them 
international standard works. In effect, highly specialised knowledge was to be turned into 
scrap metal. A similarly destructive order reached the Reclam Verlag. The order threatened 
the Universalbibliothek, a compendium of classical works of world literature. It was almost 
as though the Soviets were trying to prove Goebbels posthumously right about the threat to 
European culture from ‘Asiatic’ barbarism. Ott immediately informed Leipzig’s military 
commander and the officials in Berlin; he achieved the retaining of the standing type by 
Brandstetter in exchange for metal of the same weight. In the case of Reclam, the complete 
dismantling of the publishing house was also prevented for the time being.60 A major
source of irritation to Leipzig’s city officials was not only that the very companies needed
v
58 ‘Unsere Leistung gibt uns das Recht, die Bitte auf Erhaltung der Existenzgrundlagen der betroffenen 
Betriebe auszusprechen’. See: Ibid., Blatt 93, 16 November 1946.
59 Ibid., Blatt 94.
60 Ibid., Blatt 95, 21 November 1946.
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for a swift reconstruction -  the distinguished houses -  were to be dismantled completely, 
but that the measures also included companies that had been nationalised or belonged to 
the Socialist Unity Party. Again, a reversal of the removal orders proved highly difficult in 
these instances. The Universal printing company, property of the SED, only received an 
adjournment of its disassembly because it was in the process of preparing a volume on 
Lenin.61
In general, the Soviet decisions regarding the factories that were to be removed 
proved more and more arbitrary as the dismantlement progressed. Any mitigation achieved 
by Leipzig’s administration tended to be very limited, often only reducing the amount to be 
removed or offering a suitable substitute. Any small success in obtaining concessions, 
however, was usually soon frustrated by the Soviet authorities going back on their word.62 
Ott concluded that the removals had intolerable consequences for Leipzig, especially as it 
was perceived as a great injustice among the population: ‘The dismantling measures are 
out of all proportion to the capacities still available in the Zone as a whole. [...] Big Nazi 
companies [...] are able to continue working without disruption, while [...] antifascist 
firms in Leipzig are being disassembled.’ The conduct also exposed the argument of 
denazification (used as explanation for the choice of company to dismantle) as fraud.
In the light of the vast amounts of German property removed everywhere in the 
Soviet Zone, the damage to Leipzig’s printing quarter may seem no worse than the fate of 
most towns in the Soviet Zone. However, it is not only the material value but, more 
importantly, also the cultural meaning of the dismantled factories and companies that has 
to be taken into account. Leipzig had been given the assignment to lead the cultural 
renewal in Germany through the reconstruction of its book production and trading
-------------------------------------------  v
61 Ibid., Blatt 96, 22 November 1946.
62 Ibid., Blatt 31.
63‘Die Demontagen stehen in keinem Verhaltnis zu den noch vorhandenen Kapazitaten in der gesamten Zone. 
[...] GroBe Nazibetriebe [...] konnen unbehelligt arbeiten, wahrend [...] antifaschistische Firmen in Leipzig 
abgebaut werden.’ Ibid., Blatt 99, 2 January 1947.
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facilities. Yet, the same authorities that demanded this feat worked against its realisation. 
Schulz assessed that the city administration’s reasons for their fierce intervention were 
both the cultural as well as the political importance of these companies.64 The removals 
furthermore jeopardised the reparation production, which proved totally incomprehensible 
to the Leipzig population. Not only were the Soviets thereby diminishing their own gains, 
they also destroyed what had already been achieved in terms of reconstruction. This was 
felt by the workers who saw their efforts negated in an instant. In addition to seeing their 
achievements, sometimes literally, destroyed, the workers also experienced hardship 
through the following unemployment.65 These circumstances, coupled with the 
mistreatment many workers had to endure during the dismantling procedures, discredited 
not only the Soviets but also the Socialist Unity Party, thereby alienating a large proportion 
of the population from their new rulers. This problem was not limited to Leipzig, but 
apparent everywhere in the Soviet Zone.66
These developments did not take place in a vacuum. Whereas Leipzig found itself 
fighting on several fronts to rebuild its graphic and printing facilities and thus regain its 
status as Buchstadt, other cities grasped the opportunity of Leipzig’s weakness to stake a 
claim to the title of book trading centre. Munich, Vienna, Wiesbaden and Frankfurt am 
Main were the key players in this dispossession of Leipzig. A Viennese newspaper 
already proclaimed in September 1945: ‘Leipzig’s position in the German book trade can 
be regarded as having been annihilated.’ The article concluded that Vienna’s budding 
printing industry would be more than perfect to fill the gap. However, the cities with the 
greatest potential to rival Leipzig were Frankfurt am Main and Wiesbaden. Having profited
64 Schulz, ‘Demontagen in Leipzig’, pp. 418-9.
65 Schulz stated that the result o f all dismantlement in Leipzig was an obvious deterioration of working and 
living conditions for a considerable time. See Ibid., p. 430.
66 Ibid., StadtAL StVuR (I), No. 11054, Blatt 31 and Naimark, Russians in Germany.
67 Apart from the Austrian capital all other ‘candidates’ happened to be in the American Zone.
68‘Die Stellung Leipzigs im deutschen Buchhandel kann aber [...] als vernichtet angesehen werden.’, 
Wirtschaft No. 1, 30 September 1945.
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from the American ‘relocation’ of key figures in Leipzig’s book trading and printing 
repertoire, these two cities collaborated to build a completely new structure in Germany’s 
book trade. The Leipziger publishers and book traders had to re-establish their companies 
in and around Frankfurt. On 15 October 1945, they founded a new association for book 
traders, declaring themselves a branch of the Borsenverein. This was nearly a year before 
work in Leipzig was allowed to recommence. All zones subsequently established their own 
associations of publishers and booksellers. Yet, it was the Frankfurt branch of the 
Borsenverein that challenged the position and the legality of the headquarters in Leipzig 
and was eventually to take over the Borsenverein's duties in all three Western Zones.69
The unwillingness of the Soviet authorities to grant licences to publishers and the 
fact that most of Leipzig’s capacity was taken up by reparation production accelerated 
Leipzig’s decline. The wave of expropriation and nationalisation eventually brought most 
of Leipzig’s distinguished names to the American Zone. Authors, editors, graphic 
designers and print workers were leaving the Soviet Zone in droves. With most of its 
renowned publishers and traders gone, Leipzig began to fall behind its rivals even within 
the Soviet Zone. In 1947, East Berlin had twice as many licensed publishers as Leipzig. 
The figures for the Western Zones were even greater.70
In February 1947, a trade exhibition ‘Deutsches Buchschaffen 1945/46’ took 
place in Bielefeld and demonstrated aptly how much not only Leipzig but also the entire 
Soviet Zone were trailing behind the developments in the West. The fraction of East 
German books among the exhibits was minute. In addition, Frankfurt’s ambitions to usurp 
Leipzig’s status were openly voiced.71 Lip service was paid by representatives from the
69 The establishment of the Borsenverein in Frankfurt had been planned already in Leipzig (see below). The 
Soviet authorities explicitly allowed the Leipzig Borsenverein to work in all four zones once it had been re­
instated. Thus Frankfurt’s claim that\a Borsenverein seated in Leipzig was legally unable to represent the 
other zones was false. See: StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 8901, Blatt 6, 11 June 1947.
70 Brandsch and Herzog, Das literarische Leipzig, p. 121.
71‘Die Bestrebungen des Frankfurter Kreises [...] deuten darauf hin, daB die buchhandlerische und graphische 
Vormachtstellung Leipzigs zerstort werden soil.’; See: StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 9289, Blatt 142, 17 February 
1947, Letter by Georg Petermann {Borsenverein Leipzig) to Lord Mayor Zeigner.
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other zones to the demands of the delegates of East Germany assuring them that any 
measures taken in Frankfurt (for example the foundation of a Borsenverein branch) were 
merely temporary and would be reverted as soon as Leipzig’s situation improved.72 
However, these agreements and promises were soon forgotten. In the case of the 
Borsenverein, the claim that it was a mere ‘provisional’ entity was an outright lie. Kurt 
Georg Schauer, the main protagonist in the establishment of the Western branch of the 
Borsenverein, had already proclaimed the Frankfurt branch to be a permanent institution 
when he was aiding the American efforts in Leipzig to confiscate material for the move of 
the association. He spoke of a ‘parallel’ institution.73 The divide in Germany’s book trade 
became more and more apparent. Another call for unity in the trade was made at the spring 
book fair in Leipzig in 1947. A forum called ‘German unity and the book trade’ drew an 
audience of book trade representatives, members of political parties and also 
representatives of all four occupation powers. In his address Lord Mayor Zeigner 
emphasised the abilities and opportunities of Leipzig as a centre for book trade and 
declared that Leipzig was committed to its tradition as Buchstadt. Further speeches evoked 
the unifying spirit of the written word and warned against sectionalism for the sake of 
Germany’s intellectual and cultural, as well as the book market’s, wellbeing. However, the 
speeches had an air of whistling in the dark and probably even failed to convince the 
speakers themselves.74 By 1947, the German book trade was already divided into two 
camps and Leipzig’s status as the national book trading centre was broken. Already by 
Easter 1946, a Leipzig book trader complained that Leipzig had lost its position as centre
72 Ibid., Blatt 143, 17 February 1947.
73 Ibid., Blatt 148, 26 March 1947. The agreements were valid for less than two months. For Schauer see: 
Bille, ‘Buchstadt ohne Filetstucke?’, p. 38.
74 Borsenverein Leipzig, Die Deutsche Einheit und der Buchhandel, Ansprachen (Leipzig, 1947)
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of the German book trade to Frankfurt and that ‘we are written off by them, although we 
all are Germans and should stick together.’75
This was not due to Leipzig’s low production for the market, as that would change 
after the reparation contingents were finished. Nor did the move of the big names deliver 
the fatal blow; most nationalised companies still retained their old name, thereby 
continuing to carry the prestige associated with the houses.76 The decisive factor was the 
establishment of a second national library, a Western rival to the Deutsche Bucherei.
The Deutsche Bucherei had been a symbol for the German book trade as a whole. 
All German publishers had to send two depository copies of each of their books to the 
library, so that the entirety of German book trading output could be catalogued and made 
accessible to the public. The library’s Nationalbibliographie was the definitive account of 
the German bibliography. Therefore it marked the place that was the heart of German 
publishing. As long as the Deutsche Bucherei retained its position, Leipzig would as well. 
This was also known in the Frankfurt circle, which eagerly pursued the city’s ascent to the 
title of Germany’s premier Buchstadt.
The establishment of a second German copyright library in itself need not have 
been a contentious issue. Other European countries have several of these institutions. Yet, 
the establishment of what became the Deutsche Bibliothek des Westerns was a tool to 
engineer the demise of Leipzig’s importance. Furthermore, the split in the German book 
trade foreshadowed the division of Germany as a whole, a second national library catering 
for an embryonic second state.
Three months after the Soviet takeover in Leipzig, the head of the Soviet military 
administration in Berlin, Marshall Zhukov, issued an order on 7 September 1945
 :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  v
75 ‘...wir von dort aus abgeschrieben sind, dabei sind wir doch alle Deutsche und sollten zusammenhalten.’ 
Letter by Gertrud Kauffert, copy o f document in Monika Estermann and Edgar Lesch, Buch, Buchhandel und 
Rundfunk 1945-49 (Wiesbaden, 1997), p. 46.
76 This led to a curious phenomenon of duplication: Brockhaus, Insel, Reclam, Thieme and others appeared 
both in East and West German editions.
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77instructing the restoration and re-opening of the Deutsche Bucherei. In Leipzig, this
command was understood to be a step following Solotuchin’s vision of Leipzig’s
intellectual leadership role; especially as the means for the reconstruction were solely to
come from the city’s budget.78 Therefore, Leipzig’s administration hoped for some support
from the occupation officials to accomplish this feat, in particular in the matter of
transport. The instructions stipulated that all relocated stock of the library had to be
returned by 1 October 1945. Thus 1.6 million books and volumes of collected journals had
to be brought back to Leipzig. However, the Soviets provided neither means of transport
nor fuel. As most of Leipzig’s own transport (buses, cars) had been confiscated, this posed
a great problem and delayed the whole process.79 In addition, an inspection by library
employees of the stored relocated inventory revealed that one repository had been emptied
in the meantime by Soviet military officials, allegedly to transfer the contents to Berlin.
The seized items included the library’s stock overview (92 books) and twenty chests
containing the Book and Print Museum’s most valuable exhibits.80 The removal took place
on the 22 September, more than two weeks after Zhukov’s order, through the use of force.
Both these circumstances indicated an unauthorized action. This suspicion was verified
when neither Leipzig’s Soviet Military Commander Trufanov nor Solotuchin in Berlin
confirmed the existence of any official order to that effect. It was even alleged that the
Russian officials had used false names to gain access to the repository. Miraculously, the
stock books at least were returned to the Deutsche Bucherei three weeks later, the exhibits
of the Book and Print Museum eventually surfaced as trophies in the Lenin library in 
81Moscow .
77 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 9289, Blatt 14, ‘Befehl der Sowjetischen Militarregierung in Deutschland Nr. 12, 
7.9.1945’. v
78 Ibid., Blatt 65.
79 Ibid., Blatt 16-20.
80 The Book and Print Museum (Buch und Schriftmuseum) had been a part of the Deutsche Bucherei.
81 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 9289, Blatt 21, 27 September 1945; Blatt 22, 28 September 1945; Blatt 26, 2 
October 1945, Blatt 2 7 ,4  October 1945; Blatt 32, 9 October 1945; Blatt 33, 13 October 1945. The problem
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These were not the only difficulties encountered before the re-opening of the 
library. Leipzig’s administration were mistaken in thinking that the Soviets intended the 
library to re-open to the general public. The Soviet communists favoured more exclusive 
arrangements. The Deutsche Biicherei was to open initially for use by the Soviet Army and 
administration only. This gave rise to a great commotion as it thwarted the library’s 
original mission.82 Furthermore, a change of command in Leipzig’s military administration 
saw Trufanov replaced by Borrissov in November 1945. The new commander-in-chief 
demanded repeated confirmation that the opening ceremony had Berlin’s authorisation, 
threatening its cancellation and further delays in the process. Yet, finally, on 24 November 
1945, the Deutsche Biicherei was re-opened. The event was later celebrated in GDR 
literature as a great accomplishment by the people of the Soviet Zone. The triumphant 
claim that it was ‘the first of Germany’s academic libraries to re-open’, however, neglected 
to mention the fact that it was only open for Soviet use and to those German academics 
accredited by the Soviets.83 Contemporary accounts were also keen to portray the event as 
milestone:
The re-opening of the Deutsche Biicherei is to be seen 
as an important step in the process of the reconstruction 
of our entire political, economic and cultural life. [...]
The library shall be an element in the fight to maintain 
German unity.84
Although the library was only accessible to officials of the Soviet military 
administration, it still continued its bibliographical work. The ban on National Socialist
of Soviet removal of the library’s stock was not limited to the period before the institution’s re-opening. 
Twice, both times without the knowledge of Leipzig’s Soviet administration, books and journals were 
removed. The first removal, in early 1946, was carried out so rapidly, that it did not even allow for a proper 
cataloguing of everything that was taken. See Ibid., Blatt 97-101, 1946 and Blatt 159, 31 July 1947. For the 
whereabouts of the stolen books see: Deutsches Buch und Schriftmuseum, Geschichte, http://www.ddb.de 
(last accessed 22 May 2009).
82 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 9289, Blat* 29, 5 October 1945.
83Borusiak and Hohnel, Chronik /, p.98. The library was closed to the public until 21 September 1947.
84‘Die Wiedereroffnung der Deutschen Biicherei ist als eine wichtige Etappe im ProzeB des Neuaufbaus 
unseres gesamten politischen, wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Lebens anzusehen. [...] [die Biicherei] soil ein 
Element sein im Kampf um die Erhaltung der deutschen Einheit.’ Volksstimme, No. 65, 27 November 1945, 
‘Die Deutsche Biicherei wiedereroffnet’.
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works and literature containing ‘reactionary’ ideas had been in place since the end of the 
war in all four occupation zones. The Soviet Zone in particular experienced a very strict 
interpretation of this directive as has been shown above. It was also on Soviet orders that 
the Deutsche Biicherei began to establish a definitive list of works that were to be 
banned.85 When the inventory was returned to the Deutsche Biicherei before its re-opening, 
the bibliographers started to catalogue all National Socialist literature. Thus it was possible 
to publish an intermediate list in February 1946, succeeded by a final list containing over 
38,700 titles on 1 April. This list was adopted in all four occupation zones in Germany, 
once more demonstrating the importance of the Deutsche Biicherei for the entire country.87
However, in the course of 1946, it became clear that Frankfurt aspired to open its 
own copyright library. A small circle of intellectuals around the head of Frankfurt’s city 
and university library, Professor Hanns Wilhelm Eppelsheimer, began to draw up plans for 
this new national library. Initially, it began as a duplicate to Leipzig; yet, it soon asserted 
itself to take over Leipzig’s rights and duties. The first choice of name was an indicator: 
Deutsche Biicherei des Westens.
In Leipzig, both the head of the Deutsche Biicherei as well as the city’s 
administration were alarmed by this development. In July 1946, Leipzig’s city council 
wrote to the Lord Mayor of Frankfurt am Main expressing its concerns over a looming 
creation of a Western equivalent to the library. Special attention was drawn to the fact that 
such an action would mean ‘to acquaint oneself with the thought of a divided Germany’. 
This was not simple alarmist rhetoric. A duplication of a national institution would 
undoubtedly lead to a weakening of German cohesion, intellectually and otherwise.88 Over 
the following months the head of Leipzig’s library, Dr Heinrich Uhlendahl tirelessly
85 StadtAL, StVuR, No. 9289, Blatt 85, 26 January 1946.
86 Borusiak and Hohnel, Chronik /.
87 Brandsch and Herzog, Das literarische Leipzig, p. 97.
88 ‘... sich mit dem Gedanken der Aufspaltung Deutschlands vertraut zu machen’, StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 
9289, Blatt 95, 11 July 1946.
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corresponded with Frankfurt to avert the establishment of a rival institution there. In 
September, he again involved Leipzig’s Lord Mayor Zeigner as the situation had 
deteriorated further. Frankfurt had ordered the Western Zone publishers to send their two 
depository copies to its institution rather than honour the obligation they had to Leipzig. 
Furthermore, Frankfurt would only agree to send one copy to Leipzig in exchange for a 
copy of a book printed in the Soviet Zone.89 This completely went against any agreements 
in the German book trade. This is even more remarkable given the fact that the Frankfurt 
library had not even formally come into existence. The demand for a trade-off in books 
was also designed to undermine Leipzig, as the book production in the Soviet Zone had 
fallen far behind the combined output of the three Western Zones (the production of the 
American Zone alone exceeded that figure). In addition, a pamphlet about the Deutsche 
Biicherei emerged in Frankfurt, written by Georg Kurt Schauer.90 Schauer had been 
instrumental in helping the American effort of relocating much of Leipzig’s 
Borsenverein' s assets to Wiesbaden and Frankfurt.91 He was known to be ‘no friend of 
Leipzig’ and appears to have relished the opportunity to work against the city.92 Schauer, 
himself an author and expert in the book trade, knew that the agreement of US officials 
was essential in establishing a national copyright library. In order to sway the Americans 
he was distinctly economical with the truth in his pamphlet. He began by claiming that the 
Deutsche Biicherei started its collection of German literature ‘in 1933 [sic]’. He thus was 
using an illusory Nazi link to justify a marginalisation of the institution. Furthermore, he
89 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 9289, Blatt 102, 8 September 1946. Even the Americans considered Schauer’s 
tactics to verge on blackmail. See: Georg Kurt Schauer, ‘Erinnerung an meine Borsenblattzeit 1.6.45 bis 
1.10.1948’ in Historische Kommission des Borsenvereins, Buchhandelsgeschichte 2/5 (Frankfurt, 1980), pp. 
267-75, here p. 270.
90 Georg Kurt Schauer (1899-1984) was a Frankfurter who had worked as writer and publisher in Leipzig.
His strong advocacy of Frankfurt as new Buchstadt seem to suggest not only a shrewd business mind but also 
a certain degree of local patriotism. v
91 Schauer had been authorized to not only ‘sack’ the material resources of the Borsenverein, but he also 
pressed for information and demanded the association’s contact lists and all important documents. See 
Thomas Bille, ‘Der Borsenverein der deutschen Buchhandler zu Leipzig 1945-48’ in Leipziger Arbeitskreis 
zur Geschichte des Buchwesen, Leipziger Jahrbuch zur Buchgeschichte (Wiesbaden, 1992), pp. 165-209.
92 See Bille, ‘Buchstadt ohne Filetstiicke?’.
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alleged that Leipzig’s library had ceased its collection efforts at the end of the war and ever 
since had remained inactive. Schauer went onto claim that he had been given the green 
light by Leipzig for his scheme, thereby crossing the fine line that separates the mildly 
misleading from the blatant lie.93 Zeigner responded to these machinations with a forceful 
letter to Frankfurt’s Lord Mayor Kolb which categorically excluded any possibility of the 
use of the Deutsche Biicherei9 s name by a rival venture. Furthermore, calling a spade a 
spade, he demanded a public renunciation of Schauer’s ‘lies’.94 Zeigner only succeeded in 
so far as the institution that was created on 4 November 1946 in Frankfurt am Main carried 
the name of Deutsche Bibliothek.
Kolb only replied to Zeigner’s letter after this fait accompli. He outlined how the 
publishers in the Western Zones demanded a second copyright library, that the 500g limit 
on interzonal postal items made honouring the obligations to Leipzig impossible and that it 
was not Frankfurt’s aim to divide the German book trade. The city merely provided the 
premises for the library so much needed by the trade.95 It became clear at the Bielefeld 
meeting in February 1947 that Frankfurt was best positioned in the emerging division in 
the trade. Petermann, Leipzig’s representative, was told that the American occupation 
authority forbade the supply of books to the Soviet Occupation Zone.96 The truth of this 
claim and the reason for any such order still need to be researched. If found to be correct, a 
possible involvement of the Frankfurt circle in the decision-making would also demand 
investigation.97 Indisputably, Schauer was key in aligning the publishers of the Western
93 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 9289, Blatt 113-115.
94 Ibid., Blatt 109-112, 30 September 1946.
95 Ibid., Blatt 132, 21 September 1946. The 500g limit for postal items existed since 26 October 1945, 
however, the Deutsche Biicherei had reached an agreement with the publishers that books were to be sent in 
parts as a temporary measure. v
96 Ibid., Blatt 145, 17 February 1947.
97 The Americans trusted Schauer, thus his opinions might have had an influence on their decision making. 
However, it was the Americans who initiated the relocation of Leipzig’s major publishers in order to create a 
new centre for the German book trade, therefore their decision could have been the result of their endeavours 
in this direction. See Brandsch and Herzog, Das literarische Leipzig.
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Zones to send their depository copies to the Frankfurt institution.98 It is clear, however, that 
the Americans wanted to create their own system of control over the book trade, 
completely autonomous from Leipzig, hence their urgency in procuring not only ‘material’ 
(publishers and their company documents) but also ‘infrastructure’ (the Borsenverein’s 
address lists, trade information and documentation).99 Indeed, it has even been suggested 
that the Americans, through the efforts of the Information Control Division, wanted to 
establish a book trading centre in Frankfurt to entirely substitute for Leipzig.100 In 
connection with the growing political tensions between the Western and Eastern 
occupation powers, the fight over supremacy in Germany’s book trade was most probably 
an early manifestation of the looming Cold War. This would explain why, despite precise 
orders by the Allied Control Council in March 1947, the Deutsche Biicherei encountered 
persistent problems obtaining its depository copies during the course of the year.101 These 
problems often materialised due to animosities directed at the Soviet Zone in general.
It also emerged that the city of Frankfurt not only provided the premises for the 
Deutsche Bibliothek, it also paid for the staff. In fact, the library became a municipal 
institution.102 The Frankfurt branch of the Borsenverein assumed its leadership role in the 
Western Zones shortly after the foundation of the Deutsche Bibliothek, thus completing the 
partition of the book trade in Germany. Schauer’s previous Borsenblatt announcement 
regarding the depository copies could now proudly be followed up with the promised 
address: ‘To all publishers in the Western Zones! Don’t forget to send two copies of all
98 This had been prepared from the outset. Schauer published an appeal in the very first issue of the 
Borsenblatt (the Borsenverein’s publication) printed in the American Zone (on Leipzig’s paper) in 1945 that 
publishers should keep their depository copies. The Borsenverein (Schauer’s Western branch) was to advise 
them about a new address to send them to. See Borsenblatt des deutschen Buchhandels [West], 1/6 October 
1945.
99 Schauer, ‘Erinnerung’.
100 Bernd Gruschka, ‘Re-Education a|s US-Verlagspolitik’ in Egel, Neuanfang, pp. 60-64. Although 
tempting, an investigation of the ICD’s policies in the Buchstadt Frankfurt would have exceeded the scope of 
this chapter.
101 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 9289, Blatt 155, 25 April 1947; No. 8901, Blatt 1, 4 June 1947; Blatt 6, 11 June 
1947.
102 Ibid., No. 9289, Blatt 150.
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new publications to the Deutsche Bibliothek in Frankfurt am Main.’ 103 Thereby Frankfurt 
had become the Buchstadt it had aspired to be.
Of course, the demise of the Deutsche Biicherei in Leipzig was not exclusively 
caused by Frankfurt’s ambitions. Soviet conduct towards the library’s stock, as well as the 
lack of support shown in the reconstruction efforts, were clearly important factors. Indeed, 
Soviet meddling with the library’s bibliographical output compromised the institution’s 
position even further.104 However, the persistence with which Frankfurt pursued the 
establishment of its own copyright library coupled with the efforts to stop Leipzig 
obtaining its depository copies aided and speeded up the process. It was the creation of the 
Deutsche Bibliothek that added weight to the Frankfurt Borsenverein’s claim that their city 
had become the new German Buchstadt offering greater resources and a less restricted 
environment.
It is interesting to note in this context that the existing literature has thus treated 
the subject of the fate of the Deutsche Biicherei with a surprising lack of interest. The 
recent official account of the history of the Deutsche Biicherei merely stated that Leipzig’s 
institution lost its status as sole copyright library due to the zonal division of Germany. The 
creation of the Western equivalent is described matter-of-factly. As both institutions 
merged after the reunification of Germany, the omission of the contentious part of the 
creation of the Deutsche Bibliothek is understandable.105 However, most other accounts 
also neglect Frankfurt’s agency. The emergence of the Deutsche Bibliothek is described as 
a ‘natural’ product of the increasingly difficult situation for publishers in the Soviet
103 ‘An die Verleger der westlichen Besatzungszonen! Vergessen Sie nicht, von alien Neuerscheinungen zwei 
Exemplare an die Deutsche Bibliothek in Frankfurt am Main zu senden.’ Borsenblatt des deutschen 
Buchhandels [West] 23-24/31 December 1946.
104 The library produced updates of its list of banned literature. The second list published in March 1947 
already had the Soviet censor’s signature: it contained books by Trotsky. See Brandsch and Herzog, Das 
literarische Leipzig, p. 97.
105 Ansorge, Die Deutsche Bibliothek.
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Zone.106 Even the GDR literature paid almost no attention to the creation of a parallel 
institution as Frankfurt’s library was driven by capitalist notions and thus could not be 
regarded as an intellectual equal.107 Nevertheless, the literature applauding the creation of 
the Deutsche Bibliothek is more extensive. By and large written by the proponents of the 
institution, these accounts are classic pieces of Cold War literature. They exude in every 
line loathing for the Soviets and by extension the Buchstadt Leipzig that found itself in the 
Soviet Zone after 1945. Both Schauer and Eppelsheimer portray themselves as the saviours 
of German publishing and the copyright library. Speaking with hindsight at the height of 
the Cold War, they interpret Leipzig’s role as that of a mere puppet in the Soviet plans of 
progressively painting Germany red.108 Others join them in praising Frankfurt’s library as 
nothing less than a ‘lesson in a democratic way of life’.109 Furthermore, Frankfurt’s 
advocates dispute the status of the Deutsche Biicherei as national library and deny 
responsibility for destroying national unity of Germany in this important area.110
These claims have to be put into perspective. By 1946, the policies towards 
printing, publishing and bibliographical archiving in the Soviet Zone had not yet been set 
in stone. The process was still developing, indeed as shown above, German agency was 
able to alter Soviet ideas. The plans for the Deutsche Bibliothek, however, were well under 
way by that time. The most obvious indication that the Frankfurt circle had their own 
careers at the forefront of their minds as much as any high moral considerations for ‘true 
democracy and freedom’ is the contradiction between Eppelsheimer and Schauer with 
regards to the creation and shape of the Frankfurt institutions -  both Borsenverein and
106 Brandsch and Herzog, Das literarische Leipzig.
107 Rotzsch, Die Deutsche Biicherei.
108 See inter al: Schauer, ‘Erinnerungen’; and Hanns W. Eppelsheimer, ‘Ansprache’ in Deutsche Bibliothek 
and Borsenverein des deutschen Buchhandels, Drei Ansprachen, pp. 29-35.
109 Paul Hubiger, ‘Ansprache’ in Ibid., pp. 7-18, here p. 10: ‘eine Lektion in demokratischer Lebensweise’.
110 See Eppelsheimer: ‘[...]in Deutschland [...] wo man sich nicht entschlieBen konnte, eine 
Nationalbibliothek zu eroffnen’, Hanns W. Eppelsheimer, Die Deutsche Bibliothek in Frankfurt am Main,
Ein Bericht (Frankfurt, 1950), p. 13; also: Ibid., ‘Die Deutsche Bibliothek, Erinnerung an eine Griindung’ in 
Borsenverein, Bibliographie und Buchhandel (Frankfurt am Main, 1959), pp. 57-75, here p. 60: ‘Wir wuBten 
daB eine zweite Bibliothek ein Land nicht zerreiBen wiirde’.
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Deutsche Bibliothek. Whereas Eppelsheimer tirelessly repeats the mantra of ‘attempts at 
compromise’, calling the Deutsche Bibliothek ‘just a transitional entity, a bridge’, Schauer 
clearly states that his aims were from the outset a ‘division of the stream of tradition’ and 
‘independence from Leipzig’.111
More importantly, the argument that the Deutsche Biicherei was ‘by no means’ a 
national library, cannot be upheld in the light of the evidence. The statutes of the Deutsche 
Biicherei of 1912 clearly outline the character of the institution as the ‘central archival 
library and national bibliographical centre’. Furthermore, when this document was 
amended in 1919, the Reich minister of the interior signed and validated the charter, surely 
a sign that even the Reich government recognized the library to be a national institution.112 
Moreover, the memorandum of Erich Ehlermann of 1910, the paper that initiated the 
Deutsche Biicherei, clearly had called for a ‘Reichsbibliothek’. This intention was
implemented as was clearly acknowledged in 1927: ‘[ ] these thoughts developed then by
my friend Ehlermann [...] were realised later on, the memorandum has to be seen as the 
root of the Deutsche Biicherei.’113
Another supporting argument for the Deutsche Biicherei having been the national 
library of Germany was the fact that the institution held and still holds, as one of its special 
collections, the Reichsbibliothek of 1848. This collection of nearly 5000 books was 
compiled by the national assembly in Frankfurt’s Paulskirche as the seed com for a 
national library, a Reichsbibliothek, as later also envisaged by Ehlermann.114
These facts sit ill with both Schauer’s and Eppelsheimer’s accounts. It is 
nevertheless revealing that both felt the need to be so defensive in their accounts. Even
more intriguing is the fact that although in contemporary accounts the division of the book
    ^
111 Schauer, ‘Erinnerung’, p. 269 and 271.
112 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 9289, Blatt 3-10, ‘Satzung der Deutschen Biicherei 1912’, with amendments of 
1919.
113 See preface of Erich Ehlermann, Eine Reichsbibliothek in Leipzig, Denkschrift 1910 (Leipzig, 1927).
114 See: Reichsbibliothek, Geschichte, http://www.ddb.de (accessed 22 May 2009).
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trade was equated to a division of Germany, the literature on the institution in Frankfurt 
does not reflect this. The establishment of the Deutsche Bibliothek was the creation of a 
second national library, therefore clearly indicating the emergence of two state-like entities 
well before 1948, traditionally seen as the date of partition and the beginning of the Cold 
War.115
The developments in Germany during 1948 were also noted in the sphere of 
Leipzig’s book trade. The visitors from the Western Zones decreased considerably at 
Leipzig’s book and trade fairs as did the orders from the West. A pronounced anti-Soviet 
mood was evident among the Western visitors, colouring their impressions of Leipzig.116 
By August 1947 the dismantlement had finally stopped, thus providing the printing quarter 
with the opportunity to reconstruct. Enormous production increases were achieved, albeit 
still used largely for reparation purposes. The licensing procedure for private publishers 
gained pace and Leipzig could again present 752 book trading and publishing companies in 
the directory of the German book trade.117 The foundation of two separate German states in 
1949 cemented the demise of Leipzig’s importance for publishers in the Western Zones. 
Yet, it also allowed the city to reassert itself as the leading Buchstadt in the German 
Democratic Republic.
The call for Leipzig to lead the intellectual reconstruction of Germany was taken 
at face value by the Leipzigers. However, it soon emerged that a re-establishment of 
Leipzig’s status was not to mean a reinstatement of the pre-war Leipzig. The Soviets aimed 
at a complete transformation of Leipzig’s economy and in particular of its book trade and 
publishing facilities. Waves of expropriations, coupled with the unwillingness to license 
Leipzig’s publishers, contradicted the expectations for a revival of Leipzig as a Buchstadt,
115 Titel and Knopf, Der Leipziger Gutenbergweg; Borusiak and Hohnel, Chronik /.
116 Ibid.
117 Brandsch and Herzog, Das literarische Leipzig, p. 101.
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despite the propaganda by Soviet officials. So did the orgy of dismantling that occurred in 
the city and especially in the printing quarter. The city’s administration tried to avert or at 
least alleviate the destruction, but the limited success of these attempts and the brutal and 
absurd nature of the disassembly orders created a lasting resentment of the Soviet 
authorities among the population and especially the workers. Another battlefield was the 
struggle to retain the Deutsche Biicherei in its capacity as national library. Soviet 
propaganda praised the re-opening as a new chapter in Germany’s intellectual 
development. In reality, the library remained closed to the public until late 1947 and its 
holdings were depleted by substantial and repeated looting. Against this background, 
Frankfurt’s ambitions to succeed Leipzig in its position as centre of the book trade 
gathered pace. The foundations for this were laid by the Americans, who evacuated most 
of Leipzig’s distinguished publishers westward in 1945. This group then acted as a 
gravitational centre for everyone in the trade who left the Soviet Zone in the following 
years. The establishment of a library akin to the Deutsche Biicherei was a consequence of 
these developments and, in turn, cemented the division in Germany’s book trade. 
Moreover, it heralded the partition of Germany through the duplication of a national 
institution. Leipzig continued to fight for its position and status, however, the continuous 
problems with both the Soviet occupiers and the competition in the Western Zones meant 
that it was fighting a losing battle. By 1949, Leipzig lagged behind in terms of licensed 
publishers and in terms of book production and the city’s monopoly on the German 
bibliography had been broken. In the end, all Leipzig could hope for was to become the 
publishing capital of the GDR. Four-fifths of the German book-buying public now looked 
elsewhere.
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4 Leipzig -  City of Law
For centuries, the city of Leipzig had a special connection with the legal 
profession. The city had grown into Germany’s most important seat for jurisdiction and the 
theory and development of law. Leipzig was able to maintain and expand this position until 
the beginning of the Third Reich. In the course of the twelve years of National Socialist 
rule, the German judicial system was perverted and undermined so that it became 
necessary after the fall of the Reich to set up an entirely new justice system. Due to its 
location in the Soviet Zone of Occupation, Leipzig was unable to play any part in the 
creation of the new legal institutions of the embryonic Federal Republic in the Western 
Zones. In the Soviet Zone meanwhile and subsequently in the German Democratic 
Republic the new ideologically driven justice policy negated the burgerlich origin of 
German law, thereby depriving Leipzig of its standing in German legal discourses.
Leipzig had boasted a long history of law and jurisprudence. In 1263, a hundred 
years after the foundation of the city, the Burger were granted the power to decide their
i
own legal disputes.1 The libertas, a law that allowed them to answer any charges in front of 
a panel of peers from the city, was the first step in Leipzig’s legal emancipation from its 
feudal overlords. The jurisdiction in the city from then on lay in the hands of its Burger. 
Furthermore, a city court was founded (Leipziger Schoppenstuhl) whose influence quickly 
spread. Soon legal disputes from across the territory of Central Germany were decided in 
the Schoppenstuhl and from 1325 onwards even the king of Bohemia referred legal 
disputes to the court. When Leipzig’s university was founded in 1409 with the strong
    v
1 For the development of jurisprudence in Leipzig and Saxony see Steffen Heitmann, ‘Rechtsgeschichte als 
Gerichtsgeschichte -  Leipzigs besonderes Verhaltnis zur Justiz’ in Dieter Grimm, Leipziger Juristische 
Vortrage -  Das Reichsgericht in Wendezeiten (Leipzig, 1997) pp. 13-19 and Karl-Heinz Blaschke, ‘Vom 
Stadtbrief zum Reichsgericht’ in Sachsisches Staatsministerium der Justiz, Sachsische Justizgeschichte -  
Leipzig Stadt der Rechtssprechung (Dresden, 1994) pp. 7-30.
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support of Leipzig’s Burger, the faculty of law was one of the founding departments and a 
uniquely fruitful interplay of legal theory and practice ensued.2 This found its institutional 
form in 1483 with the establishment of the Supreme Court of Justice for Saxony 
(Sachsisches Oberhofgericht). This autonomous court took over the legal powers of 
Saxony’s sovereign as supreme judge. The feudal right of jurisdiction was thus transferred 
to a legally versed council, whose chair was concurrently the dean of the university’s law 
faculty. The city further expanded its legal influence when the bench for family and marital 
law, which was normally under the rule of the church consistory, was transferred to 
Leipzig in 1550. It was also in Leipzig, that an independent German jurisprudence first 
emerged in the early 1600s. Benedikt Carpzov, who continued the practice of combining 
the position of Leipzig law professor with one as judge at both the Schoppenstuhl and the 
Oberhofgericht, amalgamated his practical experience and academic research into 
compendia of Saxon jurisdiction, which soon acquired legal authority throughout the 
German lands.3
The next addition to Leipzig’s legal empire came in the wake of the 
industrialisation in the nineteenth century, which had increased the city’s economic 
importance in Germany. With increased trade had come increased trade disputes, 
ultimately requiring a new specialist court to hear such cases. When such a court was set 
up for the then German Confederation (Deutscher Bund), Leipzig was chosen as the city 
were the new institution should reside. With the establishment in 1869 of the 
Bundesoberhandelsgericht (Supreme Federal Trade Court), Leipzig had thus acquired for 
the first time a nationwide reach within a branch of German law. The court began hearing 
cases in 1870 and was renamed a year later Reichsoberhandelsgericht (Supreme Reich
    v
2 The exodus in 1409 of German professors and students from Prague’s Charles University in a dispute over 
representation brought many o f them to Leipzig. The Burger of Leipzig bought a building in the city centre 
and placed it at the academics’ disposal to found a new institution. See, Inter al.: Ulrich v. Hehl (ed.), 
Sachsens Landesuniversitat in Monarchie, Republik und Diktatur (Leipzig, 2005).
3 Ulrich Eisenhardt, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte (Munich, 1984).
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Trade Court) with authority vested in it to deal with trade disputes throughout the newly 
unified Reich. In the course of the efforts to unify the Reich not just by proclamation but in 
practice, several new imperial institutions were founded culminating in a Supreme Court 
(Reichsgericht). The location for what would be the most important institution next to 
parliament and government was hotly debated. To reflect the federal character of the new 
Reich the preference was for somewhere other than Berlin. Yet, the Prussian led 
government under Bismarck advocated the Reich capital. The topic was hotly debated in 
the justice committee of the Reichstag where especially Prussia’s Justice Minister 
Leonhardt strongly advocated Berlin, to ensure that Bismarck’s government was able to 
intervene in the Reichsgerichf s deliberations, should the need arise. But this motion was 
narrowly outvoted in the Reichstag. Instead it was decided to award the court to the city 
that already hosted the Reichsoberhandelsgericht, namely Leipzig. As Schubert states, it 
was Leipzig’s status as ‘deeply burgerlich city’ that swayed the majority of the burgerlich 
parliamentarians’ votes in favour of the city.4 In 1879 the court was established 
concurrently with the Reich justice laws. It was the court of ultimate resort both in civil 
and criminal law cases of imperial Germany. It consisted of three criminal senates and five 
civil senates dealing with revisions in their respective fields. Furthermore, the 
Reichsgericht was the immediate and final court for all cases of treason and high treason 
making it the guardian of the imperial laws and constitution. Not only did it decide court 
cases, it also acted to ensure uniformity in jurisdiction for the whole of Germany.
In the late nineteenth century, Leipzig had thus reached the climax of its judicial 
development and became the first city of law in the German Reich. The imposing structure 
that was built to house the Supreme Court aptly underlined this fact. This building with 
neoclassical and historicist features resembled the Reichstag in Berlin with its grand cupola
4 The justice committee of the Reichstag voted 30 to 28 votes for Leipzig, this decision then passed the 
Reichstag only in the second reading. Werner Schubert, Die Deutsche Gerichtsverfassung 1869-1877, 
Entstehung und Quellen (Frankfurt, 1981), p. 179
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and the pillared front. A great square ran along the entire front of the Reichsgericht 
guaranteeing that the grand vista was not obstructed. It also ensured that the court building 
served as impressive backdrop for rallies, a fact that later the National Socialists knew to 
utilise with great effect. The architecture reflected the court’s position in the Reich as well 
as its status among the great Reich institutions. In Leipzig itself the location of the building 
mirrored both its significance and the pride of the Leipziger. The building was in the heart 
of the city adjacent to both the Gewandhaus and the main university library and diagonally 
across from the new town hall. All institutions were within less than five minutes’ walk 
from each other. The law faculty too, could be reached within five minutes. It was situated 
just behind the new town hall thus, making it easy for judges and lawyers to hang their 
robes in their Reichsgericht office and walk to their lectures and seminars in the 
‘Collegium Iuridicum’. Being the seat of the Reichsgericht created an immense pull. By 
the end of the nineteenth century, both the quality of Leipzig’s law faculty and the nimbus 
of the Reichsgericht attracted so many lawyers and aspiring jurists that the city had the 
greatest concentration of lawyers of any city in Germany.5
Leipzig and the Reichsgericht represented German jurisprudence on the 
international stage in frequent international law congresses. In Germany the city 
manifested its prominent position with the yearly German jurists’ convention (Deutscher 
Juristentag) that was held in the premises of the Reichsgericht.6 Furthermore, in the field of 
establishing law Leipzig and later the Reichsgericht played an important role. Leipzig’s 
jurists -  practitioners and academics alike -  were substantial contributors to the Saxon 
Civil Code (Sdchsisches Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch), a law compendium that came into 
force in 1865 in the kingdom of Saxony.
5 Michael Schafer, Biirgertum in der Krise. Stadtische Mittelklassen in Edinburgh und Leipzig, 1890-1930 
(Gottingen, 2003), p. 30.
6 The Deutscher Juristentag was an event of the Bund Deutscher Juristen, an independent association of 
jurists.
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3 A view from above in 1909, the Reichsgericht in the midst of Leipzig’s burgerlich institutions.
1 -  The New Town Hall
2 -  The Reichsgericht
3 -  The Gewandhaus (destroyed 1943)
4 -  The University Library (rebuilt 1992-2002)
5 -  Collegium Iuridicum (destroyed 1943)
6 -  University Main Building (damaged heavily 1943, finally demolished 1968)
7 -  St Thomas’s Church
Source: Leipziger Volkszeitung, 29 January 2009
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Building on this expertise, they later also contributed to the Civil Code of Germany 
(Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch) which became law in 1900, the first comprehensive statute 
book regulating all of Germany. The Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch remains the basis of 
German civil law to this day.
The geographic distance from Berlin did not shield the Reichsgericht from 
political developments in the early twentieth century. Once the end of the First World War 
had brought about the abolition of the monarchy, the administration of law found itself in a 
different environment faced with new challenges. Parliamentary rule in the new republic 
was one of them. During the Weimar Republic, the Reichsgericht followed, like many 
other courts in Germany, a conservative line. This conservatism had leanings towards the 
reactionary; an anti-republican bias was part of the moral and intellectual make up of most 
judges at the time. The members of the Reichsgericht, lawyers, attorneys and judges had 
all been socialized in Wilhelmine Germany and continued to hold the values and traditions 
they had become accustomed to in that period. A certain uniformity in views and principles 
had been based on the selection process for prospective students. Both the length and the 
expenses of the legal education pre-determined the financial background of the aspiring 
jurists, their dependence on their superiors ensured their allegiance to the existing ideas of 
the Kaiserreich.7 The adherence to these ideas remained unchallenged in the Weimar 
system as the principle of ‘independence of judges’ paired with their status as irremovable 
and non-transferable remained intact. This meant that at least in the area of justice, the 
ancien regime continued nearly unchallenged.
As the Social Democratic politician and journalist Erich Kuttner noted in 1921: 
‘The great majority of judges had remained in the service of the republic, even though
7 Mueller states that the majority o f the judges sided with the right-wing of the National Conservative Party 
and kept their distance from the new  ^republic. Ingo Mueller, Furchtbare Juristen (Munich, 1989). For the 
Reichsgericht, Karl Kaul provides statistics, which place all its members in the middle class, with over half 
coming from families with an academic background. Karl Friedrich Kaul, Geschichte des Reichsgerichts, 
1933-1945, Band 4 (Berlin, 1971), p.51. Erich Zeigner declared that he had to hide his affinity for the SPD 
during his law studies and his first junior positions, otherwise his superiors would have ensured his exclusion 
from the judicial community. Zeigner in LVZ, 13 August 1948.
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being inwardly hostile to it.’8 Despite having to guard the laws of the new republic, the 
court’s relationship to the new parliamentary democracy was ambivalent. In practice, this 
meant that the state was seen as different from the country -  the republic (a ‘hopefully’ 
transient occurrence) and the fatherland (the eternal structure that had to be preserved) 
became two separate entities. This is exemplified by the differing judicial response to 
attacks on the new state from the anti-democratic fringes. The decisions tended to favour 
defendants of right-wing persuasions, whereas leftist radicals were prosecuted harshly -  in 
line with the conservative stance of the Reichsgericht. This prejudiced interpretation of 
existing laws rewarded the right-wing claims of ‘love for their fatherland’ and punished the 
ambition for the ‘international rule of the working class’.9 The fact that both positions 
threatened the existing democratic state order was regarded as largely irrelevant as the 
continuation of this order was not the utmost priority of the Reichsgericht members.10 The 
jurisprudence of the Reichsgericht, once an element in the furtherance of the development 
of the German state, had become a hindrance in the effective establishment of Weimar 
democracy. The political comfort zone of the judges came to be a goalpost in their decision 
making and the rule of law began to decline.11
Internationally, the Reichsgericht came to prominence in the 1920s through the 
so-called ‘Leipziger Prozesse’, the court cases against war crimes committed by German
8 ‘Die groBe Masse der Richter ist also im Dienst der Republik geblieben, obwohl sie ihr innerlich feindlich 
gesinnt ist.’ Erich Kuttner cited in Heinrich and Elisabeth Hannover, Politische Justiz 1918-1933 (Frankfurt, 
1966), p. 22.
9 Dieter Grimm, ‘Das Reichsgericht in Wendezeiten’ in Grimm, Leipziger Juristische Vortrage, pp. 21-45.
10 As Ernst Fraenkel noted: ‘Das gesamte Beamtentum des alten Regime war monarchistisch [...]. Der 
Richter auBerdem [...] aus innerer Notwendigkeit. Kein Zweig des Beamtentums hat sich daher auf die neuen 
Verhaltnisse schwerer umzustellen vermocht als die Jusitz.’ Therefore, the new republic and its democratic 
system were hardly deemed to be valuable commodities in the eyes of the jurists. See Fraenkel, Zur 
Soziologie der Klassenjustiz (Berlin, 1927), p. 12.
11 As Heinrich and Elisabeth Hannover put it: ‘ [...]das Prinzip der “Unabhangigkeit der Richter” [...] 
wandte sich nach [...] 1918 gegen das zum Souveran des Staates gewordene Volk. [...] Es ging ganz einfach 
um die Durchsetzung bestimmter hochst fragwiirdiger Machtinteressen, denen die in der Verfassung 
festgelegten demokratischen Freiheitsrechte miindiger Staatsbiirger weichen muBten, weil eine im autoritaren 
Denken befangene Reichterschaft es so wollte.’ Hannover, Politische Justiz, p. 33. Although Hannover’s 
harsh views on judges have been put into perspective by Klemmer, even he concedes that an inherent bias 
corrupted the ‘objective’ establishment o f truth in court cases. Markus Klemmer, Gesetzesbindung und 
Richterfreiheit (Baden Baden, 1996).
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soldiers during the First World War. The prosecution of war criminals stipulated in the 
Versailles treaties came under the authority of Germany’s highest court. Some of these 
cases indeed led to convictions; for the most part however, they ended in abatement of 
action, acquittals or in lenient sentences, which subsequently were abrogated.12 In the final 
months of the Weimar Republic, on a proposal by the NSDAP, the Reichsgericht president 
was made proxy of the Reich president Hindenburg. This was a first clear indication of the 
politicization of the judiciary that was to come.
Justice was a part of the state machine transformed piecemeal by the National 
Socialists after the takeover of power. This development is exemplified in the 
Reichsgericht; the downfall of Germany’s Supreme Court mirrors the downfall of the 
German justice system in the Third Reich, aptly labelled by Eisenhardt as the ‘darkest 
chapter of German legal history’.13 The first sign of things to come were the events after 
the Reichstagsbrand (the arson attack on the German parliament), when personal rights as 
well as the authority of the Lander governments were severely restricted, thus preparing 
the centralisation of political power necessary for the Gleichschaltung. Additionally, 
following the introduction of the Heimtiickeverordnung in March 1933, Sondergerichte 
(special courts) in all districts of all regional jurisdiction came into being. These courts 
dealt with all crimes the National Socialists deemed ‘malicious’, thus removing those cases 
from the normal legal procedures, and creating a parallel justice system devoid of
12 Recent appreciations o f the processes condemn the low rate of guilty verdicts. See, inter al: Gerd Hankel, 
Die Leipziger Prozesse. Deutsche Kriegsverbrechen und ihre strafrechtliche Verfolgung nach dem Ersten 
Weltkrieg (Hamburg, 2003); Harald Wiggenhorn, ‘Eine Schuld fast ohne Siihne - Erinnerung an die 
Leipziger Kriegsverbrecherprozessse vor 75 Jahren’, in Die Zeit, 16 August 1996. Erich Ebermayer, 
however, as observer of his father’s work as chief prosecutor in the trials at the Reichsgericht draws a 
different picture. He describes how the low sentences were negotiated between his father and the legal 
representatives of the victorious powers. ‘Nach stiller Ubereinkunft der fiihrenden Juristen [...] nur eine 
Farce.’ Ebermayer, Denn heute, p. 349.
13 Eisenhardt, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, p. 371.
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preliminary hearing or proper representation of the defendants.14 This severe encroachment 
upon the legal system was closely followed by the ‘law for the restoration of the 
professional civil service’ (Berufsbeamtengesetz, 7 April 1933) that expelled many law 
practitioners on political and racial grounds. The Reichsgericht was affected as well, even 
though it ‘only had baptised Jews’ whom Reichsgerichtsprasident Bumke mistakenly 
considered to be safe.15 When it became clear that the Reichsgericht was not beyond reach, 
Bumke did nothing to support his institution’s members. His inaction eased the National 
Socialists’ way into the institution.16
The former Reichsoberstaatsanwalt Ludwig Ebermayer had already urged Bumke 
to vacate his seat at the takeover of power by the NSDAP, feeling that real justice could no 
longer be upheld under a National Socialist government.17 Yet Bumke remained in office. 
Only when confronted with the forced dismissal of the Reichsgericht senate president Dr 
Alfons David, is Bumke said to have considered his resignation. But he later refrained, 
claiming that his true reasons (opposition to the treatment of Jews in the civil service and 
especially the justice apparatus) would be concealed and the Reichsgericht brought under 
‘real’ National Socialist control. David was deeply hurt by his dismissal and even tried to 
assure the new government of his devotion in a letter to Hitler asking for ‘forgiveness’ 
should he have somehow offended and pleading for a ‘chance to prove his loyalty to the 
new regime.’18 David was one of those German Jews who felt entirely German and thus
14 Decree for the Protection of the National Socialist Movement against Malicious Attacks, 21 March 1933, 
RGB1.1,21 March 1933, p. 135.
15 Bumke was ‘fur das Reichsgericht ohne Sorge.’ In this he shared the opinion of most of Leipzig’s 
Biirgertum that ‘assimilated’ Jews were considered ‘safe’ and should remain in their positions. Yet he and his 
fellow Burger had a rude awakening. Ebermayer, Denn heute, p. 24.
16 Bumke was not alone in this kind of apathy. Rather than outright support, the key elements in allowing the 
National Socialists to gain ground in the sphere of justice, were inaction and opportunism. Until the onset of 
war, the membership of the NSDAP grew amongst jurists, however, far from being caused by political 
persuasion it largely was founded on opportunistic reasons. The guarding and furthering of one’s career took 
precedent over regard for the ‘unfortunate few’. See Hermann Wentker, ‘Justiz in der SBZ/DDR und im 
‘Dritten Reich’ in Heydemann, Oberreuter, Diktaturen in Deutschland, pp. 188-218.
17 Ebermayer, Denn heute, pp. 76-7.
18 Letter by David addressed to Hitler in Meinecke, ‘Conflicting loyalties’, pp. 121-2. For Bumke’s reaction: 
Dieter Kolbe, Reichsgerichtsprasident D r Erwin Bumke -  Studien zum Niedergang des Reichsgerichts und 
der deutschen Rechtspflege (Karlsruhe, 1975), pp. 224-5; David later emigrated with his family to the US
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could not place themselves outside their nation, neither intellectually nor emotionally. In 
total, the Reichsgericht lost besides David six Reichsgericht court councillors 
(Reichsgerichtsrat) and one Reichsanwalt (senior public prosecutor) directly through the 
application of that law. One lawyer, a member of the SPD -  indeed the only Social 
Democrat at the institution -  resigned just a day before the law became effective, thereby 
safe-guarding his pension.19 It became obvious that the politicisation of the judiciary or 
more precisely, the conversion of the legal system into a tool for the National Socialists 
was clearly underway. This transformation could already be observed as early as 1933. The 
Deutsche Juristen Zeitung, one of the main journals of legal practice and an outlet for 
debate about legal matters as well as the legal profession, carried in its January edition 
(published 1 January 1933) an outraged call to stop political influence in the courts. The 
judge Dr Baumbach demanded a clear detachment of the judiciary from the political 
sphere: ‘Justice is [...] not a weapon of any political tendency or class.’ By October of the 
same year, these standards of judicial independence were deemed antiquated. Another 
judge, Dr Kem, even questioned whether the ‘old’ legal order had any longer any bearing 
on the new times: ‘It is doubtful, whether it makes any sense at all [...] to judge the events 
with the rules of the old legal system.’20
It is in this light that Bumke’s actions need to be understood. Both Ebermayer, as 
Bumke’s contemporary and close acquaintance, and Kolbe, the most thorough student of 
Bumke’s career, portray the man as desperately holding on to whatever he could preserve
where he survived the war. See: Wolfgang M. Schwiedrzik, Lieber will ich Steine klopfen: Der Philosoph 
und Padagoge Theodor Litt in Leipzig (Leipzig, 1996), p. 17.
19 Lothar Gruchmann, Justiz im Dritten Reich 1933-1940: Anpassung und Unterwerfung in derAra Giirtner 
(Munich, 2001). The Reichsgericht hence lost eight of a total of 110 judges and lawyers through the law. 
They had to retire but in most cases at least, through some engineering of Bumke but mostly Goerdeler, were 
granted their full pensions. Gerhard Pauli, Die Rechtsprechung des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen zwischen 
1933-45 und ihre Fortwirkung in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofes (Berlin 1992), p. 14.
20 See Dr Baumbach, ‘Umkehr’ in Deutsche Juristen Zeitung, 1/1933, columns 67-70, here column 70 and 
Dr Kern, ‘Die Grenzen der richterlichen Unabhangigkeit’ in Ibid., 10/1933, columns 656-70, here column 
657.
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of the old legal system and rule of law by making concessions to the new regime.21 It soon, 
however, became clear that these concessions were destroying the very core of the rule of 
law as it traditionally existed. The German Jurists’ Congress in October 1933 not only 
marked the takeover of the hitherto independent Bund Deutscher Juristen into a National 
Socialist institution, it also set out the new understanding of law according to National 
Socialism. Hitler himself called for an end to the difference between law and morality 
(obviously corresponding to his view of morals) and the congress’s participants also agreed 
on the notion that ‘justice and law do not necessarily amount to the same thing’.22 In other 
words, the objective assessment under the terms of the law was giving way to a subjective 
(National Socialist) view of what constituted justice.
The first, very public taste, of what was to come was one of the most notorious 
criminal cases in the early years of National Socialist rule. Equally, it proved to be a final 
show of Rechtsstaatlichkeit on such a prominent level for the remainder of the ‘Thousand 
Year Reich’. The trial against the alleged perpetrators of the Reichstagsbrand was to be a 
show case for the regime, a stage where it could prove a communist conspiracy to 
overthrow law and order in Germany and thus legitimize the government’s illegal and 
brutal actions against these political opponents. Marinus van der Lubbe, a Dutch left-wing 
activist, the German communist Ernst Torgler and three of his Bulgarian comrades, Georgi 
Dimitroff, Wassil Tanew and Blagoi Popov were charged with starting the fire in the 
parliament building. The Reichsgericht was, as Germany’s highest court, chosen as a 
suitable setting for this showcase trial. This was a first test of the institution’s power to 
uphold law in the face of the expectations of the new rulers and preconceived judgements. 
The National Socialists demanded the death sentence for all of the defendants. Under
German law effective at the time this was impossible as arson did not carry the death
v
21 Ebermayer, Denn heute, pp. 23-4 and Kolbe, Reichsgerichtsprasident p. 214.
22 ‘Recht und Gesetz miissen nicht gleichbedeutend sein.’: ‘Deutscher Juristen Tag’, Report and Hitler’s 
speech verbatim in Deutsche Juristen Zeitung 20/1933 colums 1313-24, here column 1320.
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penalty. To facilitate the call for the death sentence and abide the wishes of the National 
Socialists a fundamental rule of justice (the first of many to come) was overridden: nulla 
poena sine lege (no punishment without a law). Subsequently named lex van der Lubbe, 
the arson attack of the Reichstagsbrand was declared punishable by death. However, in 
exchange for abandoning nulla poena sine lege, Bumke wrested the right from the National 
Socialists for the Reichsgericht to conduct the trial freely.23 The subsequent result upset the 
regime deeply.24 Van der Lubbe was sentenced to death; however, his four co-defendants 
were all acquitted by the Reichsgericht.
Scholars to this day are divided about the real course of events during the 
Reichstagsbrand; there is not even agreement on van der Lubbe’s role. Hence their 
interpretations of the sentence and conduct of the case vary widely. Whereas Engelmann 
alleges that the court acted in utter obedience to the government’s wishes (including the 
claim that the acquittals were sanctioned by the regime), others portray this trial, albeit 
with reservations, as upholding the rule of law. Erich Ebermayer, as close observer and 
jurist himself, reports the fury of the National Socialist government at this outcome and 
rates the acquittals as unexpected bravery on behalf of the court, euphorically exclaiming 
that ‘there is still justice in Germany.’25 Hitler even was said to have contemplated 
abolishing the Reichsgericht completely, but was dissuaded by Bumke. This is hardly a 
sign of a judgement in line with the regime’s wishes. The suspension of nulla poena sine 
lege is obviously an indicator of a serious infringement of the rule of law. However, it is 
clear that the outcome of the case did not deliver the proof of a communist conspiracy that 
was so eagerly sought by the National Socialists.
23 Kolbe, Reichsgerichtsprasident, p. 217.
24 ‘Die Nazi Presse schaumt vor W ut\ Ebermayer, Denn heute, p. 225.
25 Ibid.: Ebermayer was positively e(ated: ‘Unser wackeres Reichsgericht [halt] sich doch noch an die 
StrafprozeBordnung’, ‘ [...] der Mut und die Kraft zu einem Freispruch der vier Mitangeklagten [...], (both 
quotes p. 221) and ‘Die vier Kommunisten sind freigesprochen [...]. Es gibt also doch noch Recht in 
Deutschland!’, p. 226.
26 Bumke had to bring his full diplomatic skill to bear in stopping Hitler from this course of action. Ibid., p. 
221, p. 225 and p. 296.
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The official abolition of nulla poena sine lege did not happen overall until 28 June 
1935 when the ‘law for the change of the penal code’ (Gesetz zur Anderung des 
Strafgesetzbuches) came into force. From then on judges were allowed to sentence deeds 
that were, if not in themselves criminal, analogous to chargeable offences. Law was 
thereafter dependent on subjective analogies.27 The absolute certainty of the letter of the 
law, the basis for the rule of law, was lost.
Even though Bumke had avoided the closure of the institution in his charge, the 
Reichsgericht lost considerable leverage after the Reichstagsbrandprozess. The authority 
over any form of treason was taken away and given to the newly established Berlin 
Volksgerichtshof (People’s High Court) in April 1934. At once, the Reichsgericht was 
‘dethroned’ and lost all legal hold on political decisions. The Oberreichsanwalt (the 
highest public prosecutor) was rendered into a ‘dummy’; the Volks gerichtshof got its own
9ftOberreichsanwalt. The Volks gerichtshof had senates of five members of whom only the 
minority were regular judges-, the three lay judges were party activists sure to act 
according to National Socialist principles.29
It might have been this loss of power coupled with the threat of complete 
dissolution that from then onwards informed the sentencing decisions of the Reichsgericht. 
Far from trying to uphold the rule of law, the court now pre-empted rulings of the National 
Socialists. This was especially noticeable in the adjudications regarding family law.30 Even 
before the Nuremberg laws of 15 September 1935, the Reichsgericht ruled marriages
27 Gesetz zur Anderung von Reichsgesetzblatt 28 Juni 1935, RGB1.1 1935, p. 844.
28 ‘Was fur uns “alte“ Juristen ebenso komisch ist, wie wenn ein Kalb zwei Kopfe hatte.’ Ebermayer, Denn 
heute, p. 296.
29 Gesetz zur Anderung von Vorschriften des Strafrechts und Strafverfahrens 24 April 1934, RGB1.1 1934, p. 
345. v
30 Eva Schumann attributes to the Reichsgericht a ‘conscious and active role’ in creating the National 
Socialist family law. The civil law was always more open to interpretation and thus bending according to 
prevailing ideas. See Eva Schumann , ‘Die Reichsgerichtsrechtsprechung in Familiensachen von 1933 bis 
1945’ in Bernd-Riidiger Kern and Adrian Schmidt-Recla (eds.), 125 Jahre Reichsgericht (Berlin, 2006), pp. 
171-214.
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unlawful that did not comply with the racial ideas of the state. The ‘requirements of
today’s state’ were mentioned in the reasons for the judgements:
If there is the possibility that one marrying party is of
an alien, especially the Jewish race, then this is a
characteristic that according to the common view of 
life, especially from the National Socialist point of 
view, will very likely prevent the other party [...] from 
marrying this person.3
Bumke had ‘fallen prey’ to Hitler’s ‘fishing for souls’ and subsequently enlisted 
in the services of National Socialist propaganda and complied with the racial ideas of the
32state. Despite all this, he was still convinced that he was upholding as much as possible 
of the laws and morality in the penal justice system of the Germany before 1933. Thus he 
decided not to retire but extend his term in office twice after 1939.33 This saw him getting 
increasingly entwined with the system of injustice in the Third Reich. Under the cloak of 
wartime exigencies, the National Socialists accelerated their programme of annulment of 
the constitutional justice system. As early as 1934, the regime had proven that it simply 
could suspend the legal system and have Hitler declare himself ‘des deutschen Volkes 
oberster Gerichtsherr’ (the highest judge of all Germans) without any objection.34 By 1940, 
with the introduction of the Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde (invalidating appeaj) and the 
aufierordentlicher Einspruch (extraordinary appeal), the National Socialists obtained the
31 ‘...die Anforderungen des heutigen Staates’, Entscheidungen des Reichsgericht in Zivilsachen (RGZ) 146, 
241-44, 20 December 1934 and ‘Liegt bei einem EheschlieBenden die [...] Moglichkeit vor, daB er [...]einer 
fremden, insbesondere der jiidischen Rasse angehort, [so ist dies ein Verhaltnis], das nach allgemeiner 
Lebensauffassung, zumal vom Nationalsozialistischen Standpunkt aus, sehr wohl geeignet scheint, den 
anderen Teil [...] von der EheschlieBung abzuhalten.’ In RGZ. 148, 193-196, 22 August 1935.
32 Both Kolbe and Ebermayer describe the personal meeting of Bumke with Hitler in April 1933 as a turning 
point in the Reichsgericht president’s estimation of the Reich chancellor. It was, however, not until 1935 that 
he publicly acted as advocate for National Socialist ideology. See Ebermayer, Denn heute and Kolbe 
Reichsgerichtsprasident. Bumke was not alone in falling for Hitler’s charms. Other critics of National 
Socialism experienced the same effect. Goerdeler had spoken of his ‘gewinnende Liebenswiirdigkeit’ as did 
Arnold Brecht who described how ‘Hitler hat seinen Magnetismus wirken lassen’. See Goerdeler, 
‘Rechenschaftsbericht4, p. 1205 and Arnold Brecht, Mit der Kraft des Geistes, Lebenserinnerungen zweite 
Halfte (Stuttgart, 1967), p. 267.
33 In July 1939, Bumke turned sixty-five and had thus reached retirement age. At this point he would have 
had the opportunity to withdraw from active office without having to fear repercussions for disloyalty 
towards the state.
34 Government declaration by Hitler on the Rohmputsch (13 July 1934), radio transmission quoted in 
Ebermayer, Denn heute, p. 345.
166
tools fully to control the legal process.35 Any sentence deemed ‘not harsh enough’ was 
returned by the Oberreichsanwalt (who had been briefed accordingly) for ‘re-evaluation’ 
and re-trial with a predetermined outcome to the Reichsgericht. Next to this the police and 
SS carried out their own ‘justice’ by sending defendants who had been acquitted or ‘too 
mildly sentenced’ to concentration camps or simply shooting them upon their release.36 
Yet, the Reichsgericht tried and succeeded in turning down invalidating appeals aimed at a 
death sentence.37 This and other ‘misdemeanours’ of the courts prompted an outburst by 
Hitler in 1942 about judges who had not realized the demands of the times. These judges, 
he proclaimed, would be removed from their office should they not fall in with the 
demands of the age. In the same speech, Hitler finally declared himself Germany’s highest 
judge and thus above any law.38 With this proclamation the National Socialist contempt for 
the justice system had reached its climax, any freedom judges might have held in their 
decisions was eliminated. The scope of the Sondergerichte was broadened; the swift 
condemnation of criminals (perceived and actual) became the decisive element in 
sentencing.
The Reichsgericht’s penal senates still attempted to avert death sentences, yet by 
1944 their efforts had come to an end. Unlike most of Leipzig’s other institutions, the 
Reichsgericht was able to continue proceedings despite the heavy air raids of December 
1943 and 1944. After the attempt on Hitler’s life in July 1944, the ruthlessness of the 
National Socialist persecution intensified and the Reichsgericht lost even the semblance of
35 Arno Buschmann, Nationalsozialistische Weltanschauung und Gesetzgebung (Vienna, 1999), p. 217. The 
Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde is a judicial tool common in European jurisdiction, the extraordinary appeal, 
however, is particular to National Socialism. Both were designated for revision purposes, yet soon became 
tools of jurisdiction in their own right. The extraordinary appeal came to trial in front of the special senate 
(Sondersenat), which because of its sentencing practice became know as the ‘Senat des Fiihrers’. See Bernd 
Engelmann, Rechtsverfall, Justizterror und das schwere Erbe (Cologne, 1989), p. 165 and Pauli, Die 
Rechtsprechung des Reichsgerichts, p. 17.
36 Karl Kroeschell, Rechtsgeschichte Deutschlands im 20.Jahrhundert (Gottingen, 1992).
37 Kolbe, Reichsgerichtsprasident, p.407. Heiko Weidenthaler has produced a detailed study on the penal 
seriates of the court where he found a great variety in the way the invalidating appeal was dealt with in the 
individual senates. He concludes, however, that there had been ‘Lichtblicke’ in all penal senates of the 
Reichsgericht when appeals had been thrown out or the proposed death sentence avoided. ‘Die Strafsenate 
des Reichsgerichts’, p. 208.
38 Beschlufi des Grofideutschen Reichstages, 26 April 1942, RGB1.1 (1942), p. 247.
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independence. On 1 October 1944, the second penal senate of the Reichsgericht was 
abolished on the basis of having been ‘too lenient’ in its sentencing. The third penal senate 
(under Bumke’s leadership) was brought into line with the threat of deportation of its 
members to concentration camps.39
The arrival of the Americans in April 1945 ended the proceedings in the 
Reichsgericht. Anticipating his arrest by the American troops, the institution’s president 
Bumke committed suicide on 20 April, ironically on Hitler’s birthday.40 The Reichsgericht 
did not dissolve nor was it immediately abolished by the Allied forces; rather it existed in 
limbo, with a number of its judges still in office, yet without function. The Reichsgericht 
was included in the ‘temporary suspension of [...] courts’ proclaimed by Law Number 2 
issued by the military government’s Supreme Commander shortly after the Americans had 
occupied Leipzig41 The term ‘suspension’ prompted the judges and barristers at the 
Reichsgericht to present their institution to the Allied Forces and declare their willingness 
to ‘cooperate in [...] the new foundation of a deeper consciousness of what is right’. They 
were clearly anticipating a mere transitional closure.42 Through Mayor Vierling, Hermann 
Weinkauff and C.G. Ruland as representatives for the judges and barristers at the court 
respectively, passed a letter to the American authorities designed as visiting card and 
recommendation for their speedy reinstatement. The jurists demonstrated an astonishing 
level of self-confidence vis-a-vis the American occupation forces by claiming that a ‘self­
administered, independent Supreme Court for the entirety of the German territory was a 
necessity for the German people’, thereby both demanding no interference in their 
institution and declaring it and thereby themselves indispensable.43 They also used it to 
rewrite the history of the years 1933-45 and the part they had played in it. The letter
39 Meinecke, ‘Conflicting loyalties’, p. 214.
40 The Americans were on the outskirts o f Leipzig gaining ground from the 16 April onwards. By the 20 
April it was clear that Leipzig was occupied. Bumke, who had lost both his sons on the front, the youngest 
just in the last days of the war, took his life. It is accidental that he decided to do so on Hitler’s 56th birthday.
41 StadtAL, StVuR (I) No. 7943, Blatt 1-6.
42 Ibid., Blatt 7-9, here Blatt 8, 17 May 1945.
43 Ibid.
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included a short history of the institution stating that ‘it was understood [that] it was 
independent and impartial in its jurisdiction [until 1933]’. Furthermore, the representatives 
of the Reichsgericht spoke of a ‘secondary and revocable authority’ of the institution in the 
justice system of the Third Reich, emphasizing the pure revision court mandate and finally 
portraying the Reichsgericht and its members as innocent victims of the times. The entire 
piece is extraordinary in its complete lack of acknowledgement of any responsibility for 
their actions.44 At first, their audacity even seemed to pay off. On 22 May 1945, the 
Americans established a Commission for the concerns of the Reichsgericht, charging three 
members (the senate presidents Brandis and Frings, and the barrister Schneidewind) of the 
Reichsgericht with the task of ensuring the cataloguing and preservation of the property of 
the institution. The commission members regarded this as first step for the reconstruction 
not only of the building but also the institution 45 They were not to be disappointed. On 6 
June, the American control office for the Reichsgericht was established under Major 
Donald White.46 The control office and the commission worked closely together and 
expanded the commission’s remit; it amounted to ‘nearly all duties of the Reichsgericht, 
apart from the actual jurisdiction’ 47 Furthermore, there were assurances from the 
Americans that the re-opening of the Reichsgericht was to happen shortly.48 Even after the 
arrival of the Soviet forces, this belief endured. The commission continued its work, and 
was officially approved by General Trufanov on 6 August 1945. The General assured the 
commission that he was anticipating the re-opening, with the final decision lying in Berlin 
with Zhukov.49
This situation, however, changed rapidly just weeks later. The commission’s 
Brandis and Frings were arrested on 24 August 1945 together with senior members of the
44 Ibid., Blatt 8.
45 Ibid., Blatt 17.
46 Ibid., Blatt 35.
47 Ibid., Blatt 31.
48 Ibid., Blatt 35.
49 Ibid., Blatt 31.
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Reichsgericht (judges and lawyers) who had remained in Leipzig (about a third of all 
senior staff at the court).50 The arrests were rather arbitrary in nature. All senior staff were 
targeted, but those who were not encountered when the arrests were carried out, remained 
unharmed, even later on.51 There was also no distinction made between party members and 
those without political affiliations, criminal or civil senate members. None of the detainees 
were given a reason for their arrest nor told where they would be taken. They were 
transported via various stations to a former prisoner of war camp in Muhlberg/Elbe and 
kept there in appalling conditions. Any attempt at flight was circumvented by the threat of 
harm to their families. Weakened by illness and malnutrition the vast majority of their 
number perished there. Schaefer kept an account of who died. In 1946 alone, 19 former 
Reichsgericht members died, amongst them the Reichsgericht commission’s Brandis and 
Frings.52 The survivors where then transferred in 1948 to Buchenwald, the former National 
Socialist concentration camp turned political prison by the Soviets. Of over thirty-five 
judges only four lived to see their release in the 1950s. None of these detainees were ever 
charged, nor had their families been informed of their arrests, whereabouts and death. 
Indeed, Schaefer was told as early as 1946 that there was nothing held against him, but 
even so he was only released in 1950 as the first of the small number of remaining 
detainees. The last one had to wait until 1955.53
The Deutsche Justizverwaltung (German Justice Administration) in East Berlin 
proclaimed on 20 September 1945, answering a enquiry from the Reichsgericht 
commission, that the Reichsgericht had ceased to exist with the end of the Third Reich.54
50 Ibid.
51 One of the survivors, August Schaefer, decribed his experience in ‘Das groBe Sterben im Reichsgericht’ in 
Deutsche Richterzeitung, 35/1957, pp. 249-250.
52 Ibid., p. 249.
53 Ibid., p. 250. See also: GUR, ‘S ievwirkten wie Geister. Das Ende des Reichsgerichts’ in Die Welt, 26 
August 2002.
54 The German Justice Administration was one of the Central administrations that the SMAD created through 
order No. 17 of 27 July 1945. It had the main authority over all public prosecution departments, courts and 
judicial bodies. Tobias Schmid, Die Bedeutung der Deutschen Zentralverwaltung fur Justiz, fur die 
Entwicklung der Strafjustiz in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone in Deutschland 1945-1949 (Berlin, 2001).
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The Reichsgericht commission ‘was never intended’ as a precursor for a re-establishment 
of the institution, but it was merely a tool in retaining the material assets of the court.55 
This view was understandably not popular in Leipzig. The retired Reichsgericht judge Dr 
Otto Weipert urged the Lord Mayor to take a stand against this view of the ‘Berlin Justice 
Administration’.56 Yet, as if to emphasize the point of the Justizverwaltung, the 
Reichsgericht was officially closed on 8 October by the Leipzig police.57 The remaining 
employees, amongst them the Reichsgericht commission’s Schneidewind were ordered to 
leave and barred from the premises.58 Some confusion ensued about the origins of the 
closure order. The Reichsgericht employees were sure that it came from the Soviet secret 
police and informed Zeigner accordingly. Yet the Leipzig police stated that its orders came 
from the Saxon Landesverwaltung and Soviet military administration.59 The arrests of the 
senior Reichsgericht members may have informed the opinions of the institution’s 
remaining employees as to the source of the closure orders. Those arrests were not carried 
out by the regular occupation authorities but the Soviet secret service. The Soviet city 
command was not even informed about the whereabouts of the Reichsgericht members, let 
alone the reasons for their arrest. It did know, however, that any enquiries about the 
arrested were not wanted and indeed dangerous: Zeigner cited in his minutes of talks with 
the commander the following order: ‘Even if the arrested members of the Reichsgericht are 
harmless people or even democrats, one should not get involved let alone champion their
The German Justice Administration was also crucial in the centralisation of the justice system in the Soviet 
Zone that preceded and facilitated the GDR. See Ibid., especially p. 173.
55 Ibid., No. 7943, Blatt 38-40, Eugen Schiffer, 9 September 1945.
56 Ibid., Blatt 27-9, Weipert to Zeigner, 6 October 1945, here Blatt 29.
57 The police were now fully denazified and increasingly controlled by the KPD.
58 Ibid., Blatt 32, 8 October 1945.
59 Ibid., Blatt 50. There is a file on tl^ e closure of the Reichsgericht that contains details of the proceedings as 
well as a list of the Reichsgericht members who were arrested on 24 August 1945. Unfortunately, in 
accordance with the privacy policies of the Saxon Archives, the city archive in Leipzig declined to authorize 
a viewing of its contents. However, the content description speaks of the ‘SchlieBung des Reichsgericht im 
Auftrag der GPU’, thus the Reichsgericht employees might have been correct in their assumption as to who 
was the origin of the closure order. Ibid., No. 17506 [GESPERRT].
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case. The military administration does not know of the whereabouts either.’60 Thus even 
those who were known to be innocent were best forgotten. Therefore the question of who 
gave the order to close the Reichsgericht loses its importance. Through the physical 
destruction of most of its members, the institution had been annihilated regardless of any 
cosmetic work done by the rump Reichsgericht commission. What Hitler had threatened, 
the Soviet occupation forces had turned into reality -  inconvenient judges were deported. It 
is a bitter irony that they even ended up in the former concentration camp Buchenwald.61 
Unsurprisingly, the Reichsgericht was not re-instated.62 It appears that none of the other 
occupation powers showed much interest in the Reichsgericht, let alone its members. A 
Supreme Court was not envisaged in any of the Allied Control Council’s plans and thus it 
was left to the Soviets to deal with the issue as they pleased. As Zeigner stated in a belated 
reply to Weipert’s letter: ‘It is not dependent on the position of any German authority 
whether or not the Reichsgericht will be re-opened. It is solely at the discretion of the 
occupation powers [plural in the original].’ Thereby, he conveniently washed his hands 
of the problem. Even though Zeigner was aware that some of the arrested Reichsgericht 
members were innocent, he kept his silence and referred all responsibility to the occupation 
forces. Looking the other way had also been very popular during the Third Reich.
The Reichsgericht did not stand alone in shaping Leipzig’s legal landscape and 
jurisprudence. The fusion of practice and theory that had informed Leipzig’s rise to 
Germany’s centre of law had continued in the first half of the twentieth century. The
60 Ibid., No. 3211, Blatt 173. 9 February 1946: ‘Selbst wenn es sich bei den verhafteten Reichsgerichtraten 
um harmlose Menschen oder sogar Demokraten gehandelt hat, so soli man sich nicht damit befassen oder gar 
parteinehmen. Die Kommandantur ist auch nicht liber den Verbleib informiert.’
61 The parallels with the National Socialist regime did not even end there. In 1950, the Leipziger Volkszeitung 
was invited to a tour of the Buchenv^ald camp and presented with well-dressed, well-nourished prisoners.
The resemblance to the Nazi propaganda of parading similarly well-kept prisoners of Dachau concentration 
camp to the press is striking. Schaefer still recalls his amazement at seeing his ‘fellow prisoners” clothing 
and physical well-being. Schaefer, ‘Das groBe Sterben’, p. 250.
62 Ruth-Kristin Rossler, Justizpolitik in der SB7JDDR 1945-1956 (Frankfurt, 2000), p. 72.
63 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 7943, Blatt 30, 31 October 1945.
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Reichsgericht did not only administer law, its members largely also wore the hat of law 
professors at Leipzig University. The celebration for the opening of the Reichsgericht was 
held with great occasion in the university’s assembly hall, the festive setting underlining 
the close links between the two institutions.64
Whereas the Reichsgericht had continued its work after a fashion right until the 
occupation of the city by Allied forces, the university’s law department was closed when 
the university stopped all teaching in the summer of 1944. Large parts of the institution had 
been damaged in the 4 December 1943 attack, yet most departments were set to continue 
when two large bombing raids destroyed most of the remaining facilities in February 1944. 
The lack of teaching room was now compounded by the obliteration of the departmental 
libraries, eradicating the basis of teaching and learning.
The law department of Leipzig University with its strong links to the practical 
concerns of the Reichsgericht had also been one of the leading law faculties in Germany. 
The members who survived the racial purges in the 1930s were largely indifferent to the 
regime’s ideology and thus attempted to continue teaching jurisprudence according to their 
own, old standards. The alignment to the new state doctrine happened passively and 
reluctantly, albeit also without open opposition. Members of the department would 
concentrate on classic topics, whereas National Socialist concepts and principles of law 
were mainly taught by Privatdozenten -  untenured academics.65
Leipzig had the third largest and one of the most distinguished universities in 
Germany. It was one of the higher education institutions immediately re-opened after the 
outbreak of the Second World War and thus a magnet for students from all over Germany. 
The law school was a leading department in its field in the whole of Germany continuing
the long tradition of the study of law intrinsic to Leipzig. Distinguished theoreticians such
v
64 For a detailed analysis of Leipzig University as a whole, see the chapter below ‘Leipzig -  city of learning’.
65 Bernd-Riidiger Kern, ‘Die Geschichte der Leipziger Juristenfakultat’ in Sachsisches Staatsministerium der 
Justiz, Leipzig Stadt der Rechtsprechung: Prozesse, Personen, Gebaude (Dresden, 1994), pp. 53-85.
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as the Roman law historian Wieacker, the civil and penal law specialists Weber and 
Gallass and the renowned constitutional law historian Huber all taught in Leipzig’s law 
school during the 1930s and 1940s, as well as former and present practitioners from the 
Reichsgericht.66 Within the state of Saxony, Leipzig was indisputably the best university. 
This might have been the reason why Gauleiter Martin Mutschmann, otherwise notorious 
for his anti-intellectualism, started to show a keen interest in the proceedings of the 
university and the law department in particular. For the summer semester of 1941, three 
positions of Ordinarius (a full professorship) became vacant as Leipzig law lecturers 
followed calls to other German universities. The formal procedure of sending a list with 
proposed candidates to the Reich Ministry of Education for approval became a political 
issue. Leipzig University submitted the list in the early autumn of 1940 to the Gau 
administration of Saxony in Dresden, which after a formal preliminary check should have 
forwarded the list to the Reich ministry in Berlin. Despite the clear urgency of the 
situation (only a few months were left until the beginning of the semester), the list never 
reached Berlin. Dresden had taken offence at the proposed appointment of a lecturer from 
Gottingen University, Professor Smed, a renowned jurist and an ideal candidate for the 
vacant position in Leipzig. Upon enquiring about the reasons, the dean of Leipzig’s law 
department was told that Professor Smed was Jewish and therefore could not take up a post 
in Leipzig. Since Jewish life by that time had all but ceased to exist in Germany, the notion 
that a Jewish professor should still have been able to teach in Gottingen seemed wholly 
fantastical.67 Indeed, the only ‘Jewish connection’ of Professor Smed was his wife who 
‘had some Jewish blood’, a fact that was well known in Gottingen and Leipzig and should 
have presented no obstacle to his appointment. Rather, in the law school’s estimation, the
real reason was that Professor Smed had neglected to become a party member. In 1935, he
v
66 Ibid.: List of professors, p. 74.
67 The first wave of mass dismissals of Jews in 1933 was followed by two more in 1935 and 1938 by which 
time all public institutions would have been fully ‘aryanised’.
68 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 4550, Blatt 128.
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had been demoted from a post in Berlin to Gottingen and his call to Leipzig was seen as 
‘attempt of rectification’, which, of course, was not in order.69 After yielding to Dresden’s 
demand to refrain from appointing Smed, Leipzig still was kept waiting. A senior civil 
servant, Regierungsdirektor Lohde, disclosed to the university’s Rektor (Vice-Chancellor) 
Professor Breve that Mutschmann had prohibited the entire list from being passed on to 
Berlin as ‘he wished not to have any more Rechtsverdreher in his Gau’.10 At this point, the 
summer semester was nearly over and the positions were still vacant. Mutschmann’s office 
informed the Reich Ministry for Education that the Gauleiter did not wish to see any 
further appointments of jurists being made in his Gau. Berlin then tried to circumvent 
Mutschmann by incorporating the law school into a combined law, politics and business 
department. The teaching of law, ‘so hated by the Reichsstatthalter’ would fade into the 
background.71 This time Leipzig objected and the dean of the law school tended his 
resignation, which was rejected. By now, the whole situation had become farcical. Another 
initiative by Berlin, to send lecturers from the university in Berlin to provide temporary 
teaching cover was met by Mutschmann’s announcement that any professor coming to 
Leipzig with the intention of teaching law would be arrested as soon as he got off the 
train.72 Yet, the perseverance of Leipzig’s university and the personal contact of Professor 
Breve with the Reich Ministry for Education ensured that the law school could not be 
dissolved completely. It cannot be gleaned from the sources why Mutschmann finally had 
a change of heart. In February 1942 (a year after the professors were required), he 
suddenly ordered Leipzig’s university Rektor to Dresden. In the ensuing discussions, 
Mutschmann declared that he had nothing against filling the vacant positions; his only 
requirement was that the candidates had to be excellent jurists worthy of a great university
69 Ibid., Blatt 129.
70 Rechtsverdreher is a very derogative term for lawyer implying that law is turned into its opposite by the 
efforts of this person, ‘...der Gauleiter wiinsche keine Rechtsverdreher mehr in seinem Gau.’ Ibid., Blatt 130
71 Ibid., Blatt 134: This so-called ‘golden bridge’ plan was neither favoured by the university nor 
Mutschmann.
72 Ibid., Blatt 132.
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• • 73such as Leipzig. However, Mutschmann’s sudden support does not appear to have been 
genuine. In July 1943, he attempted again to sabotage the law department. He tried to get 
three members of the law department called up for military service. The law department at 
that time only consisted of six remaining members, a loss of three would have ‘paralysed’ 
the whole department.74
In the night of 4 December 1943, the law school lost all its buildings and large 
parts of its library, yet it showed enormous will to continue teaching. Even after the second 
massive air raid of 20 February 1944, the dean of the law department reported back to the 
university’s Rektor that teaching could resume as long as rooms were found in which to 
teach.75 Yet by the summer of 1944, the university concluded that the destruction was too 
heavy to continue teaching any subject.
The Third Reich marked a period of rapid decline for jurisprudence in Leipzig. 
The initial reluctance and objection to the new regime soon gave way to accommodation 
or, notoriously in the case of Reichsgerichtsprasident Bumke, enthusiasm for National 
Socialist ideas. Whatever the private motivations of the Court’s members may have been, 
the effect of the conduct was unmistakable. The Reichsgericht presided over the steady 
erosion of the rule of law. Gauleiter Mutschmann shared the common National Socialist 
disregard for and aversion to the justice system and even attempted to ‘rid his Gau’ of its 
renowned law department. In many respects, Mutschmann even surpassed many of his 
fellow party members in his contempt for jurisprudence and academia, traditionally 
associated with the social elites. As a factory owner, albeit not a successful one, 
Mutschmann had been a member of the upper middle class. However, he held the customs 
and values of this social stratum in contempt. His dislike of learning and high culture
73 Ibid., Blatt 135. V
74 One of the men on the list was completely ineligible for military service due to his physical condition.
Ibid., Blatt 137.
75 Universitatsarchiv Leipzig (UAL), Bestand Rektorat, Rep I/III 128: ‘Auffechterhaltung des Unterrichts und 
Institutsbetriebs wahrend des Krieges’, Blatt 4, letter from the law school to the Rektor, 3 March 1944.
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stemmed from his own insecurity and obvious ignorance. His attack on Leipzig’s law 
school thus represents a mixture of common Nazi traits and personal flourishes.76
On 20 September 1945, the Allied Control Council issued Law number 1, which 
declared all National Socialist laws and all laws aimed at racial discrimination invalid.77 
The restructuring of the German justice system did not, however, stop there. Individual 
orders followed in the respective zones of occupation. The SMAD order number 49 
stipulated that no members of the NSDAP would be allowed to work as judges or 
prosecutors, regardless of their status as active or nominal members.78 This tightened yet 
again the measures taken under the order of the Landesverwaltung in Saxony of 17 August 
1945 -  even if jurists were deemed ‘irreplaceable’, they were now removed from their 
posts. A considerable shortage of jurists followed that continued into the following years. 
Following the Landesverwaltung order, only 240 of 1000 judges and state attorneys in 
Saxony remained in their posts, 30 per cent of whom were still former members of the 
NSDAP. The SMAD order then led to a ‘catastrophic’ shortage of jurists that was still 
unresolved by late 1947. Hundreds of judges and prosecutors were needed to ensure ‘even 
the most basic judicial operation’.79 This situation was to be counteracted by the 
introduction of ad hoc laymen courts on village and town level.80 Yet, the scarcity of 
juristic professionals also prompted the temporary appointment of old NSDAP members 
who had undergone their denazification process. The SMAD meanwhile was focused on
76 Martin Mutschmann (1879 -  1947) distinguished himself as particularly brutal and ruthless Anti-Semite. 
He was one of the ‘old fighters’ and had been made Gauleiter of Saxony as early as the mid-1920s. He had a 
strong disregard for ‘high-culture’ and saw it as an ‘alien’ element in his preferred Volkskultur (culture of the 
people). Similarly, his ‘vulgarity’ was a strong deterrent for the traditional elites, especially in the academic 
sphere. See Schreibner, Elite im Verborgenen, p. 41, and Szejnmann, Nazism in Central Germany, p. 207.
77 The Allied powers were, of course, perfectly content to permit discrimination on the grounds of gender or 
sexual orientation, which they therrpelves all practised. European Navigator, Law Number 1 from the Allied 
Control Council, http://www.ena.lu (accessed 22 May 2009).
78 SMAD order o f 4 September 1949, see Ministerium fiir Auswartige Angelegenheiten der DDR, Um ein 
antifaschistisch-demokratisches Deutschland: Dokumente aus den Jahren 1945-49 (Berlin, 1968), pp. 142-3.
79 See Julia Pfannkuch, Volksrichterausbildung in Sachsen 1945-1950 (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), p. 5.
80 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 7953, Blatt 3.
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the creation of a new body of jurists. Soon they devised a project to create ‘ Volksrichter’ 
(people’s judges). These were to be the new generation of law practitioners, on the one 
hand to ease the shortage of jurists and on the other to ‘resolve the alienation of Volk and 
justice [...] and to break the burgerlich privilege of education’.81 This sounded remarkably 
similar to National Socialist diction. On orders of the SMAD, the Deutsche 
Justizverwaltung in East Berlin devised courses according to Soviet example.82 In Saxony, 
an appeal in newspapers and other publications called for young anti-fascists who would 
be interested in a position as Volksrichter. The only educational requirement was to have 
graduated from the Volksschule (ten years of school education).83 Saxony was the first of 
the Soviet occupied Lander to start the courses; the old centre of German jurisdiction was 
to lead the way for the new justice system.84 On 1 February 1946, the first course began, 
four days before the university in Leipzig was allowed to re-open. In the beginning these 
courses were to last only six months from enrolling to passing the judge’s exam. This term, 
however, proved too short and was subsequently lengthened to twelve months’ tuition.85 
The Volksrichter courses were the clearest expression of the desire in the Soviet Zone to 
create a completely new system of justice and jurisdiction, beyond the collective decisions 
of the four occupying powers. The thereby created split foreshadowed the German 
division.86 The Allied Control Council had issued a proclamation and order in October
81 Schmid, Die Bedeutung der Deutschen Zentralverwaltung, p. 210 and p. 225 respectively.
82 Heike Amos, Justizverwaltung in der SBZJDDR, Arbeiten zur Geschichte des Rechts in der DDR, Volume 
1 (Cologne, 1996).
83 Aufruf in Tagliche Rundschau, 2 November 1945.
84 The declared aim of the re-structuring of the justice system in the Soviet Zone was ‘nicht lediglich den 
Rechtsstaat wiederher[zu]stellen, den die Nationalsozialistische Schreckensherrschaft so grausam zerstort 
hat, sondern einen neuen, und zwar demokratischen, Rechtsstaat [zu] schaffen’. The idea of democracy was 
that of a ‘hoherer Typus der Demokratie’ as opposed to the ‘formale biirgerliche Demokratie’. The old 
Rechtsstaat was equated to that lesser burgerlich democracy. See ‘Einleitung’ in Neue Justiz 1/ 1 January 
1947 and Schmid, Die Bedeutung der Deutschen Zentralverwaltung, p. 27. The Neue Justiz was to become 
the central jurists’ journal in the Soviet Zone and later the GDR.
85 Helmut Anders, Die Demokratisierung der Justiz beimAufbau der antifaschistischen demokratischen 
Ordnung aufdem Gebiet der DDR 1945-49, Karl-Marx-Universitat Diss. (Leipzig, 1972).
86 This creation of a new justice system happened ‘nach sowjetischem Vorbild’. It was ‘von der Sowjetunion 
ubernommen bzw. aufoktroyiert’. See Wentker, ‘Justiz in der SBZ/DDR’, p. 198; and Friedrich Christian 
Schroeder, ‘Die Ubernahme der Sowjetischen Rechtsauffassung in ihrer Stalinistischen Auspragung in der
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1945 that stipulated that the status of law before 1933 had to be re-established (yet the 
Volksrichter were no part of German pre-1933 German jurisdiction). This proclamation 
included the denazification measures in the justice system with the special provision that 
only those Germans who agreed with the fundamentals of democracy were allowed to
* 87 •become judges. This would have allowed for jurists who had not been party members to 
continue their work or return to their profession respectively. In the Soviet Zone, however, 
existing judges and state prosecutors were replaced as swiftly as possible by graduates 
from the Volksrichter courses.88 By 1947, Volksrichter course graduates were granted the 
same status as academically educated judges.89 Even though the Volksrichter courses 
sprang from the genuine need for prosecutors and judges, the actual juristic education soon 
became secondary to the ideological schooling of the attendees.90
The work of the other source of law education, the law faculties, was generally 
restricted by the authorities in the Soviet Zone. Lecturers were under the general suspicion 
of teaching burgerlich law, thus negatively influencing their students and undermining the 
authorities.91 The burgerlich jurisdiction before 1933 had proven partiality against the 
German left-wing. Thus, it was perhaps understandable that the Soviets and their East 
German proteges would seek to alter the ethos of the legal profession. Yet, this new 
foundation was to be laid with lectures in Russian law. Various subjects (both in penal and
SBZ/DDR’ in Der Deutsche Bundestag, Materialien der Enquete Kommission ‘Aufarbeitung von Geschichte 
und Folgen der SED-Diktatur’ (Baden Baden, 2001), pp. 11-18.
87 See Allied Control Council Proclamation No. 3 (20 October 1945) and Order No. 4 (30 October 1945), in 
Karl-Heinz Schoneburg, Geschichte des Staates und des Rechts der DDR 1949-61, (Berlin, 1984), pp.224-6.
88 In the Soviet Zone, denazification procedures did not mean rehabilitation, at least not for jurists. Anyone 
who had been even a nominal member could not return permanently to the profession. ‘Der Unterschied zur 
Entnazifizierung in den westlichen Besatzungszonen lag fur den Bereich der Justiz [...] in der konsequenten 
Verweigerung jeglicher Rehabilitationsmoglichkeiten.’ Schmid, Die Bedeutung der Deutschen 
Zentralverwaltung, p. 208.
89 SMAD order 193 of 6 August 19^7 in Schoneburg, Geschichte des Staates und des Rechts, p. 230.
90 A constantly increasing ideologization of the Volksrichter courses can be seen both in the number of 
lessons in political education as well as the dismissal of juristic teachers who refused to toe the party line of 
the SED. See Pfannkuch, Volksrichterausbildung in Sachsen, p. 140.
91 Nikitin, Zwischen Dogma und gesundem Menschenverstand. Burgerlich justice was deemed ‘reaktionar 
und volksfeindlich’, see inter al.: Schmid, Die Bedeutung der Deutschen Zentralverwaltung, p. 225.
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civil law) became obligatory. Given the record of the Soviet legal system under Stalin the 
whole exercise might be described as a glaring example of ‘mote and beam’.92 
Nevertheless, much effort went into the planning of these new courses. In Leipzig the 
admission of these new subjects into the lecturing schedule happened half a year before the
93university opened. The law school in Leipzig only operated on a provisional basis 
throughout the years after the end of the war as constant staffing shortages and political 
interference interrupted the teaching. This lack of teaching staff, mainly caused by the 
systematic ousting of the old elites of professional jurists (all burgerlich in origin), was 
unfortunate for the students, yet followed the SED’s idea of a complete re-organisation of 
the justice system. This casting out of the ‘old elite’ was distinctly reminiscent of policies 
in the Third Reich.94 Furthermore, compounding the lack of teaching staff, was the acute 
shortage of teaching materials. The law faculty’s library had been lost to Allied bombs. 
Thus Zeigner, an alumnus of Leipzig’s law school concerned with its interests, contacted 
the Reichsgericht commission in August 1945 in an attempt to grant future students of the 
faculty access to this vast resource. The commission was more than accommodating, but 
then in May 1946, the Soviet administration suddenly ordered the city to provide boxes for 
the transport of the entire Reichsgericht library to the Soviet Union 95 Zeigner was alarmed 
by this development and did his utmost to prevent this mindless measure. Eventually, after 
delaying the manufacture of boxes and refusing to pay for the costs of the transport, he
92 Schroeder rightly identifies that the legal concepts that had to be followed in these new course were ‘im 
bedriickendsten Stadium, dem Stalinismus’. Schroeder, ‘Die Umwandlung der Rechtsauffassung’, p. 12.
93 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 4537, Blatt 192, 13 September 1945.
94 Ibid., No. 17648, Blatt 133. ‘Bis Ende 1949 waren alle Professoren der alten Elite, die nicht der NSDAP 
angehort hatten, im Zuge eines an pjolitische Kriterien gesteuerten Personalaustausches von der Leipziger 
Juristenfakultat verdrangt.’ See: Siegfried Hoyer, ‘Der Leipziger Oberbiirgermeister und die 
Wiedereroffnung der Universitat Leipzig in 1946’ in Rudloff, Erich Zeigner, pp. 176-87, here p. 187. 
According to Wentker, this removal of the old elites was key in the ‘Instrumentalisierung der Justiz’. 
Wentker, ‘Justiz in der SBZ/DDR’, p. 194.
95 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 7943, Blatt 53, 26 May 1945.
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succeeded in keeping the library in Leipzig.96 By this time, however, the access to books 
was not the greatest worry for future jurists.
The prospects of studying for a law degree worsened for the students consistently 
during the late 1940s. Academically taught jurists, despite having undergone a long 
education and obligatory internships, were less likely to gain an appointment from the 
German Justice Administration than Volksrichter who attended a year of basic legal 
education and ideological tuition.97 Hilde Benjamin, a crucial member of the German 
Justice Administration stated: ‘If the universities are unable to teach progressively 
according to the needs of the new time [i.e. education according to the ideological 
requirements], we will not recognize the graduates of these universities as an essential 
factor in the creation of a new system of justice.’98 This was in line with the ideas of the 
deputy president of the Justizverwaltung, Ernst Melsheimer, who proclaimed in Neue 
Justiz'. ‘Those who want to continue being ‘apolitical’, cannot be part of the new justice 
system.’99 The beginnings of the ‘war against burgerlich objectivism’, which will be 
discussed in more detail in the chapter below, are clearly visible in this. The new 
understanding of justice was one where ‘every judgement was also a political deed.’100 
Until the complete ideologization of the universities, their graduates would naturally fall
96 For the details of his struggle see Ibid., Blatt 54-75, the confirmation that the library was to remain in 
Leipzig came on 19 December 1946, Ibid., Blatt 76.
97 Helmut Anders, Die Demokratisierung.
98 Hilde Benjamin (1947) quoted in Anders, Die Demokratisierung; Hilde Benjamin (1902-89) was a leading 
protagonist in the development of the justice system in the Soviet Zone but especially later in the GDR. She 
began in the personnel department of the German Justice Administration and was masterminding the 
dismissal and imprisonment of non-communist jurists. Later, as vice president of the Supreme Court of the 
GDR she was responsible for many show trials against opponents of the regime. In 1953 she became justice 
minister in the GDR and entered the Central Committee of the SED a year later. Interestingly, she was the 
sister-in-law of Walter Benjamin, the philosopher whose works became highly influential in West Germany’s 
1968 movement. See: Deutsches Historisches Museum, Biographien: Hilde Benjamin, http://www.dhm.de 
(accessed 22 May 2009).
99 ‘Wer fiirderhin unpolitisch sein v i^ll, kann nicht Glied der neuen Justiz sein.’ Ernst Melsheimer ‘Aufgaben’ 
in Neue Justiz, 2/1 February 1947, pp. 25-7, here p. 26.
100‘Wie auch in den anderen Landern [muB erkannt werden], daB jeder Richterspruch auch eine politische Tat 
ist.’ See ‘EntschlieBung der Juristenkonferenz des Landes Thurigen zur weiteren Demokratisierung des 
Justizwesens’ in Ministerium fur Auswartige Angelegenheiten der DDR, Um ein antifaschistisch- 
demokratisches Deutschland, p. 678.
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behind these targets. Having just emerged from twelve years of political justice, law in the 
Soviet Zone turned again into a servant of political ideology.
Leipzig’s law school had lost, like the other four law faculties of the Soviet Zone, 
its importance in qualifying the law practitioners of the post-National Socialist area. When 
the thought was briefly entertained of centralising all academic law tuition in Berlin 
Leipzig was not even considered as an alternative location.101 Law faculties did not regain 
the monopoly in educating the practitioners of law until several years after the 
establishment of the GDR. Only in 1954 did the universities retrieve authority in law 
tuition, by which time Leipzig’s law faculty was a part of the highly politicised Karl-Marx- 
Universitat in Leipzig.102
Leipzig had been the German centre of law. Not only had the city been the seat of 
Germany’s Supreme Court, but it had facilitated the development of German law both in 
theory and practice ever since its foundation. The Leipzig law faculty had been 
internationally renowned and was leading in Germany. Yet the combined efforts of the 
National Socialists and then the socialist authorities (both Soviet and German) had 
eradicated the Reichsgericht and reduced the law faculty to a mere shadow of itself.
The denazification measures in the justice system were much harsher in the Soviet 
Zone than in any of the Western Zones where most jurists were taken over by the new 
courts, despite the Control Council orders. Thus many of the Reichsgericht members who 
had fled to the Western Zones before the changeover of occupation powers succeeded in 
continuing their careers.103 The most prominent example has to be Hermann Weinkauff. In 
1950, he became the first president of the Bundesgerichtshof, West Germany’s New
101 Nikitin, Zwischen Dogma und gesundem Menschenverstand, p. 49.
102 Engelmann, Rechtsverfall, p. 2 l \ .
103 The initial suspensions were gradually revoked, as the desire to establish a working justice system 
outweighed that for a thorough denazification. At first a piggy-back system was employed where a politically 
implicated jurist was only employed when partnered with a politically ‘trustworthy’ person who then had to 
vouch for his ‘partner’. Pauli, Die Rechtsprechung des Reichsgericht, p. 26.
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Supreme Court in Karlsruhe.104 Weinkauff had been a judge at the Reichsgericht from 
1935 onwards and was able to return to his profession as president of the Landgericht 
Bamberg in April 1946.105 The continuation of careers by the existing legal elite went 
largely unchallenged in West Germany after 1945.106 Gerhard Pauli asserts that the 
restoration of the justice system in the Western Zone occurred with the ‘old workforce’.107 
The tradition of the Reichsgericht thus was continued in the new Supreme Court in 
Western Germany, ‘the continuities between the Reichsgericht and the Bundesgerichtshof 
clearly prevailed.’108 These links were not just inherent. The protagonists were well aware 
of these circumstances. On their fiftieth anniversary, the club of the lawyers at the 
Bundesgerichtshof noted the great tradition of their association that included some 
founding members who had already been lawyers at Germany’s first Supreme Court ‘and 
tied [their new positions] in with their experience at the Reichsgericht, both in form and 
matter.’109 Form and matter of Leipzig’s importance in German jurisprudence (and the 
understanding of justice in the Soviet Zone/GDR) on the other hand altered utterly. With 
the Reichsgericht the city had lost its leverage in German jurisdiction and its prestige as 
centre of German law. The general de-professionalization of the justice system in the 
Soviet Zone and later the GDR, both caused by the ousting of the traditional elite and their 
substitution by Volksrichter, cemented the downfall of this erstwhile first city of law.
104 For a comprehensive list o f those working in both the Third Reich and West Germany see Engelmann, 
Rechtsverfall, p. 166ff.
105 Bamberg was a small town in the American Zone of occupation. Daniel Herbe, Hermann Weinkauff, Der 
erste Prasident des Bundesgerichtshofes (Tubingen, 2008). Weinkauff himself sought to marginalise the 
involvement of Germany’s jurists in the Nazi regime. In his book Die deutsche Justiz und der 
Nationalsozialismus (Stuttgart, 1968), he argues that German jurists were bound to follow the laws and 
thereby were not active protagonists but rather ‘defenceless’ against the letter of the law which they had to 
follow.
106 West Germany’s uncomfortable relationship with remnants of the National Socialist legal apparatus also 
includes the case of Wolfgang Frankel, an assistant at the Reichsgericht, who after the war became first 
Bundesanwalt and then Attorney General in 1962. Only now a closer was look taken at his pre-1945 career 
and it was decided that he should retire. See inter al: Engelmann, Rechtsverfall, p. 169.
107 Pauli, Die Rechtsprechung des Reichsgericht, p. 27.
108 Ibid., p. 244.
109 ‘[...]und kniipften in der Sache und in der Form an ihre Erfahrungen beim Reichsgericht an’, Verein der 
beim Bundesgerichtshof zugelassenen Anwalte, Fortitudo Temperantia -  Die Rechtsanwalte beim 
Reichsgericht und Bundesgerichtshof, Festschrift (Munich, 2000), p. 40.
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5 Leipzig -  City of Learning
Leipzig has one of Germany’s oldest universities. By the beginning of the 
twentieth century, it had grown to be the country’s third largest institution for higher 
education with internationally renowned academics researching and teaching in Leipzig, 
furthering the kudos of the institution. The takeover of power by the National Socialists 
constituted an incision into the university’s tradition of world-class research. Due to the 
politically motivated dismissals following the Berufsbeamtentumsgesetz, the university lost 
forty-four of its academics, amongst them the subsequent Nobel prize winner Felix Bloch 
and renowned academics such as the psychologist Felix Krueger and the educationalist 
Theodor Litt.1 Yet, the university managed to remain one of Germany’s best, and was 
among the select group of institutions allowed to stay open in wartime.2 It has been argued 
that it was one of Germany’s least politicised institutions, employing academics on their 
scientific merit rather than their party political achievements, but the university could not 
of course escape the increasing limitations of life in the Third Reich.3 The example of the 
Nobel prize winner Werner Heisenberg exemplified this. Called to Leipzig University in 
1927, Heisenberg was substantial in forging Leipzig’s international reputation in the field 
of physics. His department and his science suffered through the racial policies (purges of 
colleagues) of the National Socialist regime and the increasing international isolation. 
Furthermore, by 1942, Heisenberg’s research into nuclear physics became so important for 
the regime that he was moved to Berlin where he was given a professorship at Berlin’s
1 Ronald Lambrecht, Politische Entlassungen in der NS-Zeit: Biographische Skizzen von Hochschullehrem 
der Universitat Leipzig (Leipzig, 2006).
2 Leipzig was amongst the nine universities that were to open again immediately after the outbreak of war.
The Reich Ministry for Education had ordered the closure of all higher education institutions, but withdrew 
this order for Leipzig, Vienna, Berlin, Munich, Jena and four others just four days later. Other universities 
were not so quick to follow. See Uwe Dietrich Adam and Wilfried Setzler, Hochschule im 
Nationalsozialismus, Die Universitat Tubingen im Dritten Reich (Tubingen , 1977), p. 188.
3 Both Grondin and Eller elaborate on this point. Indeed Hans-Georg Gadamer was an example of this 
appointment practice, gaining a post despite other candidates having more substantial Nazi credentials. See 
Jean Grondin, Hans-Georg Gadamer: Eine Biographie (Tubingen, 2000) and Rudolf Eller, 
‘Musikwissenschaft im NS Staat’ in Schinkoth, Musikstadt Leipzig im NS Staat, pp. 261-271.
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university and became the head of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics. In Berlin he 
worked on the uranium project of the Heereswaffenamt (the German army’s ammunition 
development agency). Thereby Leipzig University lost even more academic importance, 
both through the international isolation and through the hiring away of its most prominent 
scientists by the regime itself.4
Nevertheless, Leipzig’s university continued ‘normal’ business until 4 December 
1943 when the firestorm hit most of the university’s buildings and destroyed two thirds of 
them.5 As it was not anticipated that Leipzig would be a main target, the libraries and 
research facilities had not taken any precautions and suffered tremendous losses. The 
devastation was such that the Sicherheitsdienst recommended the closure of the university 
and the allocation of the professors to other institutions.6
The university was barely functioning when the Americans occupied Leipzig. All 
teaching activities in the university had ceased in summer 1944, yet some professors 
undertook make-shift lectures and seminars in their private flats using their own libraries. 
Until April 1945 conferrals of doctorates were signed by the Lord Mayor as contact with 
the Land administration in Dresden had obviously ceased after Saxony’s capital was 
obliterated in February 1945.7 Even after the arrival of US forces, the authority of the 
Rektor (Vice-Chancellor of the university) over the academics was unbroken. When the 
Americans scheduled an official funeral for 300 foreign workers who had been murdered 
in the final hours of Nazi rule, the Rektor advised his professors to attend as he deemed it 
‘urgently necessary that a high number of representatives of Leipzig’s population’ should 
be present at such a ceremony.8 The university and its academics still sought to act as the
4 Cassidy, Uncertainty.
5 Borusiak and Hohnel, Chronik.
6 Universitatsarchiv, UAL, Bestand^ Rektorat, Rep I/III 128, Blatt 1, SD Report 12 January 1944.
7 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 4537, Blatt 35.
8 UAL, Bestand Rektorat, R 379, Band 1, Blatt 1. The foreign workers had been working in the Abtnaundorf 
labour camp, a satellite of Buchenwald concentration camp on Leipzig’s fringes. They were killed when it 
became clear that Leipzig would be occupied. The funeral took place on 26 April.
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‘face of the city’.9 After the invasion of the Americans, the institution harboured hopes that 
‘normal’ proceedings would soon resume. These were fuelled after an election of a post­
war Rektor was permitted by the American military authorities on 16 May 1945.10 By early 
June, plans were made not only to demand the old autonomy universities in Germany had 
enjoyed before the National Socialists, but also a strategy to cooperate with universities all 
over Germany and reignite academic exchange.11 These initial positive signs of a return for 
Leipzig to its pre-war and pre-Third Reich strength were negated on 22 June 1945. ‘Project 
Paperclip’ had reached Leipzig University. Leading members of the university’s science 
departments (amongst them the deans of the medical school and the physics, chemistry and 
physiology departments) were advised by the American troops to prepare for evacuation 
the following morning. They were instructed to arrive with their scientific assistants, their 
families and minimal luggage. Despite being worded as a request and claiming to be in the 
best interest of the scientists, it was clear that this was an order. The thinly veiled threat 
‘We will know to find you’ cleared questions about a possible non-compliance. Those who 
objected, like Professor Wolf, were simply arrested.12 The university’s administration and 
the Rektor were not informed by the Americans and only learnt from their staff about the 
transport. Apart from threatening forcibly to remove university members from their homes, 
the request also stated that a transition of occupation power to the Soviet forces was 
imminent (the 24 June was quoted as date of the handover). The urgency of the measure 
was further underlined by the allegation that it was taken to prevent the imminent 
imprisonment of the scientists by the Russian troops. This explains why some university
9 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 2126, Blatt 62.
10 Wolfgang Wilmans, an agriculturalist, was followed by Bernhardt Schweitzer, an archaeologist.
11 UAL, Bestand Rektorat, R21 Band 1-R47, Blatt 47.
12 It was called a ‘voluntary measure’; however, anyone who was not compliant would be found and taken by 
force ( ‘wir werden Sie zu finden wissen’). See for example StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 2126, Blatt 93; See 
Henke, Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands p. 762. Professor Wolf, however, managed to return to 
Leipzig on his own accord. Schweitzer even speaks of ‘at his own peril’, which suggests flight. See 
Schweitzer’s report in Helga A. Welsh, ‘Entnazifizierung und Wiedereroffnung der Universitat Leipzig 
1945-1946 -  Ein Bericht des damaligen Rektors Professor Bernhardt Schweitzer’ in Vierteljahreshefte fiir 
Zeitgeschichte, 2/1985, pp. 339-72, here p. 365.
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staff not included on the Americans’ list asked to be taken as well. Yet there were also
cases of academics refusing to comply and going into hiding. One professor of medicine,
despite insisting on having done no war-relevant research, was told in no uncertain terms
that he had to follow the order. Even his wife went to protest at the CIC office, but to no
avail. Under the threat of violence they finally bowed to the pressure and agreed to the
‘evacuation’. This caused them to lose most of their possessions as they could only take the
barest minimum.13 In another case, a family was taken from their home despite the person
on the list not being accounted for and it was only decided at the departure point that it
would be ‘more humane’ to leave them in Leipzig.14 Some academics, such as the
renowned physicists Friedrich Hund (who had worked with Heisenberg before his
departure to Berlin) and Walter von Brunn, eluded the forced ‘evacuations’ by going into
hiding. Professor Robert Dopel, a nuclear scientist and former colleague of Heisenberg’s
evaded arrest by hiding at a friend’s house. The sources allow an insight into Dopel’s
motives as he himself reported at length about his decision process. Dopel stated that on a
purely personal level, a move to the American sphere of interest was desirable. His wife
had died in the war and his personal belongings as well as his scientific equipment were
largely destroyed in the air raids; furthermore, most of his friends and colleagues were to
be found in the Western Zones. His decision to stay was based on political considerations:
Europe has to be united. America possesses the means 
to achieve this, however, Russia is the only state truly 
called to attain a real order in Europe. America would, 
at best, regard Germany as a bulwark against the East.
Therefore I made my decision for Russia without 
second thoughts on political grounds.15
13 The case can be found in Henke, D ie Besetzung Deutschlands, p. 762.
14 Gerhard Wiemers, ‘Zwangsumsiedlung von Wissenschaftlern nach Weilburg/Lahn’ in Universitat Leipzig, 
1995/5, pp. 19-21.
15 ‘Europa muB geeinigt werden. Die USA hat die Mittel, jedoch ist RuBland der einzige Staat, der zur 
wirklichen Ordnung Europas gerufen ist. Amerika wird Deutschland allenfalls als Bollwerk gegen den Osten 
betrachten. Ich habe mich aus politisbhen Grunden ruckhaltlos fur RuBland entschieden.’ StadtAL, StVuR 
(I), 7966, Blatt 33. Professor Robert Dopel was one of the scientists who was sent to Russia at the end of July 
1945 to work on the Russian nuclear programme. He only returned to Germany (the GDR) in 1958 and took 
up a post at the university of Illmenau. See for example: Akadii Kruglov, The History o f the Soviet Atomic 
Industry (Taylor and Francis, 2002).
187
Dopel’s statement shows that the disagreements between the war-time Allies were already 
visible and the tension palpable at this early stage.
Both the city government and the university itself were outraged by the forced
evacuations. Erich Zeigner, at the time still legal counsel to Mayor Vierling, strongly
recommended filing a protest with the American military authorities. He was especially
concerned that this ‘sweeping’ removal of a large number of senior university staff would
‘destroy the university’s fabric in an incomprehensible way’. The city had strongly to
object, ‘in spite of potential dangers’, and attempt to stop these measures:
What is happening here in Leipzig cannot be reconciled 
with international law. It destroys the last chance of a 
reconstruction of an economic and cultural life in our 
city. The benefit for the Americans has no relation to 
the immense damage this causes us. [...] Protest is 
urgently required [...] [this is] a political question of 
fundamental social and national importance.1
Rektor Schweitzer tried to get clarification from the American city administration, 
which replied that it had no information on the entire issue and that Schweitzer’s letter was 
the first time it had heard of the events. Although it agreed that the university should be 
consulted on actions directly concerning the institution, they also conceded that there were 
military groups at work in Leipzig ‘over whom the city’s military administration [had] no 
authority’.17 These other ‘groups’ were namely the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) who 
masterminded the larger ‘Project Paperclip’ in which the Americans ‘harvested’ scientific 
and economic potential all over Germany and thus in Leipzig, too.
16 ‘Was hier in Leipzig geschieht ist unmoglich mit dem internationalen Recht vereinbar, es zerstort die 
letzten Voraussetzungen eines Wied^raufbaus des wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Lebens unserer Stadt. Der 
Nutzen fur die Amerikaner steht auBer allem Verhaltnis zu dem Schaden, der uns zugefugt wird [...] [es ist] 
unbedingt geboten, Rechtsverwahrung einzulegen [...] [dies ist] eine politische Frage von grundsatzlicher 
sozialer und nationaler Bedeutung.’ StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 4537, Blatt 55, 27 June 1945.
17 Ibid, No. 2126, Blatt 93, 24 June 1945.
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Mayor Vierling tried to impress on the Americans the catastrophic impact of their actions:
Leipzig’s university, its trade and industry were built in 
centuries through the efforts of generations of 
merchants and industrialists. This is the basis of the 
city’s importance both economically and intellectually 
within Germany and internationally. It is to be feared 
that through the evacuation the standing and welfare of 
the city and thereby of its population will be gravely 
damaged.18
The Americans were deaf to all entreaties, and Leipzig and its university had to 
resign themselves to the loss of the scientists. Together with the academics, most of their 
laboratory equipment, their scientific reports and papers and university held patents were 
also ‘evacuated’ to the American Zone. To evaluate the American actions one has to 
question the motivation. It might be assumed that the Americans wanted to secure 
‘valuable’ human resources. However, hardly any of the Leipzig academics would play a 
significant role in research for the Americans, thus the notion of procuring ‘useful’ human 
material is disproven. Most of the academics were startled by the discrepancy between the 
statements of the Americans before the transport and the reality during and after the 
evacuation. Having left most of their personal belongings in Leipzig, the scientists found 
themselves housed initially in empty barracks once used by foreign workers. These 
erstwhile symbols of Nazi criminality could hardly portray the Americans who sent the 
academics to these barracks in a positive light. Even improved housing conditions later 
were substandard compared to what the professors had to leave in their bombed out home 
town. None of the promises of ‘full compensation of losses’ and treatment according to 
their status as renowned scientists was honoured. Instead of finding new laboratories in 
which to continue their studies, they were ordered to do manual labour in the fields for
18 ‘Die Universitat Leipzigs, sein Handel und seine Industrie sind in jahrhundertelanger Arbeit, durch das 
Streben und Miihen von Generationen Industrieller und Kaufleute geschaffen worden. Sowohl wirtschaftlich 
als auch geistig beruht darauf die Bedeutung der Stadt im Reich und dariiber hinaus im internationalen 
Leben. Es wird befiirchtet, daB durch die Abwanderung die Bedeutung und das Wohlergehen der Stadt und 
damit ihrer Bevolkerung aufs schwerste Schaden erleidet.’ Ibid., No. 4537, Blatt 63, 30 June 1945.
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instance picking Colorado beetles off potato plants and dropping the insects into brown 
paper bags. Furthermore, the modality of the whole process led them to believe that by 
‘agreeing’ to the transport they would lose, or had already lost, their rights as professors 
and forfeited any chance of returning to Leipzig. Nevertheless, some regarded the 
circumstances as dire enough to attempt a ‘struggle home’ -  provided the Americans 
would not prevent them from so doing.19 In fact, only one Leipzig academic found his way 
to the United States: the head of Leipzig’s radiology department Willy Baensch. Baensch 
was subsequently able to continue his work at Georgetown University. The others were 
largely left to their own devices. Professor Heinrich Schmitthenner, an internationally 
renowned geographer, tried until April 1946 to facilitate his return. Yet, the university 
could not guarantee his re-employment and respective enquiries were left unanswered. It 
had, however, become abundantly clear that the Americans lost interest in the academics 
soon after abducting them. Contrary to the common historic narrative that the Americans 
supported German reconstruction and refrained from the vengeful behaviour mostly 
associated with Soviet conduct in Germany, this forced evacuation of Leipzig’s academics 
and those of other universities that were to come under the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 
suggest a less rose-tinted interpretation. The division between good and bad occupiers 
becomes futile in this case. In Leipzig the transport of the academics was viewed as the 
destruction of an academic apparatus which had been the ‘result of a careful, responsible 
intellectual selection process over generations’ and left the city and its university utterly 
debilitated.21 The Americans oriented themselves, however, on the Osenberg list rather 
than the Morgenthau Plan. The Osenberg list was a register of scientists that the National 
Socialists had compiled in early 1943 in the hope of turning the war through the use of
19 Ibid., Blatt 85, 24 July 1945, Report by Dr Erich Blume about letters from the evacuees to their former 
colleagues. Professor Reschke is here cited as attempting ‘sich mit Frau und Sohn wieder nach Leipzig 
durchzuschlagen’. Also: letter from Professor Heinrich Schmitthenner (one of the ‘evacuees’) printed in 
Wiemers, ‘Zwangsumsiedelung von Wissenschaftlern nach Weilburg/Lahn’ .
20 Ibid.
21 StadtAL, StVuR (I), 4537, Blatt 55, legal councillor Zeigner to Vierling.
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technology rather than military manpower. Following this list, the German army had 
recalled scientists from the front or drafted them as civilians into their weapon 
development programmes. Therefore, the specialists the Americans were procuring had the 
stamp of approval of being strategic assets.22 They were scientific capital the US forces 
were eager to secure. More importantly, it removed valuable intellectual reparations from 
their supposed allies, the Russians. In Feige’s perception this was the main reason for the 
whole American exercise in Leipzig -  it had the purpose of removing as many intellectual 
resources from the Soviets as possible rather than deploying these resources themselves.23 
This lack of real interest in using their ‘assets’ is manifested in the willingness of the US 
authorities to allow the return of some scientists just a few months later. In October 1945, 
the American military administration sent a list to Leipzig’s Lord Mayor of professors who 
had been ‘evacuated’ and now wished to come back. The university, glad at the prospect of 
an improvement of their staff figures, then requested the SMAD’s approval for the 
repatriation of its members. However, the SMAD did not act on this request.24 By 
November 1945, the denazification practice in Leipzig had become so strict that many of 
the scientists could not have returned to their old positions or indeed any work at the 
university at all. By not supporting the repatriation, the Soviet authorities on the one hand 
prevented possible lengthy denazification procedures and on the other weakened the old 
structure of the university.25 This allowed for a fundamental restructuring of the institution 
as will be seen below.
22 See for example: Clarence G. Lasby, Project Paperclip, German Scientists and the Cold War (New York, 
1971) and John Gimbel, ‘US Policy and German Scientists: The early Cold War’ in Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 101, No.3 (1986), pp. 433-51.
23 Feige, ‘Vor dem Abzug’.
24 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 4557, Blatt 1, October 1945 and No. 17648, Blatt 20, 17 December 1945. See also 
Feige ‘Vor dem Abzug’, pp. 1306-7.
25 A directive of 8 August 1945 stated that anyone who went ‘without being forced’ to the Western Zones 
was never to be allowed again to work as ‘Kopfarbeiter’ and would only find work in underground 
construction or mining. This regulation further complicated a potential return of academics. Being faced with 
an uncertain denazification procedure and having to prove their ‘forcible’ removal [most were frightened 
enough by the threat of force, did this already constitute an ‘enforced move’?] would have kept some 
scientists from applying for return in the first place. StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 2126, Blatt 85.
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A number of the evacuees eventually found new employment in universities in the 
Western zones over the following years. Especially notable in this context is the fate of
those academics who were formally arrested in May 1945 for active support of National
26Socialist ideas. Even though these arrests were covered by the agreements between the 
Allies, the removal of these scientists from Leipzig to the American Zone of Occupation 
was not as ‘it removed them from the jurisdiction of the Soviet forces under which they 
came from the 8 May 1945’.27 Moreover, despite their obvious entanglement with the Nazi 
regime the academics were all freed in 1946, at the latest, and allowed to pursue their 
professions. A prominent example was the former head of Leipzig’s eye clinic, Professor 
Dr Adolf Jess, a member of the SS, who was among the ten men arrested in May 1945. In 
November 1946, he was assigned the chair in the University of Mainz’s newly opened eye 
clinic. In 1952, he became dean of the entire medical school in Mainz and continued to 
hold both posts until his retirement in 1957.29
The Anglo-American historiography portrays these events in the light of the onset 
of the Cold War and the importance of the scientists (those who were actually employed in 
American projects) in furthering the Western aims, especially with regards to the later 
space race.30 The German historiography, both past and present, has been less inclined to 
ignore the inconvenient truth. The East German judgement of the situation was one of 
criminal, imperialist behaviour and a targeted, large-scale dismantling of the intelligentsia 
and thereby very critical.31 Whilst the East German historiography was naturally scathing,
26 An initial arrest of 10 academics was undertaken by the Americans before they assigned further 
denazification efforts to the authority o f the university. See Konrad Krause, Alma Mater Lipsiensis (Leipzig, 
2003).
27 Feige ‘Vor dem Abzug’, p. 1304.
28 Ernst Engelberg, et al (eds.), Karl Marx Universitat Leipzig 1409 - 1959, Volume 2 (Leipzig, 1959).
29 Interestingly, both histories of the eye clinic in Leipzig as well as the one in Mainz ignore Jess’s ‘unusual’ 
transition from one post to the other. See for Leipzig: http://augenklinik.uniklinikum- 
leipzig.de/geschichte.php (accessed 20 November 2008) and for Mainz: http://www-klinik.uni- 
mainz.de/Augenklinik/htmger/kl_geschichte.htm (accessed 20 November 2008).
30 See Lasby, Project Paperclip', Gimbel, ‘US Policy’; John Gimbel later included the more problematic 
aspects of the operations in his book Science, Technology and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in 
Post-war Germany (Stanford, 1990).
31 See inter al.: Selbmann, Alternative, Bilanz, Credo, p. 402.
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the West German and post-unification historiography is normally very reluctant to criticise 
the actions of the Western powers. Yet the criminal nature of the operation was so obvious 
and the dishonesty so blatant even the post-unification German historiography highlights 
the problematic nature of this issue. Henke depicts the personal hardship of forced 
removal, loss of property and uncertain future of the academics. Feige emphasises the 
detrimental effect on the workings of the university, by not only causing obvious staffing 
problems in the short term but also hampering the development of the university by 
blocking important positions whilst there was still hope of a return. Yet, most publications 
relativise the events in the light of the changes to the university inflicted by the second, 
Soviet, occupation power. Even Feige ignores the wider implications for the city of 
Leipzig that were so clearly voiced by the university and the German city administration.32 
The forced evacuations deprived the university of a significant part of its 
Bildungsbiirgertum fundament through removing the most senior staff; a development that 
was to repeat itself and accelerate under Soviet rule.
When the Russian forces took over control in Leipzig in July 1945, they 
immediately turned their attention to the university. The Soviets were not behind the 
Americans in terms of removal of scientific equipment and research from the universities 
in their zone. They too, committed scientists to work for them in the Soviet Union.33 
Beyond this, the policies of the SMAD towards higher education institutions were largely 
unstructured.34 This became very clear in the denazification policies directed at the 
universities.
32 Feige, ‘Vor dem Abzug’; Henke, Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands, chapter VI, part 5, pp. 742- 
76. Of course, a relativisation might be in order, but then no one has ever pretended that the Soviet Union 
was anything other than a dictatorship, whereas the US claimed to be a nation based on the rule of law.
33 Order Number 3 o f the Supreme Commander o f the SMA, 15 June 1945 regarding the ‘handover of 
weapons, [...] research institutes, laboratories, [...] documents, patents and other paperwork concerning 
military use’. Natural Sciences in geSieral were regarded as ‘of military use’. In: Roland Kohler and Gottfried 
Handel (eds.), Dokumente der Soxvjetischen Militaradministration in Deutschland zum Hochschul-und 
Fachschulwesen (East Berlin, 1975), p .l; see also: Krause, Alma Mater Lipsiensis.
34 Nikitin, Zwischen Dogma und gesundem Menschenverstand, p. 27. Nikitin states that the SMAD was 
largely without concept until 1947 with regards to the universities in their zone.
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In Leipzig, the denazification efforts had begun whilst the city was still under 
American command. Rektor Schweitzer was given great autonomy in the process; self- 
purging by the university was the method of choice of the Americans. It can be assumed 
that the transitional character of the American occupation played a role in this lenient 
approach. The university understood this as ‘moral obligation to rid the faculties of 
National Socialist elements.’ Bernhard Schweitzer was, however, also very intent on 
preserving as many of the university’s staff as possible. Each case was to be investigated 
individually and dismissals were only a last resort.36
Initially, this continued under the new Soviet administration. On 19 July, Colonel 
Plantanov told Lord Mayor Zeigner that the ‘old’ Leipzig University had a very good 
reputation amongst academics in Russia. He explained that it was the intention of the 
military administration to support the scientists of the university. A first token of this was 
the decision that members of the university staff should have their food rations doubled.37
The SMAD had founded its own section for Volksbildung on 10 July 1945 in 
Berlin, which under the leadership of Lieutenant General Pjotr V. Solotuchin and Major 
Pjotr I. Nikitin as permanent secretary was responsible for higher education and the 
universities.38 Under Solotuchin’s leadership, the Soviet officials aimed to maintain the 
centuries old traditions of the German universities placed under their control.39 Thus the re­
opening of the universities in their zones was speedily prepared. In Leipzig, the city’s 
commander Trufanov explained in a meeting on 4 August, that the question of the purging 
of the university staff had to be carried out ‘not too rigorously and schematically, the
35 Schweitzer’s report in Welsh, ‘Entanzifizierung und Wiedereroffnung’, p. 357.
36 Ibid.
37 ‘Ein Wissenschaftler kann nicht arbeiten, wenn er Brotsorgen hat’, StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 3190, Blatt 81, 
19 July 1945
38 Professor Pjotr Vassilijevitch Solotuchin was a historian who had been the Rektor of Leningrad university 
before the war. He thus understood ihe territory of higher education very well. Dr Pjotr I. Nikitin (later 
Professor Nikitin) was a mathematical physicist who had just completed his viva at the beginning of the war 
and then worked in the seventh department -  the propaganda division of the Red Army.
39 See both: Interview with P. I. Nikitin in Alexandr Haritonow, Sowjetische Hochschulpolitik in Sachsen 
1945-49 (Weimar, 1995) and P. I. Nikitin, Zwischen Dogma und gesundem Menschenverstand.
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number of lecturers, most of them irreplaceable specialists, should not be decimated 
without need’. The ‘spirit of National Socialism’ had to be removed, yet this was either 
possible by removing the ‘bearer of the spirit’ or the ‘spirit from the bearer’. Most 
importantly, he called for university members to be given time to adjust to the new times 
and see the error of their ways; every case was to be looked at individually without 
applying a template. The procedure of denazification was to be undertaken in agreement 
with the German authorities (the city commander did not, however, specify who exactly 
these authorities were). Where disputes arose, Trufanov would take the final decision.40 
This lenient perspective, very much in tune with Schweitzer’s own view, was not shared by 
the German authorities. Although Fritz Selbmann had characterized Leipzig University as 
possessing *[...] a body of academics of good, internationally renowned scholars and 
scientists’ that prevented the institution from becoming a ‘Rosenberg University’, it still 
was not deemed appropriate by all German communists (especially not those in charge in 
Leipzig and Saxony).41 On 17 August 1945, the Land administration of Saxony published a 
directive outlining the new employment regulations in public administrations. It called for 
the dismissal of all NSDAP members. Exceptions could be made for nominal members of 
the party and essential specialists.42 This was directly binding for the university in Leipzig 
as it was as Landesuniversitat subject to the Land administration 43 Further qualification of 
the pre-requisites for the re-opening of the universities came with the SMAD order number 
50 regarding the ‘preparation of universities for the beginning of teaching’ of 4 September 
1945. This order required universities to remove all National Socialist and militarist
40 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 4537, Blatt 99, 4 August 1945.
41 Fritz Selbmann, Aufbruch des Geistes: Zur Frage der neuen deutschen Volkskultur (Leipzig, 1945), p. 20f.
42 Amtliche Nachrichten der Landesverwaltung, 1, 1945 in Clemens Vollnhals, Entnazifizierung. Politische 
Sauberung und Rehabilitierung in den vier Besatzungszonen 1945-1949 (Munich, 1991), pp. 175-180; 
despite the fact that similar directives came into force in all Lander and provinces of the Soviet Zone, in 
Saxony it soon became custom to igViore the exception of nominal party members and request their dismissal 
as well thereby establishing the strictest denazification policy in the entire Soviet Zone. See Helga A. Welsh, 
Revolutionarer Wandel.
43 Zeigner already detected that the university would be ‘gefangen zwischen Landesverwaltung und 
Sowjetischer Militaradministration.’ StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 3211, Blatt 451.
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doctrines from the education of students and provide lists of their academic staff, their 
denazification results and their enrolment procedures for approval by the SMAD.44 On this 
basis, the SMAD department for Volksbildung developed ‘road maps’ for the individual 
universities to facilitate re-opening. Responsible for the correct completion of the order 
were, apart from the universities themselves, the mayors of the university towns, the 
Lander governments and the newly created German Central Administration for 
Volksbildung in Berlin (under the leadership of Paul Wandel, operative in the Soviet Zone) 
and its SMAD counterpart. The final decision lay with the supreme commander of the 
SMAD, Marshall Zhukov 45
This order prompted a meeting in Leipzig between Solotuchin and Colonel 
Morosov as representatives of the SMAD Abteilung fu r  Volksbildung and Schweitzer and 
Lord Mayor Zeigner on 8 September 1945 to discuss Leipzig University’s road map. In 
this meeting Solotuchin stressed that only nominal party members were allowed to remain 
in their positions; these, however, were to be treated ‘like any other citizen’ 46 This meant 
that Schweitzer’s reference to unique expertise of some of his more heavily implicated 
members of staff had lost its validity.
On 14 September, Trufanov issued an official order to Zeigner enforcing the 
SMAD order.47 Yet, the required lists were not forwarded to the SMAD Abteilung fur  
Volksbildung as instructed by order number 50, possibly because most of the NSDAP 
members (nominal and otherwise) amongst the university’s staff had remained in their 
posts at Schweitzer’s behest. Bernhard Schweitzer is often described as not very
44 Kohler and Handel (eds.), Dokumente der Sowjetischen Militaradministration, p. 21.
45 Nikitin, Zwischen Dogma und gesundem Menschenverstand. The Deutsche Zentralverwaltung fiir 
Volksbildung was one of the administrations created by the SMAD in July 1945 to oversee the development 
of the Soviet Zone. The head of the German administration for Volksbildung, Paul Wandel (1905-1995), was 
a German communist who fled from Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union and managed to survive the Stalinist 
purges. The ‘qualities’ necessary for this were translated into an uncompromising stance in his offices once 
back in Germany. In the GDR he became Minister for Volksbildung in 1949 and from 1953 also Secretary for 
Culture and Education in the Central Committee of the SED. See Manfred Heinemann and Alexandr 
Haritonow, Hochschuloffiziere und Wiederaufbau, p. 8.
46 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 4537, No. 179, Protocol of meeting 8 September 1945.
47 Kohler and Handel (eds.), Dokumente der Sowjetischen Militaradministration, p. 18.
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cooperative with regards to the Soviet authorities and their German counterparts.48 His 
conduct was denounced in the GDR historiography as reactionary and anti-democratic 49 
These accusations have been rectified in recent works, mostly by re-evaluating his 
conservative stance and to a lesser extent through a re-evaluation of his actions.50 Yet these 
actions need to be seen in their context. Schweitzer began his chancellorship with the 
promise of re-instatement of university autonomy and was given authority over the 
denazification process in his institution. He had to experience the removal of his most 
senior staff, eminent scientists who were a great asset to the university, by the Americans. 
Following the orders of Trufanov, he did his utmost to balance denazification and the 
needs of the university to remain functional. It must have seemed to him that the unending 
stream of orders and directives from different authorities were designed fully to undermine 
the control of the university over its own affairs by moving the goalposts at every step of 
the way. This also shows the difficult nature of the term denazification. Those who acted 
against it were automatically Nazi sympathisers or apologists, even if their reasons, as in 
Schweitzer’s case, were completely devoid of such motives. The occupation powers did 
not only invoke the term where it suited them, it also was a convenient cover for political 
interference. For biirgerlich Germans that must have conjured up memories of Nazi 
political interference. On 2 September 1945 (that is before SMAD order number 50), 
Zeigner instructed the Antifaschistischer Block to investigate the university on behalf of 
Solotuchin. Instead of coordinating this enquiry with Schweitzer, Zeigner suggested an 
investigation with the aid of the wardens of the lecturers’ apartment houses or other 
‘politically even better educated functionaries’.51 Despite the explicit order by the
48 Nikitin, Zwischen Dogma und gesundem Menschenverstand.
49 See for example Dietmar Keller, ‘Die Universitat nach der Zerschlagung des Faschismus bis zum Aufbau 
der entwickelten sozialistischen Gesellschaft’ in Lothar Rathmann, Alma Mater Lipsiensis (Leipzig, 1984), 
pp. 273-75 and Feige, ‘Zum Beginri’.
Siegfried Hoyer, ‘Der Weg zur Wiedereroffnung der Universitat Leipzig’ in Neues Archivfilr Sachsische 
Geschichte, Band 68/1997.
51 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 4550, Blatt 115. The Hausbeauftragte (house wardens), as already seen above, 
were members of the Antifaschistischer Block and mostly politically active in the KPD.
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Antifaschistischer Block in July 1945 that the house wardens were not to spy like the 
Blockwarte during the Third Reich, here there was an obvious parallel between the two.52 
The ‘investigation’ did not yield much as the political allegiances could not be established, 
yet those reporting were still happy to cast verdicts on the characters of those under 
investigation. Someone who might have been made suspicious by having his neighbours 
questioned, and who subsequently refrained from private contracts with them was easily 
labelled as an ‘unsocial reactionary’. Indeed the growing practice of ‘progressive’ parties, 
first and foremost the KPD, to dub adversaries ‘conservatives’ and ‘reactionaries’ is clearly 
visible in these ‘evaluations’.53 This can also be seen in the statement made by the KPD 
city councillor Holtzhauer to Schweitzer regarding the aim of the denazification process: 
not only to ‘render innocuous the Nazi activists [...] [but also] the conservative and 
reactionary parts of the lecturing s ta ff.54 In the light of these developments it is only 
understandable that Schweitzer was at pains to avoid situations in which his approach 
would be questioned.55 He felt, however, confident enough in mid-September to ask the 
Landesverwaltung to approach Zhukov to apply for a re-opening of the university. The 
Landesverwaltung shared Schweitzer’s view that the university was ready and sent the 
request on to the SMAD.56 Permission was not granted outright but an ordet concerning 
the re-opening of all universities in the Soviet Zone was issued by Zhukov in early 
October. It reiterated that only nominal members of the NSDAP were allowed to teach at 
the universities. The responsibility for the selection of lecturers and students was fully
52 The central committee of the Antifaschistischer Block issued a set of guidelines stating the role of the 
Hausbeauftragte. It clearly outlines that the Blockwarte and their spying activities were not to be copied. 
This, however, was still in July. By September 1945, the arrests and transfers of the Antifascist Bloc 
members (as seen in chapter 1) had changed the organisation, by the end of the month it was disbanded. For 
the order see: Tubbessing, Nationalkomitee, p. 115.
53 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 4550, Blatt 237 and 238.
54 Ibid., No. 4537, Blatt 200.
55 Nikitin states that it was very difficult to meet with Schweitzer at this time, ‘one was under the impression 
that he was consciously avoiding contact with any representatives of the occupation power’. Nikitin, 
Zwischen Dogma und gesundem Menschenverstand, p. 65.
56 Hoyer, ‘Der Weg zur Wiedereroffnung’, p. 258. Hoyer cites a document from the estate of the head of 
Saxony’s Administration for Science, Art and Education.
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placed on the shoulders of the vice chancellors. These then had to transfer their selections 
for review to the Landesverwaltungen who in turn had to send them to both the German 
Central Department for Volksbildung and the SMAD department for Volksbildung. 
Solotuchin gave his approval in principle for the plans in Leipzig, if Schweitzer could 
produce lists in accordance with the requirements. He would then recommend to Zhukov 
the re-opening of the institution.57 The date of 31 October 1945 was the envisaged day for 
the re-opening of Leipzig’s university.
On 4 October 1945, Zeigner declared the official dissolution of the university. As 
the fmancer of the university, the city had to assume full control of the proceedings, thus 
this official closure allowed a clean cut. A commission was to be founded to prepare the 
for re-opening.58 Alongside these measures, Schweitzer was also forced to accept a 
commission made up of all parties in the Block antifaschistischer Parteien who were to 
observe the denazification. It seemed that Schweitzer’s laissez-faire approach had gone far 
enough. The heat in the denazification debate had intensified and Schweitzer’s approach 
did not meet the altered requirements.59 Yet, the efforts for the scheduled opening date 
continued. The first higher education institution in the Soviet Zone to open was Jena’s 
Friedrich Schiller University on 15 October 1945. The opening did not mean the beginning 
of lectures as denazification issues had not been fully resolved. Nevertheless, it showed 
what could be achieved. The denazification commission in Leipzig decided on the same 
date to issue dismissals to forty lecturers who had so far been protected by Schweitzer as 
‘specialists’.60 Schweitzer then wrote a letter to Zhukov officially asking for the re-opening 
on 31 October and he included the new lists of lecturers, in hoping to have met the 
approval of the SMAD. However, he ignored the proper channel prescribed in Zhukov’s
order of early October; neither the German Central Administration for Volksbildung nor
 \
57 Nikitin, Zwischen Dogma und gesundem Menschenverstand.
58 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 4537, Blatt 206.
59 Hoyer, ‘Der Weg zur Wiedereroffnung’.
60 Feige, ‘Zum Beginn’.
199
the SMAD department for Volksbildung had received and reviewed the respective lists. 
Schweitzer’s exact reasons for choosing this path cannot be deduced from the sources. Yet 
it is highly probable that he tried to avoid the piecemeal approach both to speed up the 
process and prevent an intermediary body from stopping his proposal on -  what he would 
deem -  further incomprehensible grounds. The letter to Zhukov was forwarded to both the 
German Central Administration for Volksbildung and the SMAD department for 
Volksbildung and they agreed that a re-opening would not be possible under the 
circumstances.61 However, this was not communicated to anyone in Leipzig. Instead, the 
city’s military commander assured both Lord Mayor Zeigner and Rektor Schweitzer on 16 
October that the order for the re-opening of the remaining universities in the Soviet Zone 
would come within ten to fourteen days. Details of the re-opening ceremony were 
discussed, including guest lists, speeches and the choice of music.62 The preparations for 
the re-opening ceremony in the university church, St Paul’s, were under way with the 
political parties announcing who would attend on their behalf, city councillor Holtzhauer 
advising which representatives of the city’s factories were to be invited, and the 
programmes were being printed. Even the catering had already been organised. However, 
even if the department for Volksbildung of the SMAD had approved the re-opening, the 
submitted lists would have been out of date. On 27 October, the Soviet military 
administration in Saxony published its order number 294, which called for the removal of 
all former NSDAP members, regardless of their active or nominal status 64 On 29 October, 
Schweitzer was informed that the re-opening had been postponed for an indefinite period 
of time.65 By 15 November, order number 294 forced sixty more lecturers out of their 
posts. On 8 May 1945, the university still retained 187 professors (at the beginning of the
61 Nikitin, Zwischen Dogma und ge)sundem Menschenverstand, p. 68.
62 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 4557, Blatt 1.
63 Ibid., Blatt 7, 26 October 1945 and Blatt 6, 27 October 1945.
64 Heinemann and Haritonow, Hochschuloffiziere und Wiederaufbau, p. 40.
65 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 4557, Blatt 9.
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war in 1939, it had been 255). New appointments were very difficult and thus few and far 
between. At the end of November 1945, the university was left with forty-nine professors 
across the entirety of its departments.66 There were simply not enough academics left to 
teach.67 Nikitin admitted that by now there was only twenty percent of the required 
capacity of lecturers available in Leipzig.68 Both he and Solotuchin, however, encouraged 
Schweitzer with the advice that nominal party members would soon be allowed back in 69 
The fact that other Landverwaltung in the Soviet Zone were acting more leniently than the 
Saxon Landesverwaltung was also a cause for hope that Saxony would soon revert to its 
neighbours’ course. Thus Schweitzer continued his quest for a re-opening of his institution. 
As he had lost already most of his academic staff there was no need for him any longer to 
avoid the authorities. When Nikitin visited Leipzig in December 1945, Schweitzer 
positively sought and beleaguered him to find out whether a date had been set yet. 
Schweitzer obviously considered Nikitin’s support necessary to achieve this aim. Major 
Nikitin had at this point already prepared all necessary documents and assured Schweitzer 
that the order for the re-opening of Leipzig’s university would be published in January 
1946.70 The commitment of the Rektor to his institution did not go unnoticed by Nikitin 
who, despite Schweitzer’s disregard for some orders by the occupation power, 
recommended Schweitzer to Solotuchin for the renewal of this contract.71 However, due to 
pressure from the German authorities (the Central Administration for Volksbildung was 
integral in this and the Landesverwaltung refused to support Schweitzer against the Central 
Administration’s Wandel), Schweitzer resigned at the end of 1945.72 Partly due to his own
66 UAL, Bestand Rektorat, R236 Band 1.
67 A SMAD commission sent to investigate the situation found that Leipzig’s medical school had no teaching 
staff at all. See Hoyer, ‘Der Weg zur Wiedereroffnung’, p. 267.
68 Nikitin quoted in Kohler and Schulz, Erinnerungen sowjetischer Hochschuloffiziere, p. 22.
69 Ibid., p. 26.
70 Nikitin, Zwischen Dogma und gesundem Menschenverstand, p. 68.
71 Ibid., p. 65.
72 Details in Welsh, ‘Entnazifzierung und Wiedereroffnung’, pp. 351-53. Schweitzer’s insistence on keeping 
valuable members of staff even though they were politically implicated clearly clashed with Wandel’s plans 
of creating a ‘neue deutsche Intelligenz’. Wandel cited in Hoyer, ‘Der Weg zu Wiedereroffnung’, p. 268.
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actions, partly through machinations of his adversaries, Schweitzer had been manoeuvred
into a position where his dismissal was imminent. He chose to forestall the inevitable by
withdrawing from office. This resignation, instigated by the German authorities in Saxony
and the German Central Administration for Volksbildung was met with surprise by the
SMAD department for Volksbildung,73 Schweitzer’s letter of resignation explained his
motives and reasons in detail, not without spelling out his grievances and placing blame at
the right doorsteps. It is worthwhile to quote it at length:
One has to look further, plan ahead to ensure the 
survival of German Wissenschaft (academia) and of this 
university, which is so closely linked to this science, for 
a distant future. The ranks of productive researchers 
and academics have already been decimated alarmingly 
over the last decade. Future generations will hold us to 
account demanding to know whether we have 
understood to use this precious intellectual aptitude and 
the scientific talent [...] economically, as these times of 
destitution dictate. I am afraid that a future German 
Wissenschaft will not be able to function out of its own 
capabilities. Rather it will only be able to serve 
humanity as a satellite of foreign science.
Of course, it was the aim of all occupation powers to weaken Germany for the foreseeable
future. In the academic field the forced evacuations and removals took their toll and
reduced German academia to a ‘satellite’ of those powers who were now ruling Germany.
Yet Schweitzer seemed to regard the inner-German interference as even more destructive:
The reason for my resignation is that a circle outside 
the university [that is in the German Administration for 
Volksbildung] and a neither politically fully authorised 
nor factually competent section of the public has 
misinterpreted my attempts to maintain this university 
[...] undamaged for the future as clinging to the old.
My efforts have been misconstrued as reaction. [...] I 
therefore want to ensure that the opening of the 
university is not delayed through my person.74
73 Nikitin, Zwischen Dogma und gesundem Menschenverstand, p. 65. Nikitin and Solotuchin only learnt of 
the resignation a week after the event on 5 January 1946. Paul Wandel on the other hand had been following 
the ‘Schweitzer case’ and came to the conclusion in early December 1945 that the Rektor had to be removed 
immediately. In the months before, Wandel had already advised the city administration about a possible 
successor. See Welsh, ‘Entnazifzierung und Wiedereroffnung’, here p. 352.
74 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 4564, Blatt 15-6, ‘Man mufi weiter blicken, langerfristig planen, das Weiterleben 
der deutschen Wissenschaft und der eng mit dieser verbundenen Universitat auch fur eine fernere Zukunft
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The university relayed Schweitzer’s reasons (in diluted form) to the Nachrichtenamt of the 
city for publication. Lord Mayor Zeigner issued a swift reply stating that it could only be 
printed as fact, as any explanation ‘would only embarrass Schweitzer’.75
The order to re-open Leipzig University on 5 February was indeed given in
76 mJanuary 1946. The date alone, however, did not solve the problems of the university. 
Leipzig was still without a Rektor since Schweitzer’s departure.77 The Lord Mayor grew 
concerned when an election for a new head was prohibited on 17 January 1946. Leipzig 
was by now the only university without an elected Rektor, a rather unfortunate situation for 
an institution supposedly about to re-open within weeks.78 By 21 January, an election was 
finally allowed and Professor Gadamer became the new head of Leipzig’s university. In 
consideration of the circumstances he accepted the election under the premise that ‘fruitful 
conditions’ would exist for his administration.79 Part of this ‘fruitful’ cooperation was the
sichern. Die Reihen der produktiven Forscher und Gelehrten sind in Deutschland schon vor einem Jahrzehnt 
beangstigend diinn geworden. Von unserer Generation werden kiinftige Geschlechter einmal Rechenschaft 
dariiber verlangen, ob sie es verstanden hat mit dem so kostbar gewordenen Geistesgut und den zum 
Neuaufbau bereiten wissenschaftlichen Talenten des deutschen Volkes so haushalterisch zu wirtschaften, wie 
es die Not erfordert. Ich habe die Befurchtung, daB eine kiinftige deutsche Wissenschaft nicht mehr aus sich 
heraus sondern nur als Satellit auslandischer Wissenschaft ihren Dienst an der Menschheit verrichten kann. 
[....] Der Grand der Niederlegung des Amtes ist folgender: auBerhalb der Universitat und in einem 
bestimmten, weder sachkundigen noch politisch voll authorisierten Kreis der Offentlichkeit wurde mein 
Bestreben, die in der Vergangenheit zu bedeutender Hohe entwickelte Universitat moglichst ohne 
vermeidbaren Schaden der Zukunft zu erhalten als Festhalten am Alten miBdeutet. Es wurde als Reaktion 
verkannt. [...] Ich will mit meiner Person nicht den Befehl zur Wiedereroffnung verzogern.’.
75 Ibid., Blatt 16, Blatt 17 and Ibid., No. 17648, Blatt 42. Schweitzer left Leipzig for the Western Zones 
where in 1948 he found a new position in Tubingen, which he held until his retirement in 1960.
76 Ibid., Blatt 49, SMAD Order No. 12 to re-open Leipzig University, 15 January 1946 with specifications 
containing enrolment of students, employment of lecturers and the responsibilities of the Landesverwaltung 
towards the SMAD.
77 Ibid., The Rektor was made solely responsible for the employment of all lecturers and students. With the 
position being vacant, the university was unable to fulfil the pre-requisites for the re-opening as stated in the 
order. In this context it is worthwhile to note that Hoyer ( ‘Der Weg zur Wiedereroffnung’) used the wrong 
date for the issue of order number 12 (in his version: 18 January). He therefore misses the problems 
surrounding the Rektor election completely. Why he was mistaken is unclear as his source (Handel and 
Kohler, Dokumente) states the 15 January. The same date can be found on copies of the order in the 
university archive: UAL, Bestand Rektor, R 236, Band 1, Blatt 11 and ibid., R 50, Band 2, Blatt 1.
78 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 17648, Blatt 53. In the light of the order to prepare the re-opening, this crippling 
measure aggravated the dire situation in Leipzig. A possible explanation for the ban of an election was that 
the SMAD was set not to accept another Rektor who could display more certainty and instinct in political 
questions than Schweitzer who was ‘immer unsicher in diesen Fragen.’ See: Ibid., No. 4557, Blatt 52.
7 Professor Hans-Georg Gadamer was a student of Heidegger and himself an internationally renowned 
philosopher. His election and acceptance: Ibid., No. 17648, Blatt 59.
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establishment of a ‘political advisory committee’ for Gadamer, founded by Holtzhauer and 
the Soviet city command. This committee was to advise Gadamer to prevent him from 
falling into the same pitfalls as the ‘politically unsure’ Schweitzer.80 This had echoes of the 
Nazi practice of providing a National Socialist ‘adviser’ to ensure ‘political correctness’.
The re-opening took place in the largest hall of Leipzig’s foremost cinema, the 
Capitol. The initial plan to hold it in St Paul’s church, which had been the university’s 
assembly hall from 1545 to 1836, was abolished after Zeigner was informed that the 
Soviets would not welcome this location. The De-Christianisation of public life had also 
reached the university’s realm. At the ceremony, Lord Mayor Zeigner gave a speech in 
which he underlined the importance for complete renewal: ‘Not only the outer shell of the 
university is destroyed but also its inner form. The spirit of the university will have to be 
rebuilt over the coming years. Its face will have to change completely. Its academic staff 
will have to be democratic and antifascist.’ Thus Zeigner pointed to the fact the staff 
shortage was probably not going to be alleviated by the return of the former members of 
staff.81
Next to the staff shortage, the question of student selection was imperative.82 The 
SMAD had outlined strict rules for matriculations. As Leipzig University had remained 
open throughout the war, it had a considerable number of students hoping to resume their 
studies as soon as possible. They were joined by students who had returned from the front 
eager to finish their courses. Additionally, many school pupils were hoping to start at the 
university. All of these had to be brought in line with the ideas of the occupation power to 
create a more ‘equal’ system of higher education and allow more working-class children
80 According to the Soviet city command, the committee was founded in agreement with Gadamer. 
Unfortunately, no sources could be found that reveal the extent of the advice given, or if it indeed was 
necessary for Gadamer to consult or be advised by it. Ibid., No. 3211, Blatt 220.
81 ‘Nicht nur der auBere Bau der Universitat ist zerstort, sondern auch die innere Gestalt. Das geistige Leben 
unserer Universitat wird in den nachsten Jahren neu aufgebaut werden miissen. Ihr Lehrkorper wird 
antifaschistisch und demokratisch sein miissen.’ Speech by Zeigner 5 February 1946, Copy of Document in 
Rudloff, Erich Zeigner, pp. 188-93, here pp. 188-9.
82 The Landesverwaltung urged the university to start matriculations immediately after the order for re­
opening was given, to wait until opening day was not an option. StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 4557, Blatt 53.
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into the universities. Leipzig’s existing students had shown their assertiveness at student 
meetings in the run-up to the re-opening. The first on 25 October was conducted with 
calm. Speakers presenting a socialist point of view were met with rejection, yet orderly 
behaviour was largely observed. The second meeting, however, on 29 November, took 
place in the already heated atmosphere of the indefinitely postponed opening of the 
university. It is not surprising that the majority of the students attending the meeting were, 
at best, disappointed about the delay and anxious to get more concrete information on the 
progress of their university. The title of the gathering was sufficiently topical, thereby 
explaining the rush to the assembly: ‘When will the university re-open?’. The main speaker 
on this occasion was Dr Morenz, an archaeologist at Leipzig University.83 He turned the 
original question of the evening into ‘Why is the university not being re-opened?’ thereby 
addressing the real issue of interest for the students.84
Dr Morenz’s speech pointed to the discrepancies between the approach of the 
Landesverwaltung in Saxony and its denazification requirements and those of other Lander 
administrations namely that of Thuringia and the province of Saxony (subsequently 
renamed Saxony Anhalt). In both their universities, Jena and Halle, NSDAP members were 
allowed to remain in the teaching staff and still the institutions opened before Leipzig. 
Morenz further explained that the strict policy of Saxony surpassed even what the Russian 
authorities had ordered. All of this added to the students’ anger, which erupted in the 
overcrowded room in jeers and heckling during other speeches stressing the need for a 
‘democratic rebuilding’. 85 The city council, especially Ott and Holtzhauer were outraged
83 Ibid., No. 4565, Blatt 4 Protocol o f student meeting, 29 November 1945.
84 Students of the university had been integral to the clearing of rubble on campus and in the city of Leipzig 
itself. The main motive for student^ was a promise that their commitment would ensure a place at their 
university (social engagement was a pre-requisite for a successful university application). Lecturers and 
university staff were obliged to do clearing work if they had been NSDAP members. Age and health were not 
regarded as obstacles to this service. Ibid., No. 4537, Blatt 106, Blatt 109 and Blatt 114.
85 Ibid., No. 4565, Blatt 4.
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at the students’, but also Morenz’s, behaviour.86 Their evaluation of the event is 
symptomatic of the increasingly assertive and aggressive manner in which the city’s 
‘progressive’ elements reacted to criticism.87 The students were ‘nihilistic’ and ‘immature’ 
and unable to cope with the requirements of the time. Their behaviour was dominated by 
‘burgerliche Untergangssehnsucht’ (bourgeois longing for destruction). Morenz on the 
other hand was nothing but a ‘puppet of Schweitzer’s’ whose reactionism was once more 
apparent. Overall, they concluded that the subversive and nihilistic attitude of the student 
body, consisting in the majority of members of ‘faschistische Gesellschaftsschichten [sic]’ 
(fascist social classes), was a main obstacle to the re-opening of the university as a 
whole.88
The students had been subject already to selection procedures akin to those of the 
denazification process of the university’s staff. Their selection had been arguably even 
stricter. The guidelines stipulated that no person was allowed to enrol whose parents had 
been active members of the NSDAP, whose family members had left with the Americans 
and whose parents and/or siblings had been imprisoned on political grounds by the
on
occupation power. The order for re-opening further outlined the criteria for matriculation 
of students stating that members of the NSDAP, and activists and leaders 'o f the Hitler 
Youth were excluded from applying for a place to study.90 This was in tune with a 
directive issued by the Allied Control Council on 23 January 1946. Nominal members of 
the Hitler Youth were able, in principle, to enrol. However, each of these cases was to be 
investigated in detail and only after a positive verdict was an application considered.91 It
86 Holtzhauer, as a prominent KPD member would o f course object to any questioning of the policies of the 
Landesverwaltung that had been appointed by the SMA in Saxony. Erich Ott was a member of the SPD, yet 
very left-leaning and in favour of a unification of the workers’ parties. Hence his views mirrored that of his 
KPD counterpart.
87 Through Zeigner’s support, the KPD -  among them Holtzhauer -  was increasingly asserting itself in view 
of dissent although it was not yet the strongest force in the city.
88 Ibid., Blatt 3, Report about the student meeting and discussion in the city council.
89 Ibid., No. 4560, Blatt 45, 5 October 1945, ‘Richtlinien fur die politische Uberpriifung der Studenten’
90 Ibid., No. 17648, Blatt 49.
91 Heinemann and Haritonow, Hochschuloffiziere und Wiederaufbau, p. 42.
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soon emerged, that nominal members won hardly any places as the demand was greater
92 rnthan the supply of places. The universities across the Soviet Zone in general had to limit 
the student intake due to restrictions on their resources. In Leipzig the damage to the 
university’s departments and libraries but especially the lack of teaching staff compounded 
the problem. Of 2500-3000 applicants for places in Leipzig (as per 8 September 1945) 
Solotuchin felt 1500 to be a more realistic figure. This was before the mass-dismissals of 
staff that were still to come after September 1945, which intensified the problem further.93
Whereas the exclusion of those who were entangled with the National Socialist 
regime was understandable, students were by and large outraged at the demands of proving 
their antifascist convictions. Many found it difficult to provide references from officials of 
the antifascist parties in their home towns and prove their ‘social engagement’ and 
‘democratic and antifascist’ mind set, especially those who had often been away for years 
during their (involuntary) service in the Wehrmacht.94 It soon transpired that political 
qualifications were more important than educational ones. As Zeigner stated in his re­
opening speech: ‘The question of who is allowed to study is a political question. And as 
such there can only be a political answer.’95 The authorities in the Soviet Zone, both Soviet 
and German, followed the mantra that the privilege of higher education would best be 
broken by positive discrimination in favour of children of working class and peasant 
backgrounds.96 Students could enter the university without matriculation exams if they 
could prove experience in their chosen subject area or passed an ‘exam discussion’ in
Q7which the main focus was the potential not knowledge. These candidates were then given 
preference over those who had graduated from secondary schools who mostly had a
92 In any case, the number of places allocated to nominal NSDAP members was limited to ten percent of all 
free positions.
93 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 4537, Blatt 181.
94 Krause, Alma Mater Lipsiensis . v
95 ‘Die Frage wer studieren darf [...]  ist eine politische Frage und auf eine politische Frage kann es keine 
andere Antwort geben als eine politische’, Zeigner speech, 5 February 1946, p. 190.
96 Nikitin indeed states that this was one of the early means for the transformation of the entire higher 
education system. See Nikitin in Heinemann and Haritonow, Hochschulojfiziere und Wiederaufbau, p. 209.
97 Ibid., No. 4554, Blatt 1.
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burgerlich background. For these burgerlich applicants a numerus clausus was in place 
thus limiting their access further. The procedure then changed through the establishment of 
Vorstudienanstalten (pre-study institutions) in 1946, where the necessary qualifications for 
the entry to higher education could be obtained.98 Graduates of these institutions were then 
sure to gain a place at university. This again was seen by other students as an unfair 
advantage."
The apolitical stance of the majority of students was a thorn in the side of the 
German authorities; especially the SED demanded more political engagement. The 
foundation of the Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ) on 7 March 1946 and moreover the 
creation of the SED affiliated Arbeitsgemeinschaft demokratischer Studenten (working 
group of democratic students) in Leipzig University in August 1946 were set to change the 
political indifference. Yet, it appeared that the majority of members of the FDJ and SED 
student groups only held nominal membership. The affiliation with the FDJ and the party 
was seen as a fast track course towards a place in the university. Nikitin observed that sixty 
percent of students from 1946 onwards stated that they were members of these 
organisations in their university application. However, of those only thirty percent actually 
registered with their organisation at the university and only half again actually attended 
meetings and events.100 Despite its initial small following, this active minority was able, 
through its affiliation, to voice its views very publicly and create problems for the 
university. The first major upheaval in Leipzig was created over the issue of the re­
instatement of professors who had been nominal members of the NSDAP, to ease the 
staffing shortage and facilitate the return to normality in lecturing.
98 The attendees of these institutes worked hard to obtain their qualifications which were comparable to final 
exams in the secondary schools. See comment by Ewald Spath about his time in the Vorstudienanstalt 
Leipzig in Heinemann and Haritonow, Hochschuloffiziere und Wiederaufbau, p. 215.
99 Krause, Alma Mater Lipsiensis.
100 Interview with P.I. Nikitin in Haritonow, Sowjetische Hochschulpolitik.
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In January 1946, the Allied Control Council issued Directive Number 24 that 
further specified the circle of persons who would be excluded from public office and 
responsible positions.101 Nominal members of the National Socialist party were thus 
allowed to work in universities. This would have alleviated the staffing problems of 
Leipzig University. To m eet initial needs the university had to recall retired professors, 
many of them in their seventies and eighties. Thus the number of professors went up from 
49 to 64 with additional lecturing delivered by 137 tutors and scientific assistants. To 
compare the figures: in 1939, the university had 255 professors and 66 tutors; the teaching 
therefore was firmly based on senior lecturing staff. 102 Some subjects could not be taught 
because of lack of facilities (the entire section for veterinary medicine was flattened as 
were many laboratories and hospitals for the teaching of medicine and natural sciences), 
others because there just was no one to teach them. A call to the Landesverwaltung Saxony 
to allow nominal party members back into teaching was met with a negative reply.103 
Further constraints appeared when the Landesverwaltung halved the university’s budget in 
February 1946. The resulting cuts in staffing were substantial: the humanities lost nineteen 
posts, and the sciences lost twelve. In total fifty professorships were cut in the budget. This 
did not always matter very much in practice, however. Even after the cuts, more than half 
of the remaining professorships were still vacant.104 Yet, this budget had reduced Leipzig 
to the smallest university in the whole Soviet Zone.105 Moreover, the signal this sent out 
damaged the university’s prestige. In 1946, many universities in the Western Zones had 
been re-established and commenced teaching. The Western occupation powers also proved 
to be more lenient in their denazification efforts in the higher education sector, thus the
101 Directive No. 24, see: http://www.verfassungen.de/de/de45-49/ (accessed 20 November 2008).
102 By 1946, the malaise of only 49 remaining professors (in 1945) had been eased, yet the ratio of senior 
lecturing staff to tutors and assistants'" had been reversed and was still 120 lecturers short of pre-war levels. 
This inverted state remained reality in Leipzig into the 1950s. UAL, Bestand Rektorat, R 236, Band 1, Blatt 
1 1 .
103 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 17648, Blatt 138, 21 March 1946.
104 UAL, Bestand Rektorat, R 216, Blatt 12.
105 Ibid., Blatt 20.
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problems that accompanied understaffing were less severe and the universities better 
positioned. These universities were now courting Leipzig’s remaining eminent academics. 
The university feared that the cuts would sway their decision.106
When the re-employment of nominal party members was discussed again in the 
second half of 1946, the Arbeitsgruppe demokratischer Studenten flexed its muscles.107 It 
published a severe criticism and attack on the deliberations in the university in the name of 
‘students for a democratic university’, calling all students to boycott any ‘fascist’ lecturers 
and organise a protest against these anti-democratic measures. The Rektor was to be
presented with this resolution and the demand to support the students’ ‘democratising’
108efforts. This implied that the Rektor was not yet doing his utmost to democratise the 
university and even more controversially, was propagating an anti-democratic course of 
action. As the ‘fascist’ professors would continue to teach their opinions, the university 
would be hindered in its progress towards democratisation. Under the Allied Control 
Council Order Number 208, anyone engaging in National Socialist, militaristic or anti­
democratic propaganda was to be dismissed from a higher education institution. It further 
stated that the same applied to anyone who either supported or tolerated said propaganda. 
A Rektor was surely facilitating these acts by appointing ‘fascist’ professors.109 Gadamer 
was indignant at being publicly denounced and offered his resignation (in unison with the 
deans of all departments). The Landesverwaltung did not accept his resignation nor was he 
charged with an offence under the Control Council Order. The student body subsequently
106 Ibid, Blatt 21. Indeed in Gadamer’s case there were several universities offering positions (amongst them 
Jena, Heidelberg, Freiburg, Frankfurt and Marburg), see Grondin, Hans-Georg Gadamer.
107 The consideration only concerned'six to seven professors. StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 2268, Blatt 19, 9 
August 1946.
108 ‘Resolution der Studenten fur eine demokratische Universitat’ in Leipziger Zeitung, 2 November 1946.
109 Allied Control Council order 208 in Dimitrij N. Filipovich, ‘Die Entnazifizierung der Universitaten in der 
Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands’, in Heinemann and Haritonow, Hochschuloffiziere und 
Wiederaufbau, pp. 35-52, here p. 44.
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offered its full support to the Rektor proving that the Arbeitsgruppe was in the minority. 
Yet, this experience sealed Gadamer’s intention to leave Leipzig.110
In December 1946, denazification commissions were established in the 
universities throughout the Soviet Zone of Occupation. This was the beginning of an 
attempt to unify all denazification measures including the re-employment of former 
NSDAP members.111 By 1947, the situation in the university had by no means eased. In 
January, Gadamer had to issue a public statement clarifying several misleading reports in 
the press. Despite the beginning of the semester being announced in the newspapers, 
several departments were still closed as rooms could not be heated due to lack of fuel and 
war damage. In others the lack of teaching staff was preventing lectures from beginning. In 
the school of medicine several subjects were not taught at all, amongst them such 
fundamental courses as physiology and anatomy. By mid-1947 the dean of the medical 
school simply applied for closure of his section claiming that it was utterly impossible to 
teach medicine when the basics were left out due to a lack of teaching staff.112 Therefore, 
despite the problems in the previous year, the university quietly started re-employing 
nominal members of the NSDAP in 1947. By May, Leipzig University had to produce 
another comprehensive list of its entire teaching staff. Of 293 teaching staff (only sixty- 
five of whom where full professors) thirty-three were classified as nominal NSDAP 
members.113 However, this did not herald the end of vacant lecturing posts. By 1947, the 
SED had gathered sufficient strength to widen its influence in the universities. Higher 
education became a ‘main party focus’. If the previous ideological ‘call to arms’ had been 
directed against former National Socialists (even if just nominal party members), it now
110 In his discussion with Grondin, (gadamer admitted that the ‘Resolution’ made him lose ‘his last illusions’ 
that a democratic renewal o f Leipzig’s university was possible. Grondin, Hans-Georg Gadamer, p. 284.
111 A full alignment of denazification measures was only achieved in August 1947 with the SMAD order 
number 201. See Welsh, Revolutionarer Wandel.
112 Volker Caysa and Helmut Seidel, Universitat im Aufbruch, Leipzig 1945-56 (Leipzig, 2001).
113 UAL, Bestand Rektorat, R 236, Band 1, Blatt 12, 23 May 1946.
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extended to everyone deemed reactionary and conservative.114 What Holtzhauer had 
already expressed in September 1945, now became a doctrine in the Soviet Zone. 
Professors and lecturers who had preserved their burgerlich outlook throughout the Third 
Reich and favoured the traditional right to self-administration at the university were clearly 
contravening the SED’s ambition to shape a new societal order. As ‘educational matters 
were matters of power’, the universities had to be brought in line with socialist ideas.115 In 
Leipzig this led to an ‘exodus’ of burgerlich academics, many felt that their efforts to work 
on a rebuilding of the university as a free institution dedicated to teaching and research 
were futile. In the Third Reich they were forced to retreat into ‘academic circles’ to voice 
themselves openly, now they simply left for the Western Zones to avoid similar 
constraints. Gadamer accepted a call to Frankfurt while still in the office of Rektor, the 
staunch antifascist Theodor Litt went to Bonn as he faced the beginnings of a 
marginalisation akin to that he had experienced under the National Socialist regime. Even 
professors who were members of the SED, proclaiming their will for ‘modem 
reconstruction’ through this party membership, were not excluded from the number who 
left Leipzig. The physicist Professor Paulsen also followed a call that took him away from 
Leipzig, yet as a SED member he did not leave the Soviet Zone. Paulsen relocated to Jena 
(in Thuringia) where he could continue his studies without unwanted political interference. 
However, he felt obliged to bid farewell to his party comrade Erich Ott. The city director 
upbraided Paulsen fiercely: ‘In my opinion, the German of today does not have the right to 
act just according to his wishes. I acknowledge the adversities you faced in Leipzig, but I 
doubt that you therefore can deduce the right to leave the city and seek an easier and more 
pleasant working environment.’ Apart from the startling cynicism, Ott showed that the city
administration had no intention to address the grievances of the academics of Leipzig
v
114 Mechthild Gunther and Bernd Rabehl, ‘Wissenschaft und Universitat als Ideologic’ in Peter Erler and 
Klaus Schroder, Geschichte und Transformation des SED Staates: Beitrage und Analysen (Berlin, 1994), pp. 
180-210, here p. 193.
115 Hoyer, ‘Der Weg zur Wiedereroffnung’, p. 251.
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University but instead attempted to shame them into staying on. Paulsen replied that his 
new post ‘on the contrary has more challenges than my professorship in Leipzig. Yet I will 
take it as I am excluded from all scientific research outside my department in Leipzig. 
Even party comrades are constantly placing stumbling blocks in my way.’116 All these men 
had been internationally renowned specialists in their subject. Theodor Litt was a fierce 
antifascist, who had risked not only his position and occupation but his well-being resisting 
the Nazi regime, during which he was harangued and threatened and eventually barred 
from teaching.117 These departures only intensified, especially after the SED fight against 
‘burgerlich objectivism’ had gathered pace in the late 1940s. The idea that science was to 
be independent and apolitical, a principle that many academics had fought to preserve 
throughout the twelve years of National Socialist reign, was increasingly deemed 
unsuitable for a ‘modem’ university in the Soviet Zone and later the GDR. ‘Science must 
not be apolitical’ became the new directive and anyone who disagreed, soon felt it better to 
leave.118 The universities were seen as a ‘focal point’ for a re-structuring of society. 
Therefore, to ensure the ‘correct’ political outlook in the universities was to ensure the 
same in the wider society, true to Lenin’s notion that ‘only if we change the area of 
education completely,[...] will we be able to achieve the creation of a society that does not 
resemble the old one in any shape. ’119
Scholars of this area of Soviet Zone/GDR history assert that the domination of the 
universities was crucial in the process of gathering support for the SED in the Soviet Zone 
as a whole. Feige describes the equation of the term ‘objectivism’ with ‘reactionism’ and
116 Paulsen’s case is interesting as he did join the SED and still faced interference and challenges because of 
his ‘reactionary beliefs’. StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 4565, Blatt 75-80, May 1947.
117 Theodor Litt, an eminent pedagogue, had been the Rektor of Leipzig University until 1933 when he was 
ousted from his office by the National Socialists. He continued teaching only to be banned from public 
lecturing in 1936. His antifascist cr^ditials therefore are clear. Schwiedrzik, Lieber will ich Steine klopfen.
118 Such as in Litt’s case, who from his anticommunist standpoint could not condone the communist tainting 
of education. See Ibid.; The directive was issued by Helmuth Holtzhauer, who since 1948 had been the 
Minister for Volksbildung in Saxony. SStA Leipzig, BPA Leipzig, I 3/3, Blatt 82.
119 Caysa and Seidel Universitat im Aufbruch, p. 465; Lenin cited in Heinemann and Haritonow, 
Hochschuloffiziere und Wiederaufbau, p. 2.
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thus explained the ostracism of the word and concept.120 Caysa and Seidel identify the
campaign against the burgerlich objectivism as akin to that previously fought against
National Socialist ideas. By placing objectivism in the same category as National
Socialism, it became easier to reject, and harder to defend. Both conclude their analysis
with the view that the ensuing politicisation of the university under the SED was analogous 
* * 1 2 1to that in the Third Reich. Whereas this argument is persuasive, a full equation of the 
Soviet Zone and the Third Reich in this point is no t quite correct as the aims of the 
politicisation were different. National Socialism was content with academic passivity 
where support was not forthcoming, while the SED demanded active support.122 Overall, 
the campaign against burgerlich objectivism was directed at a ‘radical exchange of elites’ 
to facilitate the thorough establishment of SED m le in the Soviet Zone and later the 
GDR.123
The immediate result of this ‘campaign’ in Leipzig was the departure of even 
more academics, amongst them were again scientists of international standing such as 
Bonhoeffer and de Boor, who followed their colleagues and left the city (mostly for the 
Western Zones and later for West Germany).124 Their exodus left Leipzig University bereft 
of some of its greatest assets, yet it also paved the way for the complete takeover of their 
old university by ‘progressive’ (i.e. socialist) cadres. Likewise, Leipzig was prohibited 
from appointing professors from other universities in the Soviet Zone, due to the extremely 
strict political selection in Saxony. These cases included the social economic scholar 
Professor Hellmann and the mathematician Professor Bruckmann, although both were
120 Feige, ‘Die SED und der biirgerliche Objektivismus’ in Deutschland Archiv, 10/1995, pp. 1074-83.
121 ‘Das Primat der Politik bis in die L^ ehr-und Forschungsinhalte hinein pragte sowohl den 
Nationalsozialismus als auch die SBZ/DDR.’ Caysa and Seidel, Universitat im Aufbruch, p. 457.
122 Wentker, ‘Justiz in der SBZ/DDR’, p. 194.
123 See Ralph lessen, Akademische Eliten und kommunistische D iktatur  (Gottingen, 1999), p. 277.
124 Hans-Otto de Boor was one o f the last of Hoyer’s ‘old elite jurists’ in Leipzig, with him the last 
Ordinarius of Leipzig’s law faculty left. Hoyer, ‘Der Leipziger Oberburgermeister’.
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lecturing without problems in their respective universities in Halle and Rostock.125 This 
incoherence in political evaluations of candidates caused great dismay in Leipzig.126
A similar aggravation occurred in the student body. It had already become clear 
through the actions of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft demokratischer Studenten that socialist 
ideas were supposed to dominate the discourse amongst the students. So far, however, the 
burgerlich orientated students remained in the majority. In December 1946, the SMAD 
ordered the establishment of Gesellschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultdten (GeWiFa).127 The 
task of these was to educate a new generation of civil servants for the Soviet Zone. 
Therefore the new departments were not subject to control by the universities but directly 
under the German Administration for Volksbildung. The GeWiFa only gave places to 
students who could prove one year of ‘democratic voluntary work’ in a political, social or 
civil organisation.128 In return all students received a scholarship that lay well above that 
which was granted to other students. Some students were becoming more equal than 
others. The GeWiFa was teaching according to Marxist principles (subjects included 
dialectic and historical materialism) to create the cadres of a future socialist administration. 
Leipzig was graced with the presence of the philosophical consultant of the secretariat of 
the central committee of the SED, Harich, as one of the professors in the newly established 
faculty.129
Despite this new influx of students who by and large would have favoured the 
SED student organisations, the first free elections for the student council led to a 
comfortable majority for the candidates of the burgerlich parties.130 Their leader and then
125 UAL, Bestand Rektorat, R216, Band I, Blatt 67 and 79, February 1948.
126 Ibid., Blatt 103. The appointment policy was soon taken over completely by political authorities, notably 
the Ministry for Volksbildung. Caysa and Seidel, Universitat im Aufbruch, p. 450.
127 The translation ‘social science faculty’, albeit literally correct, loses the political connotation the name of 
these institutes had. ‘Normal’ social science translates into German as Sozialwissenschaft.
128 This ‘democratic engagement’ normally included voluntary work in reconstruction, social care or party 
political work (and there preferably in the ‘progressive’ parties, i.e. the SED and its predecessors).
29 Nikitin, Zwischen Dogma und gesundem Menschenverstand, p. 80.
130 The election was called for February 1947. Student councils did not exist, at least not on an official basis, 
before that date. The SMAD had no concept of student councils, which in Germany had a long standing
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elected head of the student council of Leipzig University was Wolfgang Natonek. A 
student of philosophy, Natonek stood for the Liberal Democrats (LDPD) and won the 
absolute majority in coalition with student representatives from the Christian Democratic 
party (CDU). He had been stateless ever since his Jewish father’s books were burnt by the 
National Socialists. His antifascist credentials were thus beyond reproach. Natonek 
believed in the idea of democratic renewal and was keen, as a native Leipziger, to support 
the efforts of Leipzig University to return to its high level of academic achievement. He 
also welcomed the efforts of the rectorate of the university to build the body of teaching 
staff on the basis of expertise not political affiliations. Moreover, he criticised the 
incremental discrimination of students from a burgerlich background, which laid more 
importance on the provenance than ability of students. He famously warned during a 
student meeting against a return of student selection criteria based on the family tree of the 
applicant: ‘There has been a time when he who had a non-Aryan grandmother was 
prevented from studying. We do not want a time when those who have no proletarian 
grandmother are prevented from studying.’ The parallels of Aryan and proletarian, as well 
as the parallels in the selection policy itself, were noted by the audience.131 His attempts to 
create a student parliament and thus a truly democratic representation of the students 
clashed with the ideas of the SED student body that was backed by the socialist 
authorities.132 Natonek earned nationwide respect amongst students due to a speech given 
at a ceremony marking the 100th anniversary of the German revolution of 1848, which was
tradition. Therefore, they could only decide on the matter after thorough investigation. The result of this 
investigation was a directive given to the German Central Administration for Volksbildung to facilitate 
elections for these councils. See Nikitin, Zwischen Dogma und gesundem Menschenverstand, pp. 85-6.
131 ‘Es gab mal eine Zeit, in der der verhindert war zu studieren, der eine nicht arische GroBmutter hatte. Wir 
wollen nicht eine Zeit, in der es dem verhindert wird, zu studieren, der nicht iiber eine proletarische 
GroBmutter verfiigt.’ Wolfgang Natonek cited in letter from the FDGB Kreisvorstand to University Rektor 
Dr Jacobi, 8 December 1947. In the (german the likeness of Aryan and proletarian is even more pronounced, 
the similarity was well received by the attendees of the student meeting where Natonek made the statement: 
‘Nicht arische GroBmutter and Prolet-arische GroBmutter.’ The FDGB representative was outraged by the 
comparison. See: Gerald Wiemers, Studentischer Widerstand an der Universitat Leipzig 1945-49 (Leipzig, 
1998), p. 15 (for copy of letter see pp. 101-2).
132 Wolfgang Natonek in Heinemann and Haritonow, Hochschuloffiziere und Wiederaufbau, pp. 227-29.
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attended by students from all four zones of occupation. It became clear that Natonek was a 
force to be reckoned with. His second election result was even better than his first. When 
his third term approached in 1948, he received warnings and calls for him to step down or 
at least refrain from standing for election again. He did not bow to the pressure and was 
subsequently arrested in November 1948 as an ‘American spy’. Over 20 other non-SED 
students were detained as well.133 This was not yet the end of the campaign against the 
burgerlich students. Natonek’s party group with over 600 members was dissolved and the 
students lost their scholarships. Furthermore, when the third election for the student 
council took place, the CDU and LDPD students were not allowed to vote (should they 
attempt to defy this order any of their candidates voted in would lose his or her mandate). 
Thus the SED was able to takeover leadership in the student council ending any official 
influence burgerlich students held in the university.134 Nevertheless, the student protest in 
the university continued. Having been banned from the student council, clandestine 
meetings and leafleting campaigns still allowed for the burgerlich students to voice their 
opinion about the political situation concerning their university and life. However, many of 
these students ended up in East German prisons, while others were abducted to the Soviet 
Union where they vanished in the gulags or were simply murdered.135 Schweitzer observed 
the increasing discrimination of students from a burgerlich family background from the 
Western Zones. His later conclusion was damning: ‘With the barring the children of a 
whole section of society from any form of higher education the future of countless families
133 Natonek was sentenced to 25 years of forced labour in 1949 and transferred to Bautzen, the most 
notorious prison of the GDR. There he was released prematurely in 1956 and relocated to the German 
Federal Republic. See: Waldemar Kronig and Klaus-Dieter Muller, Anpassung, Widerstand, Verfolgung: 
Hochschule und Studenten in der SBZ und DDR 1945-61 (Cologne, 1994).
134Hans-Uwe Feige, ‘Die Leipziger Sjtudentenopposition 1945-48’ in Deutschland Archiv, 9/1993, pp. 1057- 
68
135 Around 100 students o f Leipzig University were arrested in the period 1945-55. For a detailed description 
of the student resistance, especially after Natonek, see Wiemers, Die Leipziger Studentenopposition and Jens 
Blecher and Gerald Wiemers, Studentischer Widerstand an den mitteldeutschen Universitaten 1945 bis 1955 
(Leipzig, 2005).
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is destroyed while a new privileged class is created.’136 The exchange of elites was in full 
swing.
The increasing political problems in the university, such as the Natonek episode, 
but also the previous upheaval caused by Gadamer’s attempt to slowly re-employ nominal 
NSDAP members (who were allowed to work in universities according to both SMAD and 
Allied Control Council orders), called the city administration into action. It proposed the 
establishment of the position of Kurator for the university as a bridge between the 
university and the LandesverwaltungP1 Gadamer recognized the creation of the post as 
political measure by the Landesverwaltung to gain control within the university via the city 
and its proposed ‘representative’. Yet, the Rektor hoped in turn to influence the Kurator 
and thus obtain an advocate for his institution. Gadamer was not to experience the results 
as Rektor himself. He followed a call to a university in Frankfurt am Main when politics 
took over the administration of the university and left his successor to try his luck with the 
Kurator,138
Gadamer’s successor was Erwin Jacobi, a jurist who began his office with the best 
intentions. Jacobi had to face the results of the increasing student conflict and was unable 
to do anything to stop the arrest of Natonek or indeed the forced takeover of the student 
council by the SED student group. Feige declares that Gadamer's successors had hardly 
any room for independent manoeuvre in the university’s concerns.139 Martin Otto equally
136 Schweitzer drew this conclusion in a speech he gave in Tubingen in honour of the 550 year anniversary of 
the foundation of Leipzig university in 1959. Bernhard Schweitzer, Die Universitdt Leipzig 1409 -1959 : 
Festvortrag anlasslich der feierlichen Immatrikulation am 4. Dezember 1959 (Tubingen, 1960), p. 23 ‘Dort 
[wird] in den Kindern eines ganzen Bevolkerungsteiles, indem sie von jeder hoheren Bildung ferngehalten 
werden, auch noch die Zukunft zahlloser Familien gewaltsam versperrt und dafiir eine neue privilegierte 
Schicht herangeziichtet.’.
137 The Kurator (literally curator) was a position created by the city as mediator between the university and 
the political authorities. However, it soon transpired that the Kurator had become a political observer in the 
university. Hans-Uwe Feige, ‘Die Gesellschaftswissentschaftliche Fakultat an der Universitat Leipzig 1947- 
51’ in Deutschland Archiv, 5/1993, pp. 572-84.
138 Grondin, Hans-Georg Gadamer) pp. 286-90. After Gadamer’s departure, the Deutsche Zentralverwaltung 
fur Volksbildung issued the statement that ‘politisch neutrale Hochschuldirektoren sind nach den Erfahrungen 
mit Gadamer u.a. fortan unerwiinscht’. See Marianne and Egon Erwin Muller, “...stiirmt die Festung 
Wissenschaft" Sowjetisierung der mitteldeutschen Universitaten seit 1945 (Berlin, 1953), p. 160.
139 Hans-Uwe Feige, ‘Die Gesellschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultat’, p. 580.
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states that Jacobi was merely used as ‘internationally renowned, biirgerlich progressive 
figure-head’ for an otherwise anti-biirgerlich procedure to create a ‘socialist university’.140 
Thus the installation of the Kurator Erich Eichler at the university finally ended any 
possibility to regain self-administration of the institution. The inauguration of the Kurator 
on 15 October 1948 was accompanied with a speech by the Rektor. Jacobi had already 
decided to leave the chancellorship and thus might have felt freer to speak out -  he only 
had two more weeks left in office. He called Leipzig University a ‘ Volksuniversitat ’ 
(people’s university), thereby highlighting its fallen level of academic standard in teachers 
and students. Saxony’s new Minister for Volksbildung, Leipzig’s old city councillor 
Helmut Holtzhauer, was present at the ceremony. He clearly noticed the thinly veiled 
accusation and disapproval of Jacobi. When Holtzhauer subsequently spoke at the 
changeover of Rektors on 31 October 1948, he repeated Jacobi’s claim and stated that 
Leipzig was ‘of course’ a Volksuniversitat and this was what a university should be. 
Freedom of science only existed in the proper societal context and was not an end in itself. 
‘We can witness a fight between existing beliefs and new insights. The university is the 
arena of these ideological struggles. It should neither be the university of enlightened 
despotism, nor ‘free’ in the sense of the Free University in West Berlin, but only a 
Volksuniversitat.’141 With this Holtzhauer framed in words what Schweitzer, Gadamer and 
Jacobi had fought against and what still had come to pass: the demise of Leipzig 
University as an institution of international standing and excellence. By the end of the 
1940s, Leipzig University had lost many of its most renowned scientists (most of them left 
the Soviet Zone completely), it was still fighting to rebuild, and it functioned as a mere
140 Martin Otto, ‘Erwin Jacobi’ in Traugott Bautz (ed.), Biographisch-Bilbiographisches Kirchenlexikon, 
Volume 19 (Nordhausen, 2001), columns 763-767. Erwin Jacobi was forced out of both his positions at the 
Reichsgericht and the university due to the racial policies of the National Socialists, thus his election should 
have been compensation not just mere ‘window-dressing’.
141 ‘Wir beobachten den Kampf zwischen bestehender Anschauung und neuer Erkenntnis. Die Universitat ist 
der Schauplatz dieser ideologischen Kampfe. Sie will weder eine Universitat des aufgeklarten Despotismus 
noch eine “freie Universitat" vom Schlage Berlin Wests sein, sondem lediglich eine Volksuniversitat.’ SStA 
Leipzig, No. 21638, NV6/34/34-6, Blatt 3, 31 October 1948 .
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provisional solution still lacking proper facilities. The teaching staff had altered 
remarkably. Whereas fifty-eight percent had been full professors in 1945 (before the 
denazification), by 1950 only a quarter had this academic accolade. Sixty percent of the 
entire teaching body of the university were mere Lehrbeauftragte (tutors -  mostly students 
in their final semesters). Of the remaining group of Dozenten (lecturers), a third did not 
hold a doctorate (even more were without the Habilitation, the German postdoctoral 
lecturer qualification).142 Leipzig’s students had been forced into submission, some of the 
brightest heads had been arrested. Leipzig now was truly a Volksuniversitat, lacking the 
means or the will to return to its status as one of Germany’s and Europe’s leading 
universities.
Leipzig University had been a leading higher education institution in Germany 
and beyond. It had international renown for its scientific research and the quality of its 
teaching. The university was able to maintain a certain level of freedom during National 
Socialism as it prevented a takeover by mere party functionaries. Thus its teaching body 
should have been sufficient to ensure a rapid rebuilding of the university. However, both 
the forced ‘evacuations’ by the Americans and Soviets and the harsh denazification 
measures in Saxony deprived the university of most of its remaining potential. Indeed, 
denazification became a first marker of the socialist takeover. The constant pressure on its 
base of traditionally biirgerlich lecturers and students led to the exodus of even more high 
calibre teaching staff from the university. The student body of Leipzig also changed 
rapidly with politically motivated or class-based discrimination. The arrest of Leipzig’s 
democratically elected student leader sealed the institution’s fate. This Volksuniversitat
Leipzig was subsequently turned into a political cadre training ground, referred to
v
colloquially as the ‘Red Monastery’.
142 To allow ‘nicht Vollakademiker’ to run the majority of courses was regarded as ‘heresy’ by 
contemporaries. See Muller, l...stiirmt die Festung Wissenschaft’, p. 298.
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These measures went even beyond what had been envisaged by the staff of the 
Soviet Volksbildung department in Berlin. Major Nikitin remarked in his memoirs that by 
1950 the German socialists ‘were destroying everything we had worked for in the last five
v
143 Nikitin, Zwischen Dogma und gesundem Menschenverstand, p. 235.
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Conclusion
This thesis has charted the history of one Germany’s major cities through a period 
of destruction, chaos and profound political and social change. It differs from comparable 
studies in English by examining a city other than the familiar metropolitan centres, Berlin 
and Munich.1 Leipzig was chosen precisely because it was not, and never had been a 
capital city or Residenzstadt. By focusing on what was perhaps the archetypal biirgerlich 
stronghold this thesis sought to examine the decline of biirgerlich power (and the 
occasional persistence of biirgerlich attitudes against all the political odds). The study 
scrutinised patterns of biirgerlich behaviour through the prism of Leipzig’s main cultural 
institutions, the sources of the city’s pride, as well as the arena of power display and self- 
image. The chosen time frame allowed this study to analyse biirgerlich responses to a 
range of political pressures, the two German dictatorships as well as both Western and 
Soviet occupation.
In the process several points emerged. First, and perhaps most strikingly, the role 
of the Allied occupiers was not as clear-cut as traditionally perceived. The Soviet Zone, in 
which Leipzig found itself after July 1945, turns out, on closer examination, to have been 
no more monolithic than the Third Reich had been; indeed, regional differences were a 
crucial factor especially with regards to denazification, a process which affected German 
public life at the time more profoundly than any other Allied policy. Leipzig’s 
GewandhausJcapellmeister Abendroth was thus ousted in Saxony, yet welcomed with open 
arms in neighbouring Thuringia; professors Hellmann and Bruckmann were teaching, 
respectively, at the universities of Halle and Rostock but were not be allowed to take up
positions in Leipzig. That sort of defiant regional disregard of supposedly unalterable
v
1 Inter al: Peter Jelavich, Berlin Alexanderplatz (Berkeley, 2006); Peter Fritzsche, Reading Berlin 1900 
(Cambridge, 1996); David Clay Large, Where Ghosts Walked: Munich's Road to the Third Reich (New York, 
1997) and Berlin (New York, 2000), Schivelbusch, In a Cold Crater.
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nationwide policy would of course have been all too familiar to anyone who had 
experienced Nazi rule.
Furthermore, this thesis established very clearly that the traditional dichotomy of 
‘good’ Western Allies as opposed to the ‘evil’ Soviets is unsustainable. Evidence presented 
here shows that the Americans were quite capable of occasional criminal acts (and plenty 
of criminal stupidity), while the Soviets were capable, on occasion, of unexpected 
generosity. There is the further complication that in the case of both occupying powers, the 
city commanders’ behaviour was quite different from the nefarious actions of the 
respective US and Soviet secret services. The Leipzig population, of course, failed to make 
that distinction: it just perceived an ‘occupation power’ seemingly unburdened by moral 
scruples. That the Soviets tended to fare worse in any direct comparison is undisputable 
and in a sense hardly surprising. The Soviet Union, after all, was based on arbitrary rule 
and had a long and inglorious record of mass murder, while the United States at least 
publicly proclaimed its adherence to the rule of law. Yet the American ‘harvest’ of 
Leipzig’s resources -  both the nature of the exercise and the manner in which it was 
carried out -  was clearly extra-legal. It contravened the statutes of war as well as existing 
agreements between the Allies, thus poisoning East-West relations even before the start of 
the Potsdam negotiations. This study has conclusively disproved the ‘apologist’ view in the 
Anglo-American historiography that the appropriation of these resources was necessary to 
boost Western defences in view of the looming Cold War. Only one Leipzig academic ever 
began to work in America and most were left to their own devices once removed from 
Leipzig. The so-called evacuation was in effect a slash-and-bum operation, solely designed 
to devastate the city’s intellectual and economic infrastructure prior to the handover. The 
fact that the Soviets were subsequently guilty of particular brutality does not excuse the 
earlier American conduct. Two wrongs do not make a right. Most of the existing German 
historiography on the occupation has been conspicuously silent on the subject, perhaps out
of old Cold War loyalties or the fear of being accused of pursuing either a pro-GDR or, 
alternatively, a German nationalist agenda.
The existing literature has been found misleading also in its portrayal of the 
dynamics of Allied occupation. The Anglo-American historiography in particular has 
tended to give prominence to the role of the occupiers. An important point to emerge from 
this study is the need to re-think the relations of occupiers and occupied. The German 
administrators, especially those under Soviet rule, were shown to have played a pivotal 
rule in shaping the post-war face of Leipzig. The German socialists not only sought to 
influence the Soviet decision making process, but were active participants in this process 
itself, sometimes actually thwarting the efforts of the occupying power. While it has long 
been known that in the American Zone Bavarian conservatives successfully sabotaged 
much of the liberalising efforts by the US-occupiers, this study has shown that in the 
Soviet Zone the Saxon communists, too, were able to derail Soviet policy, in this case by 
being even more doctrinaire than the Soviets themselves. In the case of Leipzig’s 
university this meant that political qualification consistently mattered more than academic 
ability. That this went far further than anything the Soviets had intended is shown by the 
exasperation of Major Nikitin at the ‘destruction’ of the Soviets’ work once the German
'y
socialists took over completely five years after the war. Such evidence is difficult to 
square with the perception put forward even in recent Anglo-American historiography that 
the ‘Soviets and the German communists’ were ‘one’ ruling force in East Germany and 
should effectively be seen as Siamese twins.3 In the case of Leipzig at least, both groups 
had minds of their own, and aims that were not always congruent and at times opposing 
each other.
2 See chapter 5 ‘Leipzig -  city of learning’, p. 221.
3 See for example: Corey Ross, Constructing Socialism at the Grass-Roots (London, 2000). Ross treats the 
German communists as mere appendage to the occupying power, which is shown in his constant referral to 
the ‘Soviets and the German communists’ as fixed term, among others: Ibid., p. 5 and p. 15.
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By straddling the supposed Stunde Null in German history, this study has also 
considered the links between the two German dictatorships. The current historiography of 
the East German regime is still very much divided on the question of whether the GDR 
(and its precursor in the Soviet Zone) could be or indeed should be classified as a ‘second 
German dictatorship’ on a par with the Third Reich. Mary Fulbrook, for one, is scathingly 
dismissive of such suggestions. She states that ‘this particular case for comparison [...] has 
had more [...] to do with contemporary political considerations than with the intention of 
seeking analytical purchase on historical interpretations of dictatorial rule’. Certainly, the 
term ‘totalitarianism’ was misused during the Cold War. Fulbrook is also right in saying 
that there probably are ‘a far greater number of differences than similarities’ between the 
Third Reich and the socialist regime in East Germany, most notably that ‘there was no 
equivalent of Auschwitz in the GDR’.4 The fore-most authority on the Third Reich now 
writing in English, Sir Ian Kershaw, shares Fulbrook’s view that any comparison could 
only be superficial and essentially simplistic. Yet, one might note, that Kershaw has largely 
focused in his own work on Hitler and the ‘Hitler myth’, on one of the most distinctive 
features of the Nazi regime in other words.5 Other recent work, particularly that of 
Heydemann and Oberreuther, however, suggests that there might be fruitful aspects of 
comparison between both dictatorships in structures, institutions and behaviour.6 The 
motivations of the Nazis and the socialists might not have been congruent, yet the 
approaches sometimes seemed not too dissimilar. This can be seen very clearly in the case 
of Leipzig. The process by which both the NSDAP and SED took over the city 
administration is one obvious example. Superficially, the detail might seem different. 
Whereas Goerdeler refused to join the NSDAP and subsequently had a Nazi deputy
4 Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1949-1989 (Oxford, 1995), pp. 286-7.
5 See Ian Kershaw, ‘“Working towards the Fiihrer”: reflections on the nature of the Hitler dictatorship’ in Ian 
Kershaw and Moshe Lewin, Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 88- 
106, especially comment on the comparisons between Hitler and Honecker: footnote 2, p. 89. Also: Ian 
Kershaw, The ‘Hitler M yth’: Image and Reality in the Third Reich (Oxford, 1987).
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(Haake) forced upon him, Zeigner willingly embraced the SED and chose staunch 
communists, Hartig and especially Holtzhauer, as his deputies. Yet, the gradual seizure of 
power by the respective deputies followed largely along the same lines and with a similar 
disregard of laws, regulations and ordinary human decency. Moreover, both Lord Mayors, 
despite being on opposite ends of the political spectrum and working, as Fulbrook would 
have it, under very different regimes, were actually berated for the same supposed crime: 
their biirgerlich origin and outlook. Whether we like it or not, the anti-biirgerlich animus 
of the SED was wearingly familiar to all who had lived through the Third Reich. There 
was admittedly one difference: whereas National Socialism initially tried to co-opt sections 
of the Biirgertum, and thus ‘owed’ them at least some concessions, socialism did not even 
need to pay lip service to the ideals of the ‘old elites’. During the Third Reich, the 
biirgerlich elements of Leipzig’s society resistant to total Gleichschaltung were pushed to 
the sidelines, under Soviet occupation, and with German socialists taking the lead in this, 
they were eradicated from positions of influence altogether -  in Leipzig’s university, in its 
musical establishments, in the book trade and in the judiciary. The politicisation of the 
cultural realm, which had already proven highly damaging during the Nazi regime thus 
essentially continued after the war. The Nazis forced out Walter and Brecber (for ‘racial’ 
reasons), the socialists ousted Abendroth (because of his NSDAP affiliations) and Schuler 
(in an undisguised display of anti-biirgerlich bias). If there was a difference, it was one of 
the wider scale of things: whereas the NSDAP was content with forcing some of its 
members onto the board of directors of the Gewandhaus, the SED insisted on completely 
destroying the independence of the institution. Similarly, the Nazis were content to remove 
the Mendelssohn monument in front of the Gewandhaus, the socialists proceeded to
demolish the Gewandhaus building itself (although the core structure was sound and could
v
6 Heydemann and Oberreuther, Diktaturen in Deutschland.
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have been rebuilt). As the building was a reminder of the achievements of Leipzig’s 
Burger, it had to go. In both cases, the reasons for the demolition(s) were ideological, anti- 
Semitic in the case of the Nazis, anti-biirgerlich in the that of the socialists. (The SED’s 
obliteration of Leipzig history also led in 1968 to the dynamiting of the perfectly preserved 
university church of St Paul’s. This act of gratuitous barbarism again displayed an 
unmistakable parallel to the Nazis’ earlier efforts at ‘secularising’ German history.)
This study has also shown uncomfortable similarities between both regimes in the 
politicization of the judiciary. The Reichsgericht in Leipzig had been party to the 
perversion of the rule of law in the Third Reich, though not always willingly and rarely to 
the full satisfaction of the regime. Gauleiter Mutschmann therefore even tried to ‘rid his 
Gau\ and Leipzig, of academic jurists. Instead of re-establishing a credible supreme court, 
the new authorities in the Soviet zone translated into practice the earlier Nazi threats. Of 
the Reichsgericht members, more than a third were deported without trial and kept 
detained in conditions where all but a handful died. The biirgerlich concept that the law 
should not be subject to political expediency seemed as absurd to the socialists as it had 
done to Mutschmann or Hitler before them.
In the light of all this it seems difficult to concur with Fulbrook’s views on the 
supposed watershed of 1945 (even though her point about the singularity of the holocaust 
is clearly a valid one). This study has revealed a range of parallels, altogether too 
numerous to be dismissed as insignificant. Even in the rhetoric there were similarities 
between the Third Reich and the socialist regime in the Soviet Zone and later the GDR, 
which were not missed by the people living through both. Tellingly, Wolfgang Natonek, 
whose family had been persecuted by the Nazis, compared the earlier importance for 
people wishing to go to university of having an arische Grofimutter with the need to 
possess a proletarische Grofimutter under the new regime. To those able to observe events
7 Demolition was expressively discouraged. See Kaufmann, Von einem Abrifi wird abgeraten.
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subsequently with academic detachment these parallels might seem ‘superficial and 
simplistic’; for contemporaries denied the chance to study and arrested for speaking up, 
they were real enough. As one witness in Leipzig observed at the time, it appeared that the 
‘mind was just being raped in the opposite direction’ now.8
That ‘rape of the mind’ had previously also been regarded as the reason for the 
downfall of the Biicherstadt Leipzig. Here, too, this study has been able to correct the 
existing historiographical consensus by proving that the depletion of Leipzig’s book trade 
and the establishment of the Deutsche Bibliothek in Frankfurt were not the supposedly 
inevitable consequences of the emerging Cold War but were a trial run, in the cultural 
sphere, of the subsequent partition of Germany. Moreover, the shenanigans in the 
publishing world demonstrate, yet again, that the Germans played a greater role in actively 
shaping their country’s future, and did so in some cases much earlier than current 
historiography allows.
It only remains to record a final irony of history outside the time frame of this 
study. While both the Nazis and the (East German) socialists in the period investigated had 
sought to destroy the biirgerlich fabric of Leipzig, biirgerlich values and traditions became 
a decisive factor in ending six decades of dictatorship and arbitrary rule. It was Leipzig that 
played a central role in bringing down the GDR, and a Gewandhauskapellmeister, no less, 
who opened his concert hall and thus provided a grand forum for Montagsdemonstrationen 
and their call for civil rights: tBiirgerrechte, in German.9 The men and women who had 
earlier tried to defend Leipzig’s biirgerlich heritage against Nazi and socialist predations 
were finally vindicated.
8 StadtAL, StVuR (I), No. 4212, Blatt 175, 19 October 1945: ‘...den Geist in entgegengesetzter Richtung 
verge waltigen’.
9 For a good overview of the Friedensgebete in St Nicholas Church Leipzig from where the 
Montagsdemonstrationen originated see Christian Dietrich and Uwe Schwabe (eds.), Freunde und Feinde. 
Friedensgebete in Leipzig zwischen 1981 und dem 9. Oktober 1989 (Leipzig, 1994).
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